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ABSTRACT OF THESIS. 
The Corn Laws and the movement for their repeal were both indigen-
:oua products of Scotland, although even in the eighteenth centur,y, 
less intrinsically Scottish than the polemics of the debate woul~ sug-
:est. The evolution of aim, attitude, and vehicle of agitation in 
Scotland, and its contribution to the formation of the later Anti-
Corn-Law League has been substantially ignored. 
The peculiar identification of Manchester vith the Corn Law 
question and ~th the League largely succeeded the latter's formation, 
and even then the conception of a "Manchester League" must be qualified. 
Although leadership was clearly vested nationally in Manchester, regions 
suCh as Scotland made substantial contributions to the free trade move-
:ment in terms of local leadership, pecuni~ donations, and ideas -
there was a difference in emphasis between the well-defined aims of 
the League in Manchester and the more ~de-ranging aspirations of the 
Scots repealers. 
However, the strength of the League in Scotland has been exag-
:gerated, partly due to a misinterpretation of Scottish support for 
Whig concepts of "free traden. In particular, its support among 
agriculturists and the working-classes has been grossly over-estimated. 
Even among the urban middle-classes, its principal source of strength, 
substantial pockets of protectionist sympathisers existed, especially 
in Glasgow. Nevertheless the assumption that the League's campaign 
was conducted in a distinct political, economic, religious, and social 
environment in Scotland was correct, and was evidenced by the com-
:plexion of the interest groups which it attracted and the polemical 
debate which reflected separate (if similar) interests and social values, 
at least to some extent. 
As a pressure group in parliamentary politics, the League's 
activities on the Corn Law issue had been anticipated, albeit in 
milder forms, ~ free traders and protectionists in the late eight-
:eenth and early nineteenth centuries. The schismatic tactics of 
the radicals, frequently emphasising the corn question, in the 1830 1s 
constituted recent precedents, emulated by the League. In Scotland, 
the apathy of the free traders in the field of registration - to some 
degree attributable to the distinct provisions of the Scots Reform 
Act of 1832 - gave the League cause for considerable concern. To 
some extent, this eased the embarrassment of the Whigs, under pressure 
in Scotland from both sides on the free trade question, Who lost little 
ground on the issue, principally due to the conservative provisions of 
the Reform Act, and to the reluctance of the electors to forsake the 
Whigs and moderate reform for the radicals of the League and the excl-
:usive aim of total and immediate repeal of the Corn Laws. 
The free trade movement was a British movement in Scotland, not a 
Scottish movement in Britain, but the region and locali~ in Which it 
campaigned determined to some extent its characteristics. 
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1. 
1. INTRODUCTION - The Corn Laws and Eighteenth Cen~ Scotland. 
2. 
Although the historian of the Industrial Revolution in Scotland 
considered 1780 a convenient date for the start of What he termed the 
first "stage" of the process of industrialisation,(!) the explosion 
of population and the growth of commerce and industry which it co~ 
:prised, was a process of evolution ~ich had no definitive start. 
The expansion of shipping on the Clyde from a tonnage of 5,600 to 
(2) 
22,896 between 1735 and 1783 was largely a fait accompli by this date. 
Nevertheless, the acceleration in economic grovth conveniently termed 
the ttindustrial Revolution" may be attributed to the last twenty years 
of the eighteenth century, although its roots were embedded in the 
period prior to it. From 1755 the population of Scotland rose from 
Webster 1s estimate of 1,265,380 to a figure of 1,6o8,420 by the first 
official census of 1801, and most of this increase was concentrated in 
the last two decades of the century. Geographically too the popu-
:lation growth was concentrated. The figures for several Lowland 
counties dependent on agriculture, such as Haddington, Linlithgow, 
Peebles, or Roxburgh were static in this period, whereas those counties 
in which the rising coal industry or "King Cotton" had taken root ex-
:perienced a complete transformation. The population of Lanarkshire 
rose from 81,726 to 147,692, and the neighbouring county of Renfrew-
:shire increased from 26,645 to 78,501. Old and new communities alike 
mushroomed, especially Glasgow which nearly trebled its population to 
77,385 by 1801, and Paisley WhiCh more than quadrupled its population 
to 31,179.( 3) 
1) Henry Hamilton: The Industrial Revolution in Scotland. p. 1. 
2) ibid., p.4. 
3) G.S. Pryde: Scotland from 1603 to the Present Day. pp. 140-41. 
Hr the last quarter of the century, eighteenth century society 
was clearly in the melting-pot. The new trading and manufacturing 
interests in the urban communities were a challenge to accepted 
notions of economic and social order. The cities provided an environ-
:ment in w.hich the stratification of societ,y ~thout their boundaries 
was replaced by one based on economic success. Furthermore, new 
economic interests were provided ~th a scientific, incontrovertible 
religion of economic advance in 1776, when Adam Smith published his 
"Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations". Its 
acceptance was all but universal, and even agricultural protectionists 
did not venture to question the teaching of the great master, that 
commercial intercourse should be free, but merely asserted that he had 
(4) 
made corn an exception to his general principles. To the commercial 
and manufacturing classes of the growing industrial towns, especially 
on Clydeside, the new doctrine required immediate translation into 
practice as a general principle of commercial policy, although enthusiasm 
waned among some sections when its application to protected industries, 
notably linen, was suggested. Agricultural produce seemed a more 
eligible candidate for such experimentation, particularly in view of the 
popular equation in the towns of the price of corn with the cost of 
labour, and thus with the competitive abilit,y of British manufactures 
in foreign markets. 
Scrutiny of government policy in the late eighteenth century in-
:creased and produced demands for the repeal of the Corn Laws and free 
importation, although this implied the end of physical controls (with 
4) George Buchan Hepburn of Smeaton: Observations on the Bill for 
the sale of corn by veight. 1796. p.91. 
4 •. 
some exceptions) rather than the end of all protection. The urban 
classes were still prepared to concede ••moderate" protection, if only 
to obviate a charge of inconsistency in the case of other manufactures. 
Significantly, however, the Corn Laws were increasi~y attacked not 
only on the grounds of their economic motivation, but also as a w.ymbol 
of the political and social domination of the landed interest. It 
was easy for condemnation of the Corn Laws to stray into criticism of 
idle landholders w.hose lack of industry kept large tracts of the most 
fertile land in Britain ttin shrubberies and pleasure grounds" as 
obstacles to agricultural improvement, with of course, appropriate 
(5) 
quotations from Adam Smith in support of this thesis. The increas-
:ingly aggressive and self-confident attitude of the urban communities 
appeared, however, with them towards the end of the eighteenth century. 
Although a division of interests between town and country existed be-
:fore then, the social cleavage expressed in terms of aims and the 
language in which they were formulated was less obvious. 
The Corn Law controversy did not commence in Scotland with the 
Corn Act of 1815. Like its southern neighbour, Scotland had adopted 
legislation governing the importation and exportation of grain, prior 
to the Act of Union of 1707. As in England too, the northern legis-
: lature was dominated by the landed gentry, and agrarian interests were 
reflected in the enactments flowing from it. Successive acts in the 
(6) 
reigns of Charles II, James VII, and Anne brought Scotland's Restor-
:ation Corn Laws into a rough alignment with those of England, pro-
:hibiting in particular the importation of victual from Ireland "vhereby 
5) Anonymous: Observations on the Corn Laws, 1805. pp. 5-6. 
6) The Acts were respectively 1672.c.J.; 1686.c.l4.; and 170J.c.9~ 
the sale of corns growing within this kingdom has been stopped, and 
(7) 
much money had been unwarrantably carried out of the kingdom". The 
growing concern over the drain of specie especially forced greater 
concessions to mercantilist theor,y, and in 1703 the prohibition was 
made general, being made applicable to England (with some reserv-
(8) 
:ations) and other countries. ~ the same act, the embargo on 
Irish victual was extended to Irish cattle, allowance was made for the 
confiscation of illegal imports, and previous penalties on participants 
in such a trade were ratified. Encouragement to domestic agriculture 
had also inspired legislation in 1695 which overturned a system of 
export duties in favour of export bounties when grain prices fell 
(9) 
below fixed levels. 
The attempt to achieve a greater degree of self-sufficiene.y 
through the stimulus of increased prices represented a gain to home 
producers at the expense of domestic consumers. However, the interests 
of the latter, largely identifiable with the burghal interest, were not 
completely disregarded, and the effects of the new legislation were 
partially mitigated through the application of discretionar.y powers. 
The Act 1695. C.32 permitted the Lords of the Privy Council to prohibit 
exportation in times of dearth, when prices exceeded bount.y rates, 
7) .Anonymous: Essay on the Corn Laws •••• in opposition to the 
inflammatory memorial for the merChants, traders, and 
manufacturers of Glasgow. 1777. p.7. 
8) English Wheat, peas, and beans for seed could be imported on 
payment of a surcharge. 
9) The act 1695 c.)2. substituted a bounty of 8 marks per chalder 
When wheat fell below £12 Scots per boll; bear, barley, and 
malt below £8 Scots per boll; and peas, beans, and meal below 
£6 Scots per boll. 
6. 
Moreover, by the Act 170;.c.9., they were further empowered to sus-
:pend the prohibition against importation Vhen prices exceeded these 
(10) 
rates. Some attempt was therefore made to safeguard the interests 
of consumers in periods of scarcity, although the interests of the 
agriculturists and the fears of the mercantilists were paramount. 
Subsequent legislation in 1706-8 rapidly nullified the protection 
enjoyed by consumers. The Act 1706.C.7 (incorporated in the Treaty 
of Union) allowed export bounties on oats and oatmeal, equated the 
bear of Scotland with the barley of England, raised the export bounties 
to English levels, and ratified the prohibition of imports from Ireland 
or overseas "until more proper and effectual ways be provided by the 
Parliament of Great Britain for discouraging the importation of the 
said victual from beyond the sea". 1\ The coup-de-grace for the Scottish 
consumer was the abolition of the Scots Privy Council in 1708, Which 
(11) 
removed the machine~ and powers of mitigation in times of distress. 
He was rendered defenceless. 
However, the situation established by the legislation of 1706-8 
was not seriously challenged until the dearth of 1740-41. The social 
distress engendered then was acute. In October, 1740, riots in Edin-
:burgh and Leith forced the troops to open fire to protect granaries 
and retailers, and obliged the magistrates to subsequently agree to 
indemnify all losses by mobs to importers of grain through Leith. By 
1741, the dearth of provisions in Edinburgh was so great that "the 
10) Report of the Committee of Directors of Glasgow Chamber of Commerce. 
1787. p.4.; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland. Vol. XI. 
pp. 109-11. 
11) Deport of the Committee of Directors of Glasgow Chamber of Commerce 
1787. p.5.; Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland.Vol.XI.p.407. 
~lamours and importunities of these miserable objects made it very dis-
:agreeable to walk the streets". Substantial imports of English grain 
(12) 
through Leith took place in the early months of 1741, but the distress 
of the metropolis was not unique. Aberdeen Town Council facing a simi-
: lar situation agreed to purchase grain to relieve the dearth of food 
(13) 
within the burgh. By 13/11/1740, the Convention of Royal Burghs had 
intervened to complain that the prices of victual were so high that 
"the poorer sort of people, day labourers and others, have been, and are, 
in danger of starving for want" - a situation which they attributed to 
the restrictive legislation of the Scots Parliament {especially the Act 
of 1703) which prohibited the importation of foodstuffs except in dearth, 
and the sub~equent removal of the means of mitigating the evil by the 
British Parliament. 
The resurrection of discretionary powers "lodged by law in proper 
(14) 
hands" in Scotland was the Convention's answer. In place of the 
defunct Scots Privy Council, the Royal Burghs envisaged that these could 
be devolved on the Court of Session. Provost Patrick Lindsay, M.P. for 
Edinburgh, subsequently reported to the Convention that a meeting of 




"Scots Magazine", 1740. pp. 482-84; 577. ibid., 1741. pp.45-46, 190. 
Between 25/12/1740 and April, 1741, over 15,000 quarters of Oats, 
3,000 quarters of Wheat, and 11,000 quarters of Barley were im-
:ported through Leith from England. 
Minutes of Aberdeen Town Council, 6/4/1741. 
In April, 1741, Aberdeen Town Council agreed to purchase at 
least 4,000 bolls of meal from the count.y or nearest seaport 
for the local populace. 
Extracts from the Records of the Convention of Royal Burghs of 
Scotland, 1738-59. pp. 62-64. (hereinBfter referred to as 
Con. R.B.s.) 
B. 
had been disagreement over the circumstances during which importation 
could take place. Representing predominantly the landed interest, 
the Members had contended that ~th the exception of Wheat {a relative-
:ly unimportant crop north of the Tweed) the prices at w.hich importation 
could occur under the 1703 act were too low. The burghal interest in 
the Convention voiced the consumers' view that they were too high, but 
(15) 
agreed to adhere to the status quo as a more realistic aim. 
Exploiting the measure of agreement whiCh did exist, Lindsay on 
behalf of the Convention (and at their expense) moved a corn-bill in 
Parliament which vested the powers of suspension previously held by 
the Scots Privy Council, in the judges of the Courts of Session, 
(16) 
Justiciary, and Exchequer. Nevertheless, the act 14 Geo.II.C.?. 
was not a total victory for the burghal interest. Important conces-
:sions were made to the landed interest. Importation was permitted 
at price levels generally in excess of those of 1703, particularly for 
(17) 
the staple food, oatmeal. Moreover, it was governed by price levels 
of middling British corn, grain and oatmeal in the city and county of 
Edinburgh, which from its situation in the granary of Scotland was a 
"low-price area. Finally, the evidence on price levels was to be 
obtained from two persons in possession of landed estates of at least 
(18) 






Or any nine of them, "With five during vaci\tion. 
Importation was permitted When the price of Wheat rose to 5/- per 
Winchester bushel, bear (or barley) to 2/3d. per bushel, oats 
to 1/Sd. per bushel, and oatmeal to 13/~d. per boil. 
Con.R.B.S.,l738-59. pp.66-68; Report of the Committee of Directors 
of Glasgow Chamber of Commerce. 1787. pp.5-6. 
circulated four hundred copies of the act to the clerks of the royal 
burghs so that they would know how to apply to have their ports open 
(19) . 
for importation during a dearth, the burghal interest was far from 
satisfied ~th its provisions. On 9/7/1741, the Convention's annual 
committee determined to apply for an explanation of the act. It 
further resolved that ttas by the treaty of union, the export and import 
of the United Kingdom is to be upon one footing", the same regulations 
should apply to Scotland and England in respect of corn, except for 
the method of assessing corn prices. This power, the Convention 
agreed, could remain vested in the Court of Session, if it vas not 
considered a proper function to be entrusted (as in England) to the 
(20) 
justices of the peace. 
Although the price levels fixed by the legislation of 1741 
especially that of the Scottish staple, oatmeal, were too high for the 
burghal interest to accept, it required a further dearth in 1755-57 to 
infuse fresh vigour into the dialogue on the complexion of the Corn 
Laws. The crisis commenced with a deficient crop in 1755, but was 
temporarily allayed by English imports. In 1756, however, inclement 
weather and a late harvest produced poor crops of barley and wheat, 
while supplies from England, Ireland, and Europe were substantially 
curtailed by corresponding crop failures in these regions. The popular 
(21) 
reaction was an outcry against corn-dealers, Who assumed the role of 
19) Con. R.B.S., 1738-59. p.74 
20) ibid., 1738-59. PP• 81-82. 
21) Anonymous: Remarks on a paper entitled "Observations upon the 
grievances vith respect to the present dearth of grain, etc." 
1757. pp.l-2. 
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scape-goats, but more constructive attempts to relieve the suffering 
of the poor followed in the form of public subscriptions and fiscal 
(22) 
rewards for importation. 
Significantly, it was the gro~ng commercial community of Glasgow 
which led the assault on the Corn Laws. On 28/12/1756, the Convention 
of Boyal Burghs agreed to the suggestion of the Provost of Glasgow to 
petition for the removal of import duties on grain v.hile the prevalent 
high prices continued - a petition subsequently submitted ~ George 
Boss, the Convention's agent in London. The plea seemed timely as 
(23) 
Parliament had already appointed a committee to consider the issue. 
In response to pressure throughout Britain, and particularly to alleviate 
the riotous proceedings in those areas most acutely afflicted by high 
prices and social distress, a corn-bill was eventually passed prohib-
(24) 
:iting exportation until 25/12/1757. Despite this concession, how-
:ever, the Convention under continuing pressure from commercial inter-
:ests, continued to agitate for a further advance. Boss was instructed 
to inform Scottish burgh M.P.•s that the Convention favoured a ~rmanent 
{25) 
prohibition of all exports of grain above a fixed price ceiling and 
22) A public subscription was raised in Edinburgh in December, 1756, 
While in Glasgow, the magistrates and Merchan~ House responded 
by offering a reward of £10 sterling for ever,y thousand bushels 
of the first 20,000 bushels of sound Indian corn imported by 
1st August, 1757, for the use of the city's poor. ("Scots 
Magazine", 1756. pp.622-23). 
23) Con. R.B.S., 1738-59. p.534. The comadttee was appointed after the 
riots which followed the poor harvest and high prices of Autumn, 
1756, and the dialogue on the policy of bounties v.hich had raged 
in England since 1750-51, v.hen Charles Townsend1 s pamphlet on the 
subordination of manufacturing to landed interests had been pub-
lished. 
24) D.G. Barnes: A History of the English Corn Laws from 166o to 1846. 
PP• 21-25, 32, 37-38· 
_25) 26/- per quarter for wheat, 14/8d. per quarter for barley, and 18/-
per quarter for oatmeal. 
11. 
the removal of both the prohibition and duties on importation w.hen 
(26) 
prices rose to approximately two-thirds above these rates. 
No progress was made, however, towards the Convention's declared 
aim of assimilation with English practice unti 1 1772-73, when a 
further severe dearth produced its usual quota of scape-goats -
(27) (28) 
principally distillers {as consumers of grain) and corn-dealers 
and vituperation against the legislation governing Scotland. Parlia-
:ment's response was a new Corn Act on 1st January, 1774, which for 
the first time attempted to standardise regulations for both Scotland 
and England, as far as the separate judicial establishments in each 
country would permit such a fusion. Par ado xi cally, however, the 
Scottish burghal interest discovered that the fruits of uniformi~ 
were not uniformily sweet. Import and export levels of grain through-
(29) 
:out Britain were raised, but the peculiar ScottiSh grievance related 
to the treatment of oatmeal. Its import price was raised from 13/4d. 
per boil {corresponding in terms of real value to the import price of 
16/- per quarter for oats) to 16/- per boil. The price at w.hich the 
26) Con. R.B.S., 1738-59. p.540. 
27) Anonymous: The Causes of the present scarcity and dearth of 
provisions assigned. 1772. p.3. 
28) Riots took place in several localities including Dundee, Perth, 
and Newburgh. In Longforgan Parish, the residence of David 
MYlne of Mylnefield was ravaged by a mob from Dundee, in January, 
1773. At a meeting on 10/3/1773, the heritors of Forfarshire 
denied that Mylne was tteither a corn-dealer, meal-monger, or 
some such obnoxious persontt or that he had been "screwing up 
the prices of grain".(~Scots Magazine ... 1772. p.692.; ibid., 
1773. PP• 164, 329.) 
29) Grain could be imported at noainal duties ~en the "market prices" 
in the maritime counties in vhich individual ports of entry 
were situated reached 48/- per quarter for middling British 
wheat, 24/- per quarter for barley or bear, and 16/~ per 
quarter for oats. 
12. 
staple diet of the labourers of Scotland could be imported was thus 
raised by twenty per cent, and above its just proportion in relation 
to oats. A reduction in the import price levels of the English 
staples, wheat, and wheat-flour, exacerbated Scottish irritation. 
Moreover, while the act permitted the warehousing of eve~ other kind 
of victual When the ports were shut in readiness for the urban market 
When prices would rise and duties fall - a concession to the towns v.hich 
could count on a more secure supply in times of dearth - oatmeal was 
an exception. It was excluded until the price in the home market 
climbed to 16/- per boll. Scottish burgh opinion protested vocifer-
(30) 
:ously against what was readily identified as discrimination. 
The remaining provisions of the act, however, went far to con-
:ciliate its prospective critics in Scotland. The commercial interests 
of the west of Scotland in particular were delighted at the cardinal 
principle of the new legislation. This terminated the concept of 
nation-wide importation regulated by Midlothian prices. Instead, 
ports opened and shut on the "market prices" ascertained by local 
sheriffs, in maritime counties in Which individual ports of ent~ 
were situated. Prohibitions, duties, and bounties were thus deter-
:mined over most of Scotland by local conditions. Thirteen years 
later, Glasgow Chamber of Commerce waxed enthusiastically about the 
halcyon days of the 1774 Corn Act, which had placed Scots "nearly on 
a footing with our fello,i-subjects of England, particularly insofar as 
it has made the prices in each county, the mark of its wants and the 
rule for importation to supply its necessities". As a "dear grain" 
30) Minutes of Aberdeen Town Council, 15/3/1774; 31/3/1774. 
1:;. 
market, Glasgow was enabled to import cereals with increased facility. 
If the act did not furnish the city with a cheaper supply of grain, it 
did at least provide a more constant and steady supply which "greatly 
promoted the increase and improvement of our manufactures, and the 
commerce connected with them: wich have flourished more of late than 
(31) 
at any former period". 
The growing sense of identi~ and self-interest on the part of 
the manufacturing and commercial interests in Glasgow, apparent in 
previous dialogues, was highlighted from 1777 w.hen attempts to improve 
the machinery of the 1774 Corn Act threatened to rob Glasgow of some 
of the advantages which the city had derived from it. On 28/4/1777, 
Glasgow Town Council pronounced that a corn-bill aimed at regulating 
the corn trade of Scotland currently pending in Parliament was harmful 
to the trade and manufactures of ttthis part of the United Kingdom". 
The Council appointed a committee under Provost Robert Donald to concert 
measures with the merchants and traders of the city to oppose it, and 
agreed to contribute a proportional share of expenses incurred in suCh 
(:;2) 
a stand. 
The Glasgow merchants proceeded to enlist the aid of the Con-
:vention of Royal Burghs, ~ich accepted and endorsed the memorial 
of the former. This objected to the proposals in the corn-bill for 
a reversion to the principle of Midlothian prices governing Scotland, 
as inimical to the commercial communities of the west ~ich would be 
31) "Scots Magazine", 1777. pp.l98-203; Report of the committee of 
directors of Glasgow Chamber of Commerce. 1787. pp.6-10. 
32) Robert Renwick ( ed.): Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of 
Glasgow. vol.?. p.5Q2. 
1~. 
deprived of imports until Edinburgh prices reached the requisite level. 
However, the Convention also concurred in objections to the limitation 
of the time of opening of ports to thir~ days on the ground that this 
was insufficient time to permit imports from Ireland {Glasgow's princi-
:pal source of supply) or elsewhere. The increasing commercial cons-
:ciousness of the opposition was most clearly revealed when the quali-
:fication of witnesses testifying to price levels, namely £400 Scots 
valued rental of landed estate, came under fire. Finally the Conven-
:tion reiterated the traditional Scottish grievance over the regulations 
for oatmeal, concluding that the bill was highly prejudicial to Scotland 
in general, and to her manufactures in parti~ular. Provost Donald was 
recommended to print and circulate the Glasgow memorial to the magi-
{33) 
:strates of all the royal burghs. 
When the Convention appointed a committee on 8/7/1777 to consider 
{3~) 
the bill in detail and frame recommendations, the united front was 
soon broken. Most of the committee's suggestions were calculated to 
{35) 
appeal to the Glasgow mercantile community. However, the Convention 
also accepted the commdttee 1s recommendation to agree to the concept of 
Edinburgh prices governing importation for Scotland on condition that 
33) "Scots Magazine". 1777. pp.569-73; Con. R.B~S., 1759-79 pp.SI:I:l-~2. 
34) Con. R.B.S., 1759-79· pp.550-51. 
35) These included the need for three months' importation, the ware-
:housing of oats, the qualification of witnesses to include 
substantial merchants, and a proposal that the Lord Provost 
of Edinburgh and the Provost of Glasgow - rather than the 
local sheriffs - should be given powers, together w:i th the 
judges of Session and Exchequer, to determine When and at 
what rates importation should take place. 
15. 
oatmeal could be imported at a rate not exceeding 14/Sd. per boil, with 
(36) 
oats at 16/- per quarter. With this proposal in mind, the Convention 
appointed a second committee to co-operate with the Lord Advocate and 
the landed interest in framing legislation "for the benefit of this 
(37) 
part of the United Kingdom". However, despite its assertion that "for 
the sake of peace the resolutions of the Convention of Royal Burghs may 
be adhered to", Glasgow's concurrence was qualified. The Town Council 
insisted that its support was dependent on the regulation of importation 
by prices on a county basis, with Lanarkshire and Glasgow forming one 
district regulated by Glasgow prices. If this condition was not satis-
:fied, Glasgow intended pressing for a reduction in the import price of 
(38) 
oatmeal to 13/4da per boll, as previously suggested. 
The outcome of the Convention's meeting with the Lord Advocate 
and the landed interest contributed nothing to ease the tension between 
Glasgow and the rest of the burghal interest. Agreement was reached 
on the importation of oats and oatmeal whenever the price of oatmeal on 
the Edinburgh Corn Market climbed to 14/Bd. per boil, and on most of the 
(39) 
other divisive issues. The landed interest was not, however, prepared 
to concede the claim to warehouse oats if the ports ~re to be open for 
36) The committee urged as a safeguard that the court of enquiry should 
meet to ascertain price levels at least four times per year - as 
the sheriffs did - and more often if necessar.y, and that they should 
be furnished with weekly reports from the clerk of the Edinburgh 
meal and corn market. 
37) Con. R.B.s., 1759-79. pp.562-6%. 
38) BDbert Beuwick (ed.); op. cit., vol.?., p.511. 
39) The Convention dropped its proposed addition of the c1~c chiefs of 
Edinburgh and Glasgow to the proposed tribunal, and the landed 
interest agreed to the inclusion of mercantile ~tnesses and 
the production of weekly reports from the Edinburgh corn market. 
16. 
three months. With the Convention equally intransigent on the issue, 
(40) 
a second meeting failed to resolve the impasse. In the face of this 
setback, the majori~ of the Convention reverted to the resolutions of 
the previous general Convention, with their demand for warehousing of 
oatmeal, its re-exportation like 
(41) 
other grains, and the importation of 
oats at 16/- per quarter. The delegate from Glasgow moved that the 
Convention should reverse its previous decision and press for the regu-
(42) 
:lation of importation on a county basis, but this was rejected as con-
:trary to the unanimous resolutions of the previous Convention. Des-
:pite a dissident Glasgow, the Convention reiterated these and instructed 
(43) 
its agent to print and distribute a copy to all the royal burghs. 
If the details of the proposals of 1777 produced an apparent 
division of interest between Glasgow and the other burghs, it was 
dwarfed by the overall demand of the burghal estate for cheap bread, 
and the clear-cut division between town and country which this both 
reflected and produced. This schism was observed by one anonymous 
political scribe of the period When he noted that if the Member of 
Parliament for Midlothian regarded the interest of his constituents in 
40) Con. R.B.S., 1759-79. PP• 566-67. 
41) Glasgow Town Council had appointed its own committee to meet with 
the landed interest, but this initiative foundered on the 
question of importation on a county basis in addition to the 
issues which had undermined the Convention's own negotiations. 
Glasgow wished EngliSh legislation to extend to Scotland. 
(Robert Renwick (ed.): op. cit., vol.?., pp.512-13.) 
42) The price of oats in Glasgow and the west was 1/- per boil higher 
than in the east, in the opinion of an agricultural spokesman. 
( J ames Anderson: An enquiry into the nature of the corn laws 
~th a view to the new corn-bill proposed for Scotland. 1777. 
PP• 49-50.) 
43) Con. R.B.S., 1759-79. PP• 570-71. 
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the county, he would be obliged to vote for the corn-bill, but if he 
heeded the pra1ers of his friends in the town, he would have to vote 
(44) 
against it. He was not alone in lamenting a division which r~sulted 
in manufacturers and merchants taking one side and the landed gentlemen 
(q5) 
and farmers the other. The growing self-confidence and self-interested 
motivation of the expanding commercial communities, especially Glasgow, 
were apparent to a degree hitherto unparallelled. 
The implication of urban, and in particular Glasgow, demands was 
understood by most agriculturists. As one anonymous agrarian pamph-
:leteer observed, the demand for the reduction of the importation price 
of oatmeal to 13/4d. per boll - the pre-Union price level - had intro-
:duced a new principle, that corn should be permitted to be imported 
even when there was no scarci~. This proposal, he blamed on "fine 
philosophical abstracted reasoning, drawn from liberal principles", 
and argued that the strategic necessity of self-sufficiency had under-
:lain even Adam Smith's partial exception of corn from his general 
principles of political econo~. His correlation of the Glasgow demands 
of 1777 with the publication of Smith's treatise in the previous year 
led him to refute the idea of mobility of labour from argicul ture to 
industry, the equation of cheap provisions with manufacturing success, 
and the application of general principles to specific eases. The ob-
jection of the Glasgow merchants to Edinburgh prices ignored the pre-
:sence of the Forth and Clyde Canal as a means of shipping grain from 
(46) 
the east, but the underlying contest was not over such detail. The 
44) Anonymous: To the D(uke) of B{uccleuch) by one of your best 
friends. 1777(?). p.5. 
45) Anonymous: Corn Bill Hints. 1777. 
46) ~ 1775, the canal had been completed from the Forth to Stoeking-
:field, three miles north of Glasgow. (Henry Hamilton: Op.cit:p.232.) 
18. 
(47) 
innate virtues of rural life were glamorised and the proposition was 
advanced that manufactures should be encouraged only as a stimulus to 
agricultural production. Having attained that object, one should 
not wish "for a greater degree of these nor a more numerous population 
(48) 
than that pitch of agriculture can support". Other agricultural 
apologists wrote in a similar vein, but behind the polemics about 
landowners becoming "mere beasts of burden to the trading and manu-
: facturing parts of this kingdom", were genuine fears that unless 
agriculture shared in the rising prosperity and prices of the country, 
the relative economic and political importance of the landed interest 
(49) 
would decline, in the path of an emergent industrial socie~. Accord-
(50) 
:ingly, there was general, though not universal, hostili~ to mercantile 
claims, on the part of the landed interest. 
The failure of the landed interest to effect their aims in 1777 
produced a truce, but by 1786 a group of landed proprietors precipitated 
47) If agriculture was depressed, manufacturers would in their "rural 
excursions, meet with no pleasing, no smiling object; 
No plowman whistling o1er the furrow 1d land, 
No milk-maid singing blithe". 
(Anonymous: Corn-bill hints. 1777. pp.7-8.) 
48) ibid., pp. 2-4, 7-8, 10, 13-18, 20, 22. 
~9) Anonymous: Essay on the Corn Laws •••• in opposition to the 
inflammatory memorial for the merchants, traders, and 
manufacturers of Glasgaw. 1777• pp.6-10. 
50) James Anderson of Monk's Hill, Aberdeenshire, addressed the Glasgow 
manufacturers in a more conciliatory tone, attempting to assure 
them that their fears were groundless. His concern was Scotland 1s 
probable inability to compete with foreign grain supplies, 
especially oatmeal, the average price of Which had been a mere 
13/- per boll for the best quali~ over a period of twenty years 
in the Midlothian fiars. To make up for years of deficiency, he 
argued that in certain years, and in certain areas (namely Glas-
:gow) higher prices would be justifiable, but conceded that ware-
:housing should be permissible. Imports should be available immed-
:iately When prices rose, and farmers should not make unJust pro-
:fits.(James Anderson: op.cit., pp.8-9, 12-13, 31,43,58.) 
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a further collision ~th the commercial interests of the west, When 
they proposed a revision of the Corn Act of 1774 to bring the law 
closer to the system adopted at the Restoration. This implied ~ 
prohibition of importation of foreign grain imports - on the plea 
that imports had exceeded exports by 300,000 quarters per annum under 
existing legislation. In pursuit of this aim, they revived the con-
:cept of Midlothian prices, to be assessed by a jury of fifteen subs-
:tantial landed proprietors and "respectable citizens of Edinburgh who 
are not dealers in grain". The latter concession to the burghal 
interest was qualified by the probabili~ that the middle-classes of 
the metropolis would be more amenable to landed influence than those 
of certain other urban communities. Their further proposal that 
ports should be open or shut for three months at a time had even less 
merit from the burghal viewpoint, because of its implications for a 
period of dearth. Nevertheless, spurred on by What they considered 
the low grain prices of 1785-86, the landed proprietors prepared to 
lobby Scottish Members of Parliament, county conveners, and the Lord 
(51) 
Advocate. 
The strength, complexion, and polemics of the urban reaction indi-
:cated how much water had flowed under the bridge since the previous 
agricultural initiative of 1777. In 1783, the growing commercial and 
industrial interests of the west had combined in a permanent association 
to protect their intrinsic interests. Significantly, one of the dec-
:lared objectives of Glasgow Chamber of Commerce was "to consider all 
matters affecting the Corn Laws of this part of the United Kingdom in 
particular, as being of the utmost consequence to its trade and 
51) Report of the comodttee of directors of Glasgow Chamber of Commerce. 
1787; pp.31-36, Appendix.; "Scots Magazine".l786.pp.~8-4:9. 
20. 
(52) 
Consequently, the proposals to impose further res-manufactures." 
:trictions on the grain trade were immediately resisted by the new 
pressure group, and on blatantly self-interested grounds. On 1~/10/ 
1786, the Chamber urged the need for cheap labour - "the certain con-
:sequence" of plentiful supplies of provisions at "reasonable" rates 
- in order to make British manufactures competitive. The mercantile 
interests wished to modify the existing legislation ~ ending the 
concepts of bounties and prohibition, and substituting a moderate i~ 
:port duty. They totally opposed any modification of the 177q Act 
which would entail importation on Edinburgh prices, as these were 
(53) 
considered to be about ten per cent lower than in Glasgow. The 
objections and fears of the Chamber were paraphrased two days later 
by Glasgow Town Council, Which proceeded to canvass for further support 
from the merchants' and trades' houses of the ci~, the royal burghs, 
and the preses of the Convention, pointing out the size of the poFulation 
(5~) 
in the west and the impact of such a demand on raising prices. 
The principal effect of the attempt by sections of the landed 
interest to render the Corn Act of 177~ more rigid was to induce the 
commercial interests of the west to question its intrinsic justification 
per se. Glasgow Chamber of Commerce made it clear that in campaigning 
for a continuation of the existing legislation as "the best that can 
be", there was "another and more effectual improvement", namely repeal 
of the Corn Laws and prohibition. In the course of their peroration 
52) Henry Hamilton: "The founding of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, 
1783" in the Scottish Journal of Political Economy• 1954. 
Vol. I (i) p.~5. 
53) "Scots Magazine". 1786. pp.515-16. 
54) Minutes of Aberdeen Town Council, 11/11/1786; Robert Benwick (ed.): 
op. cit., vol. 8. pp. 205-6, 209. 
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on this theme, the directors held forth the vision of Britain as an 
entre-pot for Europe's grain trade, in addition to the strategic {and 
popular) bonus of making her a "nursery for seamen••. Moreover,. the 
translation of such ideals into reality was not to be a long-term aim. 
The Chamber demanded immediate measures to modify existing restrictions 
(55) 
on the grain trade and the creation of juries {as in England) to 
ascertain prices. To the provisions of the 1774 Act for oatmeal, 
there was unequivocal hostility. The Chamber concluded that 1'His 
Majesty's subjects in this part of the United Kingdom are of right 
entitled to the same privileges ~th their fellow-subjects of England; 
and any part to deprive them of these, by a law particular to Scotland, 
is inconsistent with our safety, and with the meaning and spirit of the 
Union, incorporating both nations into one; and is an unjust violation 
of our rights as men, and as British subjects". A wi. de range of 
commercial and manufacturing interests in the west of Scotland concurred 
and associated themselves ~th the fears and demands of the Chamber of 
{56) 
Commerce and Town Council in Glasgow. 
As in the preceding decade, however, the advanced sentiments 
expressed in Glasgow and its environs were not entirely representative 
of opinion in other burghs. To some extent, this difference in 
55) In particular, the Chamber wished permission to use the Forth and 
Clyde Canal for the transit of grain shipments from Glasgow to 
the east, and in the reverse direction. Also, they wanted 
vessels arriving ~th grain at a shut port to be able to proceed 
immediately to an open one without the formality of re-export-
: ation. 
56) These included the Glasgow Merchants' House, the Glasgow Trades, 
the master-manufacturers of Glasgow; the town council, manu-
:facturers, and societies of Paisley; the town council and 
societies of Greenock; Port Glasgow, Saltcoats, Hamilton, Kil-
:marnock, and Anderston. (Report of the committee of directors 
of Glasgaw Chamber of Commerce. 1787. pp.l)-14.) 
22. 
emphasis reflected a division of interest due to the mechanism of the 
corn legislation. Thus Edinburgh Chamber of CoDDDerce, formed two 
years after its western counterpart, wanted Scotland to form one .dis-
:trict with ports open and shut at the one time, determined b.r an 
average compiled in Edinburgh from quarterly reports by juries in 
particular counties. Located in Scotland's cereal counties, this 
proposal would have mitigated the relatively long time w.hiCh would 
elapse before the metropolis would be permitted to import grain on the 
prevailing county average principle. The Edinburgh Chamber 1 s plea was 
(57) 
inevitably opposed vigorously in Glasgow. 
If the identity of interest among the burghs was destroyed by 
local considerations, this was equally true of the landed interest. 
In the process, the geographical division between the arable east and 
the pastoral west emerged almost as clearly as the cleavage between 
town and country. The grazing interests of the north and west, led by 
the Duke of Argyll and the freeholders of his county, the freeholders 
of Renfrew and Dunbarton, the Earl of Fife, and other landowners in 
Morayshire and Inverness-shire, supported Glasgow Chamber of Commerce in 
opposing a Midlothian average for Scotland as calculated to cause dearth 
in less fertile areas. Alluding to attempts to stimulate indust~ in 
(58) 
the Highlands, notably by legislation of 1753, the coun~ of Argyll 
argued that it was vain to encourage fisheries and manufactures in the 
north "if by any alteration of the present Corn Laws, the power of 
supplying the inhabitants with grain at reasonable prices is to be 
57) ibid., 1787. pp. 15,21,23-30. 
58) Henry Hamilton: The Industrial Revolution in Scotland. p.87 and 
note. The act was 26 Geo. II. c.20. 
2). 
_ suspended, till the markets of the grain counties of Scotland are 
first glutted". The fact that Irish cattle were imported without 
restriction to compete ~th Highland cattle discouraged the prospect 
of sympathy among the pastoralists of the north and west for the 
(59) 
cereal-producers of the east. Even the Established Church clergy 
in the west - a later pillar of protectionism - shared the territorial 
attitude of the freeholders. Aware of the inadequacy of locally-
grown cereal supplies, one of them noted in retrospect the danger 
implicit in the eastern proposals. Lauding the principles of the 
legislation from 1774, he observed that its passage was attributable 
"to the wisdom and humanity of the legislature; as if it had passed 
in the way in which the gentlemen of the east country would have had 
it, we should have been compelled, occasionally, to have lived only 
(60) 
upon air and water". 
In 1787 a compromise suggestion had been advanced that the country 
should be regulated by district averages, and this principle had been 
(61) 
incorporated into legislation for England in 1789. The rumour that 
its terms would be extended to Scotland rekindled interest among the 
commercial interests of the west in the Corn Laws, and by January, 
1790, Glasgow Chamber of Commerce had published the first of three 
59) The County of Argyll complained that Irish grain imports, the food 
of the poor, were already too much discouraged, unlike butcher-
:meat, the staple of the opulant. (Report of the committee of 
directors of Glasgaw Chamber of Commerce. 1787. pp.IS-18.) 
60) The Reverend Dr. John Smith of Campbeltown pariSh observed in 
1794 that the quantity of corn raised in the parish fell far 
short of consumption - 2,500 boils of meal had to be imported 
annually - but as a result of the recent Corn Law, oatmeal 
had not exceeded Ifd. per pound. (Old Statistical Account. 
Vol. 10. Argyllshire (Parish of Campbeltown), p.sso.) 
61) The act was 29 Geo. Ill. c.58. 
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diatribes on the issue. It reiterated the Chamber's belief in "a 
perfect freedom of trade", regulated solely by a small protecting duty, 
with an end to prohibition - a proposal whiCh was attributed to Adam 
Amith. Long-standing complaints over discrimination against oatmeal 
and restrictions on the free movement of grain ~thin Britain and 
Ireland were also given further publici~, but the Chamber's principal 
concern was over the delineation of the boundaries of the proposed 
district. They suggested that a suitable region might comprise Lanark, 
Renfrew, Dunbartonshire, and Argyll, with the possible addition of 
Ayrshire "to take in all the Firth of Clyde", but excluding the southern 
counties of the Solway. On 15/3/1790, the directors petitioned the 
(62) 
House of Commons in these terms. 
Neither the delay in transmitting a petition, nor its eventual 
timing were fortuitous. It was the Chamber's immediate response to 
news of the first overt threat to add substance to rumour. On 8/3/1790, 
Her Majesty's Council for Trade had reported their concern on the need 
for adequate supplies of grain in view of Britain's growi~ dependence 
(63) 
on imports, and concluded that these should be home-grown. Glasgow 
Chamber of Commerce interpreted increasing dependence on imports as an 
indication of growing opulence, concurred in the Council's concern for 
adequate supplies, but not in the latter's conclusion. It also seized 
the opportunity to condemn the export bounty as illogical in view of 
62) 
63) 
Second Report of a eommdttee of directors of the Chamber of Com-
:merce and Manufactures in Glasgow, relative to the Corn Laws. 
(January) 1790. pp.4-12. 
The "Representation" of the Committee of the Privy Council on 
Trade and Foreign Plantations, on 8/3/1790, paved the way 
for legislation of 1790-91. (See D.G.Barnes: op. cit., 
pp.S%,61-62,64-65.) 
25 • 
. the existing balance of trade in corn, as calculated to enhance prices 
(64) 
to the domestic consumer at the expense of Britain's competitive ability. 
By 11/5/1790, Glasgow Town Council, spurred by the publication of 
a corn-bill in the Commons, had also taken up cudgels on behalf of the 
(65) 
western mercantile and industrial interests. Like the Chamber of 
Commerce, Glasgow Town Council considered that the growth of commerce 
and manufactures to "its present advanced statett rendered importation 
necessary at all times. The Council unsurprisingly shared the former 1s 
{66) 
demands for an end to prohibition though not all physical controls, 
but their main concern was with the terms of the proposed legislation, 
which seemed to be detrimental to Glasgow's interests in at least three 
major respects. Firstly, the Council disagreed with the concept of a 
district rather than a county average, but objected especially to the 
inclusion of Wigtown and Ayrshire in the fourteenth (Glasgow) region 
insofar as their corn production could keep the average for the entire 
district low and thus frustrate importation. Secondly, the Council 
demanded that Glasgow be included as a port for warehousing corn, with 
the twin advantages of receiving the commodity at a cheaper rate and 
the business of handling it. Lastly, it demanded that the exportation 
of certain quantities of grain from Greenock and Bort Glasgow to the 
Isle of Man, Nova Scotia, the Bay of Chaleur,and Labrador should continue 
64) Third Report of the committee of directors of the Chamber of 
Commerce and Manufactures of Glasgow, relative to the Corn 
Laws. (April) 1790. pp.S-17, 30-32. 
65) Robert Renwick (ed.): op.cit., vol.8.pp.351,356-57. 
In late March, 1790, the Town Council had appointed a committee 
to confer vith the Chamber of Commerce on the corn question. ~ 
11/5/1790, the Council petitioned against the bill. 
66) In periods of dearth, the Council wanted a cessation of all exports. 
26. 
(67) 
unimpeded. The contents of the corn legislation of the late eight-
:eenth century ~th their far-reaching implications for price levels 
in different localities inevitably orientated discussion towards· 
details rather than underlying principles. 
With this consideration to the fore, Glasgow Town Council, having 
defined their attitude to the bill, proceeded to muster support in 
opposition to it. The Convention of Royal Burghs were entreated to 
assist in an application to be heard by counsel at the bar of the House 
(68) 
of Commons. Predictably, the Convention responded enthusiastically 
to the demand from the west for equality with England on the perennial 
(69) 
problem of oatmeal. On 31/1/1791, the Convention resolved that in 
the event of importation of oatmeal to Scotland being governed by the 
price of meal instead of oats {as in England), such import prices should 
70) 
be fixed at a rate corresponding to the English price, "and that import-
(71) 
:ation be made in every other respect free as in England". 
Demands from the Solway that Dumfries-shire and Kirkcudbright 
should be included in the Glasgow district {below) furnished a more 
67) Report of the commdttee of the Town Council of Glasgow appointed 
to consider the Corn-bill. 179l.pp.~,20. 
Councillor Gilbert Hamilton, secretar,y of Glasgow Chamber of 
Commerce was one of the committee of seven members set up by 
the Town Council on the Corn Laws. 
The proposed fourteenth district would comprise Argyll, Bute, 
Dunbartonshire, Renfrew, Lanark, Ayrshire, and Wigtov.n. ("Scots 
Magazine". 179l.pp.~2-4J.) 
68) Robert Renwick (ed.): op. cit., vol.S. pp.~00-2. 
69) A. Colquhoun, M.P. to Henry Dundas, London, 3/5/1790, in Melville 
Papers. Mss 6~1. 
70) The importation price for oats in England was 16/- per quarter. 
71) Copy resolution of the Annual Committee of the Boyal Bnrghs of 
Scotland, relative to the Corn Law bill, 31/1/1791, in Melville 
Papers. Mss.6~1. 
immediate threat to local Glasgow interests, and was strongly resisted 
by the commercial classes in the ci~ Who feared that the proposed 
inclusion of Wigtown (and even Ayr) already posed a danger. Th.ey feared 
that these counties ~uld provide on the one hand sufficiently substantial 
supplies of corn to prevent prices rising to importation levels, and on 
the other, fairly high prices due to transport costs from these counties 
(72) 
to Glasgow. The merchants of Glasgow anticipated that a division of 
the fourteenth district would be accompanied by two salutor.y results. 
Ports would be opened more quickly, enabling them to take advantage of 
cheap Irish grain {despite transport costs), and the trade would be 
(73) 
retained in the hands of Glasgow merchants. A combination of these 
fears and hopes inspired Glasgow Town Council to dispatch Lord Provost 
James MacDowall and the Town Clerk of the city to London to endeavour 
to extract the exclusion of Ayrshire, Wigtown, Dumfries-shire, and 
(74) 
Kirkcudbright - especially the last three - from the fourteenth district. 
72) A. McDowall to Viscount Melville, Bristol, 13/2/1791. in ibid., 
Mss. 641. 
73) A. MCDowall to Viscount Melville, n.a., 22/3/1791, in ibid. Mss.641. 
Not all landed proprietors were unequivocally opposed to the 
case advanced ~ the Chamber of Commerce in Glasgow. Noting 
the leading part in Whipping up the agitation Which that body 
had taken, I.F. Erskine suggested that Scotland should be 
split into two districts, comprising low- and high-priced 
counties respectively. But he hoped that that proposal would 
not only conciliate the manufacturers of the west, but also 
obviate the need for a ~stem whereby Glasgow could import 
grain through Grangemouth and the Forth and Clyde Canal, even 
though the ports in the east were closed. (I.F.Erskine to 
Henry Dundas, Tower of Alloa, 18/5/1790. in ibid. Mss.641). 
(74) Robert Renwick {ed.): op. cit., vol.8.pp.410-12. 
The Town Council rejected a request from the Trades 1House 
of the city to invite public participation on the ground that 
the "constitutional bodies corporate" were using their utmost 
endeavours anyway - a reflection of the unease of the propertied 
classes at rousing organised demonstrations on such an emotive 
issue. 
28. 
Although the commercial interests in Glasgow and district had taken 
the lead, as usual, in opposing the corn-bill, dissatisfaction with 
different aspects of it was also vociferous from sereral parts of the 
thirteenth (Edinburgh) district. From Dumfries and Kirkcudbright, the 
commissioners of supply expressed alarm that as predominantly pastoral 
counties, they would be obliged to defer importation until the grain of 
the cereal-producing Lothians had been exhausted. Like the consumers 
in the burghs they complained too of the discrimination against oatmeal, 
but as small-scale corn producers, their interests were not identical. 
The county of Dumfries demanded that the export bounty on its small-
scale export trade in grain to the Isle of Han should be maintained as 
it was "of material consequence to this county". In view of the fact 
that they had no connection "either from vicinity of situation or 
similarity of circumstance" with the east, they demanded to be included 
in either the Glasgow district or in a new sixteenth district including 
(75) 
Wigtown, and determined to employ counsel on their joint behalf. 
The burghs of the east were no more enchanted with the proposed 
structure and felt their local interests threatened. Under the county 
system, Edinburgh had been able .to import grain w.hen prices in the city 
and county of Midlothian had reached the prescribed level. The inclusion 
of several more grain-producing counties Where prices in general, and of 
oats and oatmeal in particular, were lower, would defer importation. 
This could entail "great distress and very high prices along with perhaps 
disturbance at Edinburgh" - an alarming thought in view of previous food 
riots in the city and the shock of the 1780 Gordon riots in London -
75) Resolutions of the Commissioners of Supply of the Stewartry of 
Kirkcudbright, 1/2/1791; Extract. Minutes of the County of 
Dumfries, 2/2/1791. Both in Melville Papers. MBs.641. 
before the average of the enlarged area would permit the port of Leith 
to be opened. In contrast, the market price of London governed the 
importation for nine adjoining counties, and Edinburgh saw no reason 
why the northern metropolis should not be regulated in a similar manner. 
Further, a new tax proposed for coastwise corn traffic would penalise 
(76) 
both Leith and its consumers. Moreover, the latter did not all reside 
in »>inburgh. Kirkcaldy demanded to be included as a port for direct 
importation of foreign grain, instead of being obliged to rely on 
Leith, observing that there was "an arm of the sea betwixt them and 
us of so many miles, Which in tempestuous weather is ane impassible 
gulph, when we are like a separate kingdom from them". Inclement 
weather conditions apart, Kirkcaldy wished to avoid the additional 
time and expense of re-shipping grain, with its attendant wasteage 
incurred due to the operations of measuring and reloading, embezzlement, 
(77) 
and rot. Underlying, however, the disparate objections of the critics 
of the corn-bill in both east and west was a unifying theme - all feared 
high grain prices and wished to facilitate importation of foreign cereals. 
A second themewhich emerged to an even greater degree than hitherto 
was the political content of the polemical debate betveen the protagon-
:ists. George Hepburn of Smeaton adhered to the older tradition When 
he contended dispassionately that Britain's increasing failure to be 
self-sufficient was attributable less to an exploding population with 
its effects on consumption, and more to changes in the Corn Laws since 
76) Copy. George Chalmers to the Lord Provost of Edinburgh, 11/5/1790. 
ibid., Mss.641. 
77) Petition of the Provost, Magistrates, and Town Council of 
Kirkcal~ to the Privy Council, 28/12/1790. in ibid., 
Mss. 641. 
:;o. 
1756 Which had given insufficient encouragement to cereal production. 
(78) 
. His temperate argument and language was untypical. More characteristic 
was Sir John Sinclair of Ulbster, who contended that the only st.able 
basis for national prosperity was agricultural success, and that co~ 
:mercial success should be based on {and secondary to) the former. 
Sinclair wanted "the special protection of the legislaturett to induee 
industry on the part of the farmer as without self-sufficiency in food 
production, a nation was not truly "independent". Too muCh attention 
ha"d been paid to "the interested information of the merchants and to 
(79) 
the ignorant clamour of one class of consumers". The principal 
recipients of Sinclair 1s invective were no less aware of the far-
reaching implications of their aims. Glasgow Chamber of Commerce 
castigated the proposed corn-bill of 1790 in politico-social terms 
which fully anticipated those familiar during the follo~ng century, 
contrasting "the importation of oats to feed the sumpter horses of the 
opulent and luxurious on easier terms than that of meal to supply the 
(so) 
necessities of the labouring and manufacturing part of the people". 
The mid-nineteenth century struggle of industrial societ.y for political 
and social influence commensurate with its economic power was fore-
shadowed - albeit on a limited scale - in the last quarter of the pre-
:ceding century, although this fact was partially obscured by the orien-
:tation of the debate on the mechanism of succeeding pieces of legis-
:lation. 
78) George B. Hepburn of Smeaton: op. cit., pp.82-83. 
79) Sir John Sinclair: Address to the Landed Interest on the Corn-
Bill now depending in Parliament. 179l.pp.4,7-10,22-26,40. 
80) Third Report of the committee of directors of the Chamber of Com-
:merce and Manufactures of Glasgow,relative to the Corn Laws.pp.l0-11. 
Complaints from Scotland in the closing years of the eighteenth 
and early years of the nineteenth centuries perpetuated the same 
mixture of national and local grievances manifested in 1790-91, ~d 
seemed to justify at least some of the fears expressed at the time. 
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In 1793, at the behest of Glasgow Town Council, the Convention of 
Royal Burghs gave a carte-blanche to their preses, the Lord Provost of 
Edinburgh, to sign any memorial from Glasgow Which demanded that the 
Privy Council would open the Scottish ports. Uniformity in legis-
:lation on both sides of the Border had not matched expectations. Due 
to the high proof price of English wheat, importation of the product 
(81) 
into England was permitted, although the Scottish ports were shut. 
Dissatisfaction existed too when high prices obliged importation in 
(82) 
1795 and 1799. On the latter occasion, Edinburgh found ground for 
complaint in the scarcity of grain in Scotland which she alleged had 
been created by exports of grain to England and Ireland. This had 
produced a dearth and price levels in the Lothians w.hieh exceeded the 
statutory ceiling debarring exportation, but paradoxically in view of 
the earlier fears of the peripheral areas of the thirteenth district, 
Edinburgh could not import grain until there was an overall rise in 
81) Bobert Renwick (ed)& op. cit., vol.8., pp.519-21. 
Although a quarter of English Wheat was more expensive than 
its average Scottish counterpart, the former produced suCh 
a disproportionately greater.quanti~ of flour that it was, 
in the view of the Scottish commercial interests, intrinsically 
cheaper. 
82) Poor crops in 1799 and 1800 led to a scarcity of provisions. In 
Paisley, corn dealers and farmers were mobbed, and in Glasgow 
a public subscription to import oatmeal raised £15,000. 
(Anonymous: Letter from an Inhabitant of Paisley to his 
fellow townsmen. 1800.pp.9-10; Memorial for the Lord Provost, 
Magistrates, and Town Council of the city of Glasgow. 1803. 
p.2.) 
(83) 
.cereal prices throughout the region. To exacerbate her sense of 
grievance, Glasgow took advantage of the situation to import Wheat 
(84) 
through Leith originally intended for the metropolis. The ful~il-
32. 
:ment of earlier predictions and fears added yet a further chapter to 
the saga of commercial and industrial frustration with existing 
restrictions on the grain trade. 
More positively, it contributed to the growing consciousness of 
a distinct enonomic interest ~ich had evolved in the west in the 
course of the late eighteenth century. By 1804, when a further 
attempt was made to standardise importation throughout Britain, by 
taking the aggregate of the maritime districts, thus threatening to 
terminate the district principle Which had proved relatively satis-
:factory from the Glasgow viewpoint, the western interests responded 
with undisguised local self-interest. They pointed out that the 
counties of Lanark, Renfrew, Dunbartonshire, Argyll, and Bute contained 
3-400,000 inhaiitants, and that even with a good harvest, the domestic 
supply of corn was inadequate, forcing them to rely on imports from 
Ireland and North America. Moreover, prices of the staple, oatmeal, 
were allegedly 10-15~ higher than the Scottish average (especially 
the east). Yet a regular supply of corn at a moderate and steady 
price was indispensible "for the maintenance of internal peace and 
good order" - a potent argument in view of the recent social convulsion 
in France. The western commercial interests reiterated their view of 
83) 
84) 
Although the prices in the Lothian markets were high - Edinburgh 
(58/lld.), Haddington {61/2d.), and Linlithgow (57/4d.) -
and all exceeded the requisite importation price level of 
54/-, the overall district average was only 53/4d.by 29/5/1799. 
J. Stirling to Henry Dundas, Edinburgh, 29/5/1799. in Melville 
Papers. Mss.641. 
1791 that "the advanced state at which conunerce and manufactures have 
arrived in this country" demanded the abolition of physical controls 
except in periods of extreme dearth. They concluded by objectiQg to 
the proposal for uniformity, the rates and mode of assessment, and 
demanded that ports should be open for three months at a time, with a 
free transmission of grain throughout Britain, including Ireland as 
(85) 
an integral part of the United Kingdom since 1800. 
The agitation continued into 1805 with Glasgow's intrinsic 
interest in the issue increasingly evident. Having appointed a com-
:mittee to stimulate other public bodies to oppose the proposed corn 
law, Glasgow Chamber of Commerce proceeded two weeks later to petition 
through the M.P. for Glasgow, Boyd Alexander, that prices under pro-
:hibition had been raised more than was necessary "to secure to the 
farmer an adequate return for his skill and industry". The directors 
pontificated further that bounties on exportation and restrictions on 
importation of grain into any country which was not self-sufficient 
raised prices "in a greater degree to the consumer than is of advantage 
to the grower11 • As important as the Chamber's attempt to promulgate 
a foundation of economic principle for its assault on the Corn Laws, 
was its pragmatic response to the Government's amended proposal for 
separate national averages for Scotland and England. Although this 
seemed a concession to Glasgow's previous claim for local regulation, 
the Chamber was aware that an average embracing the whole of England 
(and not merely the maritime districts) ~uld facilitate earlier 
85) Robert Renwick (ed.): op.cit., vo1.9. pp.410-12,419; Minutes 
of Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, 11/7/1804; 26/12/1804. 
The Duke of Montrose agreed to present a petition for Glasgow 
Chamber of Commerce in December, 1804, but made it clear that 
he did not concur with its contents. 
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i~portation. This explained the apparent tergiversation of the Chamber 
in combatting it with a demand for a British average, together with 
internal free trade within Britain. The stimulus to the coasting trade 
was merely one bonus which Glasgow hoped to derive from these suggestions, 
but they did not stand in isolation. They were accompanied by demands 
for lower importation price levels, and the opening of ports for six 
(86} 
months to permit American imports - a significant advance on previous 
urban demands. Six months later, the city's Lord Provost had the 
satisfaction of reporting that the Corn Law ultimately enacted had 
secured several of the leading objects of the Town Council's previous 
(87) 
petitions. The increasing economic sense of separate identity among 
the mercantile and industrial magnates of the west was confirmed. 
The agitation of 1804-5 and its predecessors in the late eighteenth 
century foreshadowed the events of the following forty years in several 
respects. In the first place, the changing economic environment which 
formed the backcloth to the confrontations and moulded thei-r character 
continued to evolve on the lines established by the close of the 
eighteenth century. Between 1700 and 1800, the population of Scotland 
increased by an estimated 560,420, but in the first half of the nine-
(88) 
:teenth century, this figure was dwarfed by a further 1,280,322. 
Equally important, the distribution continued to concentrate the increase 
almost exclusively in those areas in Which the textile industries, 
especially cotton, flourished. For the corn question, the fact of this 
accelerating increase was of vital importance if only because it 
86) Robert Renwick (ed.): op. cit., vol.9.p.443; Minutes of Glasgow 
Chamber of Commerce, 22/1/1805. 
87) Bobert Reuwick (ed.): op. eit., vol.9.pp.461-62. 
88) D.F.MacDonald: Scotland's Shifting Population, 1770-1850.p.5. 
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~epresented a corresponding increase in the number of consumers. The 
commercial interests had already had occasion in the course of the 
eighteenth century struggles to draw attention to this fact, es~cially 
in the west of Scotland, and had extracted from it the apparently 
obvious conclusion that they could (and should) be supplied from 
external sources - as increasingly had taken place. In turn, the 
agriculturists had drawn from their viewpoint the equally legitimate 
conclusion that by fiscal protection marginal soils could yield domestic 
supplies to meet this demand. The continuation of the demographic 
trends of 1780-1800 into the follo~ng century added a new sense of 
urgency to the urban case. 
Moreover, the growth in economic importance of the commercial and 
manufacturing interests Which the population figures in part reflected, 
produced fear as well as self-confidence on the part of the emergent 
industrial communities. Even by the close of the eighteenth century, 
manufacturers were afraid that Britain's new role as the workshop of 
the world might be short-lived. Her hegemony over other nations was 
attributable to "our abundance of fuel, great skill of our artisans, 
our superior machinery, and great capital" but not "cheapness of living", 
and if any other country "should come anything near us in other respects, 
the low price which they pay for food, and the cheapness of labour, would 
(89) 
soon turn the balance against us, and drive us out of the market". 
The equation of the price of provisions with labour costs had been made 
repeatedly in the eighteenth century, but as other countries, notably 
Prussia, Belgium, France, and the United States of America fostered 
nascent industries under the umbrella of protective tariffs, the 
89) Anonymous: Observations on the Corn Laws. 1805. pp.lS-16. 
)6. 
manufacturing and commercial interests of Britain turned ~th increasing 
urgency to free trade in self-defence, as the only apparent means of 
preserving Britain's industrial monopoly. 
In one significant respect, the eighteenth century agitations 
differed from those of the following forty years - they were, or appeared 
to be, more self-consciously Scottish. Three principal factors served 
to contribute to this characteristic. In the first place, the legis-
:lation governing Scotland until 1774 was largely framed by the pre-
Union Scots Parliament, and its application was thus restricted geo-
:graphically to north of the Border. Secondly, the British Parliament, 
when it ultimately did legislate for Scotland, insisted on apparently 
discriminatory legislation, especially in the case of oatmeal, Which 
in Scottish eyes was readily equated with the subservience of peculiar 
Scottish interests and a negation of Scottish rights under the articles 
of Union. Finally, the principal vehicle of agitation on behalf of 
the burghal interest collectively was the peculiarly Scottish institution, 
the Convention of Royal Burghs. 
Even in the eighteenth century, however, the Scottish content of 
the agitations was more apparent than real. Towards the close of the 
century, the debate over the details of successive pieces of embryonic 
legislation increasingly failed to mask the trend of the commercial 
interests of the west to question its intrinsic justification in the 
light of an exploding population and the gospel of Adam Smith. Clearly 
too, the agitations even in the eighteenth century were primarily moti-
:vated by local considerations - especially the alleged effects of the 
Corn Laws on the economic well-being of manufactures and trade - although 
37· 
the mechanism of the legislation in dispute tended to orientate the 
polemical debate from principles to details. The following half-
century diminished the Scottish character of the debate. As the. 
legislation governing Britain became standardised and national, as 
the demand for outright free trade came to the fore, and as the anti-
corn-law movement became a platform for a variety of economic, social, 
and political radicals, the apparent {almost superficial) Scottish con-
:text was submerged. This outcome was both aided and reflected by the 
evolution of a British anti-corn-law movement (assisted by a multiplicity 
of background factors including better communications) culminating in 
the Anti-Corn-Law League. The movement continued to be conducted in 
a different economic, social, pOlitical, and religious environment 
north of the Border - and this was reflected in attitudes to the debate 
and the composition of the contesting interest groups - but in this 
context, the local rather than the Scottish environment was the crucial 
factor. It was the rise of an industrial society and its challenge to 
the existing order which really originated the debate. 
Moreover, the new towns of the Industrial Revolution, as has been 
(90) 
pointed out, were not "insensate" ant-heaps. They were not merely 
a forum for the conception of new economic, social, and political orders, 
but also facilitated the evolution of pressure groups and extraparlia-
:mentary organisations to translate new dawns into reality. The 
formation of Chambers of Cormnerce in Glasgow and E.dinburgh in the 
1780's were a manifestation of a growing sense of separate economic 
interests in terms of general commercial policy. In the absence of a 
mass electorate, and the domination of the politics of interest 
90) Asa Briggs: The Age of Improvement. p.46. 
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(rather than the politics of ideology), they and other established 
corporate bodies individually and collectively represented the 
interested public insofar as it seemed safe or expedient to represent 
it. Other sections of the ttpublicu unrepresented in these middle-
class bodies also made their views on the corn-bills known through 
more traditional channels of protest, riots. Together these media 
of expression voiced the opinions of the two principal interest groups 
involved in the eighteenth century corn law agitations - the commercial/ 
manufacturing interest and consumers. 
Concurrently, however, with the corn law agitations, the 
eighteenth century had witnessed the rise of other extraparliamenta~ 
organisations, such as the Yorkshire Association, the Society for 
Constitutional Information, and the Scottish Convention movement of 
the 1780's, Which had gradually developed techniques of agitation, 
political education, and pressure on Parliament on constitutional 
(91) 
and political issues. A growing debate had evolved too in the 
eighteenth century on the functions of a Member of Parliament and his 
accountabili~ to his constituents. These developments were subs-
:tantially divorced from the anti-corn-law agitations of the 
eighteenth century, although the underlying social and political 
implications of the claims of the growing urban communities were 
increasingly evident by the last quarter of the century. In the firs-t 
half of the following century, however, the movements drew together and 
partially overlapped. The new economic interest WhiCh had fought the 
Corn Laws, frustrated in repeated attempts to secure commercial policies 
91) See Eugene C. Black: The Association; B~itish Extraparliamenta~ 
Organisation, 1769-93. 
based on free trade principles, turned to parliamentary reform as a 
means of promoting its own ideals. In turn, the political radicals 
(and other diverse interest groups) embraced free trade finding in 
it a collective platform from Which they could launCh a unified assault 
on the existing political and social order, as ~11 as anachronistic 
commercial principles and policies. Free Trade became decreasingly 
a purely commercial question. 
The increasing complexity of attitudes and interests rendered 
established corporate bodies, including chambers of commerce ~th their 
restricted aims and composition, insufficiently representative to 
function as effective vehicles of agitation. New associations which 
would include all those who subscribed to repeal of the Corn Laws, and 
exclude all those who did not - and the latter included more conservative 
commercial and industrial interests after Tooke 1s petition of 1820 -
were essential. Their functions too were wider. They were required 
to borrow from the techniques of the eighteenth century extraparlia-
:menta~ organisations for parliamenta~ reform, and develop these in 
the context of the opportunities created by an enlarged (though not 
mass) electorate from 1832, increasingly conscious of the politics of 
ideology. Previous agitations had tended to be pragmatic responses 
to either parliamentary legislation in embryo or to dearths, but after 
1832 an attempt was made to place the extraparliamentary agitation on 
a footing where it would operate continuously, independent of either 
proceedings in Parliament or fluctuations in the economic cycle. 
In the evolution of these new aims and teChniques of political 
association, Which found its fullest and most successful expression in 
the Anti-Corn-Law-League, Scotland made an important - though not 
40. 
primarily a self-consciously Scottish - contribution. It is an over-
(92) 
:simplification to suggest that the League was "made" in Manchester. 
Undoubtedly, the leadership of Cottonopolis was important, but no~th 
of the Border, it was grafted on to an existing anti-corn-law movement. 
Moreover, the latter had its roots in the earlier, if less successful, 
campaigns of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The free 
trade tradition in Scotland was not born in 1839. 
92) Asa Briggs: Victorian Cities. p.97. 
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2. The Corn Law of 1815 and post-war Scottish-radicalism, 1813-19. 
42. 
By 1813 the comparative boom in agriculture which had accompanied 
the FrenCh Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars was in danger of coming 
to a close. The renewal of imports of grain from Europe, together 
with an abundant domestic harvest (following years of dearth) combined 
to threaten the high price and rent levels which had pertained prior 
(1) 
to 1813. The danger to the economic prosperity of the landed interest, 
particularly marginal famers who had converted pastoral land to arable 
use in anticipation of continuing high prices, was acute. As their 
fears grew, enthusiasm for increased protection waxed, securing the 
formation of a Select Committee on the Corn Trade in 1813. The con-
:frontation which ensued, prior to the presentation of the Commdttee's 
report and lasting t'iJv years, served to confirm the trends which were 
already apparent in the late eighteenth century, but more emphatically. 
There was a clear-cut division of economic interest between the cereal-
producing landed interest and the commercial and consumer interests of 
the rapidly-growing urban communities. What was novel about the 
struggle of 1813-15, however, was the aggregate strength of the urban 
backlash and the pronounced political motivation of its participants, 
especially in the closing stages. 
Resistance from the urban communities to the possibility of 
increased grain prices was immediate, and not surprisingly, the initia-
:tive was taken by Glasgow. Before the report of the Select Committee 
had been presented to Parliament, the town cotmcil of the city had 
determined to petition against any increase in the importation price 
(2) 
level of grain. Special committees on the Corn Laws were created by 
1) D.G. Barnes: op. cit. Chapter 7. 
2) fv1inutes of Glasgow Town Council, 24/5/1813. 
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the council in 1813 and 1814, which urged the city to employ all con-
:stitutional and legal means to oppose any such enactment. Thereafter, 
annual petitions were presented against successive parliamentary pro~ 
(3) 
:posals for increased grain prices. From other nnmicipal corporations, 
such as Edinburgh, Dundee, Perth, and Inverness, similar sentiments 
(4) 
were expressed. Collectively, the Scottish burghs contested the pro-
:posals through the traditional medium of the Convention of Royal 
Burghs. This followed the successful motion of the commissioner for 
Glasgow that the Annual Committee be awarded conventional powers to 
"use all constitutional means for preventing the adoption of any exces-
:sive rise injurious to the nation at large, as well as to the commer-
(5) 
:cial and manufacturing interests of the country". 
Behind the universal protest of the official voice of burgh 
opinion lay an unprecedented degree of co-ordinated agitation, fre-
:quently instigated by unofficial pressure groups. In Edinburgh and 
Glasgow, the nuclei of manufacturing and commercial interests represen-
:ted in their respective chambers of commerce poured forth repeated 
(6) 
petitions against the various corn-bills of 1813-15. Moreover, in 
response to the example of Stirling Guildry which in March, 1814, had 
3) ibid., 3/6/1813; 24/2/1814; 5/5/1814; 24/2/1813. 
4) "Glasgow Chronicle", 10/3/1814; "Dundee Advertiser", 4/3/1814; 
18/3/1814; 24/3/1815; Minutes of Edinburgh 'Ibwn Council, 
20/4/1814; 15/3/1815; Minutes of Dundee Tmm Cotm.cil, 7/5/1814; 
13/3/1815; Hinutes of Inverness 'lbwn Council, 14/6/1813; 
7/3/1814; vl. Creech to Viscount Melville, Edinburgh, 26/5/1813. 
in Melville Castle Muniments. GD.51/5/298. 
5) Tflinutes of the Convention of Royal Burghs. 15/7/1813; 21/1/1814 .. 
6) "Dundee Advertiser", 4/3/1814; David Steuart to Viscount Melville, 
Edinburgh, 18/4/1814. in Melville Castle .Nuniments. 
GD.51/l/458.; Minutes of Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, 
3/6/1813; 15/4/1814; 15/2/1815. 
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formed a corresponding committee to communicate with the chambers of 
(7) 
commerce on the cor.n question1 the Glasgow body followed suit. It 
formed its own committee to correspond with other parts of the country 
(8) 
"taking an interest in the question". Together with similar ini tia-
:tives by the town councils of Glasgow and Edinburgh1 the activities 
of the Glasgow Chamber's corresponding committee had a salutary effect 
in gingering up more lethargic municipal corporations, such as Perth 
(9) 
and Inverness, to add their voices to the urban chorus. 
Among other more representative bodies of urban middle-class 
opinion, the trades incorporations were conspicuous as a vehicle of 
protest, from communities as diverse geographically and socially as 
(10) 
Glasgow, Aberdeen, Ktrkwall, and Crail. Even in predominantly 
agrarian areas, their demonstrations indicated that small pockets of 
trading or consumer interests shared in the consensus view of the 
larger urban centres. Furthermore, they too achieved a degree of 
combination which foreshado-vred later developments. 'lll:i. s was 
particularly true in Edinburgh, where the incorporations of the 
metropolis, Leith, Canongate, Calton, Easter and Wester Portsburgh 





The Stirling Guildry Book. p.l89. 
I\iinutes of Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, 15/4/1814. 
Minutes of Perth Town Council, 2/5/1814; l\tlnutes of Inverness 
Town Council, 14/6/1813; 7/3/1814. 
Report by the committees appointed by different incorporations 
of Edinburgh, etc., to attend to the progress of the corn-law-
bill now pending in Parliament. in "A collection of newspaper 
cuttings, pamphlets, etc., 1792~1847".; "Glasgow Chronicle", 
3/5/1814; 21/5/1814. 
'Ihe incorporations also included those of Ayr, Banff, Brechin, 
Dumfries, Dunfermline, Dysart, Elgin, Haddington, Hamilton, 
Irvine, Jedburgh1 Kelso, Kirkcaldy, Kirkcudbright, Linlitbgow, 
Montrose, fVJusselburgh, Nairn, Paisley1 Peebles, San~ar, St. 
Andrews and Stirling. 
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(11) 
a former Convener of Trades. This body proceeded to consider the 
corn question in depth, published "Observations" on the ministerial 
proposals, and co-ordinated petitioning activity by the constituent 
incorporations. Hi th increased ambition, it formed a corresponding 
sub-committee, transmitted copies of its broadsheet to the royal burghs 
of Scotland as well as some of the principal manufacturing towns in 
England, and levied a subscription on the local trades to defray the 
expense of its agitation. Moreover, its comnn.mications were recipro-
:cal. It received a request from the Incorporated Trades of Aberdeen 
to share the expense of retaining cotmsel in London to plead their case 
at the bar of the House of Commons, declining it only in view of the 
fact that several M.P. 's had taken up the question on behalf of the 
(12) 
manufacturing interest. 
However, the petitioning movement of 1813-15 owed as much to spon-
:taneity as to organisation, and the participants were not drawn from 
the limited confines of merely the middle-classes. \1orking- class 
sympathy with the protest was evident in the petitions of friendly 
(13) 
societies, and on a wider scale was expressed in mass petitions 
emanating from open meetings. In 1814 and 1815, Lord Archibald 
ll) 1he secretary of the aggregate committee was a lawy-er, William 
Gardner, W. S. 
12) Report by the committees appointed by different incorporations 
of Edinburgh, etc., to attend to the progress of the corn-la\'1-
bill now pending in Parliament; Also, "Observations made by 
the sub-committee on the corn-law bill, on the 12th., April, 
1814". Both in "A collection of newspaper cuttings, 
pamphlets, etc., 1792-1847". 
13) "Glasgow Chronicle", 7/5/1814; 10/5/1814. 
In Ayr, the friendly societies held a general meeting on 
3/5/1814 to petition against the corn bill, while in Hamilton, 
they combined with the town council in a joint application: 
46. 
Hamilton, M.P. for Lanarkshire, received petitions from Glasgow with 
over 18,000 signatures. On the latter occasion, these had been 
allegedly collected in less than four days after a public meeting 
chaired by the Lord Provost. Resulting from middle-class willingness 
to participate, unlike previous occasions, in a popular movement 
against the corn-bills, mass petitions proportionately as numerous 
emanated from a multiplicity·of communities in the cotton and linen 
(14) 
regions. The appearance of malpractices, including intimidation, to 
(15) 
secure signatures in isolated cases did not detract from the popular 
character of the movement. Rather it reflected the scale of the 
activity, and the unfamiliarity of many of the participants with the 
correct procedure cf petitioning. Not all were as fortunate as the 
Incorporated Trades of Rutherglen who were advised on the "regulation 
(16) 
of their conduct" by Lord Archibald Hamilton, and the Incorporated 
Tailors of Edinburgh 't'lere not alone in being tmsure of the "proper 
(17) 
channel of communication" for such a form of expression . A group of 
knot·Tled.geable petitioners in Glasgow, having received "frequent appli-
:cations respecting the mode of conducting a petition to Parliament", 
attempted to resolve the dilemma by publishing a set of instructions. 
The necessity for this action reflected the foundation of truth in 
their contention that "the annals of our country do not record an 
14) ibid., 14/5/1814; "Dundee Advertiser", 10/3/1815. 
Other mass petitions included Dundee (8-9,000); Perth 
(4,000); Hamilton (1,400); Pollokshaws (1,500); and Lanark 
(1,600). ( 11Glasgo\'l Chronicle", 4/6/1814; "Dundee Advertiser", 
10/6/1814; 17/3/1815.) 
15) e.g. in Dtmdee and Forfar. ("Dundee Advertiser 11 , 17/3/1815). 
16) "Glasgow Chronicle", 21/6/1814. 
17) vl.R. Denison to Viscotult Melville, Edinburgh, 20/3/1815. in 
H.O.(Scot.)Corr. R.H. 2/4/lo6. 
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instance wherein there was a more general and unequivocal expression of 
(18) 
the public voice against any measure". · When the "Glasgow Chronicle" 
reported in March, 1815, allegations which had been made in England· 
after riots in London that the corn-bill question was one which the 
lower classes could not understand, it felt obliged to concede that 
this assertion "may apply to the English". But triumphantly, the 
liberal organ concluded that it was certainly not true of the working-
classes in Scotland "\'lhose judicious resolutions, al\'1ays we believe, 
composed by themselves, prove that they are at least as conversant 
(19) 
with the subject as the higher classes". 
The "Chronicle's" complacency was premature. In l'1larch and April, 
1815, working-clas~ dissent in Scotland too found expression in uncon-
:stitutional action. In Glasgow, a mob stoned Kirkman Finlay's house 
(20) 
in anger at his volte-face on the corn-bill, ·forcing the Government 
to send six troops of dragoons from Hamilton to contain the situation. 
In view of the small size of the military establishment in Scotland, 
(21) 
the eruption alarmed the authorities north of the Border. In 
Edinburgh, the local militia took precautionary measures to anticipate 
"any unpleasant circumstances" which might accrue from "matters 
(22) 
connected with a subject no\'1 or lately tmder public discussion". 
18) Resolutions passed at a public meeting of the inhabitants of the 
city of Glasgow, 12/4/1815; Corn Laws: petition for repeal, 
12/4/1815. Both in ibid. 
19) "Glasgow Chronicle", 7/3/1815. 
20) James Gourlay ( ed. ) : The provosts of Glasgow from 1609 to 
1832. pp.118-9. 
21) Alexander Colquhoun to Viscount Sidmouth, Edinburgh, 31/3/1815. 
in H.O.(Scot.)Corr. R.H. 2/4/lo6. 
22) I-:iajor Lewis Gordon to Viscount Sidmouth, Edinburgh, 25/3/1815. 
in ibid. 
48. 
These steps were timely, as a minor disturbance broke out in the metro-
: polis a few days later in \!thich the Lord Provost 1 s windows were, as in 
Glasgo'\'1, the prime target. Its revolutionary overtones were readily 
confirmed in the eyes of the panicky authorities \'then "inflammatory 
hand-bills" on the repeal of the corn-bill were found on one of the 
(23) 
culprits. In Perth, "a discontented spirit among the labouring 
classes, particularly the -vmaversn led to serious and recurring dis-
(24) 
:turbances, culminating in the stoning of a magistrate, while in 
Clackmannanshire and neighbouring Stirlingshire, colliers, miners, and 
manufacturers furnished a nucleus for similar protests against the 
(25) 
corn-bill. 
The riots wer~ widespread, but would have been on a wider scale if 
some of the Government's adherents in Scotland had not acquiesced in 
the constitutional mode of petitioning, in order to avert the threat 
of disturbances which l'tould have followed any attempt to frustrate 
(26) 
legitimate self-expression. Nevertheless, the alarm of both the 
23) Alexander Colquhotm to Viscount Sidmouth, Edinburgh, 31/3/1815. 
in ibid. 
24) Robert Ross to the Duke of Athole, Perth, 21/4/1815. in ibid. 
25) D. Boyle to the Lord Advocate, Edinburgh, 1/5/1815. in ibid. 
Lord Justice Clerk Boyle reported that the local magistrates 
had detected "indications of a seditious tendency and 
approaching to a contempt of the authority of the law 
amongst the people of that cotm.ty and neighbourhood". 
26) One of those tl'D.ls embarrased was Provost Wilson of Dunfermline. 
a loyal adherent of the Ministry. He felt obliged to apologise 
to Viscount Melville for having to transmit a petition to him 
on 16/5/1814, on behalf of the inhabitants of the burgh, as 
the signatories were "ill-informed and inadequate to ju~" 
the issue. But he enclosed it "chiefly to prevent the clamour 
that probably would be the consequence of my refusing to comply 
with their request; and which might tend to injure the interest 
of the Government in this burgh - which I am most anxious to 
preserve". (G. Hilson to Viscotmt Melville, Dtmfermline, 
16/5/1814. in Nelville Castle Muniments. GD.51/5/304.) 
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authorities and the urban middle-classes, who remembered the social 
convulsion in France or the militia riots of 1797 at home, was acute. 
Lord Justice Clerk Boyle perambulated the industrial areas reporting 
sedition and urging the formation of volunteer corps "of the better 
classes of the inhabitants" to co1.mteract the \'IOrking-class agitation 
(27) 
and protect property. Boyle shared the general concern at the 
inadequacy of the existing military forces in Scotland, but by 8/5/1815, 
Viscount Sidmouth had made it clear that these would not be augmented, 
(28) 
and that responsibility for order would devolve on the yeomanry. 
This gave little comfort to those who detected a "revolutionary" situa-
:tion in reports that the rioters in Perth, Forfarshire, and 
Clackmannan were receiving instructions from Glasgor.-r or another centre. 
(29) 
Invariably, the authority for such imputations was mere rumour, 
and they did not survive the cessation of rioting in early May, 1815. 
The anti-corn-bill demonstrations of 1813-15 were a multiplicity of 
local responses rather than one national movement, and if they 
differed from those of the preceding century, this lay less in the 
groping attempts at co-ordination which were made, and more in the 
scale and intensity of the urban protest. 
In another respect too, the anti-corn-bill agitation of 1813-15 
reflected a degree of continuity with those of the eighteenth century. 
Ir1ost of the later petitions and resolutions paraphrased the original 
plea of Glasgow Town Council on 24/5/1813 that "no advance might be 
27) D. Boyle to the Lord Advocate, Edinburgh, 1/5/1815. in H.O. 
(Scat.) Corr. R.H. 2/4/lo6. 
28) Viscount Sidmouth to Lt. General Sir William Gordon, London, 
8/5/1815. in ibid. 
29) Robert Ross to the Duke of Athole, Perth, 21/4/1815; and, D. 
Boyle to the Lord Advocate, Edinburgh, 1/5/1815. Both in ibid. 
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made in the prioes at which the importation of the different sorts of 
(30) 
grain might take place". ·This implied, though infrequently stated, 
a recognition of the right of agriculture to its existing level of 
protection in 1813. The concept of outright free trade in grain 
(31) 
was postulated by some of the more radical elements in the agitation, 
but it was conspicuously absent from the demands of the middle-class 
corporate bodies. 'Ihe Incorporated Trades of Edinburgh were fairly 
typical when they conceded that agriculture was "beyond doubt, the 
first and most necessary of all the arts, and as such, entitled to the 
protection of the legislaturerr, confining their criticism to "so great 
an extension of the import price of corn". In the event, and equally 
(32) 
typically, they favoured no extension. 
By 1815, when the proposals of the original Select Committee had 
been drastically modified, the previous tmanimi ty of the urban middle-
class demands became dissipated. Conservative members of the urban 
communities were prepared, like Kirkman Finlay, to accept an increased 
measure of protection which would "secure perfectly, and beyond all 
doubt, our ow.n agriculture from the effects of foreign importation in 
ordinary seasons, without being such as to augment to the consumer 
the unavoidable distress of unfavourable ones". With more than a 
30) Robert Renwick (ed.): op.cit. vol. 10. pp.178-9. 
31) The inhabitants of Greenock argued that "from the bulky nature 
of its products", agriculture always enjoyed a natural 
protection through.the cost of transportation. The 
inhabitants of Kilwinning were "not sufficiently acquainted 
with the political economy of nations to decide whether 
the corn laws should not be repealed in toto". ("Glasgow 
Chronicle", 12/5/1814). 
32) Observations made by the. sub-committee on the corn-law-bill 
on the 12th., April, 1814. in "A collection of newspaper 
cuttings, pamphlets, etc., 1792-1847". 
51. 
particle of truth, he pointed out that no-one denied in petitions 
that the home grower required protection, to aid him against the 
disadvantages of heavy taz:ation, an inferior soil, and an uncert.ain 
(33) 
climate, and that the debate centred on the required level. 
Ho\•rever, even in the conservative Edinburgh Merchant Company, the 
adherents of Finlay 1 s vie\11 ltrere repulsed by "a very great majority" 
when they proposed increased agrarian protection to render Britain 
self-sufficient and to yield "that fair encouragement to the farmer 
(34) 
for his capital and industry to which he was justly entitled". 
The proposals by many middle-class corporations by 1815 for a level 
of protection in advance of e.:>dsting levels t'lere less a recognition 
of the intrinsic justice of the agriculturists' case, and more an 
appreciation of political reality. They represented an attempt to 
modify a measure which \'las obviously destined to be enacted, and many 
were qualified by the recommendation that any additional protection 
(35) 
should be temporary. Not even Finlay and the conservative minority 
advocated the level of protection eventually secured by the landed 
interest in 1815. 
The polemical arguments of the urban interests reflected con-
:tradictory attitudes towards the case for increased agrarian 
protection. The substantial measure of self-sufficiency and high 
33) Finlay believed that an import price level of 75-6/- per quarter 
for wheat would suffice to achieve his objective. On his 
own admission, his conviction that increased protection was 
required evolved during 1814-15 - during the depression in 
the price of grain. (~linutes of Gla.sgo\'1 Town Cotmcil, 
25/3/1815.) 
34) Minutes of the Edinburgh Merchant Company, 13/3/1815. 
35) Minutes of Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, 25/2/1815; Minutes of 
Glasgow Town Cotmcil, 24/2/1815; Minutes of Perth Town 
Council, 6/3/1815. 
52. 
prices reached in war-time conditions were readily cited as proof 
(36) 
that no further protection was required. The impact of peace-time 
conditions and the cessation of bad harvests on future price trends 
were conveniently overlooked. The Deacons of the Incorporated 
Trades of Dumbarton \'rere more honest (if less politic) when they 
admitted that they had been prepared to accept high prices in war-
time as a necessary evil, even although it had brought prosperity 
to the occupier of land, but that it was a "maxim of political 
(37) 
economy" that the price of provisions should find their own level. 
The possible repeal of the property tax on landed estate and the 
pace of agricultural improvements seemed calculated in urban eyes 
to provide adequate compensation for any loss sustained through lower 
(38) 
price levels. If additional redress was required, economical reform, 
a cut-back in public expenditure and therefore taxation, through dis-
:banding the army and purifying the pension-list, were more palatable 
(39) 
measures than tJti.ghtening-up the Corn Laws. 
If the urban interests rejected the concept of increased agrarian 
protection as intrinsically justifiable for the prosperity of agri-
:culture, they equally rejected the presentation of its case on 
national considerations. Both Glasgow Town Council and Glasgow 
36) Minutes of Edinburgh Merchant Company, 1/7/1813; Observations 
made by the sub-committee on the corn-law-bill on the 12th., 
April, 1814. in "A collection of newspaper cuttings, 
pamphlets, etc. 1792-1847". 
37) The Dumbarton deacons asserted that "all the other produce of 
land sells at a rate so high as that many articles are yet 
placed beyond the acquisition of the lower classes". 
(Petition of the Incorporated Trades of the Royal Burgh of 
Dumbarton on the Corn-Laws, 10/3/1815. in H.O.(Scot.)Corr. 
R.H. 2/4/106. 
38) ibid.; Also, 'Ihe Stirling Guildry Book. p.190. 
39) "Dundee Advertiser", 24/2/1815. 
Chamber of Commerce rejected the plea of the Select Committee for 
self-sufficiency as inconsistent. The latter summed up the manu-
:facturing and commercial attitude, observing that "the results 
upon which the Select Committee found their plea for altering the 
corn laws are at variance with each other, and the reverse of 
what this Chamber conceive ought to be drawn from the circumstances 
( 4o) 
from whi eh they are drawn". Britain's increasing dependence on 
fore.ign grain was due, in urban eyes, not to agrarian decay, but 
to increasing consumption resulting from commercial and industrial 
(41) 
success. In the opinion of the urban middle-classes, Britain 
could never regain her former self-sufficiency, and the claims of 
( 42) 
the landed intere~t merely appeared self-interested. Even if 
such a policy did bear fruit, as a result of increased protection, 
it would be "at an unnecessary expense to the great body of the 
( 43) 
nation". 
The motivation of the urban middle-classes was no more disin-
:terested than that of the agriculturists. Th~ assumed that wages 
rates were governed by the cost of provisions, anticipating a 
multiplier effect on prices which would render British exports of 
manufactured articles uncompetitive, and produce a flight of 
4o) fllinutes of Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, 25/5/1815; 3/6/1813. 
41) The Council's committee argued that 11 the excess of imports 
since 1765 has arisen, not from the decay of agriculture 
in consequence of the absence of restriction on impor-
:tation, but from the increased consumption, of which the 
great prosperity of trade and manufactures affords the 
means and which it naturally induces 11 • (Minutes of Glasgow 
Town Council, 3/6/1813). 
42) "Glasgow Chronicle", 30/4/1814. 
43) Minutes of Edinburgh Town Council, 20/4/1814. 
manufactures and capital abroad. ( 44 )Such attitudes \'Tere not novel, but 
the genesis of industrialisation in continental Europe, evident b.y 
1813-15, rendered them more acute. In particular, the cotton 
industry of the west of Scotland, which since the close of the 
eighteenth century had been the premier industry of the country 
after agriculture felt threatened by the possibility of increased 
labour costs in the face of potential competition from France or other 
continental states. (45 ) 
The fear of the Narking-class agitators, and consequently the 
violence of their reaction, was more acute. The dearth of 1813 
was only the most recent reminder that Britain's population had out-
:stripped its domestic food supplies, as the Edinburgh Trades 
(46) 
correctly perceived. The spectre of Malthus was a cogent threat. 
Moreover, even the prospect of high cereal prices could scarcely 
be greeted with equanimity. The corn-bill of 1815 was readily seen 
by working-class radicals as peculiarly oppressive to those at sub-
:sistence level who would be denied na: participation in the Bounty 
of Heaven n. Noreover, insofar as increased food prices would inevi-
: tably lead to retrenchment in other spheres of individual expenditure, 
including education, its effects could be far-reaching. Not only did 
44) ibid., 20/4/1814; Observations made by the sub-committee on 
the corn-law-bill on the 12th., April, 1814. in 11A collection 
of newspaper cuttLngs, pamphlets etc., 1792-1847. 
45) IVdnutes of Glasgow Town Council, 5/5/1814. 
46) In the space of ten years, Britain's population had risen by 
1,611,882. (Observations made by the sub-committee on the 
Corn-Law-Bill, on the 12th., April, 1814. in "A collection 
of newspaper cuttings, pamphlets etc. 1792-1847". 
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it prejudice the peculiarly Scottish social value attached to working-
(47) 
class education, but it could be productive of social disorder. 
However, neither the vTorking-class nor middle-class agitators 
were motivated purely by economic hopes and fears. The political 
content of the dialogue, so apparent even in the previous century, 
emerged more prominently in 1813-15. 'Ihe attempt by the 1 anded 
interest to secure a continuation of the high level of war-time prices 
was inevitably interpreted by the manufacturing and commercial interests 
as calculated "to put money into the pockets of the land.holders at the 
expense of the other classes of the community". Even the farmer, it 
was anticipated, would benefit only temporarily from increased prices, 
as any increase in his income would be absorbed on the renewal of his 
(48) 
lease by rent increases. The protectionist plea for self-sufficiency 
for national strategic reasons met with little· sympathy, and the per-
:sistence of the landed interest in Parliament heightened the ground of 
suspicion that its supporters had "other and less patriotic enq.s in 
( 49) 
view". Moreover, to a variety of urban interests increasingly ready 
to identify themselves with the nation as a whole, and the progress of 
47) Resolutions passed at a public meeting of the inhabitants of the 
City of Glasgow, 12/4/1815. in H.O.(Scot.)Corr. R.H. ~4/lo6. 
48) r.1inutes of Glasgow Chamber of Conunerce, 15/4/1814; Minutes of 
Glasgow 'Ib\m Council, 24/5/1813; David Steuart to Viscount 
Melville, Edinburgh, 18/4/1814, in Melville Castle muniments. 
GD. 51/5/458. 
49) "Glasgow Chronicle", 30/4/1814. 
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. (50) 
industry and commerce with the march of civilisation, the concept 
of preferential treatment for the landed interest seemed anachronistic 
as well as inequitable. 
The overall political motivation of the urban agitation was 
obvious to apologists of the landed interest. In particular, the 
landholders seemed "to be the great object of clamour, and they are 
held up as an avaricious set of beings, whose chief aim is to prey 
(51) 
upon the necessities of the unfortunate manufacturer". All agri.cul-
:tural protectionists subscribed to the comforting verdict that the 
middle-class bodies of the towns had not considered the question from 
"a great national point of view", but merely as a piece of class legis-
:lation with which they had charged the landed interest with a desire 
(52) 
to oppress the poor". Dubiety existed only on one point, the principal 
source of the urban agitation. Hepburn of Smeaton blamed the "sus-
:picious jealousy" of the manufacturing interest, and questioned the 
consistency of Glasgow Chamber of Commerce's alleged demand for free 
(53) 
trade in corn, in view of the high level of manufacturing protection. 
50) The Incorporated Trades in Edinburgh reflected that "when Britain 
was a country of shepherds and warriors, we beheld her incon-
:siderable in numbers or power, but when manufacturers found 
their way into the country, when the spirit of commerce 
actuated all, we have seen Britain rise to a pinnacle of 
grandeur and power unexampled in the annals of the world • • • 
Our manufacturing industry, and our mercantile enterprise 
have alone enabled our Government to make such Herculean 
efforts for the salvation of Europe". (Observations made by 
the sub-committee on the corn-law-bill on the 12th., April, 
1814. in "A collection of newspaper cuttings, pamphlets, 
etc. 1792-1847". 
51) John Campbell of Carbrook: A Letter on the proposed alteration 
of the Corn Laws addressed to Sir Henry Parnell, Bart. p.a. 
52) N. Lowis: A Letter in defence of the claim for an increase on 
the import duty of grain. p.4. 
53) The Sp~ech of the Hon. Mr. Baron Hepburn of Smeaton on the 
subject of the Corn Laws. pp. 52-3, 56-7. 
' 
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On the other hand, John Campbell of Carbrook, another agricultural 
spokesman, exonerated the 11\ltell-informed" manufacturers from leading 
the agitation, and laid responsibility at the door of the consumer 
(54) 
interest represented by the tradesmen. 
There was an element of truth in Campbell's observation, insofar 
as the corn-bills of 1813-15 appeared to t-lorking-class opinion in 
Scotland peculiarly partial. Class legislation in the interests of 
the landed interest, to maintain prices, was contrasted with the 
rejection of the operative's demand for legislative protection to 
secure minimum wage rates in 1811-13 - an agitation in which Scotland 
(55) 
had been in the forefront. -From stricken weaving communities, such 
as Strathaven and Paisley, petitions contrasted the readiness with 
which the landed interest in Parliament were prepared to legislate in 
their own interest, with the obloquy attached to the operatives' corn-
:parable attempts to fix a minimum price for their produce, their 
labour. 'Iheir conclusion \'las that "one class of the community ought 
never to be upheld and emri ched at the expense and misery of any other 
54) Jolm Campbell of Carbrook: op. ci t., pp.39-40 
55) Alexander B. Richmond: Narrative of the condition of the manu-
:facturing population and the proceedings of government 




classes belonging to the same community". -As Alexander Richmond, 
the lynch-pin of KirlrJnan Finlay 1 s spy-ring observed, it was this 
contrast which stimulated a demand for parliamentary reform after 
the corn-bill was passed in 1815. 
Until then, the question of parliamentary reform had been 
scrupulously omitted from resolutions and petitions, but the passage 
of the cor.n-bill in 1815 inevitably prompted some to enquire whether 
the lower chamber v1as truly representative of the popular will. By 
April, 1815, this ~·1as the dominant theme in some meetings in the v1est 
of Scotland. A public meeting in Glasgow on 12/4/1815 concluded that 
the passage of the corn-bill indicated that "the representation of the 
people in Parliament is radically defective". It pointed out the 
existence of pocket boroughs and the lack of representation for "great 
and populous towns", attributing a multitude of sins from the corn 
laws to the wars in which the country was perpetually involved - "and 
the intolerable load of taxes v-1herewi th we are consequently burdened" -
56) "Glasgow Chronicle", 3/5/1814; 12/5/1814; 31/5/1814. 
A political songwriter of 1814 contrasted class legislation 
to enrich the landed interest with the refusal of Parliament 
to legislate for \'/ages in 1811 :-
"It is not many- years since petitions were sent, 
from all kinds of tradesmen, their wages to stcnt, 
So that they might live by the sweat of their brow; 
But these you rejected, and why not this too? 
"But because ye're determin'd the poor to suppress, 
And the wealth of the Landholder still to increase, 
SuCh partial proceedings I ne'er knew before, 
I pray you desist from what all does abhor". 
(Anonymous: The Corn Laws, a new song. pp.3-4) 
59· 
to the "overwhelming preponderance of a selfish aristocraticaJ. 
(57) 
obligarchy". In Strathaven, a working-class demonstration on 
27/4/1814 asserted that the evidence taken before the Select Commit-
:tee of 1813 had been "partial and interested", and that the landed 
interest in Parliament had acted as "a court composed of judge or 
. th . " JUrors on e1r own case . The "obstinate precipitancy
11 of the 
measure had illustrated that "the higher orders in society consider 
the loifrer as merely subservient to their purposes" in war and peace. 
'Ihe disregard of the people's petitions indicated that "the protection 
of the people's rights and liberties by the House of Commons is a 
mere delusion, existing only in the dead letter of the constitution". 
A 11thorough refoi:'lll 11 of Parliament was essential if the petitions of 
the people were to be "candidly and conscientiously attended to". The 
(58) 
chairmaiL of ·the Strathaven meeting was a weaver, James "Perly" Wilson, 
executed for his role in the uRadical Warn in 1820. The :roots of post-
war Scottish radicalism were nurtured in the corn-bill crisis of 1813-15. 
The demand for parliamentary reform emerged from a feeling that an 
undefined balance of interests was not being safeguarded by the legis-
:lature, and from the apparent total inability of the urban interests 
in general, and of the lower echelons of society in particular, to 
influence parliamentary events. 
57) Resolutions passed at a public meeting of the inhabitants of 
the City of Glasgow, 12/4/1815. in H.O.(Scot.)Corr. 
R.H. 2/4/lo6. 
Subsequently printed as a handbill, a copy of these 
resolutions was fo~Tarded by Lord Provost Robert Ross 
of Perth through the Duke of Athole to Sidmouth, as 
evidence of organised sedition. (Duke of Athole to 
Viscount Sidmouth, Perth, 21/4/1815. in ibid.) 
58) "Glasgow Chronicle", 3/4/184o; "Glasgow Argus", 17/6/1841. 
This meeting was erroneously dated in 1819 b,y Alexander 
Wi1son: "The Chartist Movement in Scotland." p. 309 
note. D.Phil. thesis. Oxford, 1951. 
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The cessation of anti-corn-law activity by mid-1815 and its 
virtual disappearance until the middle of the following decade tended 
to conceal the link between the corn question and political radicalism. 
It has been assumed that the inactivity of the post-war years could 
be attributed to low prices over half of the seven years from 1815 -
which offers no explanation for acquiescence in the years when prices 
were high - or to the proposition that the working-classes had "more 
(59) 
pressing grievances to hold their attention". In the Scottish context 
at least, such interpretations are barely adequate. The increasing 
propagation of the principles of free trade, particularly their impli-
:cations for the corn trade, by the expanding periodical press, belied 
the suggestion that interest in the Corn Laws was dead. The partici-
(60) 
:pation of the ''Scotsman" (from its commencement in January, 1817 
(61) 
and the "Edinburgh Review" in the debate challenged the view that 
moderate middle-class urban reformist opinion accepted the "finality" 
o£ the Corn Law of 1815. 
Not all moderate r~formers after 1815 did imbue passionate anti-
corn-law sentiment. l".tany of the Parliament House \Vhigs, such as Henry 
(62) 
Cockburn, were less enamoured '\vi th the glamour of industry than other 
observers of the industrial scene. Moreover, although Jeffrey, 
Cockburn, and the \fuig reforming advocates of Edinburgh shared in the 
almost universal enthusiasm for the infant science of political 
59) D.G. Barnes: op. cit., p.157. 
60) "Scotsman", 5/12/1818. 
61) "The Edinburgh Review", July, 1819, pp. 57-61. 
62) e.g. Lord Cockburn's reference to an area of Stirlingshire 
being "unpolluted" by manufactures. (Henry Cockburn: 
Life and Corre~pondence of Lord Jeffrey, Vol. 1, p.21). 
61. 
economy, in the application of its more radical tenets to economic 
and social problems, they were conservative. Follol'dng Mal thus, 
Jeffrey blamed the post-war depression on overpopulation, and con-
:tended that it was "plainly impossible that it can be cured by any 
(63) 
change in our commerci aJ.. relations 11 • At the Pan the on meeting on 
16/12/1820, the sole concession to free trade was a resolution which 
alluded to "an ignorant and illiberal system of policy as to the laws 
(64) 
and regulations of trade". -By social function and political instinct, 
the Whig lawyers were primarily interested in organic constitutional 
and political issues. But in their preoccupation with this narrow 
definition of politics, they reflected as well as created the prevail-
:ing mood. In Glasgow, a prominent free trader in later life and a 
leading merchant, James Oswald, was similarly occupied. In 1820, 
he chaired a meeting which advocated organic changes in the constitu-
:tion, and paid only ambiguous lip-service to criticism of "impolitic 
(65) 
restrictions and burdens" on trade. 
However, with the average price of corn in 1816-19 low only in 
(66) 
contrast to years of peak \'Tar-time prices such as 1812-13, the death 
of the corn question was more apparent than real. It merely found 
expression in what seemed, in view of the Corn La\47 of 1815 and of the 
63) Henry Cockburn: ibid., vol. 2., pp. 189-90. 
64) Henry Co ckbum : Report of the proceedings of the general 
meeting of the inhabitants of Edinburgh, December 16, 
1820. pp. 23-5. 
65) "Scotsman", 30/12/1820. 
66) D. G. Barnes: op. ci t., Appendix B., p. 298. 
The annual average price in England Vlales fell to 67/lOd. 
per quarter for '"heat by 1820. 
62. 
subsequent repressive measures of the Ldverpool administration, a 
more realistic demand for parliamentary reform. The passage of 
the Corn Laws, and its effects in raising the price level of "the 
first staple of consumption" and disrupting trade, were squarely 
attributed to "the partial and corrupt representation of the people 
in Parliament" by the Paisley reformers in October, 1816. Consti-
(67) 
: tutional reform \'las their panacea. The banner bearing the legend 
"Bread or Blood! 11 which fluttered over the Nagdalen Yard Reform 
meeting in Dundee in November, 1819, was far from tmique, and anti-
(68) 
corn-law slogans ador.ned many radical rallies. The parliamentary 
reformers of the post-war period did not draw their wide base of 
popular support frum a universal pre-occupation with the intricacies 
of constitutional la\'i, or even from an intrinsic interest in the 
political complexion of the incumbents in power. Parliamentary 
reform was not merely an end in itself, but a means to several ends, 
one of which was a revision of the Corn Laws. 
In his attempt to furnish a pedigree for the Anti-Corn Law League, 
Archibald Prentice undoubtedly exaggerated when he later claimed that 
"from 1815 to the period when some considerable parliamentary reform 
was seen to be inevitable, its necessity was mainly argued from the 
(69) 
impolicy and the injustice of the Corn Laws". · Nevertheless, there 
was substance in his contention that resentment against the 1815 Cor.n 
LaN provided a popular head of steam for radicalism. Not only did 
67) Robert Brown: History of Paisley. vol. 2., pp. 165-68. 
68) Robert Brown: ibid. Vol. 2., pp. 184-5; An Account of the 
proceedings of a meeting held at Dundee, lOth., November, 
1819; Also, \'1. Norrie: Dundee Celebrities of the 
Nineteenth Gentry. p. 39. 
69) Archi bald Prenti ce : History of the League. vol. I. , p. 1. 
its outcome seem to prove the need for constitutional change in 
order to produce "impartial legislation 11 , but the sustained 
ferocity of the debate over the Corn Laws in 1813-15 contributed 
much to the evolving consciousness of a separate political and 
economic identity throughout the urban communities. If the 
dread of revolution prevented the immediate adoption of parlia-
(70) 
:mentary reform by the manufacturing and commercial interests, 
this did not long survive the dissipation of the threat. When 
the landed interest in Parliament proved an intractable barrier 
to the implementation of their new comprehensive free trade faith 
in the case of corn, the logical road out of the impasse had been 
indicated already by the radicals. From the confrontation of 
1813-15, the issues of Corn Lat·l repeal and parliamentary reform 
were intertwined. Sometimes they became separated, but they were 
never totally divorced. 
70) The intense fear of revolution on the part of the more influ-
:ential members of the propertied middle-classes in 
Scotland, during the post-war era, was adequately reflected 
in the address of Aberdeen Town Council to the Prince 
Regent in 1819. 'lhey venerated "the unparalleled excel-
:lence of our happy constitution in Church and State", 
contemplating with concern the attempts of radicals 11tmder 
the specious but delusive pretence of reform, assembling 
numerous and often tumultuous conventions of the people, 
and by seditious harangues inflaming their minds against 
the Rulers of our country", aided by "that most powerful 
engine of mischief, a profligate and licentious press", 
and oblivious of "the dreadful example of revolutionary 
France". ( Ivlinutes of Aberdeen Town Council, 23/11/1819). 
3. The Turn of the Tide - the Emergence of Free Trade, 1820-32. 
Despite the modification of the original proposals of the Select 
Committee of 1813, by 1815 when the new Corn Law was eventually 
enacted, the landed interest had secured a considerable increase in 
the degree of legislative protection enjoyed by agriculture. The 
urban interests who contested the various bills in 1813-15 were con-
:sciously on the defensive, had moderated their own suggested amend-
:ments accordingly, and felt totally vanquished when the Corn Law 
received the royal assent. The fact that the new law did not accede 
to the full demands of the agriculturists detracted little from the 
triumph of the landed interest. Ten years later, however, the 
latter had commenced the long retreat from the high-water mark of 
agrarian protection, and by 1832, the landed interest was forced to 
fight the Refor.m Bill partially in defence of a reduced level of pro-
:tection. This transformation, achieved in the face of relatively 
little anti-corn-law agitation in urban areas, was attributable to the 
slow acceptance of a more comprehensive free trade philosophy by urban 
interests and the disillusionment of the landed interest with existing 
for.ms of protection. 
In 1813-15 agricultural opinion in Scotland had a pro~und faith 
in the efficacy and necessity of a high level of physical prohibition 
of cereal imports. The lack of an agricultural agitation in 1813-15 
corresponding to that in the burghs cannot be construed as evidence 
to the contrary. More accurately, it reflected the faith of the 
agricultural interest in the purpose and capacity of its parliarnen-
:tary representatives to ensure an adequate degree of protection. 
This optimism was not unjustified in view of the premise of the chair-
:man of the Select Cormni ttee, Sir Henry Parnell, that "the interests 
of the agricultural labourers and of the farmers as forming so great 
a part of our national wealth and strength have a great claim to 
protection, even independent of the leading object of a sufficient 
supply of corn". (l)Besides, Scottish agriculturists could rely, as 
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one protectionist succinctly stated, on Viscount Melville 1s "Imowledge 
of country matters" to protect their interests. (
2
) 
However, by 1815 the modifications to the original proposals of 
Parnell's committee had eroded some of their faith in Viscount 
Melville. In the premier wheat county of East Lothian, the agricul-
:turists raised meetings in Dunbar and Haddington to petition for 
higher levels of prohibition than those proposed in the 1815 bill. 
They contended that the proposed level for wheat would barely ensure 
the farmer against actual loss, and that to provide a "fair" remunera-
:tion, it should be raised. The rates for barley and oats should be 
correspondingly raised. (3 )Robert Dundas of Arniston was undoubtedly 
correct when he pin-pointed distress and alarm in November, 1815 to 
areas of lately-let and high-rented arable farms, those lands of "a 
middling and inferior quality" which inflated war-time prices had 
converted in the Lothians as elsewhere from pastoral use. He was 
less representative of his class when he contended that even reduced 
import levels would permit the Scottish farmer to cultivate wheat 
advantageously, with the gradual return of inferior lands to their 
1) Copy. Sir Henry Parnell to John Gladstone, wndon, 26/5/1814, 
in Buccleuch Muniments. GD.224/511. 
2) F. Walker to Viscount Melville, Haddington, ~2/1815, in Melville 
Castle Muniments. GD. 51/5/3()(~ 
3) F. Walker to Viscount Melville, Haddington, 18/2/1815, in ibid., 
G.D. 5l/5/307. 
"original and proper purpose". (4 )Faced with the prospective burden 
of ruinously high rents contracted on the assumption of continuing 
high war-time prices, and subject to the additional embarrassment of 
Scotland's traditional long leases, many tenant farmers were turning 
in desperation to the advocacy of palliatives, notably the conversion 
of money to corn-rents. (5 ) 
Nevertheless, although the agriculturists as a class felt their 
prosperity was dependent on adequate and increased protection, they 
equally felt bound to justify their case on grounds other than that 
of self-preservation, in the face of free trade polemics from the 
manufacturing and mercantile interests. This had been apparent even 
in the closing agitations of the previous century, but it was more 
evident by 1813-15. Significantly, even the messiah of prohibition 
in agriculture, the Earl of Lauderdale, did not attempt to confute 
the principles of free trade in general, but merely contended that it 
was prejudicial to impose them unilaterally on one species of trade 
and employment. In the case of agriculture, however, he found that 
legislative interference was essential anyway, due to the uncer-
:tainty of the produce and the necessity for an adequate supply. (6 ) 
Hepburn of Smeaton too was haunted by the spectre of Adam Sni th, and 
declined to challe~ the great master. He contended, instead, that 
4) Copy. Robert Dundas to Sir John Sinclair, Arniston, 14/11/18151 
in ibid., GD~5l/5/313. 
5) Robert Brom1: Letters on the Distressed state of Agriculturists. 
(Edinburgh, 1816). p.54; Also, Robert Wilson: An Enquiry into 
the Causes of the High Prices of Corn and Labour. 
6) A Letter on the Corn Laws by the Earl of I.auderdale. 
pp. 4-5, 7, 19-21. 
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the economist had favoured protection for agriculture, as "the last 
upon which the experiment of free trade should be tried". Like 
Lauderdale, Hepburn averred that Britain's increasing imports in the 
second half of the eighteenth century were attributable to lack of 
encouragement for domestic agriculture, and recommended "as near a 
recurrence to the former system as the great changes that have taken 
place and the great increase of the wealth and population of the 
. 11 ll " (7) emp~re wi a ow • 
Tb reinforce their case for additional protection, the landed 
interest readily cited the strate~c need for national self-sufficiency 
as evinced during the period of the "Continental System", and 
coloured this with ~althusian gloom. (8)The alleged peculiarly onerous 
burdens, taxation and gratuitous services exacted from the landed in-
:terest, also furnished the basis of claims for consideration~ The 
former in Scotland included the land tax, stipends, teachers' 
salaries, the construction and repair of manses, churches, and school-
:rooms, poor-rates, and rogue money in addition to unpaid services as 
justices of the peace or commissioners of supply. (g)But as one of their 
urban apologists admitted, although the agriculturists were prepared 
to stress their burdens for propagandist purposes, their objective was 
7) The Speech of the Hon. Mr. Baron Hepburn of Smeaton on the subject 
of the Corn Laws. pp. 4-5, 7, 19-21. 
8) John Campbell of Carbrook: A letter on the proposed alteration 
of the Corn Laws addressed to Sir Henry Parnell, Bart. 
pp. 8, 34-5, 46-7. 
9) N. I.owis : A letter in defence of the claim for an increase on 
the import duty of grain. pp. 17-8~ 
(10) 
not a removal of taxes but the encouragement of agriculture. These 
complaints were subsidiary to the cardinal point which Hepburn of 
Smeaton crystallised when he repudiated the claim of Glasgow Chamber· 
of Commerce for free trade in corn as inconsistent in view of the 
existing level of manufacturing protection. (ll)As long as the manu-
:facturing and commercial interests retained a substantial measure of 
protection in their own sphere of economic activity1 the landed in-
:terest enjoyed a strong argumentative position when the Corn Laws were 
assailed. 
From 18201 however, the representative bodies of the major manu-
:facturing and commercial interests in Britain officially promulgated 
a new commercial code founded on the principles of free trade. The 
latter had been preached with liberal (and selective) quotations from 
Adam Smith in previous anti-corn-bill demonstrations, but no attempt 
had been made to advocate these consistently and comprehensively. 
However1 Tooke's ,petition to Parliament on 8/5/1820 formulated a demand 
from the merchants of the city of London for the acceptance of univer-
:sal free trade principles~ in manufactures as well as commerce. Con-
:taining the "elements of free trade", it has been considered the first 
outright challenge to the protectionist policy of the landed interest. (l2 ) 
10) Robert Ainslie: Practical Observations for the Landed and Agricul-
.~tural Interest on the Question of Corn and Money. p.lO. 
However, the agriculturists acquiesced in the terms of the 1815 
Corn Act partly because they anticipated that the Property Tax 
would be repealed. When the Government proposed to contirrue 
it in 1816 in an amended form, there was a violent reaction 
f'rom the landed interest in Scotland1 in contraet to their 
relative inertia in 1813-15. (Petition of the County of Edin-
:burgh on the Property Tax. 4/3/1816. in Melville Castle 
Muniments. GD. 51/5/313; "Edinburgh Evening Courant 11 , 7/3/1816) 
11) The Speech of the Hon. Mr. Baron Hepburn of Sneaton on the subject 
of the Corn Laws. pp. 56-7. 
12) D.G. Barnes: op.cit.~ pp. 157, 177; Henry Ashworth: Recollections 
of Richard Cobden, M.P. 1 pp. 18-9. 
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Its significance was primarily symbolic, and it did not stand in 
isolation. It reflected as well as created public interest. The 
threat to the landed interest contained in the renunciation of manu-
:facturing protection was not confined to the metropolis. 
Similar indications of a wind of change were apparent in Scotland 
before Tooke's petition was presented in Parliament. In April, 1820, 
Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce resolved to petition against all high 
import duties as these were counter-productive insofar as they pro-
:voked retaliation. 'Although corn was not listed specifically as 
worthy of special attention, (l3 ) the implications of the Chamber's new 
religion were all-embracing. The directors attributed the recent 
depression to Britain's previous commercial policy, and proposed that 
the international trend should be reversed unilaterally by Britain 
"without regard to reciprocity of benefit between us and any particu-
:lar nation". (l4)Predictably, Glasgow Chamber of Commerce also sub-
:scribed to the new faith. Paraphrasing the Edinburgh petition, the 
western body upheld the ideal of trade restored to a "free state" 
with an international division of labour and capital in those sphe~es 
which were "naturally profitable". (l5 )Testimony to the spread of the 
heresy was furnished when even the conservative Edinburgh Merchant 
Company - "the only respectable mercantile body this unmercantile 
place possessed" in the view of the Whi~ Cockburn(l6 )_ petitioned 
13) Not without some regard for the city's intrinsic coDitlercial in-
:terests, the Chamber specified Baltic timber, iron, raw silk 
and French linens as particularly worthy of attention. 
14) Minutes of Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce, 20/4/1820. 
15) Minutes of Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, ~5/1820. 
16) Henry Cockburn: Memorials of His Time. p. 332. 
the House of Lords to "modify the restrictive code of our canmercial 
laws". (l7) 
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However, the danger to the landed interest was not il11Dediate1·= and 
S.H<~v&.J> 
the radical economic principles of the 1820 petitions ~ not be 
exaggerated. Their key-note was caution, and if they proclaimed ad-
:herence to a new philosophy for commercial relations, this was subject 
to qualification. Glasgow Chamber of Connnerce with deference to the 
protectionist interests within its own ranks, added that "no alteration 
of the laws • • • be attempted till after a full investigation of the 
particular case". (l8) The proliferation of vested interests in the 
existing system ensured the retention of an element of pragmatism, 
rather than permit the formulation of an unequivocal doctrine for uni-
:versal and immediate translation into reality. Nevertheless, the 
petitioning activities of 1820 reflected a demand for a shift of em-
:phasis in commercial policy, and one which contained far-reaching, 
albeit long-term implications for cereal protection. This reality was 
highlighted when the agriculturists demanded increased protection in 
1822. Glasgow Chamber of Commerce resisted their claim on the plea. 
that the existing level of cereal prices would prevent a reduction of 
wage rates, and therefore impair Britain's competitive ability. In 
defence of this self-interested motivation, and in refutation of the 
agrarian claim that they wanted free trade merely in agricultural 
produce, the directors pointed to their petition-~of 1820. The latter, 
they held, proved their fidelity to the belief that "with as much speed 
17) W. Trotter to Lord Melville, Inchture, 9/8/1820. In Melville 
Castle Muniments. GD. 51/5/332~ 
18) Mirmtes of Glasgow Chamber of Connnerce, 2/5/1820. 
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as a due regard to cases involving particular hardships would admit, the 
(19) 
trade of the country should be throHn entirely o:pen". 
Yet the protest of GlascoH Chamber of Commerce at the nevl Corn 
Law of 1822 was isolated. The broad range of manufacturing and con-
: smner interest groups 1·1hich h2.d ca1npaigned against prohibition in 
Scotland in 1815 Has silent, and there Has no 1·1idescale attempt to 
utilise the new position of strength acquired in 1820. The low corn 
prices from 1822 , .. ,hich prompted the reappraisal of the former legisla-
:tion contributed to this apathy, but this factor had not prevented the 
agitation of 1815. Hore pointedly, urban opinion \•Tas divided on 
1-1hether the nei.J" legislation Has an improvement on the 1815 la H. r.Phe 
reduction in the level of physical prohibition, and the substitution of 
a measure of fiscal protection was interpreted in some quarters as an 
(20) 
advance towards free trade principles. But even more important, as the 
"Glasgow Chronicle" conceded, it seemed futile to petition against the 
legislation of 1822 in view of the failure of such activity, (from the 
(21) 
urban vieHpoint) in 1815. It v1as the continuing lack of urban faith 
in the responsiveness of the political system, which shielded the 
landed interest and the Corn Laws from the challenge of free trade. 
When the free trade measures of Huskisson and the other liberal 
To~J ministers from 1823 served to restore a degree of urban faith in 
19) ibid., 16/5/1822. 
20) The underlying principle of the 1822 act was the substitution of 
fiscal protec·tion for prohibition in the case of \vheat above 
10/- per quarter, but the section of the 1815 act prohibiting 
the importation of wheat below 80/- per quarter was never re-
:pealed. The "Scotsman", however, merely regarded the new 
legislation as calculated to ~erpetuate existing price fluc-
:tuations. ("Scotsman", 18/5/1822) 
21) "Glasgow Chronicle", 14/5/1822; 23/5/1822. 
13· 
the propensity of the existing political system to permit change, it 
was the appearance of a political opportunity~ rather than an economic 
st~lus, (22 )which initiated a general free trade agitation against 
agricultural protection. Satisfaction with the performance of the 
Huskisson school in office was widespread. The Convention of Royal 
Burghs recorded their approbation of "all those liberal and enlightened 
acts of government, by which in adopting the principles of free trade, 
they have protected our commerce, increased our manufactures, and 
without lessening the revenue, have greatly reduced the burdens of the 
people". (23 )rn the lower echelons of society, a similar renewal of 
faith in the existing political system due to the ministers' pursuit 
of a free trade progr·amme was discernable. At a mechanics' meeting 
in Glasgow, they were held to have adopted "many of the liberal prin-
:ciples of the age", with the result that the distinction between Tory 
and Whig had been "almost lost". (24 )rn turn, past performance had 
stimulated future expectations. The urban interests demanded free 
trade in corn too, or "the effects of this liberal policy will be the 
reverse of what is intended." (25 )When Jose ph Hume toyed with the notion 
of bringing forward his own measure on the Corn laws, if no ministerial 
22) Although corn prices were high in 1825, relative to those of 1823-
24, they failed to approach war-time levels. (D.G. Barnes: 
op. cit., Appendix B.P.298) 
23) Mirrutes of the Convention of Royal Burghs, 14/7/1825. 
24) "Glasgow Chronicle", 18/11/1826. 
25) The attitude of the Incorporated Weavers of Forfar was echoed by 
the free trade "Glasgow Chronicle" which contended that the 
Corn Laws were 11the keystone of free trade", and that relaxa-
:tions "cannot safely be attempted in other articles while the 
price of food, and of course, the rate of labour, are kept up 
by monopoly", (Glasgow Chronicle", 7/2/1826; 11/3/1826) 
74. 
measure was forthcoming, he was assailed by the "Scotsman" which con-
:tended that the corn question was an issue "which can be advantageously 
brought forward by none but them". (a6)Mere rumour that the ministers 
were contemplating such a revision sufficed to produce a number of free 
trade and protectionist petitions in 1825. 
The complexion of the free trade attack in 1825-28 proved less 
radical than agricultural alarmists feared. The keynote of caution in 
the original petitions of 1820 continued to temper the demands of the 
urban manufacturing interests. The desirability of ultimate repeal 




27)and represented the traditional consumer interest1 rather 
than the economic fr~e trade interests embodied in the chambers of 
commerce. Representative bodies of middle-class urban opinion tended, 
like the Convention of Royal Burghs, to discard motions for total re-
:peal in favour of requests for "ample justice" for the landed interest. (
28
) 
Their conception of justice, however1 bore little relation to agrarian 
views, and in supporting the substitution of fiscal protection for 
physical prohibi tion1 they agreed with Edinburgh Chamber of Cozmnerce 
that a "fair and moderate protecting duty" should be "on the lowest 
26) "Scotsman", 2/12/1826. 
27) "IAlndee Advertiser"., 17/8/1826; "Glasgow Chronicle"., 23/2/1826; 
28/11/1826. 
28) Minutes of the Convention of Royal Burghs, 12/7/1827; "Scotsman"., 
14/7/1827. 
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possible scale". (29) Only in the Edinburgh Merchant Company did a group 
of conservatives led by the Tory publisher, William Blackwood, submit 
a plea for the retention of prohibition in order to keep poorer soils 
under the plough, but they too were worsted. (30)In regarding 1820 as 
a threshold for the free trade movement, it is dangerous to assume that 
the immediate sequel was a demand for total repeal of the Corn Laws. 
In the mid-1820's, partly from principle and partly from expediency, 
there was widespread recognition of the claim for at least a measure 
of cereal protection. What the urban interests would not accept was 
the principle of physical exclusion. 
The danger to the landed interest in 1825-28 lay as much in the 
intensive as in the extensive nature of the free trade claims. 'Ihe 
urban middle-classes, after the emergence of physical-force radicalism 
in Scotland in 1819 had correctly diagnosed the Corn Laws as part of 
the motivating force behind the movement. They were not disposed to 
understate the connection or the danger to property incumbent in such 
a mov.ement. In their petition of 1822, Glasgow Chamber of Commerce 
had alluded to the radicalism of 1819-20 as evidence of social dis-
:content engendered by high cereal prices allegedly attributable to 
the Corn Laws. (3l)This same brand of conservatism ran through the :r.ree 
trade agitation of 1825-28, when the Corn Laws were readily identified 
as "the certain fore-runner of misery, crime, disaffection, and 
29) Minutes of Edinburgh Chamber of Cormnerce, 5/4/1825; 13/1/1827; 
See too, Minutes of Glasgow Town Council, 2~1~1826; ~tes 
of Dundee Town Council, 14/6/1826; 6/12/1826; Mirrutes of 
Perth Town Council, 15/3/1827. 
30) Mirmtes of Edinburgh Merchant Company, 29/1/1827; "Scotsman", 
3~1/1827. 
31) Mirrutes of Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, 16/5/1822. 
political connnotion". (32 )Typical of his middle-class origins, Robert 
Wilson of Hawick blamed the appearance of trades unions on the in-
:consistency of parliamentary legislation to maintain prices but not 
wages. "Dnpartial legislation" was essential to the maintenance of 
the existing political and social order, and the socially divisive 
Corn laws were an exception to this maxim. (33 ) 
Paradoxically, however, the ghost of 1819 substantially negatived 
the strength which it bequeathed to the free trade agitation, insofar 
as the fear of social disorder on such an emotive issue made the urban 
middle-classes reluctant to initiate a popular agitation in 1825. 
They preferred to protest through the medium of established, corporate 
and mercantile bodies lram which the lower echelons of society were 
excluded. In Edinburgh, the middle-classes did take the field in a 
public demonstration, but only a:f'ter the "Scotsman" had lamented the 
lack of such activity and urged that the sti~a be removed. (34) A 
similar situation prevailed in Glasgow. When the operatives of Gor-
:bals, Hutchesontown, Lauriston, and Tradestown organised a demon-
:stration on 22/2/1826, they discovered that no-one "of same conse-
: quence" was prepared to take the chair. It had to be filled by a 
weaver. The identification of the organisers with trades unionism 
did not contribute to a rapproohement with the middle-classes. (35) 
32) "Scotsman", 25/11/1826. 
33) Robert Wilson: A Disquisition on the Corn laws, with a few 
Observations on Pauperism. (Hawick, 1826). pp. 40, 42, 
94-5. 
34) "Scotsman", 23/4/1825. 
35) "Glasgow Chronicle", 23/2/1826. 
A previous demonstration organised by Glasgow weavers on 




In Dundee, the provost declined a request for a public meeting on the 
plea that it would be more prudent to petition through existing in-
:corporations1 (36 )although the majority of the prospective demonstra-
:tors belonged to none. 
With middle-class dissent largely confined to the transmission 
of petitions from corporate bodies, the popular agitation was le:f't 
substantially to the working-class free traders, with weavers fre-
:quently to the fore. In the process, it tended to degenerate into 
more negative channels, cataloguing the grievances and fears of the 
latter. Their fear was destitution and unemployment, and they anti-
:cipated that repeal would enable them to "live better, be better 
clothed, and better lodged". Unlike the Irish, the Scottish working-
classes had known better days. (37)They abhorred grants and public 
subscriptions as they constituted charity "which destroys that feeling 
of independence which had raised Scotsmen high in the scale of civilised 
society". (
38
)'Ihe weakness of this intellectual base for the agitation 
was evinced by the diversionary interests of some of the participants. 
The weavers of Scoonie and Wemyss contemplated the extension of the 
English Poor Laws (with their compulsory assessment for a poor-rate) 
to Scotland, as an alternative to repeal. (39)In other areas, notably 
Paisley, demands for parliamentary refonn were twinned with Corn Law 
36) "IAmdee Advertiser", 30/11/1826. 
37) "Glasgow Chronicle"~ 18/11/1826. 
38) ibid., 25/11/1826; "Dundee Advertiser", 17/8/1826. 
Subscriptions for the relief of the manufacturing districts 
were being raised in Edinburgh, by May, 1826. ("Scotsman", 
13/5/1826) 
39) "Scotsman", 10/l/1827. 
' ·. 
. - \' . 
repeal, (40)although these were exceptional. One orator was warmly 
received by mechanics in Glasgow when he advocated parliamentary re-
: fonn as the enly practical way to repeal the Corn Laws, as rrthe 
lords of the soil were the lords of representation,, but his view-
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point was not endorsed. The mechanics detennined not to deviate from 
their strict aim as rrin 1819 when a similar system was pursued, it 
disgraced the country and terminated in bloodshedrr. (4l)Nevertheless, 
if the working-class agitation did not tarnish its respectability by 
permitting itself to be openly tainted with political radicalism, it 
largely failed to project the more positive, broad free trade 
philosophy which had promoted the petitions of 1820. 
The working-class agitation suffered from a further serious 
limitation: it failed to evolve a vehicle of protest which would be 
other than ephemeral. This was illustrated by the transitory 
character of the movement in Dundee, despite sound local leadership. 
Part of a general petitioning movement throughout the linen conmruni-
:ties of Tayside, (
42
)the agitation in Dundee deprived of middle-class 
leadership, was conducted by the operatives on their own account • 
They acted responsibly, condemning the incidence of riots in England~ 
and rejecting demands for total repeal in favour of more practical 
objectives, notably opening the ports and releasing bonded wheat. (43) 





"Glasgow Chronicle rr, 18/11/1.826. 
ibid., ll/3/1826; 25/7/1826; "Dundee Advertiser", 18/l/1827; 
ibid., 17/8/1826. 
On receipt of their first petition, Peel testified to the 
"patience and good feeling" of the labouring classes in the 
city. (ibid., 24/8/1826) 
19· 
Led by James Saunders, a weaver fran Scouringburn, they endeavoured 
to place the agitation on a more systematic footing, by electing a 
committee, transmitting further petitions (with over 8,000 signatures 
adhibited to each) to both Houses of Parliament on 17/1/1827, and pub-
:lishing an exposition of their case entitled "The Mechanic in his 
rr own defence • In this, they refuted local prohibitionist claims that 
they were merely "a foul mouth'd multitude" - in itself a camnentary 
on the social composition of the free trade agitation in the city -
and prophesied cheap food and steady employment through reciprocity of 
trade. (
44 ) A year later, however, the agitation in Dundee was in the 
doldrums: a petition against the ministerial proposals of 1828 secured 
a mere 2,000 signatures. (45) 
Improved trade, apparent even in Paisley by early 1827, (46) and 
more important, the knowledge that the concessions wrung from a 
grudging legislature were "the best which the all powerful lords of tqe 
soil would allow them to pass", (47) served to defuse the movement in 
Dundee and elsewhere of all but the most intransigent and optimistic 
spirits. The mitigation of social distress and the dissipation of 
44) Although the author of "The Mechanic in His Own Defence", !Xmdee 
1827, purported to be an artisan "more accustomed to handle 
the tools of mechanism than the pen of erudition", its voca-
:bulary, grannnar, and composition belied the suggestion. It 
was probably written by George Kinloch of Kinloch, Senior, 
who wrote on the corn and currency questions after his return 
from exile in 1823, and who was reputed to have written a 
rrvaluable pamplet" on the Corn Iaws in 1827. (see W. Norrie: 
Dundee Celebrities of the Nineteenth Century. p. 41) 
45) "Scotsman", 31/5/1828. 
46) "Glasgow Chronicle", 13/1/1827; 13/2/1827; 17/2/1827. 
47) "Scotsman", 5/4/1828. 
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political opportunity to make a greater advance removed the two 
stimuli of the agitation, and it collapsed. Without middle-class 
leadership, it was over-dependent on the politics of hunger and 
temporary enthusiasm. The way out of the impasse was signposted in 
Gloucestershire, with the formation of an "Anti-Bread-Tax Association" 
in Charford, C
48
)a society established to agitate specifically and 
continuously for one objective. Only on such a footing could the 
urban interests - manufacturers, merchants and consumers - effectively 
utilise the new position of strength which they had acquired by 
adopting a consistent free trade programme to wring further concessions 
from the landed interest. But that implied a degree of faith in the 
flexibility of the existing political system which the apparent failure 
of Huskisson and the liberal Tories in 1828 largely dispelled. The 
tenns of the corn bill of 1828 seemed to embody a further triumph for 
the landed interest, if less sweeping than that of 1815, and to indi-
:cate how little progress had been made since 1820 in translating the 
principles of free trade into practice in the case of cereals. 
However, the transformation which had take place since 1820 was 
more far-reaching than either free traders or protectionists deemed 
politic to admit. Despite the apparent weakness of the urban agita-
:tions, the landed interest had been placed squarely on the defensive. 
This result was attributable not only to the pranulgation of free trade 
principles, but also to the prevalence of agrarian distress which de-
:stroyed the euphoria anticipated by the agriculturists in 1815. The 
latter made the painful discovery that low prices were due, not to 
48) "Dundee Advertiser", 14/12/1826. 
massive imports from·abroad, but to the super-abundance of domestic 
production and Irish imports. (49 )The Corn Law of 1815 had merely pre-
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:vented imports Which would have exacerbated the situation. However, 
even a perceptive agrarian analyst. like James Cleghorn, was so totally 
cormnitted to the premise that the landed interest had an indisputible 
right to protection, (due to their allegedly utilitarian function in 
society) that he could only suggest palliati ves which were peripheral 
to the central problem - tightening up the existing Corn Laws and 
offering a compensatory reduction in landed burdens. (SO) As David IDw, 
professor of agriculture at the University of Edinburgh, and an urban 
apologist of the landed interest, observed, increased protection was 
self-defeating. A critic of the concept of prohibition, which he 
contended caused violent price fluctuations and retaliatory exclusion 
of British exports, he advocated a further extension of the counter-
:vailing duties introduced in 1822. But although he wholeheartedly 
shared Cleghorn's premise that the landed interest had an undeniable 
right to protection, he was even less successful in producing a panacea 
for their distress, merely embracing the hope that "time will alleviate, 
49) One anonymous pamphleteer alleged that the law of 1815 based on 
the principle of prohibition had been useless, as British 
farmers had to face unrestricted foreign competition for three 
months a:rter wheat prices reached 8o/- per quarter. The main 
problem, however, was lack of domestic consumption. (Anony-
:mous; Ietter to His Grace, Alexander, Duke of Hamilton and 
Brandon on the subject of the present situation of agriculture 
in Great Britain and the means of ameliorating it. pp. 18-20, 
31). 
50) James Cleghorn: On the Depressed state of Agriculture. 
pp. 63, 73-80, 84-5, 97-8, 102-19, 126, 130-2. 
(51) . 
and may remove it". The proven fa~lure of prohibition, recognised 
by the most articulate spokesmen of the landed interest, rendered 
existing levels of agricultural protection vulnerable to assault at 
precisely the manent when the urban interest groups were formulating 
a more coherent free trade progrannne. 
Thus weakened, the landed interest in Scotland as in the South 
were obliged to justify the exemption of agriculture from the 
apparently incontrovertible truths comprising the principles of :free 
trade. Neither Cleghorn nor Low had attempted to question the in-
:violability of the latter, but had merely contended that the doctrine 
should exclude agriculture as the landed interest shouldered an 
allegedly disproportionate share of fiscal burdens and unremunerative 
duties. They were followed in this assertion by most prominent 
leaders of agricultural opinion in Scotland, like the Marquis of 
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Tweeddale, Lord John Hay, or James Gibson-Craig. Their "wann advocacy" 
of free trade principles prudently excepted corn which could be im-
:ported "at almost any price, however low". (S2 )No matter how sound free 
trade principles were when applied to trade, they seemed to spell ruin 
51) David Low: Observations on the Present state of Ianded Property, 
and on the prospects of the Iandholder and the Farmer. 
pp. 39-53, 56-8, 68-9, ~1, 97-102, 122. 
Low suggested that tenants should be given relief through 
rent abatements or an allowance in the rent for capital 
investment. Grain rents he rejected on the ground that 
increased prices did not always compensate for the de-
:ficiency in quantity, and that the heaviest rent could be 
demanded when capacity to pay was at a minimum. Also, the 
price of grain was no criterion for pastoral lands, and the 
underlying concept ran counter to Iow"s laissez-faire belief 
that the farmer, like every other trader, s~d benefit 
from a rise in the price of his produce. 
52) "Glasgow Chronicle", 23/4/1825. 
for agriculture, especially in Scotland ~mere two-thirds of the total 
acreage could be considered "inferior". (53) 
The ultra-prohibitionists entertained less respect for the 
apostles of the dismal science, 11these etherial agriculturists in the 
sublunary profession". (54 )Henry Stephens of Balmadies, the pro-
:hibitionist leader in Forfarshire, dismissed free trade without 
qualification, "a doctrine as erroneous in principle as it has proved 
calamitous in its operations to these interests in which it has been 
tried". Feebly, he contended that free trade in corn was inconsis-
:tent with the (diminishing) export bounty still enjoyed by the local 
linen industry. (S5)sir John Sinclair, the veteran self-appointed 
defender of the landed interest, was equally undeterred. He bluntly 
refused ·to recognise that agrarian distress was attributable to causes 
other than the inadequacy of existing protection, and adhered firmly to 
the premise that the pre-1822 legislation anchored on the concept of 
physical exclusion was "the climax of wisdom". Any concession to 
Ricardian notions was anathema to Sinclair as a threat to the economic, 
social, and political dominance of the landed interest. (56) 
53) Letter to a Member of Parliament on the contemplated changes in 
the Corn Law. pp. 4, 9, 12. 
54) An Essay on the Fhiloso-Political Economy of the Modern Athens. 
p. 4. (In a series of five articles published in Dundee and 
Edinburgh, in 1825-7, for private circulation, entitled Charles 
Gray of Carse; Thoughts on the Corn laws, etc.) 
55) Corn I.a.ws: 'lhe Mechanic in His Own Defence. p. 18; "Dundee 
Advertiser", 18/l/1827. 
56) Sir John Sinclair, Bart.: An Answer to a tract recently published 
by David Ricardo, M. P. pp. 4-9, 11-5; ibid. : Address to the 
Owners and Occupiers of Land in Great Britain and Ireland. pp. 
3-4, 15, 26; ibid: On the Corn laws. pp. 3-4. 
The weakness of the prohibitionist polemical argument, due to 
urban acceptance of free trade principles in manufactures and 
commerce, was partially illustrated by their emphasis on the social 
and political dangers inherent in f'ree trade. Stephens saw the 
question - like the more radical urban f'ree traders - as a class con-
:flict between the agriculturists, whome he identified as "Britannia's 
right arm", and the urban middle-classes. The justification, he 
offered for the entrenched privileges of the former was their numeri-
:cal strength as the largest class in the country. (S7)sinclair feared 
social revolution if "the only individuals who have a solid and per-
:manent interest in the I:Ublic prosperity" were reduced to 11the same 
miserable state as the commercial". (S8)But even without the alarmism 
of the agriculturists' prophet of doom, the political implications of 
universal free trade were all too clear. In large tracts of rural 
Scotland, the existing political and social hierarchy was grounded on 
an economic foundation of arable agriculture, and if one should ". • • 
drive out the plough; for the farmer substitute the shepherd and the 
grazier - the connection between landlord and tenant is dissolved, and 
the constitution is no longer the same". (59) 
T.he failure of prohibition and the difficulty of countering the 
apparent consistency of the economic case propagated by the free traders 
combined to produce a pallid ag:l. tation in defense of the prohibitionist 
57) 
A c; Q\S~~~ ~N 
1 
Corn laws: The Mechanic in His Own Defence. 
"lAt.ndee Advertiser", 18/1/1827. 
58) ibid., 2~9/1826. 
pp. 1-4, 13; 
59) Thoughts on the Corn Laws by a Farmer. p. 3. (In a series of five 
articles • • • entitled Charles Gray of carse: 'Ihoughts on 
the Corn laws, etc. ) 
legislation of 1822. Sinclair struggled to counter total indifference 
from sections of the grazing interest of the north who conceived that 
they had no intrinsic interest in the retention of protection for 
cereals. (60)In reply, he pointed out the comprehensive nature of the 
tree trade movement of the 1820's. observing that once the Corn Laws 
succumbed to the new doctrine, consistency would demand its extension 
to pastoral farming. The drovers of Scotland would be unable to corn-
:pete with the steam-boats of France and Flanders in transporting 
livestock economically to the southern markets. (6l) 
In 1826, Sinclair launched a personal crusade to rouse Scottish 
agriculturists from their slumber. He wrote county conveners to 
initiate petitions, published further pamphlets, and made personal 
appearances at agricultural meetings. His tour-de-force was a 
meeting of representatives of the landed interest from several Scottish 
counties in Edinburgh which he chaired on 17/1/1827. '.Ihis agreed to 
circularise county conveners with a request to present petitions for 
adequate protection. (62 )But the response to his efforts was tepid: 
the landed interest preferred to await the course of events in 
(6 ) fl$U..ow- ~P.eHlf:d'li(~NIS~ Parliament. ~ His~ce religioinsts met with no more success. The 
60) The County of Inverness detennined by 32 to 7 votes that it would 
not support a petition against an alteration of the Corn Iaws, 
as it had no intrinsic interest in maintaining protection for 
cereals. (James Barron: 'lhe Northern Highlands in the 
Nineteenth Century. vol. 2. , p .13) 
61) "Dundee Advertiser", 21/9/1826. 
62) ibid •• 23/11/1826; "Scotsman". 15/11/1826; 24/1/1827; "Glasgow 
Chronicle 11 • 25/1/1827. 
63) The la.nied interest in Perthshire on 3/10/1826, at a meeting 
chaired by the Earl of Kinnoull. decided to reject Sinclair1 s 
suggestion of a cormnittee as premature, as no specific pro-
: posals had emanated from the Ministry. ("Scotsman". 
10/10/1826; "Dundee Advertiser", 5/10/1826) • 
county of Forfar declined to give official sanction to the pro-
:hibitionist petition raised by Stephens, (64 )and even in Scotland's 
granary, the county of M1dlothian merely sanctioned the formation of 
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(6 ' 
a connnittee to keep a watching-brief on proceedings in Parliament. 5 J 
The Ministry's conversion to the concept of fiscal protection 
sealed the fate of Sinclair and his prohibitionist disciples. 
Approval in principle of the ministerial proposals was almost uni-
:versal, due to agrarian disenchantment with the fruits of prohibition. 
Accordingly, criticism was centred on the technical details of the 
proposed measures, and the need to raise the level of protecting duties 
for individual local staples. (66 )rn East Lothian, a minority of pro-
:hibitionist diehards led by William Aitchison of Drumore made a final 
stand for the exclusion principle, but were trounced at the local 
(67) 
county meeting. Most East Lothian freeholders were prepared to 
settle for a "protective duty so high as to prohibit imports except in 
times of scarcity". (6B)The revised ministerial proposals of 1828, 
representing a measureable advance in the proposed level of duties, (69 ) 
largely satisfied Scottish agrarian demands. Due to the strength of 
the landed interest in Parliament, and the weakness of the urban free 
64) "Scotsman", 17/2/1827; "Dundee Advertiser 11 , 15/2/1827. 
65) "Scotsman", 4/10/1826. 
66) ibid., 24/3/1827; 28/3/1827; 3/5/1828; "Glasgow Chronicle", 
20/3/1827; 25/3/1827; 31/3/1827. 
67) "Scotsman", 16/4/182S. 
68) ibid., 31/1/1827. 
69) D.G. Barnes: op. cit., p. 200. 
trade agitation outside, (70)the landed interest had successfully 
surrendered prohibition in exchange for a prohibitive level of pro-
:tection. 
However, the landed interest paid a price for its victory. The 
free trade programme of the liberal Tories from 1823 had restored a 
considerable volume of urban middle-class faith in the propensity 
of the existing political system to respond to external pressure from 
urban economic interests for commercial policies reflecting more 
accurately their own increasing importance. At first, few middle-
class free traders followed Robert Wilson of Hawick in openly twinning 
a demand for free trade in corn with a demand for the representation 
of the trading and connnercial classes in Parliament, in order to pro-
:duce ''better" legislation. (7l)By the winter of 1826-27, however, the 
agrarian backlash in Parliament was sufficiently apparent to produce 
several demands for reform of "the Connnons 1 House of Parliament" 
if the landed interest succeeded in frustrating the Ministers' 
intentions. (72) Although the tenns of the 1828 Corn Act did not produce 
an immediate wholesale demand for parliamentary reform, they did serve 
to confirm the lesson of 1815., that "impartial" legislation could not 
be expected from a legislative body, the composition of which was over-
:whelming associated with a separate and conflicting economic interest. 
'!he 1828 Corn Act was the greatest concession, limited though it seemed., 
70) 'Ihe free trade "Glasgow Chronicle" lamented that it would be long 
"before Ministers hazard their places on behalf of those who 
have not even thanked them for their generous exertions". 
"Glasgow Chronicle ••.. 20/3/1827) 
71) Robert Wilson: op. cit., pp. 87-8. 
72) "Scotsman", 16/8/1826; 21/11/1826; 17/2/1827. 
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liable to be extracted from the existing legislature. Consequently~ 
the aspirations of the urban manufacturing and commercial interests 
for what they regarded as the essential corollary of the free trade 
measures already enacted, the substitution of "moderate" duties on 
corn, became centred on a programme of parliamentary reform. 
The effects of this metamorphosis were not immediate. Low 
average corn prices in 1829-32 together with substantial imports a:f'ter 
the 1828 Corn Act (?3) served to temper urban interest in the Corn Laws. 
Moreover, when the Reform Bill agitation did emerge in 1830~ anti-corn-
law sentiment was not the principal or immediate motivating force. 
Nevertheless~ it furnished an underlying current which moulded atti-
:tudes on both sides to the expediency of constitutional changes. In 
the Borders, a Tory observer confessed, that the farmers were cam-
:paigning against the (English) Reform BI.ll because they were "terrified 
about the Corn Iaws being tenninated". C74 )Moreover, once reform was 
clearly a fait accompli, similar fears for the well-being of the 
landed interest stimulated the latter to demand increased representa-
:tion in the reformed legislature for the Scottish counties to secure 
"the better protection of the agricultural interests". (7S) 
The anxiety of the agriculturists regarding the implications of 
reform for the Corn Laws was not misplaced~ except retrospectively in 
view of the conservative nature of the changes produced by the 18.32 
Act. The aspirations of the manufacturing and commercial interests, 
73) D. G. Barnes: op. ci t. ~ Appendices B & c. 
74) William Scott to Alexander Pring].e of Whytbank~ M. P. ~ Edinburgh, 
4/1/1831 in B.lccleuch Muniments. GD. 224/58o. 
75) 111Alndee Advertiser", 7/7/1831; 28/6/1832. 
and their hopes from reform, were adequately expressed by David 
Charles Guthrie of Dundee, who pontificated that the end of all 
government was to legislate in the majority interest. He conceived 
that the Reform Act would not only produce that desirable state (or 
"our high expectations will be grievously disappointed 11 ), but that 
now the consumers had a voice in the election of their legislators, 
he would rejoice "to see the interests of the manufacturers of 
.Dundee treated with that attention which their importance demands" 
through repeal of the Corn Laws. <76)By 1832, the urban manufacturing 
and commercial interests who had previously embraced free trade had 
followed the radicals in adopting a commitment to parliamentary re-
:form. '!he two aims were indissolubly intertwined. Both reflected 
the demand of the urban middle-class interests for not only commercial 
policies based on the principles of free trade, but also a recognition 
in political and social terms of their growing relative economic 
importance. The .urban equation of manufacturing success with the 
national weal and the march of civilisation was an old theme by the 
1820's, but it was reiterated with increasing conviction and virulenc~!7) 
By 1832, the landed interest was on the defensive on all fronts. 
76) Report of the Reform Jubilee Procession and Dinners, (Dundee, 
1832). 
77) e.g. Robert Wilson of Hawick contended that "the generality of 
landed gentlemen are to be ranked among the unproductive 
classes • • • and placed as a dead weight on the industry 
and enterprise of the nation". The question was whether 
Britain would "retrograde to a state of pastoral imbecility, 
to the idle cruelties of game-shooting and the chase, and all 
the other exploded avocations of feudal times, or whether 
this powerful empire shall continue to make progress in the 
attairunent of wealth, civilisation, intelligence, and fame". 
(Robert Wilson: op. cit., pp. 33, 72.) 
Between the passing of the Corn Law of 1815 and the Reform Act 
in 1832, there was little effective extra parliamentary agitation 
against the Corn Laws. The demonstrations of 1825-27 in terms of 
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organisation looked back to the previous century, rather than forward 
to the societies of the succeeding decade. Yet the watershed in the 
evolution of the anti-corn-law movement was not 1832, but 1820. The 
adoption of free trade principles, though not without qualification, 
in a more coherent and systematic code, disarmed the agriculturists 
of their trump card in defending protection for cereals, the incon-
:sistency of previous urban claims. The manufacturing and commercial 
interests with a strengthened polemical base could and did take the 
offensive, albeit in a circumscribed manner. There were anti-corn-
bill demonstrations before 1820, but the free trade movement for repeal 
of the Corn Laws traced its roots to that date. 
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4. Preoursors of the l.eague: the evolution of an organised 
anti-corn-la\'T movement in Scotland and its failure, 1833-38. 
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The 1820's contributed, albeit qualified, the principles of free 
trade to the evoJ.ution of the anti-corn-law movement, but the failures 
of the decade had been important. It bequeathed to the 18)0 's at 
least three major problems. Firstly, despite the promulgation in a 
more assertive manner of a new commercial code, no systematic, 
continuous agitation for its application had been conducted except in 
1825-28, principally because a demand for organic constitutional 
changes had seemed more realistic. Secondly, even during the 
agitation of 1825-28, the movement in Scotland had failed totally to 
evolve any improvement on the vehicle of agitation which had ruled 
in the eighteenth century and in 1813-15. No attempt was made to 
create any permanent co-ordinating machinery, and the agitation 
depended on spontaneous, individual initiatives. Thirdly, the 
agitation of 1825-28 had been bedevilled by social divisions between 
the propertied middle-classes and the working-classes, both of whom 
were acutely aware of the shadow of the radical disturbances of 
1819-20. The succeeding decade, after 1832 saw successive attempts 
to rectify each of these problems through the medium of societies 
launched with the specific and exclusive aim of repeal of the Corn 
Laws through the application of the principles of free trade. The 
perpetuation of the first and third of the problems of the 182o's 
into the post-Reform Act era limited the success of the contribution 
of the 1830's in furnishing a forward-looking vehicle of agitation, 
but the societies of 1833-38 were nevertheless the direct ante-
:cedents of the later and more successful Anti-Corn-Law League. 
In the beginning of 1833, the prospect of repeal of the Corn 
laws and the application of the principles of free trade to the grain 
trade seemed favourable to those who had anticipated that free trade 
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would follow reform. The landed interest had already experienced 
defeat in the Reform Act at the hands of the alliance of middle- and 
worl<ing-classes which had carried it, and thus strengthened, the 
latter appeared poised for further gains. Thus the absence of an 
agitation on the corn question was principally attributable to faith 
in the Reform administration and the reformed Parliament to proceed 
with the measure, rather than urban disinterest. When the radicals 
in Edinburgh of the Scotch Metropolitan Union met in January, 1833, 
to consider petitioning for repeal of the Corn Laws, they failed to 
agree that it was necessary "until the real designs of the Ministry 
were known", (l) and although a few petitions for repeal vrere trans-
:mitted in the first few months of 1833, including one from Perth 
with 4,000 signatures(~)probably stimulated by the introduction of 
Whitmore 's motion into Parliament on 30/4/1833 - the vJhig Government 
still commanded the confidence of the radicals. The issue was not 
forgotten - Kirkman Finlay was hissed at a Whig dinner in Glasgow for 
urging gradualism in dealing with it(2)but the competition of other 
public questions and the fear of rocking the boat of the Reform 
Ministry combined to silence those sections of reform opinion, such 
as the Whig "Scotsman" who were disturbed by the opposition of the 
1) "Scotsman", 12/1/183 3. 
2) ibid., 4/5/1833; "Glasgow Argus", 6/5/1833. 
3) "Scotsman", 18/5/1833. 
Earl of Ripon, on behalf of the ~1inistry, to Earl Fitzwillaim 1s 
C La 
(4) 
motion on the orn ws. 
The demand for an agitation specifically on the corn question 
emanated from two sources. Through his "Edinburgh Magazine" \•lhich 
commenced publication in April, 18)2, VJilliam Tait, a radical and 
publisher, warned of the dangers of disappointing public expectations 
on the issue, perceived the question as part of a general confront-
:ation between radical and whig, and conceived that the latter party 
was "supposed to include every man who, disapproving of our Corn 
Laws, is of opinion that it would be inexpedient to alter them". (5 ) 
In a more influential position was William Weir, editor of the 
"Glasgow Argus", the official organ of the dominant section of the 
Glasgow whigs founded in February, 1833. An advocate by profession 
and more radical than his employers, he had been eo-founder of 
Edinburgh Political Union (in company with William Tait, James Aytoun, 
and George Kinloch, junr.), (6 )but gave precedence to the Corn Laws as 
"the most important question that can be mooted in our legislative 
assemblies", attacking the timidity of the Whig administration and 
promising not to let the subject rest. (7) 
4) The "Scotsman" condemned the "Glasgow Argus" for decrying the 
Reform Ministry on the ground that such an attitude would 
merely result in the return of a Tory Government. 
("Scotsman", 20/4/1.833; see too, ibid., 18/5/1833). 
5) "Tait's Edinburgh Magazine", vol.2., pp. 815-17; vo1.3., 
pp. 58-9. 
6) Minutes of the Proprietors of the "Glasgow Argus ", 4/2/1833; 
''I'ait 's Edinburgh Magazine", December, 1.833, p.)86; ''Dtmdee 
Advertiser", 16/5/1834. 
7) "Glasgow Argus", 20/5/1.833; 7/10/1833; 17/10/1833. 
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Despite the demand of Weir in the columns of the "Argus" for an 
organised agitation on the Corn La.\'rs, no interest was sho\'ln in the 
proposal in Scotland until the end of the year. TWo factors served 
to stimulate interest in the proposal. In October, an anti-corn-law 
st>ciety, with a specific aim and fee, \'Tas formed in Nottingham (1trith 
another shortly after in London), and in Scotland some of the agri-
:cul turists made the fatal mistake of following the Marquis of 
Chandos, the protectionist leader in England, and took the initiative 
in defending the existing Corn Laws; this furnished Vleir 1t1ith the 
excuse to demand a requisition to the Lord Provost for a public 
demonstration as Glasgow was "at present silent, not satisfied". (8 ) 
Nevertheless, the first reaction came from Edinburgh, not Glasgow. 
On 20/11/1833, a Mechanics 1 Anti-Corn -law Association \'las formed, 
r with a \'Tide social base ensured by a membership fee of )d. and a 
further ld. for every public meeting attended. The artisans who 
founded it, led by a local cabinet-maker, Boyd, anticipated better 
employment from reciprocity of trade and cheaper food. Behind these 
aspirations, however, lay complaints of the growing division in 
industrial society between "the man of affluence" and the labourer, 
resulting in legislation such as the Corn laws, which they contended 
bore heavily on low-income groups. Following the example of the 
burgh reform agitation, they determined to exclude all extraneous 
issues, such as the ballot or triennial parliaments, until the Corn 
Laws were repealed, and issued a declaration for total repeal by 
8) Grant Duff of Eden addressing Banffshire Farmer Club dwelt on the 
danger of an alteration of the Corn Laws, especially for 
Scottish farmers as the "soil of this country was entirely 
different from the rich and fertile meadows of England" 
(ibid., 31/10/1833; 21/11/1833) 
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constitutional means, although they left open the divisive question 
of whether this should be gradual or immediate. (g)Weir contrasted 
the "business-like m~er" of the Edinburgh mechanics with Glasgow's 
apathy, and condemned in particular the prevalent opinion in the city 
that no progr-ess could be made "till scarcity shall make the people 
feel the effects of the Corn Laws". (lO) 
By December, 1833, the Lord Provost of Glasgow had received a 
requisition for a public meeting on 19/12/1833 to form an anti-corn-
law society, but it was different in complexion from the movement in 
Edinburgh. The requisionists were middle-class vlhigs, appealing to 
middle-class, commercial interest gr-oups - "bankers, merchants, 
manufacturers, and other traders" - at a time, 1 pm., (ll) calculated 
to discourage large-scale working-class participation. From the 
start, the agitation was subject of a schism. The principal actors -
James Oswald, M.P., Col in Dmlop of Tollcross, James Dennistotm. of 
Golfhill, Henry Dunlop, Jolm Fleming, C .J. Tennant, and Peter 
Mackenzie - represented different shades of reformist opinion. 
Oswald, Colin Dtmlop, Henry Dunlop, and Tennant had all served their 
political apprenticeship on the management committee of the "a.risto-
:cratic" Glasgow Reform Association, dissolved in October, 1832, (l
2
) 
9) The principal participants were William Biggar (printer), P .M. 
Knox (teacher), Mr. Reed (slater), James Alston (joiner), and 
George A. Fleming (painter). (ibid., 25/1~1833; 
"Scotsman", 23/11/1833. 
10) "Glasgow Argus ", 25/11/1833. 
11) ibid., 2/12/1833; 16/12/1833. 
12) Glasgow Reform Association. report. Glasgow, 1831 pp. 17-20. 
(Mi tchell Library); ''Dundee Advertiser", 11/10/1832. 
while Mackenzie had been a prominent fieure in the "popular 11 Glasgo\'1 
(1-·) 
Political Union, also defunct. ~ The latter succeeded in frustrating 
the intention of the "conservatives" that it should be made socially 
exclusive by imposing a membership fee of twenty shillings in favour 
of a still exclusive fee of five shillings, to permit more of the 
"humbler classes" to participate, (l4)although the society was still 
safely in middle-class hands. The socially-exclusive, whig dominance 
of the society was confirmed in the ballot for the committee at the 
first general meeting of subscribers on 6/1/1834, when apart from 
Weir, only one other radical - James Wallace, a former committee 
member of Glasgow Political Union- was elected.(l5) 
On 9/3/1834, at a public meeting, the split reappeared, when 
Peter rJiackenzie proposed that James Ewing, Glasgow's second M.P ., 
who - unlike Oswald - had refused to attend the meeting, should be 
"tested 11 on the Corn Laws. This \'las rejected by the more con-
:servative wing who carried an amendment that the committee should 
wait on every Liberal M.P. to ask for his support for the society's 
petition -a substitution which did little to ease Ewing's embarrass-
:ment. On tactics too there was a division of opinion. All an 
13) Glasgow Political Union: Objects, Rules and Regulations. 
Glasgow, 1831. (Mitchell Library); Peter Mackenzie: 
Remini~ences of Glasgow and the West of Scotland. vol.2, 
p.266. " 
14) "Glasgow Argus ", 19/12/1833. 
Hilliam Gray, a jeweller, was appointed interim secretary, 
but subsequently superseded by William 'ltleir. 
15) The first committee comprised John Fleming of Clairmount (mer-
: chant); Walter Buchanan (merchant); Charles Tennant (St. 
Rollox Chemical Works); Alexander Dennistoun (merchant); 
James Wallace (tea inerchant); Colin Dunlop of Tollcross (Clyde 
Iron Works); William Dunlop (cotton spinner); vlilliam Ban..~ier 
(manufacturer); John Whitehead (merchant); \>Jilliam Gray 
(jeweller), William Weir, and Hugh Smith. (ibid.,6/l/1834) 
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Fu].larton of Overton., a former committee member of the Reform 
Association., condemned the inefficiency of the Reform Act and the 
"flagrant coalition" of Whigs and Tories., concluding that the ballot 
was necessary., forcing the chairman., Lord Provost Robert Grahame., to 
rule him out of order., while the first president of the society., the 
conservative Colin Dunlop of Tollcross., was obliged to intervene to 
urge the need to s:ink differences of opinion in other fields., behind 
the one aim of repeal of the Corn Laws. (l6)such a prospect was 
impossible. On 14/2/1834., James Moir., a former committee member of 
the Political Union (and subsequent Chartist) had tabled a notice of 
motion favouring the reduction of the entry fee to one shilling to widen 
the social basis of the society and ensure a mass membership extend-
:ing to at least the more affluent working-classes. This proposal 
was resisted by the conservatives associated with the former Reform 
Association - Dunlop., Buchanan., and W .P. Paton - on the weak gro1md of 
a technicality., that it involved an alteration to the society's con-
:stitution. On 1/4/1834., in ~ir 1s absence., it was moved by Dr. 
'nloma.s Light body and Samuel Southernden., and accepted by the society. 
This reverse for the conservatives was followed by another at the 
same meeting when Mbir and Lightbody were added to the committee., 
which was otherwise re-elected in its entirety. The confirmation of 
Weir as secretary for a further year - a natural recognition of his 
initiative in the cause - was a further gain to the radical wing., and 
was only partly off-set by the election of Colin Dunlop as first 
president. (l7) 
16) ibid... 24/2/1834. 
17) ibid • ., 17/2/1834; 3/4/1834. 
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Despite its internal divisions, however, Glasgow Anti-corn-Law 
Society assumed a period of fervent, if short-lived activity~ and 
established the pattern of future anti-corn-law agitation in Scotland. 
Arrangements were made with a local bookseller to distribute a regular 
supply of tracts on the Corn Laws (especially Earl Fitzwilliam1s 
"Address to the landowners of Great Britain" and the "Corn Law 
Magazine"~ a publication of London Anti-corn-Law Society) giving 
particular attention to agricultural areas. This was in line with 
Weir 1s repeated assertion that the prime purpose of such a body was 
to "diffuse lmowledge" on the issue. The second function which he 
conceived it should fulfil was that of a vehicle for the expression 
and transmission of public sentiment~ and this role materialised when 
the society determined to petition in support of Joseph Hume 1s 
parliamentary motion on the Corn Laws on 6/3/1834. (l8 ) A systematic 
canvass for signatures produced 6o~OOO within two weeks(!9~ commentary 
on the degree of organisation achieved by the nascent association~ and 
on Weir's own initiative in urging this form of activity. 
'!he prototype set up in Glasgow was adopted in other areas • In 
Edinburgh~ the middle-classes had shown no enthusiasm for the 
Mechanics 1 Anti-corn-Law Association formed in November~ and the 
"Scotsman" lamented that the Whig Government had "little chance to 
succeed~ till the public calls more unanimously and decidedly for a 
change", (20)but on 24/1/1834, a meet:ing of 'lnerchants~ gentlemen., and 
others" took place preparatory to calling a public meeting to form an 
18) ibid • ., 17/2/1834; 20/2/1834. 
19) ibid • ., 3/3/1834; ''Tait 1s Edinburgh ~gazine"., April~ 1834. 
p .214. 
20) "Scotsman"~ 16/11/1833; 8/1/1.834. 
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association "of all classes" pledged to repeal of the Corn La\'rs, vthen 
resolutions vtere adopted and an interim committee appointed. (21 ~The 
formation of an anti-corn-law association ensued. (22 )From the outset, 
the agitation in Edinburgh was dominated by John Wigham, junr., a 
shawl manufacturer and merchant, who was deputy chairman of Edinburgh 
Chamber of Commerce. On 28/1/1834, l:ligham persuaded the Chamber by 
a majority vote to petition for total repeal as the Corn LaNs \'lere 
"unjust in principle". A Quaker, his attitudes reflected a corn-
:bination of moral principles and commercial interest. He contended 
that the Corn Laws bore most heavily on those with limited pecuniary 
resources, especially operatives in the export trades, that they 
entailed a continous danger of social unrest, and that as the Chamber 
agreed in principle with freedom of trade, it was logical that it 
should extend to grain.( 23) 
Wigham determined, however, to widen the support for the agitation, 
by promoting a requisition to Lord Provost James Spittal for a public 
meeting to consider the propriety of petitioning for outright abo-
:lition.<24~The list of 150 requisitionists contained the names of 
radical ~1higs, like Duncan McLaren, Ralph Richardson, Andrew f'.'Iillar, 
21) ibid., 25/1/1834; "Glasgow Argus", 27/1/1834. 
22) "Tai t' s Edinburgh Magazine", January, 1834. p. 512. 
23) Minutes of Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce, 28/1/1834. 
24) The aim of the agitation of 1833-34 was abolition - immediate or 
or gradual - of the Corn Laws, and not as suggested by one 
authority, a dispute in 1828-41, between the rival merits of 
a sliding scale or a fixed duty, with the radicals supporting 
the latter ''l.manimously". ( C.R. Fay: The Corn La\'IS and 
Social England. p.86) 
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and John F. Macfarlane, and of middle-class radicals like V/illiam 
(25) 
Tai t and James Aytoun. The meeting, held on 14/3/1834, reveaJ.ed 
that Wigham had succeeded in creating a "union of all classes 11 in so 
far as several of those who had been prominent in the Mechanics' 
Association - such as P.M. Khox (teacher) and G.A. Fleming (artisan 
painter) - took part in the proceedings, but the fabric of unity 
among the middle-classes was less secure. Although Spittal, on 
Tait's motion, occupied the chair, he indicated that he did not 
support total and immediate repeal, contending that the corn gr:;wers 
were subject to peculiar burdens which foreign growers did not bear, 
and merely postulated that repeal could take place at an unspecified 
time in the future. On behalf of the more radical Whigs, Wigham was 
"very much inclined to doubt their title to so much sympathy" and 
urged "Free Trade over the World" and "Equal Laws for the good of all" 
through the force of moral persuasion. To placate all shades of 
opinion, the meet:ing adopted the compromise formula of a "speedy 
abolition" of the Corn Laws as contrary to "the principles of free 
trade". However, the rift in the Edinburgh agitation applied to 
tactics as well as aims. The "conservatives" overwhelmingly 
frustrated a proposal to censure the Loro Advocate, Abercr()mby, one of 
the city's Members for failing to support Hume's motion for a revision 
of the Corn legislation. (26 )Despite the internal divisions, however, 
the metropolitan agitation, like that in Glasgow, achieved sufficient 
25) "Scotsman", 8/3/18}4. 
26) ibid., 15/3/18}4; "Glasgow Argus", 17/3/18}4. 
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unitY of purpose to produce a petition against the existing Corn Laws 
containing 17-18,000 signatures.( 27 ~ 
Paradoxically industrial Dundee, despite its history of previous 
anti-corn-law agitation, was the tortoise of the 1833-34 agitation; 
probably attributable in part to previous fustrations and to the death 
of George Kinloch, in.early 1833. By the end of January, 1834, the 
free trade "Dundee Advertiser" had joined the 11Scotsmanu in lamenting 
general apathy towards the formation of anti-corn-law associations, 
observing that "even Dundee, which is seldom last in popular movements, 
seems to be asleep on this all-important subject". The "Advertiser" 
counselled the necessity of a public meeting and the formation of a 
body to continue the agitation, ( 28 ~but when the challenge was accepted, 
the initiative came, as in Edinburgh, from the working-class radicals. 
The Trades Unions of the city on 14/2/1834 petitioned against both the 
Corn Laws and the connection between Church and State. The principal 
movers - Edward Buik (flax-dresser), James Buik (weaver), Alexander 
Young (flax-dresser) , J ames Whyte (ironmonger) , and John Penny - w·ere 
of predominantly working-class origin, and several of them, including 
Edward Buik, James Buik, and John Penny, were prominent members of 
Dundee Political Union. As such they had limited faith in the degree 
of transformation which had been achieved by the Reform Act. James 
Buik observed the futility of petitioning the existing legislature, 
'Zl) 11Tait's Edinburgh Magazine11 , June, 1834. p.359. 
28) "Dtmdee Advertiser", 31/1/1834. 
Letters urging repeal of the Corn Laws appeared in the colunms 
of the "Advertisern in 1833-34. (ibid., 5/7/1833; 29/11/1833; 
24/1/1834). 
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but urged the need for anti-corn-law associations. (29) 
By May, they had been joined belatedly by the middle-classes. 
Provost Alexander Kay received a requisition from 125 "merchants, 
manufacturers, and others" including Eclward Baxter (of the flax-
spinning firm), George Duncan (future M.P. for the city), George 
Kinloch of Kinloch, Junr., and Bailie William Christie (chairman of 
the local Political Union). (30)The ensuing meeting, on 14/5/1834, 
indicated that a union of all classes had taken place. \·li th most of 
the mills closed, and the trades unions in full support, a demon-
:stration of 10-15,000 took place in the scene of previous radical 
rallies in Dundee, Magdalen Yard. TI1e mixed social composition of 
the movement was reflected in the selection of speakers, \·lho included 
J ames Brown (flax-spinner), William Christie (banker), George Milne 
(solicitor), and Edwaro Buik, James Buik and Alexander Young, 
representing the operatives. The radical complexion of the Dundee 
Whigs precluded the possibility of a schism, unlike Edinburgh, and 
there was unanimous approval for the dominant theme of the agitation 
that by submission to the Corn La.\-vs, the urban classes were depriving 
themselves of "the practical benefits of reform" (George Milne) and 
that the Whig administration under Grey had been "mere nibblers at 
reform" (John Penny). The danger that such radical attitudes would 
lead to the conclusion that organic constitutional changes were 
essential as a prerequisite to repeal of the Corn Laws was countered 
by William Weir, who impressed an the Dundee free traders that Glasgow 
Anti-Corn-Law Society had recognised the necessity for otherxeforms 
29) ibid., 21/2/1834. 
30) ibid., 9/5/1834. 
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too, but had merely determined to give priority to the corn question 
as one of the most important. Heir feared that the division of 
opinion over the issue of a comprehensive or a restricted aim \'Thich 
had threatened to disrupt the Glasgow agitation in its f:;rmative 
stages would afflict the movement in Dtmdee. Significantly, he also 
realised the futility of spontaneous, unco-ordinated local demonstra-
:tions, and utilised the platform of the Magdalen Yard meeting to 
advocate the need for co-ordinated activity among the anti-corn-law 
societies of Scotland and England, with simultaneous petitioning.(3l) 
The Dundee Anti-Corn-Law Society formed as a result of the meeting 
commenced with a representative interim committee of 49 - mainly drawn 
from the middle-class manufacturers, merchants, and shopkeepers of the 
city - but including at least ten members of working-class origin, 
principally flax-dressers in the linen industry. The latter included 
James Saunders, the Scouringbur.n weaver(32 )who had been chairman of the 
Dundee operatives' anti-cor.n-law committee in 1826-27. r.toreover, 
although the offices in the society were principally filled from the 
middle-classes - George Kinloch (advocate and landowner), president; 
Baillie William Christie, vice-presidentt George Milne, Secretary; 
and William Mbyes (merchant), treasurer - the entry fee of sixpence 
with no further contribution except for special purposes ensured that 
1 t would be open to all but the lower-paid, generally liDSkilled 
artisans. The major division of opinion within the society was not 
a social or a political one, but a difference of opinion an the 
31) ibid., 16/5/1834; "Glasgow Argus", 15/5/1834. 
The participants also included two radical Whig members of the 
landed interest, George Kinloch of Klnloch, junr., and Patrick 
Chalmers of Auldba.r. 
32) "Dtmdee Advertiser", 16/5/1834. 
tactical que:_;tion of vlhether to implement \deir' s advice in favour of 
simultaneous petitioning, or vlhethe:c to reject it in favour of an 
irnmedie:J,te pcti tion. Like its Edinburt,h counterpart, Dundee Anti-
(33) 
Corn-Law Society determined on the latter course. 
Outside the larger centres of population, some attempt v1as made 
to emulate the examples of the anti-corn-lal·l societies forned in the 
former. On 10/3/1834, an anti-corn-lavt demonstration attended by 
2,000, e1nd chaired by Lord P2~·ovost Aclam Pringle \vas held in the North 
Secession Heeting-house, Perth, 1::hen it \·:as agreed. to form an 
(34) 
association, to agitate for repeal. In Fife, Strathmit,;lo, Ceres, 
Leslie, Dysart, and Auchterrnuchty also follovTed suit. The broad 
social basis of the city societies was also accepted as the pattern 
for the associations established in the small burghs. Tflc ent~J fee 
(35) 
to the society at Ceres was 3d. Hovrever, the existing radical 
associations also furnished a vehicle for the agitation. Iviarkinch 
Political Union had petitioned for repeal on 12/2/1833, along with 
(36) 
other projects of parliamentary reform, and in 1834, Balmerino 
(37) (38) 
Political Union and Errol and Carse of Govn·ie Political Union 
did likewise. In most areas, however, the agitation was based on 
transient public meetings, frequently held in Dissenting churches -
an augury of the future - and chaired by middle-class civic leaders. 














12/5/1834; 2/6/1834; "Scotsman", 
Dundee Advertiser", 14/3/1834. 
"Scotsman", 12/3/1834o 
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interspersed with requests for further measures of parliamentary 
reform, notably triennial parliaments. (39 )The demonstrationr> \'lere 
stimulated by the example of others, rather1han by any systematic 
attempt to organise them, although William Weir preached the 
necessity for activity in Greenock, while attending a local \v.hig 
dinner, \'nth some success - a requisition was submitted to the provost 
who subsequently chaired a demonstration of 1,000. (40) 
By the Autumn of 1834, the agitation had faltered. In Dtmdee, 
the alliance forged between the working- and middle-classes proved 
too brittle to survive the increased tension in the linen industry 
between masters and operatives. Edward Baxter and William Christie 
were in the forefront of an attempt to break the Dundee and Lochee 
Weavers' Union(~ll dispute regretted by the "Dundee Advertiser" because 
it prevented a tmited campaign against the Corn Laws, ( 42 ~in view of 
the identification of working-class repealers with the trades unions 
in the city. When the urban interests in Dundee patched up their 
differences again on Wellington's accession to office, it was for a 
different purpose- defence of the Reform Act.< 43)In Edinburgh too, 
a split took place. Completely disillusioned with the Whigs who had 
left all the major monopolies untouched, and having concluded that no 
progress could be made with meaningfUl reforms on issues such as the 
39) ibid., 22/1/1834; 22/2/1834; 11 Glasgow Argus", 20/1/1834; 
"Dundee Advertiser", 7/3/1834. 
40) 11 Glasgo\'l Argus", 13/2/1834; 20/2/1834; "Tai t' s Edinbur~ 
Magazine", April, 1834. p.214. 
41) 11Dundee Advertiser", 13/6/1834; 20/6/1834; 27 /6/1834; 
4/7/1834. 
42) ibid., 11/7/1834. 
43) ibid., 5/12/1834. 
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corn LaNs, before a further measure of parliamentary reform, the 
working-class radicals hived off to form their own "Edinburgh 
Association for a further improvement in the Representation of the 
People" on 20/8/1834. (44 )The formation of a new anti-corn-law 
association in Anderston on 2/9/1834 VTas hailed by the 11 Glasgm"l Argus" 
as evidence that the movement had "not been arrested, although for 
some months its progress has been scarcely perceptible", but the 
admission \vas more important than the connter-claim, and condemnation 
of public apathy constituted one of the principal themes in the 
speeches of the deputation from Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law Society, who 
attended the inauguration.< 45 ~Although the new association maintained 
a flicker of life in an agitation which had disappeared elseNhere, 
by transmitting a free trade petition to Colin Dunlop, M.P., on 
9/2/1835, ( 46 ~even the apostle of the exclusive aim of Cor.n Law repeal, 
William Heir, had begun to doubt whether any progress could be made 
under the existing constitution of Parliament, and had placed a new 
emphasis in the columns of the "Argus n on the ballot as the necessary 
prerequisite to more meaningful reform in other spheres.< 47~ 
What \'leir failed to appreciate \"Tas that lack of interest in the 
Corn Laws was attributable less to the inadequacy of the Reform Act 
44) "Scotsman n~ 23/8/1834. 
45) Both Wal ter Buchanan and Dr. Thomas Lightbod.y castigated public 
apathy on this issue. The latter was not surprised at the 
Government's refusal to concur in the motion for repeal 
"'vhen the people themselves were so cold and apathetic on this 
point". The new association had an entry fee of 3d. ensuring 
a broad social base, probably under Lightbody's influence as 
the prime mover in the project. ("Glasgow Argusn 1 4/9/1834). 
46) ibid., 12/2/1835. 
47) ibid., 9/11/1835. 
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of 1832, and more to economic conditions. The good harvests and low 
prices of 1834-36, in which the princip~l problem was agrarian 
distress, ensured that there was no economic or social impulse for a 
sustained agitation. Although the commercial and manufacturing 
interests had been represented in the agitation of 1833-34, the 
initiative had devolved on the political radicals and the motivation 
of the movement had been political - frustration and disappointment 
with the Reform Act - rather than economic. Without the spur of 
economic distress, the interest of the commercial interests was liable 
to remain largely on an academic and political plane, despite their 
belief in principle in total repeal as consistent with the principles 
of free trade. To the radicals, hov1ever, the situation also 
provided a dilemma. The agitation had shown the apparent inadequacy 
of the 1832 Reform Act, and had underlined the basic division of aims 
and philosophy dividing them from the more conservative Whigs. Two 
responses were open to them. They could recognise the futility of 
attempting to carry individual reforms such as Com Law repeal -
which was merely one of a number~ albeit an important measure - and 
broaden their aim to encompass organic constitutional changes as the 
prerequisite for other reforms~ as Weir himself had considered the 
only escape in 1835 when the agitation \'las stilled. Alternatively 
they could resolve to rectify the deficiencies of the agitation of 
1833-34, especially its lack of co-ordination, and regard Corn Law 
repeal as long-term but attainable aim, providing that sufficient 
effort was put into propagating its need among the middle-classes. 
From 18.36, a growing division of opinion emerged between the two 
schools of thought in Scotland, each of \'lhich grew in strength \'li th 
the waning of prosper! ty in 1837-,38. 
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For the anti-corn-law movement~ the formation of the London 
Anti-Gorn-Law Association in 1836 marked a significant development~ 
principally because the association's title was misleading. Instead 
of a purely local society~ it was in a territorial sense~ a national 
committee with members drawn from several parts of Britain~ inclu.iing 
suCh prominent Scottish free traders as Patrick Chalmers of Aulbar~ 
M.P. Robert Wallace~ M.P. William Ewart~ M.P ·~ William Tait~ Dr. 
John Taylor, and William Weir (who joined subsequently to its form-
:ation). Politically and socially, it was less ''national" in com-
:plexion: all the Scottish members of it were middle-class radicals~ 
albeit of varying hues. For the future, however, it set several 
pointers. It recognised the necessity for a long-term, systematic, 
co-ordinated anti-corn-law agitation through local anti-corn-law 
societies, the promotion of public meetings on the subject. (in 
isolation from extraneous issues)~ and the education of public opinion 
through the distribution of tracts and the insertion of propaganda in 
metropolitan and provincial newspapers. The aim of total repeal of 
the Corn Laws was accepted from the agitation of 1.833-.34 ~ but . the 
London Association's plan of campaign indicated that the predominant 
vehicle of previous agitations - the short-lived~ local protest, 
arising spontaneously -was ineffective, and had to be jettisoned. 
The societies of 1833-.34~ which were then the exception to the 
character of the agitation as a whole~ were to be promoted as the 
norm to counter the prevalent apathy~ but no lo~r to act in 
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isolation: they were to be co-ordinated. (4S)That the lofty hopes of 
the 1836 London Anti-Corn-Law Association failed largely to be 
translated into reality does not detract from its significance as a 
collation of ideas - from individuals such as William \'leir \'Tho had 
been advocating co-ordinated petitioning in 1834 - for future 
application. Not least important, it \'/as an opportunity for anti-
corn-law advocates from different parts of the country to become 
acquainted v1ith each other, and collectively with those who espoused 
their cause in Parliament - such as Hume, Grote, Roe buck, and 
Molesworth - although in most cases, they were familiar with each other 
anyway, as fellow-advocates of other radical objectives. 
Moreover, in Scotland at least, the statement of aims of the 
London Anti-Corn-Law Association \'Tas no dead letter. In 1837-38, 
Weir succeeded in realising in the west of Scotland (and in certain 
other localities) the a~pirations of the London Association. 
Although the organisers of the latter have been summarily dismissed 
(by Co l:xlen' s biographer, unsurprisingly) as poor organisers, ( 49 ~such 
a description ·could not be applied to Weir. His relative success, 
however, derived mainly from a change in economic and social can-
:ditions in Scotland in 1837-38, whiCh provided a head of steam for 
a popular movement. At the beginning of 1837, there was little to 
betray the end of the "boom" of the mid-1830's, and the nscotsman 11 
commenting on John Clay's parliamentary motion for a revision of the 
48) Archibald Prentice: ep.oit. Vol. 1, pp.49-50. 
Also; 11London Anti-Corn-Law Association for procuring the 
Total Repeal of the Com Laws", London, 1836, in J~B. Smith 
Papers6 Vol. 1, Ms. 923.2. S 333. 
49) John Morley: The life of Richard Cobden6 Vol. 1, P•l43· 
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existing Corn Law of 1828 in favour of a fixed duty, observed that 
although Peel's law was bad in principle, the moderate price of 
grain "and the comfortable state" of the labouring classes had 
deprived the subject of interest, while the laws had been rendered 
"alroost nugatory by the late great improvements in agricultttr'e ".(50) 
By the end of April, however, a recession had hit the "Comfortable 
state" of the weavers in the linen industry of Perth, where the 
prices of some fabrics were reduced by 15%, over 1,000 weavers were 
idle in Pollokshaws, while the weavers in the cotton trade in Crieff 
petitioned the local gentry for employment. (5 l)Within a month, 
public subscriptions to relieve distress were being raised in 
Paisley (where 2,000 were unemployed), Edinburgh, and Glasgow.<52 ) 
other areas followed suit. With hundreds of weavers idle, Dunferm-
:line raised over £1,000 to relieve local distress, which was 
exacerbated by influenza, typhus fever, and measles. Moreover, as 
late as July, 1838, although the depression had considerably abated, 
there were still over 6oo weavers in the town out of employment. (53 ) 
The situation was further aggravated by a rise in grain prices, 
which although still "moderate" were measureably higher than those of 
1834-36. (54)Those on low incomes were thus squeezed from both sides, 
facing an increased price of bread, with reduced purchasing power. 






ibid., 22/4/1837; 26/4/1.837; 
ibid., 6/5/1837; 13/5/1837; 
29/4/1837. 
7/6/1.837. 
Ebenezer Henderson: Annals of Dunfermline and Vicinity, 
1069-1878 pp.642-3. 
54) D .G • Barnes : A History of the English Corn laws • A pp. B. 
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corn Laws, as the section of the community most acutely affected, in 
50 far as the cost of the "necessaries of life 
11 comprised a consider-
:ably more significant proportion of the household fudget .. 
The revival of interest in the Corn Laws occurred spontaneously, 
rather than in one universal burst of enthusiasm. In June, 1837, a 
public meeting in Strathmiglo (where a society existed in 1834) 
petitioned for relief for the working-classes through repeal of the 
Corn Laws, and the adoption of free trade, (55 )while 7,000 attended a 
mass anti-corn-law demonstration on a field north of Forfar (Wind-
mill Brae), when deputations from Dundee, Kirriemuir, Letham, Car se-
:burn, and other weaving communities in Forfarshire were present. 
The meeting was primarily working-class in composition, while two of 
the speakers (R. Proctor and A. Morrison) were weavers, MOreover, the 
aim of the demonstration was instant relief by allowing grain to 
enter the home market free of duty "to afford temporary relief to 
the working-classes in the tmprecedented state of distress" .. Never-
:theless, the middle-classes provided the majority of the speakers -
W. McLeish (vinter), P. Thornton (manufacturer), and significantly 
for the future, two dissenting ministers, the Rev. Mr. I.Dwe 
(Independent) and the Rev. Mr. M9.ckay (Methodist) (56) • The theme 
of working-class participation apparent at the Strathmiglo and Forfar 
meetings also extended, however, to the formation of anti-corn-law 
associations. In June, Kirkcaldy Anti-Gorn-Law Association, con-
~ 
:sisting chiefly of the working-classes, or at least non-electors 
of the burgh, was formed, and proceeded to issue a circular on the 
55) "Scotsman", 21/6/1837. 
56) ibid., 5/7/1837. 
' 
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Corn Laws to the electors of the burgh during the 1837 election. (S7) 
In Glasgow an anti-corn-law association was organised in the suburbs 
of Cowcaddens, Blackquarry, and Springburn - the second society in 
the suburbs of the city - to co-operate with the existing Glasgow 
Anti-corn-Law Association in promoting petitions. It held its first 
public meeting on 28/8/1.837, when one of the moving spirits was Mr. 
McGavany, a handloom-weaver, who dwelt on the theme that high prices 
for bread arising from the Corn Laws forced those near subsistence 
level to work longer hours, thus depriving them of utilising the time 
"for relaxation, for educational purposes, and for the general 
improvement of their m:inds u(2;8l repetition of a peculiarly Scottish 
social attitude on the value of education for the masses. 
Despite these local protests, there was little indication at the 
end of August, 1.837, that a more systematic agitation would emerge. 
Concurrently with a report on the formation of Blackquarry Anti-corn-
Law Association, Weir made the revealing admission in the columns of 
the "Glasgow Argus" that "a temporary apathy on the part of the public 
is no apology for remissness; it is, on the contrary, an additional 
argument for exertion". A similar admission was implicit in the plea 
of Anderston Anti-Gorn-Law Association two months later, when they 
issued an address calling for a cessation of activity on "questions 
of little or no moment" and a concentration on 11one well-directed 
rrovement" for the removal of the Corn Laws, ''nor slacken in our zeal 
for the accomplishment of this object nntil success shall have 
57) David Forrester to George Wilson., Kirkcaldy, 19/3/1.840, in 
~tter Book of the Anti-corn-Law League. Vol. 3, No. 453. 
(hereinafter referred to as L .L .B.) 
58) ''Glasgow Argus 11., 31/8/1837; "Scotsman", 2/9/1837. 
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11 (59) The IL crowned our labours • first steps towards the object of a well-
directed" movement were taken early in the following month, when 
delegates of several anti-corn-law associations in Glasgow and 
district, including Anderston, Blackquarry, and Auchinearn, met in the 
Harness-weavers' office, Trongate, to form a co-ordinating committee, 
of which William Weir was elected chairman, and Jolm Mackinnon, 
secretary of Anderston Anti-corn-Law Association, secretary. At 
the committee's next business meeting later in the same month, it 
indicated that its official style - the Central Anti-Corn-Law Associ-
:ation for the West of Scotland - was misleading in so far as its 
interest extended beyond any possible such geographical definition. 
Having heard reports of anti-corn-law associations in existence or in 
embryo in Hamilton, Partick, Pollockshaws, Gorbals, Paisley, and 
Crieff, it determined to commence a preliminary subscription to 
finance its activities, formed a committee to issue an official 
Address, and instructed Weir to correspond with Colonel Perronet 
Thompson, author of the celebrated 'tatechism on the Corn Laws". (6o) 
The "Address 11 of the Central Anti-corn-Law Association 
published in December, 1837, invited all suburbs and villages near 
Glasgow to send delegates to the committee, and communications 
from more distant associations, thus recognising the impossibility of 
forming a truly "national" connnittee for geographical reasons. '!he 
Address further invited all requiring information to enquire of the 
Central Association. which would indicate the source of it. Its 
declared aim was to provoke discussion and petitions, and "should 
59) "Glasgow Argus n, 12/10/18 37 • 
6o) ibid., 4/12/1837 • 
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our organisation and our means extend sufficiently, we will adopt the 
plan, so successfully pursued by the Anti-Slavery society, of sending 
lecttn"ers through .the country". Weir concurred in the dual role 
ascribed to the central Association, of disseminating information, 
setting up corresponding societies, and ~tting up petitions, and 
once a position of strength was secured, "the missionary system is 
wha. t will do the deed 11 • He added the example of 0 1Connell 1s 
catholic Association to that of Clarkson's anti-slavery movement as a 
model for the Central Association, and hoped that in order to extend 
the effective influence of the Association, more distant associations 
would appoint local residents living in Glasgow as delegates to the 
joint committee.(6l) 
The extent to which the Central Association lived up to its 
founders' expectations, however, was severely circumscribed. 
Principally for geographical reasons, it remained orientated largely 
within the confines of Glasgow and its suburbs, despite its interest 
in other areas • The delegates present invariably represented 
associations within the city, and indeed, even the Address setting 
forth its aims, was officially released on behalf of five Glasgow 
societies - Anderston6 Auchinearn6 Blackquarry6 Springburn6 and 
Tollcross. Even in Glasgow6 the development of new associations in 
the suburbs, subsequent to the formation of the Central Association 6 
although they undoubtedly owed something to the interest in the 
issue created by it. were largely formed by local initiative. 'lhus 
the inaugural meeting of Pollockshaws Anti-corn-Law Association 6 
held during the same evening as a business meeting of the Central 
61) ibid. 6 4/12/1.837. 
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Association, was chaired by Bailie Leckie, and the moving spirits 
were Andrew Rankin (shoemaker) and Charles McGrigor (weavers' 
secretary) • Neither Weir nor Mackinnon were present. A new 
association formed in ~idgeton, in December, 1837, also pursued an 
active and largely independent course, publishing their own Address, 
and dividing the village into districts to be the individual 
responsibilities of membersof the Association committee, who would 
(62) . 
utilise it for canvassing. The Central Association exercised l~ttle, 
if any, control over the freedom of individual associations, leaving 
them to devise their own rules. The Central Association merely 
framed rules for its own conduct, including the terms on which 
delegates from the constituent associations were received, and fixed 
subscriptions from the latter to cover unavoidable expenses.(63) 
Apart from the co-ordination of the petitioning activities of 
individual associations prior to the introduction of Villiers' 
parliamentary motion in the House of Commons in February, 18.38, the 
Central Association's own activity in Glasgow was restricted to 
instructing Weir to request the directors of Glasgow Reform Associ-
:ation to co-operate, and to seek similar assistance from Glasgow 
Town Council. (64) 
Outwith Glasgow, the irifluence of the Central Anti-corn-Law 
Association was also strictly curtailed, although its interest was 
widespread geographically. Its meetings were effectually debarred 
by distance from participation by delegates from local associations, 
62) ibid., 1/1/18.38; l/2/18,38; 8/2/1838. 
63) ibid., 15/l/18.38. 
64) ibid., l/1/18 .38; 15/1/1838 • 
and Weir's hope that distant associations would be represented by 
citizens resident in Glasgow failed to materialise. Reports of the 
activities of local associations in being or in embryo were made 1 
however, to meetings of the Central Association. Members of the 
Central Association appeared on the platforms of local anti-corn-law 
(65) 
associations 1 but as in Glasgow~ the local associations were 
completely independent. Thus Saltcoats Anti-Corn-Law Association 
formed on 2/1/1838~ determined to limit their activities to a small 
quarterly subscription to purchase books and other means of receiving 
and communicating information on the subject.<66)The Central 
Association was 1 however 1 as it set out to be, a means of co-ordinating 
petitioning activity1 and a source of information and advice on the 
agitation. Girvan free-traders were advised by the Central 
Association to form a permanent committee or association - it did not 
matter which option was adopted - "as the struggle for the abolition 
of the Corn Laws was not likely to be brought to a successful issue in 
one day". (G7) 
Local leadership and initiative was the prerequisite for success-
:ful agitation within any locality1 and in Perthshire the Central 
Association had an agent who provided a northern counterpart of Weir 1s 
activities in Glasgow. On 22/11/1837 1 an anti-corn-law association 
was formed in Crieff, with the intention of co-operating with the 
Central Association in Glasgow. Office bearers appointed included 
Alexarxler Fyfe (surgeon) as secretary1 and J. McNab (solicitor) as 
65) ibid •1 15/1/1.8;8 • 
66) ibid •1 8/l/1.8;8 • 
67) ibid.l 1/l/1838. 
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(EB) 
treasurer. McNab and a delegation from Crieff proceeded to agitate 
the question in Perth, while Fyfe turned his immediate attention to the 
(69) 
reformers of Dtmning. By early January, 1838, Dr. Fyfe was enabled 
to report to the Central Association, that six associations were 
ready to co-operate with the former - Crieff Anti-Corn-Law Association, 
Errol and Carse of Gowrie Political Union, Dunning Anti-corn-Law 
Association (formed by Fyfe), Perth Radical Association (promised 
Fyfe to move when Glasgow wished), Methven Anti-Corn-Law Association 
(formed by MCNab and Fyfe), and Auchterarder Reform Association. 
There were also, in Fyfe 1s view, associations at Stanley and Bankfoot 
which would be prepared to co-operate, Comrie was forming an 
association, and Fyfe intended "trying" Dunblane. (70)Fyfe further 
verified that there was an association in Dunfermline, prepared to 
co-operate with the Central Anti-corn-Law Association. (7l) 
However, there was a two-way communication between local anti-
corn-law leaders such as Fyfe, and the Central Association, which 
went further than merely submitting reports of local activities to 
the joint committee in Glasgow. Tracts were exchanged for distri-
:bution and local viewpoints expressed to the Central Association on 
further activity whiCh it could undertake - an indication of faith in 
its potential ability to put such aspirations into practice. Fyfe 
was one of the first to suggest to the Central Association that it 














probably as a result of this, Weir was instructed to correspond \'li th 
(72) 
likely parties in these countries, although the concept of Glasgow 
as a missionary centre had been implicit in the first Address of the 
Central Association. Crieff Anti-corn-Law Association determined to 
distribute copies of the Glasgow Address, and further opened up a 
subScription in Crieff to assist the Central Association in its 
activities, nespecially to enable the (Central) Association to send 
active and prudent agents into England and Ireland, to lay before the 
people the enormous evils arising from the Corn Bill, and to organise 
associations". They urged other associations to send their "mite" 
for the same purpose. <73 )The expression of similar sentiments after 
the defeat of Villiers 1 rllotion in Parliament had confirmed that 
there was no short-cut to success, by Dysart Anti-corn-Law Associ-
:ation, who in sending copies of their own local Address to Glasgow 
for distribution in agricultural areas, offered to share the cost of 
publishing an Address and agitating the corn question in Ireland, 
produced a new determination among the members of the Central 
Association to make Glasgow "a permanent centre of missionary 
agitation for the repeal of the Corn Laws". '!hey :Instructed Weir 
(74) 
to take practical steps with the merchants of the city. The 
selection of Ireland was not fortuitous; as Weir observed in the 
colunns of the "Argus ", the sister island furnished "a fine natural 
field for manufactures" once the Corn Laws were repealed, and the 
Irish would then have the money to purChase food.(75) 
72) ibid., 15/1/18 ;8 • 
73) ibid • , 8/2/18 ;B • 
74) ibid., 23/8/1838. 
75) ibid., 3/9/18;8. 
12 o. 
The Central Association had already endeavoured, however, to 
translate the ideal of a missionary centre into reality, perhaps 
emulating the example of Dr. Thomas Murray of Edinburgh, whose 
lectures on the Corn Laws had reputedly produced a salutary effect 
in the east of Scotland.<76)0n 3/4/1838, the Central Association 
unanimously agreed to a resolution from Auchinearn for lectures on 
the Corn Laws in every parish in Scotland, (77)but this too remained 
a dead letter except in so far as it was carried out by others. 
Perth Radical Association invited Mr. Nairn, a local flax-spinner, 
to give a lecture on the Corn Laws, but it was delivered to a 
meeting of the association. (78)0n 4/6/1838, the Central Association 
agreed to request liberal papers to give full coverage to a lecture 
to be given by the Rev •. Alexander Harvey, a local dissenting 
minister, to the Working Man's Association in Glasgow on 14/6/1838, 
but was obliged to defer the question of employing "missionaries" and 
(79) . 
lecturers due to a poor attendance. The question was raised aga~n 
when the Central Association unanimously adopted a motion from 
Anderston to address the merChants and manufacturers of Glasgow on 
the propriety of employing missionaries throughout the country, (80) 
and a month later, the Association agreed on a memorial to the 
commercial interests of the city requesting their co-operation in 
raising funds to try the experiment of "a missionary system against 
76) ibid., 22/3/1838. 
77) ibid., 9/4/1838. 
78) ibid., 30/4/1838. 
79) ibid., 7/6/1838. 
80) ibid., 9/7/18:13. 
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" (81) . the Corn Laws similar to that against colonial slavery. By the 
close of 1838, however, opinion in Glasgow on the Corn Laws was, as 
"luk " (82) and there was little hope of obtain-Weir conceded, ewarm , 
:ing the financial resources for such a project. 
Despite its failure to put into effect the second of its 
declared objectives - the establishment of a missionary system based 
on Glasgow - the Central Association had achieved some success in its 
first one. It had distributed tracts, given advice to emergent 
local anti-corn-law associations, and stimulated interest in the 
question in those areas in which its views had been propagated -
Glasgow, Lanarkshire, Ayrshire, West Lothian, Fife, and Perthshire. 
Moreover, its call on local associations for petitions in support of 
Villiers' motion to reach London by the last week in February, 1838, 
(83)had evoked a considerable response, (
84
)with several mass 
petitions - Girvan (1,500 signatories), Gorbals (9,000) and Kirk-
:caldy (1,700). (85 )The Central Association also served to bring anti-
corn-law associations in different parts of Scotland together -
including those, such as Kirkcaldy, (
86
)which had been in existence 
prior to the formation of the Central Association. The necessity 
for a missionary system was also realised, but foundered on the 
81) ibid., 2/8/18.38. 
82) William Weir to Archibald Prentice, Glasgow, 24/12/1838 in 
letter Book of the Anti-corn-Law league, Vol. 1, No. 2. 
83) "Glasgow Argus ", 1/2/18:;8. 
84) ibid., 5/2/18~; 8/2/1838; 12/2/1838; 15/2/1838; 22/2/1838; 
22/3/1838. 
85) David Forrester to George Wilson, Kirkcaldy, 19/3/1840, in 
L.L.B., Vol. 3 1 No. 453. 
86) "Glasgow Argus 11 , 9/7/1838. 
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problem which subsequently beset the Anti-Corn-Law League north of 
the Border - the reluctance of Scottish free traders to provide 
finance on an adequate scale for a sustained agitation. The 
central Association marked a stage in the evolution of the anti-
corn-law movement in Scotland and in Britain - it was a pilot 
scheme for the aspirations of the otherwise abortive London Anti-
Corn-Law Association to be translated into at least partial reality 
on a local scale. The relative success of the Central Anti-corn-
Law Association for the West of Scotland must be me~sured, above all, 
against the fact that as Villiers personally conceded when intro-
:ducing his motion in Parliament in early 1838, there was ''no 
particular excitement on the subject, • • • the country generally 
being in a healthy state 11 • (87) 
The Central Anti-corn-Law Association was more successful than 
the later League in one respect: it succeeded in averting the 
antagonism of those radicals who had determined after the failure of 
1833-34 to give priority to comprehensive parliamentary reform to 
the exclusion of all extraneous issues. It further retained the 
support of many other ultra-radicals who subsequently identified 
themselves with the Chartist movement. Even in 1836 when prices of 
corn were low, and wages comparatively high, the Corn Laws were a 
principal object of ultra-radical criticism, (8S)but with the 
depression of 1837, this attitude correspondingly hardened. Dr. 
John Taylor demanded the abolition of the Corn Laws at a Chartist 
87) "Scotsman", 21/2/1.8.38 • 
88) "Dtmdee Chronicle 11 , 20/2/1836; 27/2/1836; 26/3/1.836; 
"Glasgow Argus 11 , 26/12/1836 {quoting the "Perth Chronicle 11 ). 
rally on Glasgow Green on 14/6/1837, observing that they '~ould 
leave it to the speculating philosopher to talk about triennial 
parliaments, the vote by ballot, and education and endowed churches -
let them speculate on these as much as they will - but we must have 
food before we can enjoy any of them". (Bg)At the same time, however, 
he concurred in a decision of Edinburgh Radical Association that no 
radical should support any candidate in the forthcoming election who 
was unprepared to endorse triennial parliaments, the ballot, and 
household suffrage, as well as the "speedy and total repeal of the 
Corn Laws 11 • (go )In the Leith election of 1837, Taylor was prepared to 
give only modified support to J. Erskine Murray of Aberdona, a free-
trader and member of Leith Radical Association, whose platform 
included "a more equitable division of the franchise", as he 
(Taylor) was only prepared to fully sanction a candidate endorsing 
universal suffrage, annual parliaments, and the ballot(21ihe 
principal planks on the Chartist platform. Thus in 18 37, ultra-
radical opinion favoured total repeal of theCorn Laws, indeed 
regarded such a step as an integral part of its programme, but merely 
one feature among many. There was no sense of conflict between 
advancing further organic changes to the constitution, and engaging 
in an agitation against the Corn Laws. 
In these circumstances, the support of most ultra-radicals for 
the Central Anti-corn-Law Association or any other vehicle for 
protest against the Corn Laws was natural. Several radical 
associations declared their adhesion to the Central Association, 
89) "Glasgow Argus 11 , 15/6/1837. 
90) "Scotsman", 1/7 /Ji337. 
91) ibid., 5/7/JB37. 
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either by sending delegates or transmitting petitions at the 
Association's request. These included Errol and Carse of Gowrie 
Political Union, (92 )Whitburn Political Union, (93 )strathaven Reform 
Association, (94)Kirkintilloch Reform Association, (9S)Dumbarton 
Reform Association, (96)and ~idgeton Radical Association.(97) 
Moreover, several prominent Chartists played a significant role in 
local anti-corn-law associations. Dr. John Taylor was appointed by 
Hamilton Anti-corn-Law Association as their delegate to the Central 
Association.(gB)Another prominent Chartist, John Rodger, was 
treasurer of ~idgeton Anti-corn-Law Association, and an active 
member of the Central Association, (99)while the Association's 
energetic organiser in Perthshire, Dr. Fyfe, was one of the Chartists 
participating in the Cal ton Hill meeting, on 28/5/1838. (lOO) 
Perhaps more significantly for the future, however, was the absence 
92) "Glasgow Argus ", 7/12/1837. 
93) ibid., 15/~1838. Also; Leslie Wright: Scottish Chartism, p.37. 
94) Strathaven Reform Association, formed on 30/1/1838, with the 
objects of extension of the suffrage, ballot, triennial 
parliaments, repeal of the Corn Laws, had 6oo members. 
They nominated James Thompson (cotton-broker) as their 
delegate to the Central Anti-corn-Law Association for the 
West of Scotland. (-"Glasgow Argus ", 22/2/1838.) 
95) ibid., 8/3/1838. 
96) "Scotsman", 21/2/lB;E. 
gr) On 30/7/1838, the Central Anti-Corn-Law Association agreed to 
admit a delegate from Eridgeton Radical Association, and 
from any similar organisation incltrling repeal in its plat-
:form; also, to correspond with any suCh organisation. 
(-"Glasgow Argus ", 19/7/1838) • 
S8) ibid., 15/1/1838. 
99) ibid., 8/2/18;8; 22/3/18;E. 
lOO) "Scotsman", 8/12/1838. 
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of James Moir, who had taken such an active part in the activities 
of the Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law Society in 1834, and to a lesser extent 
of ultra-radical leaders, such as Abram Duncan and Edward Fraser, 
from the ranks of the anti-corn-law movement in 1837-38. 
There was, however, until mid-1838 no clear-cut party for either 
repeal of the Corn Laws or further parliamentary reform - merely a 
difference of emphasis among Scottish radicals on the priority whidh 
they attached to either plank of the one platform, and shades of 
opinion on the degree of parliamentary reform required. Thus at 
the Cal ton Hill ultra-radical meeting of 28/5/1838, Edward Fraser 
spoke at some length on "the darmable Corn Laws" am on other 
measures of the Tories and Whigs "between whom he did not see much 
difference • • • All those evils would be cured by Annual 
Parliaments, etc.". (lOl)His sentiments on the subject were echoed by 
other speakers at the same meeting. In the same month, a Chartist 
rally on Glasgow Green, addressed by the Birmingham radical, Thomas 
Attwood, M.P., and chaired by James Moir, witnessed the presence of 
numerous banners with inscriptions decrying the continued existence 
101) ibid., 30/5/1838. 
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(102) . 
of the Corn Laws. On the other side of the coin~ many of the ant1-
corn-law meetings endorsed other complaints too. Thus the Gorbals 
Anti-Corn-Law Association originated in a requisition asking for a 
public meeting to petition for the twin objects of the ballot and 
repeal of the Corn laws~ (l03 )and at the ensuing meeting on 8/12/1837 ~ 
Weir~ Alexander Hedderwick~ and Dr. Thomas Lightbody spoke in 
. (lo4) 
support of both obJects. Weir addressed a further public meeting 
in Glasgow in the course of the same month~ in favour of the ballot 
and an extension of the suffrage~ during which he proclaimed his 
adhesion to "the abstract principle of tmiversal suffrage"~ but 
moved no resolution to that effect as he had to carry other reformers 
along with him. (l05) 
102) Ba.mlers carried slogans such as ''Repeal of the Corn Laws 11 ~ 
"From Corn Laws and Election Bribery~ Oh~ Lord~ deliver us"~ 
"Mens 1 Food should not be taxed - we ask no concession -
we demand our rights; free trade in corn 11 • From Ruther-
:glen~ a large flag bore the legend:-
"our rights to obtain~ 
"Let the masses decree 
'~t we both have the will 
"And the power to be free. 
"A free trade in corn~ let the millions loud thunder -
"Join our ranks~ oppressed brothers~ 
'You once obeyed your com1try 1s call~ 
''The rights you gained you gave to others~ 
"Press forward now for rights to all". 
(''Glasgow Argus "~ 21/5/1838; 24/5/1838; "Scotsman"~ 
26/5/1838 • ) 
103) "Glasgow Argus "~ 30/11/1.837; 7/12/1837. 
104) ibid.~ lL/12/1837. 
105) "Scotsman"~ 3/L/18 38. 
From 22/2/1.838 ~ the editorial of the "Glasgow Argus 11 was 
headed with the caption of "Short Parliaments; Extension 
of the Suffrage; Redistribution of the Electoral Districis ; 
Vote by Ballot". 
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The schism among Scottish radical opinion which occurred in 
mid-1838 was attributable in the first instance to the suggestion 
of the "Birmingham Journal" that it was vain to attempt to obtain 
a repeal of the Corn Laws until universal suffrage had been 
acquired, but underlying the new "hard-line 11 approach were other 
factors. In the first place, there was a growing division between 
the new ultras - such as Fraser - prepared to accept nothing short 
of the entire programme embodied subsequently in the Charter, and 
the "respectable 11 middle-class radicals like \'lilliam Tai t or Jarnes 
Aytoun, who were prepared to accept reform (including repeal of the 
Corn laws) by :instalments, albeit large ones. The latter had boy-
:cotted the Calton Hill ultra-radical meeting of 28/5/18;8. (l06) 
Secondly, the new ultras were aware of the pull of the anti-corn-law 
movement as a rival attraction to the working-class (and middle-
class) support which they in turn hoped, and required, to gain. In 
Scotland, working-class involvement in the agitation of 1837-38 had 
again been apparent, frequently to the forefront, in the formation of 
local anti-corn-law associations (above), in the transmission of an 
operatives 1 petition against the Corn Laws, (l07)and in the evidence 
of J.C. Symons, Assistant Commissioner for the Handloom Weavers' 
Commission, who found that in Kilmar.nock, the weavers attributed 
106) "Scotsman", 30/5/1838. 
107) "Glasgow Argus ", 23/7/18~. 
From the manager, clerks, mechanics, tenders, dressers, 
weavers, etc., of Messrs. John and Archibald Reid, Glasgow. 
Others from the female operatives in the musl:in ma.nu-
:factories of Glasgow, and by the operatives of Charles 
Todd 's Springfield Works, Glasgow. ( -"Glasgow Argus, 
24/1/1839; 14/2/1839). 
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manufacturing distress to the operation of the Corn Laws. (lcB )The 
weavers of Cupar were of a similar mind, considering that an abo-
:li tion of the Corn Laws would be "productive of great relief to 
them, as well as to the country generally".(lOg)Finally, there was 
the indisputable fact that despite the apparent success of the 
anti-corn-law agitations of 1833-34 and 1837-38 in demonstrating 
public opinion on the issue, the so-called reformed Parliament had 
treated the expression of public feeling with disdain, producing 
a situation whiCh was not dissimilar generally to 1815 or 1828, 
and evoking a similar response - if the existing composition of 
Parliament was a bar to progress, constitutional reform should be 
the key to further legislative reform. 
The stand taken by the Birmingham radicals was rapidly adopted 
in Scotland by those ultra-radicals who had remained aloof from the 
activities of the Central Anti-Corn-Law Association. Indifference 
to the anti-corn-law movement was replaced by antagonism, and in turn 
by active opposition. Abram Duncan was the first to earn the rebuke 
of the "Glasgow Argus" for calling for miversal suffrage, rather 
than repeal of the Corn laws, as the former would "cure all the 
evils of the body politic", producing in turn a Chartist demand 
that the "Argus" would support universal suffrage. (llO)Dtmcan 's 
hostility increased, and at a second meeting on Calton Hill, 
Edinburgh, on 11/9/18;8, he denounced the anti-corn-law movement "as 
an expedient got up by the whigs to distract the attention of the 
1d3) ibid., 4/6/18.38. 
109) ibid., 20/8/1838 • 
110) ibid., 30/8/18,38; 6/9/18,38; 10/9/18;8. 
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(111) 
working-classes from the more pressing and more useful agitation". 
·' · ·A similar line was adopted by James Moir, who called on the 
working-classes not to lose sight of universal suffrage by agitating 
for repeal of the Corn Laws, contending that the agitation against 
the Corn Laws had been whipped up by the whigs to divert attention 
away from the growth of radicalism. He added the further warning 
that whereas repeal of the Corn Laws would doubtless follow 
universal suffrage, the converse was not true.(ll2 )In Edinburgh, the 
radical stayrnaker, Peddie, who had also participated in previous 
anti-corn-law demonstrations (below) observed the despair of the 
working-classes for repeal till the state of representation in 
Parliament had been changed. (ll3) 
However, while ultra-radical opinion in Scotland adopted the 
Birmingham "line 11 that universal suffrage should precede repeal of 
the Corn Laws, there was general acceptance of the necessity for the 
latter, and when the radicals of Perth formed a new radical reform 
association in Errol on 4/9/1838, its objects comprised both repeal 
of the Corn Laws and universal suffrage. (ll4 )A few dissentients 
appeared, however, from this general attitude, including Moir. By 
September, 1838, some Chartists were questioning the wisdom of 
repeal of the Corn Laws at all, without a concurrent reduction of 
the National Debt, accepting the protectionist view that wages 
followed prices, that repeal would also result in reduced wages, and 
111) "Scotsman", 12/9/1838. 
Edward Fraser was also present. 
112) "Glasgow Argus ", 6/9/1838. 
113) ibid., 31/12/18~. 
114) ibid., 1/10/1838. 
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that the working--classes would therefore have to pay the same level 
of taxation from reduced means. Some ultras advocated countering 
the activities of the Corn Law repealers, resulting in a further schism 
in the Chartist ranks, between those such as Moir who favoured such 
action, and those like Alexander Hedderwick of Glasgow, who believed 
that the anti-corn-law agitation should be left alone, while the 
Chartists ploughed their own furrow. (llS)Moir's extremist position 
arose at least in part from his dissatisfaction with the numbers 
adjoining the recently··fonned Glasgow Universal Suffrage Association: 
he warned members of it not to be led away by the Corn Law agitation~116 ) 
Support for his position came from Edinburgh and Midlothian 
Universal Suffrage Association, whose president, John Duncan, warned 
J.J. Darling, an Edinburgh solicitor and free trader, that if an 
anti-corn-law meeting was called in Edinburgh over the winter of 
1838-39, the U.S.A. would move an amendment for universal suffrage as 
"the only measure which can confer any benefit" on the people. 
Duncan further indicated that he feared "cheap bread" might be a 
prelude to "cheaper labour", and argued that any agitation against 
the Corn Laws should be waged within the vehicle of the Midlothian 
Universal Suffrage Association. (ll7 )From the viewpoint of Weir and 
the Corn Law repealers, it made little if any difference whether the 
opposition of the ultra-radicals stemmed from their non-adherence to 
the cause of repeal, or their opposition to the means by which it 
was being pursued. In either case, the Chartist movement was a 
115) ibid.,l7/9/l$38. 
116) ibid., 20/9/1838. 
117) "Scotsman", 19/9/1838. 
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counter-magnet for working-class support which had hitherto been 
channelled into the anti-corn-law movement, or at worst, had been 
indifferent • Indeed, the fact that most Scottish Chartists 
recognised the legitimacy of the cause of repeal, and differed from 
the free traders only on the means by which the end was to be 
achieved made them potentially more da~rous rivals for working-
class sympathy, which in Scotland had been consistently to the fore-
:front in all the anti-corn-law agitations. 
The allegation of the ''Birmingham Journal" that it was vain to 
attempt to secure repeal of the Corn Laws until l.miversal suffrage 
had been obtained, and its adoption by the ultra-radicals in Scotland 
forced Corn Law repealers to define their attitude - hitherto 
undefined- on the question of universal suffra~. They also felt 
obliged to justify an agitation for repeal of the Corn Laws in the 
face of the apparent futility of securing any concession from the 
House of Commons as constituted, after the rejection of Villiers' 
motion. Weir's reaction was to contend that an agitation for repeal 
of the Corn Laws would produce either repeal - what some Chartists 
feared - or "such a demonstration of the inadequacy of the 'Reform 
Parliament' to obtain justice, as would induce a sufficient minority 
of the enfranchised to unite with the unenfranchised to force an 
extension of the suffrage". Weir further contended that it was 
only by ''ripening the public mind 11 to the condition of the lower 
classes that an extension of the suffrage could be '~eaceably ob-
:tained". (ll.8) As a political radical, albeit a ''respectable" one. 
Weir could not regard the corn question in isolation from his 
118) "Glasgow Argus ", 6/8/1838. 
132. 
aspirations for further parliamentary reform, and argued conversely 
from the Chartists that an agitation for repeal of the Corn Laws 
would be the more certain means to the end of a further instalment 
of organic constitutional changes, as "every monopoly that is 
destroyed sends fresh recruits to the cause of all", (llg)in so far as 
one monopolist interest tended to support another. However, Weir 
conceived that by a strict separation of extraneous issues from the 
central aim of Corn Law repeal, it would be possible to draw on a 
wider base of support, and on other interest groups, for a campaign 
for what he regarded as the attainable aim of repeal of the Corn Laws. 
(l20)rather than the mirage of universal suffrage. 
Considering as he did that repeal of the Corn Laws would be a 
major step towards the fulfilment of parliamentary reform, whiCh he 
felt free to agitate as an individual concurrently anyway, Weir did 
not see such a concept as contradictory to his philosophy as a 
radical. en the contrary, the anti-corn-law movement fulfilled, if 
Weir was correct in his political assessment, a complementary role to 
the Universal Suffrage agitation. On the same argument, the 
119) ibid., 10/9/1838. 
120) On behalf of the Central Anti-corn-Law Association, Weir wrote 
to Lord Brougham, that while their irmnediate aim was repeal 
of the Corn Laws, they were aware of other abuses whiCh 
they traced "to defects in our legislative and represen-
:tative systems. So far from wishing to divert public 
attention from those other urgently-required ameliorations 
in our institutions they will be found individually prompt 
to lend their aid to any movement for that end which 
affords a reasonable prospect of sticcess. The restriction 
of their combined efforts to the question of the Corn Laws 
originated in the belief that this restriction would admit 
of the co-operation of many who might differ on other 
points - that it would bring to bear upon the organised 
defenders of the Corn Laws, a more numerous and concentrated 
organisation". { - ibid., 11/10/1838). 
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universal suffrage movement, though not complementary to the anti-
corn-law agitation, was not - unless the former showed hostility -
necessarily an antagonist. 
Other free traders of a less radical hue than Weir, however, 
regarded the universal suffragists in a less indulgent light. 'llie 
"Scotsman" which favoured repeal of the Corn laws was extremely 
critical of the Chartists from a multiplicity of middle-class, whig 
fears and prejudices, which included the charge that they retarded 
the progress of reform on "really practicable measures" - such as 
Corn Law repeal - by "fostering a dread of change". (l2l)Moreover, 
the disruptive tactics of the universal suffragists provoked counte~ 
sentiments from some ~ee traders. A Chartist rally in Hawick 
addressed by Abram Duncan and Edward Fraser was protracted till very 
late to prevent an amendment being moved - with the obvious approval 
of the "Scotsman" - that "universal suffrage was at present uncalled 
for; and that the efforts of the people ought rather to be con-
:centrated against the continuance of the Corn Laws". (122) 
By the beginning of 1839, open hostility reigned between the 
majority of Scottish Chartists - whether from opposition to repeal or 
to the vehicle whereby the issue was being agitated. When several 
free traders in Edinburgh employed J .R. Reed, "a member of the 
working-classes" to give two lectures on the Corn Iaws in late 
December, with a nominal admission charge of 2d. to encourage working-
class participation, the secom of these witnessed "a rather stormy 
discussion" between free traders and Chartists on which issue was 
121) "Scotsman 11 , 29/8/1838; 1/9/1838; 22/9/1838; 3/11/1838. 
122) ibid., 10/10/1838. 
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the priority- repeal of the Corn Laws or the Charter(!2,)discussion 
in which both parties appeared equally numerous. In Dumfries, on 
24/1/1839, Chartists nullified an anti-corn-law meeting by succes-
:sfully moving an amendment that the Corn Law was wrong in pr:In-
:ciple, but that the current agitation against it was injudicious. 
The amendment was argued, however, on the fear that abolition would 
cause rural depopulation, an over-supply of labour in the towns, and 
lower wages, which it was contended was the motivation of the 
"Cotton Lords" in undertaking the campaign. (l24)Further anti-corn-
law meetings were captured by the Chartists in Kilmarnock and 
Glasgow, inspiring the free trade "Glasgow Chronicle", a radical 
Whig journal, to urge both parties to compromise and unite, in the 
belief that there was no hope of any change so long as the existing 
composition of Parliament was perpetuated.<125 )rn some localities, 
however, the Chartists concurred in repeal meetings, notably in 
Greenock and Kirkcaldy. At the latter meeting, active working-
' class participation was apparent, with George Hbwie, a flax-dresser, 
(126) 
as one of the principal speakers. There was no clear-cut social 
cleavage between the working- and middle-classes in Scotland on the 
123) 
124) 
ibid., 22/12/1.838; 29/12/18.:;8; "Glasgow Argus ", 31/12/18.:;8. 
"Glasgow Argus ", 31/1/1839· 
125) "Glasgow Chronicle", 18/2/1839; 23/12/1.839. 
On 8/1/1839, the directors of the recently-formed Glasgow 
Anti-corn-Law Association had rejected a proposal from 
Glasgow Universal Suffrage Association to include universal 
suffrage in their aims, (and the threat of opposition if 
the forroor did not comply) on the ground that it was in-
:consistent with the object of the Association. 
( -"Glasgow Argus ", 10/1/1.839) • 
126) "Glasgow Argus ", 31/1/1839; 7/2/1839. 
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corn question by 1839, but the radical interest \'ras increasingly 
divided on the issue of which question - or more accurately, which 
aspect of the one question - parliamentary reform or the Corn Laws. 
should receive priority. For the radicals, these were inextricably 
connected. As a body, the middle-class radicals, such as Weir or 
Erskine Murray, regarded the latter as the most effective, feasible 
blow at the social and political predominance of the landed interest, 
while working-class radicals, such as Peddie in Edinburgh, viewed 
parliamentary reform as the expedient means to the end of "just" 
legislation to ameliorate social and political grievances, including 
"dear bread ". 
The lB30 1s were a formative, if largely unsuccessful, period for 
the advocates of free trade in corn. The preliminary agitation of 
1.833-34 established the aim of total repeal in most areas, although 
the allied question of whether it should be gradual or immediate was 
frequently left conveniently vague. This aim was accepted by the 
.c later league in its more successful agitation. However, the major 
experimentation of 1833-;8 was in the vehicle of protest. The 
anti-corn-law societies of 1833-34 were the first permanent associ-
:ations formed in Scotland to agitate for repeal, and marked the 
transition belatedly from an agitation based largely on eighteenth 
century teclmiques. to its nineteenth century equivalent. The lack 
of co-ordination between the individual societies, and their con-
:sequent limitation as machinery for missionary activity was realised 
and to some extent rectified in the Central Anti-corn-Law Association 
in 1837-38, which attempted to put into effect on a regional scale 
the aspirations of the founders of the wndon Anti-corn-Law 
Association of 1836. The evolution of an increasingly sophisticated 
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organisation. relying less on spontaneous enthusiasm. and accepting 
the obligation of a long-term proselytising role did not emerge 
suddenly with the League in 1839; it had its origins in the earlier 
and less successful societies of the l830 1s. and in techniques 
borrowed from other agitations of the period. especially the anti-
slavery movement. Nevertheless. the Central Association was sub-
:stantially a failure. Geographically~ despite its interest without 
the west of Scotland. it was lar~ly Glasgow-based. In 1837-.38 ~ 
there was no organised anti-corn-law movement in Edinburgh~ Dundee~ 
or Aberdeen. More important • it failed to attract the support of 
interest groups other than a small core of radicals • many of whom 
were turning to miversal suffrage as the panacea for all ills and 
the road to all further reform. Even the commercial interests who 
had participated. largely from immediate political frustration. in 
1833-34 • absented themselves in 1837-;8. If more successful 
agitation was to be conducted. it had to be more widespread 
geographically and gain the adherence of middle-class interest 
groups. After 1833. however. the unsuccessful projects which had 
largely been fostered by Weir indicated that there would be an anti-
corn-law movement in existence to take advantage of any future 
commercial distress and channel manufacturing discontent against the 
Corn Laws. The League learned from previous experience and 
especially from previous failures. 
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5. The emergence of the Anti-Corn-Law League in Scotland, 1839. 
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In mid-18)8, Glasgo\v seemed, and v1as, the focal point of the anti-
corn-law movewent throughout Britain, although its influence Has 
substantially confined to Scotland. ~ili thin a year, the focal 
point of ~Jn enlarged a.gi tation had migrated south, and I13.nchester 
HaS the unquestioned leader of the movement, or perhaps more 
accurately, collection of local movements vlhich comprised the 
anti-corn-law agitation. However, although a key factor in the 
rene\-Ted agitation of 1839 v1as the leadership of the fl".tanchester free-
traders - a leadership they retained until 1846 - it vrould be an 
exaggeration to suggest that the Anti-Corn-Law Le2,gue Has "clearly 
(1) 
stamped from the start ,.,ith the designation 'made in !·ianchester'"• 
The League was moulded in a Nanchester crucible, but the ingredients 
represented commercial and industrial areas in several parts of 
Britain apart from Lancashire, who contributed to its formation in 
ideas and material resources. T:qere Has some degree of continuity 
before and after the League's formation: some anti-corn-law asso-
(2) 
:ciations (such as Kirkcaldy formed in 1837) which had adhered to 
the Central Anti-Corn-Law Association subsequently were associated 
with the League • In short, the League did not start with a blank 
slate, but merely witnessed the assumption by !·1anchester of the 
leadership of a movement which was already in existence. There 
was a two-way transmission of ideas, men, and resources between 
~~nchester and the rest of Britain, whichhas been insufficiently 
recognised. 
1) Asa Bribgs: Victorian Cities. p.97. 
2) David Forrester to GeorgB Wilson, Kirkcaldy, 19/3/1840 
in L.L.B., vol. 3, no. 453. 
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The loss of leadership by Glasgow was far from clear in 
mid-1838, because although the Central Anti-Corn-La\·l Association 1 s 
influence was concentrated in certain restricted areas in Scotland, 
it was the closest approach to a co-ordinated agitation as envisaged 
by the London Association of 1836, and some of its members had been 
demanding the extension of its activities to England and Ireland, 
with lecturers and correspondence. By late 1838, ho\'rever, it 
\'las increasingly clear, that the Central Association in Glasgow had 
not the resources at its disposal to translate the hopes of some of 
its leaders for the evolution of a "missionary systemu into practice. 
\Vhereas in February, 1838, the "Glasgow Argusu could boast that the 
masses were alive to the importance of the corn question, and that 
any meeting in a populous district would be numerously and enthusias-
(3) 
:tically attended, -the gro\'r.i.ng hostility of the ultra-radicals in the 
latter half of the year, forced Weir to question the value of public 
meetings, missionary lectures, and petitions to Parliament. Weir 
was also obliged to recognise that not only the tactics might be wrong, 
but also the composition of the anti-corn-law movement. The Central 
Anti-Cor.n-Law Association had relied heavily on the support of a 
political interest group - the radicals. With this interest group 
subject to the pull of the counter-magnet of universal suffrage, he 
conceived that the enlistment of another interest group - a comnerci al 
and industrial one - would suffice as a substitute. Weir sought the 
support of the manufacturers~ merchants and traders of industrial 
towns (such as Glasgow and Dundee), to replace the unenfranchised 
3) "Glasgow Argus 11 , 22/2/1838. 
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classes vrho v1ere "obviously intent on riding their hobby of universal 
suffrage", and who "won't dismount, whistle on them as you may". 
(4) 
As the Central Anti-Corn-Law Association was "if not absolutely 
defunct, ••• in a hopeless state of suspended animation" by the end 
of 1838, Weir was approached by some electors in Glasgow's first ward 
to form a new one, which he did (but on a wider basis than for one 
municipal ward) after the distraction of the municipal elections of 
(5) 
November 1838 were over. The new Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law Association, 
formed in the Black Bull, at a meeting chaired by James Dunlop of 
Clyde, and convened by circulars addressed to electors in each of the 
nine municipal districts of the city, was different in social and 
political complexion from its predecessor. It represented the 
industrial and commercial middle-classes of Glasgow, epitomised in its 
first chairman, Alexander J olmstone of Oak bank, (cot tom spinner) • 
Weir as secretary constituted a hangover from the radical nature of 
past agi tations in the city, and a recognition of his own services to 
(6) 
the movement. Significantly, however, the new association attempted to 
retain a considerable lower middle-class base, by retaining an entry fee 
of only one shilling (what Moir had advocated in 1834) although this 
was sufficient to deter the influx of working-class Chartists. 
Wil1iam Weir had, however, a specific purpose in forming the 
Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law Association, other than merely combatting the 
prevalent apathy which existed in Glasgow in late, 1838, and putting 
the excitement which existed "into working shape". He had conceived 
the idea of pressing Parliament to be heard by counsel at the bar of 
4) ibid., 20/12/1838. 
5) ibid., 7/1/1639. 
6) ibid., 3/1/1839; 7/1/1839. 
141. 
the House of Commons. As a member of the Scottish bar, he contended 
that Parliament was a court of justice, which could listen to a law-
(7) 
plea in support of repeal of the Corn Laws. Weir was not suffi-
:ciently sanguine to believe that the landed interest which dominated 
Parliament would be prepared to accept the case for repeal merely 
because it was presented by counsel, but he hoped that taking the 
issue directly to Parliament would stimulate interest in the question 
of the Corn Laws, if only because "the wrangling and disruption in the 
Conunons after would keep public attention. 'Ihe game played against 
(8) 
the Orders in Cotm.cil might be played again against the Corn Laws". 
Weir envisaged Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law Association from the beginning 
(9) 
as the vehicle for propagating what was his idea, and at the inaugural 
meeting of the nascent association, the chairman and committee were 
directed to prepare an immediate petition to the Commons craving to be 
heard by counsel and to present evidence at the bar of the House, to 
ask for total repeal, to procure signatures for the petition, to obtain 
subscriptions to a guarantee fund - already urged by Weir through the 
(10) 
"Argus" - and when it was sufficiently advanced, to intimate to, and 
seek the co-operation of various chambers of commerce, free trade 
(11) 
associations, and anti-corn-law associations in its support. It was 
clear from the start that Glasgow could make no impact on Parliament 
7) ibid., 27/12/1838. 
At the inaugural meeting of Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law Association, 
V.lilliam Craig alluded to the deputions sent to Westminster by 
the Anti-Slavery Movement. (ibid., 7/1/1839.) 
8) vlilliam Weir to Archibald Prentice, Glasgow, 24/12/1838 in 
L.L.B., vol. I, no. 2. 
9) "Glasgow Argus ", 21/1/1839. 
10) ibid., 27/12/1838. 
11) ibid., 3/1/1838. 
142. 
on its o\m, and that the support of other industrial communities 
was essential for the success of v/eir 's proposal, and before the 
new Glasgow association was formally initiated, the "Argus" had 
urged a delegation from Glasgow to proceed to Manchester, and expound 
it at the anti-corn-law dinner to be held by Manchester Anti-Cor.n-
(12) 
Law Association in late January, 1839. 
Manchester's involvement in the anti-corn-law movement in 1838 
was tardy. No anti-corn-law association existed until October 
(13) 
(subsequently joined by Richard Cobden). However, its business-
like manner of setting to work, with lectures in Manchester and 
Birmingham by A.W. Paulton, raising subscriptions, and above all the 
"capture" by the Manchester free traders of the local chamber of 
commerce, in December, when they carried a petition for total repeal 
(14) 
of the Corn Laws, created a considerable impact in the Scottish 
(15) 
liberal press, which hailed the last as an indication that the 
agitation \'Tas gaining strength. 'Ihe r'Ianches ter Chamber of Commerce 
petition established Lancashire as the I-1ecca for the free trade 
movement throughout Britain, insofar as it indicated a willingness 
on the part of the mercantile community in Manchester to move on the 
question. This fact was noted by the Scottish delegates not only 
in atten~ the Manchester anti-corn-law dinner on 23/1/1839, but 
also in their speeches at the event. Alexander Johnstone expressed 
"the feelings of obligation which the men of Glasgow entertain towards 
12) ibid., 27/1</1838; 7/1/1839. 
13) Archibald Prentice: op. cit. vol. I, pp. 73-74. 
14) ibid., vol. I, pp. 64-65, 71, 79-88, 91-93. 
15) "Glasgow Chronicle", 20/12/1838; "Scotsman", 22/12/1838; 
"Reformers' Gazette", 29/12/1838, p. 423. 
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those of i1 anchester, who first brought forward this question (Corn 
Laws) \'lhile we were slumbering". The Hon. J. Erskine I1lurray ~rho 
attended as in interested individual from Edinburgh, noted that 
prior to the proceedings of Manchester Chamber of Commerce, "the 
inhabitants of Edinburgh were asleep on the question", and that the 
facts and figures produced during the debate in the Manchester 
chamber had "shocked them out of their lethargy", although no anti-
(16) 
corn-law association had been formed in the city. 
Although the example of Manchester was lauded in Scotland, 
Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law Association was unprepared to assume the role 
of a "camp follower". Armed with Weir 1 s idea for an agitation to 
be heard at the bar of the House of Commons, they sought the eo-
operation of Manchester in its pursuit. When Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law 
Association appointed Johnstone and Weir as their delegates to the 
Manchester anti-corn-law dinner on 23/1/1838, they went with the 
intention of craving a forenoon conference with Manchester Anti-Corn-
Law Association and the delegates of other manufacturing towns "to 
make a connnon plan of attack" and to provide for "a closer and more 
(17) 
energetic co-operation in the futln'e". One of the directors of 
Glasgow Anti-Oom-Law Association, Walter Buchanan, had g_one so far 
as to suggest that the Glasgow delegates should request the assembled 
delegates :in Manchester to establish "a central Anti-Corn-Law Board, 
so as to centralise as much as possible the efforts of the people for 
16) "Glasgow Argus", 28/1/1839; also, J. Erskine Murray to John 
Hill Burton, Greenock, 27/1/1839, in Hill Burton Papers, 
f•1SS • 9391 f • 233. 
17) "Glasgow Argus", 10/1/1839; also, William Weir to James 
Chapman, Glasgow, 9/1/1839, in L.L.B. vol. I, no. 31. 
(18) 
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the repeal of the Corn Laws". I1oreover, the ideas propotmded by 
Weir and J ohnstone were accepted in ~1anchester. 'Ihe concept of 
carrying the anti-corn-law case to Parliament had already been 
accepted by r~anchester Anti-Corn-Law Association, prior to the 
(19) 
dinner, but at the latter function, \•Jeir 1 s authorship of the idea 
was recognised, and he was toasted (by Archibald Prentice) for his 
personal contribution. Similarly, Cobden, on behalf of r1anchester 
Anti-Corn-Law Association proposed to set up an anti-corn-law 
board in London comprising members of different associations 11acting 
with one common object", with a view to enlisting the aid of 
favourable r~.P. 's, and to collect and arrange evidence to be sub-
(20) 
:mitted to Parliament. The demand for co-operation came from 
Glasgow, rather than IVIanchester. The latter responded to this 
pressure: it did not initiate it. 
However, f•lanchester leadership of the anti-com-law movement 
emerged increasingly, before the Anti-Corn-Law League was officially 
latmched. The anti-corn-law dinner was succeeded by the promulgation 
of the constitution and rules of the ~1anchester Anti-Corn-Law As so-
:ciation, which accepted a national commdtment. Paraphrasing those 
of the abortive 1836 London Association, they committed the Manchester 
free-traders "to obtain by all legal and constitutional means, such 
as the formation of local Anti-Corn-Law Associations, the delivery of 
lectures, the distribution of tracts, the insertion of articles :in 
the public papers, and forwarding petitions to Parliament, the total 
18) "Glasgow Argus", 21/1/1839. 
19) ibid., 14/1/1839. 
20) ibid., 28/1/1839. 
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(21) 
and innnediate repeal of the corn and provision laws 11 • Increas-
:ingly, Scottish free-traders looked to Manchester for guidance. 
ThUs on 31/1/1839, Dr. N.N. Forbes, a free-trader in Inverness 
requested the r·~anchester Association for a copy of the resolutions 
embodying its rules, and for any advice the Association could give 
"in aiding to promote the great object in view", in addition to a 
(22) 
hand-bill on the subject. Organised anti-corn-law associations in 
Scotland also looked to Manchester for guidance. In March, Hawi ck 
Anti-Corn-Law Association twice communicated with Manchester, request-
: ing guidance on future activities towards total and inunediate 
(23) 
repeal, and subsequently ordering pamphlets from Manchester Anti-
(24) 
Corn-Law Association. Even Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law Association 
requested a copy of the resolutions adopted by the Manchester Anti-
Corn-Law Association as to the evidence proposed to be adduced in the 
event of the House of Commons granting leave ••• "for the guidance 
(25) 
of the (Glasgow) Association". -On the same date ( 28/1/1839), Weir 
gave the "unqualified assent" of Glasgow to the Manchester Association 
rule that "party or political topics" should be strictly excluded from 
21) Archibald Prentice: op. cit., vol. I, p. 104. 
22) N.N. Forbes to J.B. Smith, Inverness, 31/1/1839, in L.L.B., 
vol. I, no. 82. 
23) vi. Scott and A. Scott to J.B. Smith, Hawick, 4/3/1839, in 
ibid., vol. I~, no. 119. 
Hawick Anti-Corn-Law Association was formed on 29/1/1839. 
("Scotsman", 26/1/1839). 
24) W. Scott and A. Scott to Manchester Anti-Corn-Law Association, 
Hawick, 30/3/1839, in ibid., vol. I, no. 141. 
25) D. Nurray to J. Chapman, Glasgow, 28/1/1839, in ibid., 
vol. I, no. 75. 
(26) 
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the agitation. 'llie leadership of IvJanchester was tmquestioned in 
Scotland before the Anti-Corn-Law League was formed. 
Nevertheless~ William Weir and Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law Association 
continued to be the principal source of activity north of the border, 
and concurrently with securing the support of r·~anchester for the 
"Glasgow plan", they endeavoured to attract active participation in 
the scheme in Scotland, with particular attention to commercial and 
manufacturing interests. Through the columns of the "Glasgow Argus", 
and by direct communication, Weir urged other communities to support 
Glasgow, with some effect. '!here was an enthusiastic response from 
the commercial classes of Dundee. 'll1.e local Chamber of Connnerce 
called a meeting in early January, 1839, of "bankers, fla.xspinners, 
manufacturers, and ship-owners" to consider the Corn Laws. 'llie 
resulting meeting, chaired by Alexander Balfour, president of the 
Chamber, commenced with the reading of a letter from Weir asking for 
the co-operation of Dundee for the Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law Association, 
and concluded by acceding to the request, and setting up a local 
(27) 
committee to prepare and transmit petitions to the Houses of Parliament. 
This committee subsequently raised a public subscription to pay for 
' expenses incurred in employing counsel at the bar of the House of 
(28) 
Commons. Weir likewise conununicated \'Ti th Edinburgh Chamber of 
Commerce, which resulted (on Jolm. \-ligham's motion) in a memorial 
(29) 
against the Cor.n Laws being drawn up by the Chamber. Further letters 
26) "Glasgow Argus ", 28/1/1839. 
27) ibid., 14/1/1839; "Dundee Advertiser", 4/1/1839; 11/1/1839. 
28) "Glasgow Argus", 28/1/1839; "Dundee Advertiser", 18/1/1839. 
29) I~nutes of Edinburgh Chamber of Comnerce, 16/1/1839. 
from Weir, and Shearman (Secretary of the Anti-Corn-Law delegates 
in London) requesting the Chamber's support in presenting petitions 
to be heard at the bar of the House and to appoint a delegate to 
(30) 
London, concluded with Wigham's selection for the task. On 21/1/1839, 
an anti-corn-law association was formed in Aberdeen, which resolved 
(31) 
to furnish evidence at the bar of the House. The following day, the 
mercantile community of Arbroath agreed to subscribe to any general 
fund raised for the purpose of petitioning to be heard by counsel at 
the bar of the House of Commons "as determined in Manchester and other 
(32) 
influential towns". Other urban comrmmities in Scotland responded :in 
(33) 
a similar fashion to Weir's challenge, either convening public meet-
: ings or petitioning through established incorporations. Support 
for an agitation to be heard by counsel \'las widespread in mercantile 
circles, who, in common with the propertied classes in general, still 
hesitated to engage in a "popular" agitation on such an emotive issue. 
'lliis was not least true in Glasgow, where the local anti-com-law 
association made a significant individual contribution to furnish 
effective support for Weir's scheme. They set up a committee under 
the chairmanship of Alexander Graham (author of a free trade pamphlet 
in 1835 on the tax on cotton wool) to collect evidence from both 
mercantile and landed interests on the operation of the Corn Laws, 
30) ibid., 5/3/1839. 
31) "Glasgow Argus", 27/1/1839; "Scotsman", 26/1/1839. 
32) "Scotsman", 26/1/1839. 
33) e.g. Anti-Corn-Law meetings held in Perth, Kilsyth (an 
association formed), Leith (ditto), Dalkei th, Kirkcaldy, 
Perth Guildry Incorporation, Greenock Chamber of Commerce, 
Dunbar, etc. (Scotsman", 26/1/1839; 2/2/1839; 6/2/1839 .. 
et seq.) 
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for submifJsion at the bar of the House, on the assmnr;tion that Par-
(34) 
:liament Hould grant leave to present it. Furthermore, they raised 
a petition in support of the pler:i, ·Hhich attr2.c ted 1+3, 000 f3igna tures 
(excluding the suburbs of the city, unlike the petition of 1834), 
and havin~ secured by mid-January, a subscription of £500 to cover 
necessary expense~.; - al thouch this sun1 \lrts meab"Te in contr2.st Hi th 
(35) 
those ~3ubsc:!:'i bed in r•Tc.1nchester - the Ar.::soci3.tion ensured that it 
Hould be contint~ously represented at the meetings of the anti-corn-
law board in London, by appointing eibJ'flt delegates headed by Heir 2nd 
(36) 
Johnstone, to act in rotation on their behalf. The industrial and 
corrur.ercial classes of GlasG-ow - or more acc-:....u .. "'e:tely, some of theJYt - and 
of the rest of Scotland, gave Hanchester and Glas;·rrK anti-corn-l2.w 
associations in 1839, support vThic:D they had previously dt::nied to the 
defunct Central 1inti-Corn-LaH Association and \veir' s former hopes for 
a 1.:1issionary system based on Glast:;Ovl. 
The rejection by the House of Con@ons of Villiers' motion of 
18/2/1839, that J.B. Smith, R.H. Greg, and others be permitted to 
(37) 
present evidence at the bar of the House killed ~veir' s scheme Hi th 
one blow. It did not, ho-v;ever, shake the determination of the 
anti-corn-law board in London to continue the agitation. On the 
contrary, it was the immediate spur prompting the formation of the 
Leac;ue. Significantly, the rules for the new body - a pe~anent 
34) "Glasgow Argus", 14/2/1839; "Glasg'Ow Chronicle", 13/2/1839. 
35) Archibald Prentice: op.cit., vol. 1., pp. 91-93. 
36) "Glasgow Argus", 21/1/1839; 31/1/1839; 4/2/1839; 14/2/1839. 
The other delegates included Charles Todd, \val ter Buchanan, 
John Tennent, William Gemmill, and Alexander Graham. 
37) 1~chibald Prentice: op. cit., vol. 1., pp. 112-3. 
union to agitate for repeal, modelled at least partly on the example 
(38) 
of the German Hanse of the £1iddle Ages - Nere drawn up by I·Ianchester 
Anti-Corn-La~'l Association, who further transmitted a circular 
(39) 
i.nvi ting the adhesion of the various local associations. f:ioreover, 
the decision to form a permanent union had been taken in r~·~anchester 
at a meeting in the Corn Exchange on 7/3/1839, when delegates from 
several parts of Britain were present, including Glasgow, Edinburgh, 
and Dl.mdee. Scottish free-traders had, however, played an active 
part in the proceedings, notably Weir, Alexander Johnstone, George 
Kinloch, jnr., the Hon. J. Erskine Hurray of Aberdona, and J obn \'ligham: 
the last-named had indeed moved the formation of a 11tmion of those 
(40) 
great comnnmi ties represented on this occasion 11 • Although the League 
was from the start Ivlanchester-orientated and - based, free-traders in 
Scotland (and the rest of Britain) were not passive spectators, but 
took a leading part in its formation. Ivioreover, at its inauguration, 
it was the intention of the League to have delegate meetings at each 
of the principal towns represented, and not merely at Manchester (or 
(41) 
London) • The overwhelming dominance of Manchester was not planned: 
it grew. 
Although the anti-corn-law delegates in London were not despon-
:dent at the defeat of Vi1liers' motions, and had reacted to the 
38) ibid., vol. I., p. 115. 
39) "'Ihe Anti-Corn-Law Circular", 16/4/1839. 
40) Archibald Prentice: op. cit., vol. I., pp. 118-22. 
'lhe formation of the Anti-Corn-Law League was officially 
declared by the anti-cor.n-law delegates in London an 
20/3/1839, after the defeat of Villiers' second motion 
to consider the Corn Laws. (ibid., vol. I., p. 124). 
41) ibid., vol. I., p. 124. 
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situation by placing the agitation on a permanent basis for the exclu-
:si ve end of repeal of the Corn Lavrs, it was not clear either before 
or immediately after, that the declaration of the Anti-Corn-Law 
League would not possibly remain an ideal rather than a reality; a 
repetition of the 1836 London Association. '!he attitude of the ~·lhig 
administration to the corn question produced the inevitable division 
of opinion among the anti-corn-law advocates - or at least, those of 
radical persuasion - what reaction they should adopt. The League was 
formed against a background of a growing schism betvreen Whigs and 
middle-class Radicals, and many of the latter in early 1839, at least 
contemplated a general attack on the former on a broad range of commer-
:cial and political issues rather than the exclusive aim of Corn Law 
repeal, which had been adopted by the nascent League. llius Richard 
Cobden was engaged on the project of exploring the possibility of 
commencing a new newspaper in Manchester which would advocate not only 
"free trade in its utmost meaning ••••• corn, coffee, or sugar", but 
also parliamentary reform, the ballot, extension of the suffrage, 
shorter parliaments, national education, "progressive reform and 
(42) 
retrenchment", and having been introduced to John Hill Burton (the 
Edinburgh historian, advocate, and free trader) by the latter's 
brother-in-law, James Erskine Murray, and having invited the opinion 
(43) 
of William Tait (the radical publisher) of Hill Burton's capabilities, 
(44) 
negotiated with the l·atter as a potential editor for the journal. 
42) Richard Cobden to Jolm Hill Burton, Nanchester, 25/3/1839, 
in Hill Burton Papers, f .11(37). 
43) Copy letter. Richard Cobd.en to W:illiam Tait, Manchester, 
2/4/1839, in W .S .R. o. Cobden Papers, 30. 
44) Richard Cobden to John Hill Burton, Manchester, 11/6/1839, 
in Hill Burton Papers, f. 11(50). 
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In his letter to Tait, Cobden had observed that nothing had tended 
more to push forward reform than the anti-corn-law agitation. Sir 
John .Bowring had earlier anticipated that the frustration of the 
movement by Parliament and Government would stimulate a demand for 
( 45) 
organic changes, and in May, 1839, William Tait and Hill Burton 
attempted to secure Bowring as a Radical candidate in Leith against 
(46) 
the new Whig Lord Advocate, Andrew Rutherfurd. William Weir reflec-
:ted the attitudes of leading Scottish free-traders - such as Hill 
Burton, Erskine f·h.trray, or Tai t - when he urged the formation of a 
new Radical party to take over from the Whigs and Tories, with a 
wide-ranging programme of political and social reform, including 
short parliaments, the ballot, extended (but not universal) suffrage, 
equal electoral districts, entire freedom of trade and industry, 
entire freedom of religion, separation of Church and State, and 
direct taxation in relation to income. Heir looked to "men at 
present provincials unhaclmeyed in the ways of existing parties" to 
form the basis of such a party, and looked to Manchester for leader-
(47) 
:ship. 'Ihere was a degree of fluidity in radical opinion in early 
1839 on whether to agitate for the exclusive aim of repeal of the 
Corn Laws or to pursue a broadly-based programme of reform. Despite 
the League 1s adoption of Corn Lro-1 repeal., there was no final commit-
:ment on the part of many free traders to agitate for this aim to 
the exclusion or detraction of others. '!he League had adopted the 
45) J olm Bowring to J ol:m Hill Burton, London, 2/2/1839, in 
ibid." f .20(15). 
46) Jolm Bowring to John Hill Burton, Paris., 3/5/1839, in ibid., 
f. 20(16). 
47) William \'ieir to Richard Cobden, London, 24/3/1839, in 
W.S.R.O. Cobden Papers, 1(14). 
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exclusive aim of Corn Law repeal from the constitution and rules of 
the Manchester Anti-Corn-Law Association, but its success was depen-
:dent on its adoption by other anti-com-la\·T associations too. 
In Glasgow, it ~~as far from clear that the League's aim \'tould 
be endorsed. There had been in Glasgow (unlike l.Janchester) a 
continuous anti-corn-law agitation, albeit of varying importance, 
throughout the period from 1833, and the rejection of Weir's scheme 
by the House of Connnons af'ter so many previous frustrations had 
created a strong feeling of "utter hopelessness" of carrying repeal 
without a further instalment of parliamentary reform, and some of the 
more advanced spirits had gone so far as suggesting that the local 
anti-corn-law association should be merged lrl th one for the extension 
of the suffrage. 'Ihrough the "Glasgow Argus 11 , Weir deprecated such 
a reaction, from the fear that English opinion was not ripe for such 
a transformation, and urged that meantime both agitations should 
(48) 
proceed simultaneously. Weir's singlemindedness in excluding other 
issues - commercial and political - from the aims of the anti-corn-
law agitation was of recent origin. He had personally invited the 
delegates to the anti-corn-law board in London to enquire of their 
constituents whether the agitation should not be broadened into one 
for free trade :in e;eneral (especially with regard to the sugar and 
tea questions), and had also raised the question of further 
48) "Glasgow Argus", 1/4/1839. 
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(49) 
p·arliamenta.ry reform as a means to the end of Corn Law repeal. 
The mixed reaction of the English delegates - especially the hostility 
of the Woollen Interest of the West Riding of Yorkshire - had, 
however, convinced him that even an extension of the agitation's aim 
to comprise free trade in toto could only be purchased at the cost of 
disunity. Consequently on 3/4/1839, at a meeting in the Trades Hall, 
Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law Association declared their adhesion to the Anti-
corn-Law League, and to its limited and exclusive aim of Corn Law 
repeal. 'Ihe resolutions (prepared by Heir) which embodied this 
decision also contained, however, "standing instructions" to future 
Glasgow delegates to the councils of the League "to impress upon that 
body the necessity of extending its sphere of operation, and consti-
:tuting itself into a free trade League, for the purpose of protecting 
the rights of industry from the deleterious effects of landlord legis-
:lation so long as the legislative bodies shall remain unreformed". 
A further "standing instruction 11 bo1.md Glasgow delegates to urge the 
League to co-operate "with all and every class of citizens who shall 
be actively engaged in promoting such a peaceable but thorough-going 
reform of our electoral system, as shall leave no class of the 
conmuni ty without its due share of influence in the legislature and 
shall render the House of Commons amenable to the real people, and 
not alone to a preponderating landed interest". 'llie adoption of 
49) ibid., 25/3/1839. 
Weir informed the delegates in L:>ndon that they "must 
not shrink from asking the question of what it was that 
had made these arguments of non-avail. It would perhaps, 
in such case become necessary to inquire what was the 
constitution of that body which rendered it insensible to 
arguments by which others were convinced?" 
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this individualistic and radical stance by Glasgow Anti-Corn-La\'1 
Association \'Tas welcomed by Weir in the "Argus ", whose editorial 
interpretated the resolutions as "perpetuating their 1.mion, even af'ter 
the repeal of the Corn Laws until trade shall be emancipated from all 
trammels", and as a radical and an advocate, Weir could not but 
express his satisfaction that Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law Association had 
reserved the right to urge the League "to the expediency of availing 
itself of any real national movement for parliamentary reform, to 
throw its weight into the scale, and seek, by this means, to secure 
(50) 
a more impartial tribunal to sit in judgement on its case". 
A declaration of adherence - albeit lrlth strings - to the Anti-
Corn-Law League did little, however, to dispel the prevalent despair 
in Glasgow, and in Scotland generally, of making any progress on the 
corn question, Without a further measure of parliamentary reform. 
The attitude underlying the adoption of Weir's resolutions at the 
Trades Hall meeting on organic changes, continued to frustrate any 
anti-corn-la\'/ agitation in Scotland. Thus although Glasgow Anti-Cor.n-
Law Association had agreed in its declaration of adherence to the 
League at the Trades Hall to provide a due financial contribution to 
(51) (52) 
its efforts, and subsequently promised the specific sum of £500, 
50) The Woollen Interest of the West Riding was the most adamant 
on the exclusive aim of Corn Law repeal. 'llle other 
principal interests represented at Manahester - the Iron 
District of Warwickshire and Staf'fordshire, the Cotton 
Interest of Lancashire, and the Cotton and Linen Interests 
of Glasgow and Dundee - accepted the broad principles of 
Free Trade. 
51) "Glasgow Argus", 4/4/1839. 
52) William Weir to J .B. Smith, Glasgol'l, 23/4/1839, in L.L.B., 
vol. 2, no. 169. 
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Weir felt obliged a few weeks later to take the Association to task, 
lauding fiJanchester Anti-Corn-La\11 Association and their missionary 
efforts, and castigating Glasgow for failing to show the same zeal, 
as it was "not intermi tting bursts of enthusiasm, but steady, 
unintermi ttirig exertion that will carry the repeal of the bread-tax". 
In particular, \'leir called on Glasgo\11 to bestir itself and generously 
fill in the subscription papers which l'rere in process of circulation 
(53) 
towards the support of the League lecturers. 'Ihe lethargy of the 
free-traders in Scotland was noted in I~'1anchester too. 'Ihe Anti-
Corn-Law Circular" observed the prevalence of apathy in Scotland, 
attributing this to "the siclmess of hope deferred", and contended 
that basically there was more support for repeal in Scotland, and 
that once Glasgow - "the Manchester and Lancashire of Scotland" - was 
(54) 
aroused, it would in turn have a powerful effect on England. 
Outwith Glasgow, the situation in Scotland was even less favourable 
for the prospects of the League. Relatively :"£ew anti-corn-law 
associations existed, and they were displaying a similar lack of 
fervour. Even in the three other main cities, despite the existence 
of nuclei of free-traders in all, only one (Aberdeen) had an official 
anti-corn-law association. IV1oreover, the future appeared if anything, 
more bleak, as the dismissal of William \•leir by the proprietors of 
the "Glasgow Argus" in May (below) threatened to deprive the embryonic 
League in Scotland of the services of the man who had been in the 
forefront of every anti-corn-law agitation in Scotland since 1833, 
53) "Glasgow Argusn, 20/5/1839.P 23/5/1839. 
54) n'Ihe Anti-Corn-Law Circular", 28/5/1839. 
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and who appeared to be the most likely candidate to mobilise free-
trade op:inion north of the Border behind the League. 
Forttmately for the future of the !£ague in Scotland, ho\·Tever, 
Weir's dismissal was not immediately effective. He remained as 
(55) 
editor of the "Argus" until the end of June, and in spite of his 
desire to secure an engagement in London, and to fulfil a term of 
(56) 
one month as a lecturer for the League, probably in England, Weir 
did not leave Scotland until September, by ~1hich time the emissaries 
of the League had made an initial impact on Scottish opinion, in the 
persons of I\. .W. Paul ton (lecturer) and J. Shearman (joint secretary 
to the League), and had been able to utilise Heir 1 s personal 
contacts and lmowledge in the furtherance of their cause. 'lhe 
possibility of a lecture tour by Paulton in Scotland had been 
mooted before the formation of the League. vlhen Weir and Johnstone 
returned to Glasgow from the Il'lanchester anti-corn-law dinner in 
January, they reported that they had been advised to invite Paulton 
to lecture in Scotland to counter the disruptive activities of the 
Chartists who had just succeeded in "capturing" another anti-corn-
(57) 
law meeting in Perth. The decision by the League council to send 
both Paul ton and Shearman to Scotland in Ivlay-June, 1839, however .. 
may be attributed in part to a plea from Heir in April that a 
League lecturer was required in Scotland as Glasgow Anti-Corn-Lro'l 
Association had found that "prophets have little honour in their 
55) "f.'linute-Book of the 'Glasgow Argus 111 , 21/6/1839. 
56) William Weir to Richard Cobden, Glasgow, 7/5/1839, in 
W.S.R.O. Cobden Papers, I(l6). 
57 ) 11Glasgow Argus 11 , 4/2/1839. 
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(58) 
o\'m coW'ltry", and in part to their alarm at the lack of support, 
especially of a financial nature, for the League in Scotland. 
Paulton commenced lecturing in the suburbs of Glasgo\·1 with 
an enthusiastic reception in the Baronial Hall, Gorbals, on 
31/5/1839, which obliged him to hold a second meeting in the same 
district in a larger building, and after further lectures in 
(59) 
Cowcaddens, Calton, and Anderston, he proceeded to Greenock 
where he concluded a meeting on 8th., June, conducted by the 
provost and bailies, with the formation of an anti-corn-law asso-
(60) 
:ciation. ·However, Paulton's reception in Glasgow and district 
was not a completely triumphant progress. On 10/6/1839, he 
(61) 
addressed a poor audience in Cowcaddens on his return from 
Greenock. On 22/6/1839, he was forced to take comfort from the 
fact that little interest had previously been shown at all in Ayr, 
(62) 
when he addressed a small audience. Ho\·;ever, poor attendances 
were less of a problem to Paulton in many areas than the presence 
of hostile Chartists. At a meeting in the Rev. Alexander Harvey 1s 
Church in Cal ton, J ames I\1oir was present and argued that nothing 
could be achieved tmtil an extension of the franchise had taken 
place. Paulton agreed with Moir's viewpoint, advancing a personal 
opinion that the Com Law repealers should join:. the Chartists in 
58) William Heir to J.B. Smith, Gla.sgo"VT, 23/4/1839, in 
L.L.B., vol. 2, no. 169. 
59) "Glasgo\'1 Argus!', 3/6/1839. 
6o) J. Shearman to George Wilson, Greenock, 9/6/1839, in 
L.L.B., vol. 2, no. 225. 
61) J. Shearman to George Wilson, Glasgow, 11/6/1839, in 
ibid., vol. 2, no. 227. 
62) "Glasgow Argus 11 , Z{ /6/1839; 2/7/1840. 
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seauring such an object. and merely defended his lecture tour on 
the ground that he \llas doing good diffusing knowledge on the Corn 
Laws, a!> a popular Parliament would repeal them. As a result of 
Paulton's concession, the Chartist amendment was withdrawn. and 
(63) 
the Corn Laws were tmanimously condemned. At other meetings, 
however, Paulton's personal views on parliamentary reform did not 
suffice to stem Chartist opposition. He had a "skirmish" \rlth 
(64) 
them at Paisley on 18/6/1839 in front of a "bumper audience", 
and the following day, frustrated an attempt by Chartists to 
(65) 
disrupt "a tolerably well-filled" meeting in Hamilton. Having 
refuted Paulton's views, and stated that the League had neither 
(66) 
time nor money for any object other than Cor.n Law repeal - the 
orthodox I•lanchester "line" - Shearman likewise attracted hostility 
(67) 
from the Chartists when he lectured in Partick. 
Shearman's functions as envisaged by the League had not 
included lecturing- which was Paulton's province - but merely 
to take advantage of the interest which the latter was anticipated 
to create, to organise anti- corn-lal'l associations and to look 
after the financial. arrangements for the League in Scotland. 
Shearman's connections with the English Dissenters had. however, 
63) ibid., 17/6/1839; also, A.W. Paulton to Richard Cobden, 
Glasgow, 16/6/1839, in L.L.B., vol. 2., no. 229. 
64) "Glasgow Argus "• 20/6/1839. 
65 ) A. W. Paul ton to George Wilson, Kilmarno ck. 21/6/1839, in 
L.L.B., vol. 2, no. 233. 
66) "Glasgow Argus ". 17 /6/18;19. 
67) J. Shearman to George Wilson, Glasgow, 20/6/1839. in 
L.L.B., vol. 2, no. 232. 
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given rise to the suggestion that he might be able to enlist the 
support of their counterparts in Scotland in the anti-corn-law 
agitation, as they had previously participated in the anti-
(68) 
slavery agitation - a hope which \'las encouraged by the facility 
with which Dissenting Churches had been made available to Paulton 
for his lectures. Shearman was eminently more successful in 
pursuing this additional project than in expediting his allotted 
tasks. Having conferred with the Rev. Dr. Ralph vlardlaw and 
the Rev. William Anderson, prominent leaders of the Dissenters 
in Glasgow, on the prospect of forming a religious association 
in Scotland to fight the Corn La\'J's, the latter had agreed to 
identify himself \llith Shearman's mission to the extent of intima-
:ting from the pulpit that Shearrnan would lecture in his chapel 
on the immoral and irreligious tendency of the Corn Laws, "Vrhile 
both Wardlaw and Anderson resolved to defer the question of a 
committee pending the return of the Rev. Dr. Heugh, another promi-
(69) 
:nent Scottish Dissenter from England. 
William Weir, like most prominent Scottish free-traders an 
(70) 
active Dissenter, anticipated in the "Glasgow Argus" that if 
successful, the formation of such a connnittee would "circle like 
electric spark along the chain of the churches in Scotland af'fi-
(71) 
:liated on the principle of religious liberty and equality" 
or those accepting the voluntary principle. Probably, the idea 
68) "Glasgo\'l Argus ", 13/6/1839. 
69) J. Shearman to George Wilson, Glasgow, 20/6/1839, in L.L.B., 
vol. 2, no. 232; also, "Glasgow Argus 11 , 17/6/1839. 
70) "Glasgow Argus ", 18/1/1838. 
71) ibid., 17/6/1839. 
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of soliciting the support of the Dissenters was Weir's brainchild. 
Apart from giving votes of thanks at some of Paulton 1s meetings 
(72) 
in Glasgow, vleir Is contribution to the mission had been - as 
always - that of the inconspicuous organiser. As secretary of 
Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law Association, he had made the arrangements 
(73) 
for Paulton's itinerary in Glasgow and district. He also 
endeavoured to prepare the ground for him in Edinburgh and the 
Borders, urging the free-traders in Hawick and Kelso to communi-
:cate with Edinburgh in preparation for Paulton 1s arrival there, 
and also requesting John Hill Burton in the city to get organised 
to some degree prior to Paul ton 1 s arrival, at least to the extent 
(74) 
of appointing a secretary to receive communications. In his 
letter to the latter, Weir waxed enthusiastically about the success 
which Shearman had already achieved \'lith the Rev. William Anderson, 
and predicted that nthe nest will follow, and if we can set the 
puritans in array against the Corn Laws as they took the field 
against the slavery of the blacks, we \'lill have enlisted a potent 
auxiliaryn, and having achieved success in Glasgow, Weir had no 
doubt that Shearman would carry recommendations to all the evan-
:gelical dissenters in Scotland from there. In a further commu-
:nication to Hill Burton, Weir confirmed that they were "getting 
the saints (among the dissenters) to open against the Corn Laws 11 
72) ibid., 3/6/1839; 10/6/1839. 
73) ibid., 3/6/1839. 
74) Williarn Heir to John Hill Burton, Glasgow, 15/6/1839, in 
Hill Burton Papers, fw'lss. 9391/243. 
and expressed the view that if they only worked half as well as 
(75) 
they did against slavery, he would be satisfied. 
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Shearman's promising start with the Dissenters was endangered 
however, by his failure to secure financial support for the League. 
Although the committee of Glasgow Anti-corn-Law Association had 
voted Shearman as secretary of the League £500 shortly after his 
arrival in the city, nothing had materialised allegedly because 
of the fear of an election with Tory and Chartist candidates 
(76) 
threatening to oppose the return of James Oswald. Urged by 
Cobden and Ballantyne (joint secretary of the League) to return to 
Manchester, via Edinburgh, Shearman urged George Wilson (chairman 
of the League) on the necessity of his remaining in Glasgow for two 
reasons: firstly, he wished to conclude arrangements for a 
religious league against the Corn Laws, and secondly, having 
unsuccessfully attempted to solicit even£100 from Glasgpw Anti-corn-
Law Association who would give nothing till the election was over, 
(77) 
he intended trying them again the day after the election. 
Alarmed at the prospect of Shearma.n 1s departure, Weir also pleaded 
with Wilson to permit the former to stay at least a further week 
or ten days in Glasgow. He urged the importance for the whole 
of Scotland of enlisting the support of the Dissenting clergy, and 
noted the progress in this respect which Shearma.n had already made 
through his lectures on the moral and religious aspects of the 
75) William Weir to Jolm Hill Burton, Glasgow, 18/6/1.839, :in 
ibid., Mss • 9391/245 • 
76) J. Shearman to George Wilson, Glasgow, 20/6/1839, in L.L.B., 
vol. 2, No. 232. 
77) J. Shearma.n to George Wilson, Glasgow, 21/6/1839, in ibid., 
vol. 2, no. 234. 
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question. He confirmed that it had been "the devil 's own work to 
squeeze money out of Glasgow pockets on this occasion"., and 
indicating that he personally intended sp:eaking candidly to the 
Association once the "excuse" of tre election was over., he requested 
Shearman 's support for this purpose., on the spot. Finally., Weir 
added a warning that if Shearman preceded Paulton to Edinburgh., he 
(78) 
was in grave dadger of encountering apathy - a commentary on the 
lack of interest in the metropolis. The meeting with the 
Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law Association proved abortive: only seven 
members of the Association appeared., and Shearman could not succeed 
"in screwing anything out of them". They agreed to conduct a 
canvass on behalf of the League., in the face of Shearman 1 s threat 
to conduct a personal canvass of the city if they did not succeed. 
Significantly., they pled that one reason for the difficulty in 
obtaining finance had been Paul ton's views on suffrage reform as a 
prerequisite for Corn Law repeal., whiCh despite the resolutions of 
the Local Association in the Trades Hall., did not endear the 
mission to the monied free-traders of the city. Shearman accepted 
this as a bona fide reason for his failure to make any headway, had 
remonstrated with Paulton in vain to drop this argument., and urged 
George Wilson to intervene. The only cheering news which 
Shearman was able to impart to Wilson was that Dr. Heugh had 
indicated that the Dissenting clergy would be prepared to join an 
agitation if others took part - a significant breakthrough for the 
future - and almost equally encouraging for the poverty-stricken 
78) William Weir to George Wilson., Glasgow., 21/6/1839.. in ibid • ., 
vol. 2., no. 235. 
League in the present, that he had been invited to Kirkintilloch 
and Kilsyth to lecture" •• and to make collections". (79) 
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Again however, events proved Shearman 1 s hopes to be illusory. 
In Kilsyth, he addressed a large audience, but as it comprised 
largely the working-classes, with few monied people, no collection 
could be made, and in Kirkintilloch a crowded and enthusiastic 
meeting produced only £1. (80)The fact that lack of financial 
support for the League was prevalent in Scotland apart from Glasgow 
was likewise verified by Paulton, who vainly invited "a very 
numerous meeting of respectable tradesmen" in Kilmarnock to show 
with more tangible evidence than compliments, their support for 
repeal, concluding that the Scots had an "itching palm for gold". (8l) 
To Shearman, however, remained the prime task of overcoming the 
pecuniary problem. He reported to Ballantyne that his sole object 
- which was untrue- since he came to Scotland, had been to obtain 
money, but how to obtain it had baffled his ingenuity. In part 
his pessimism had arisen from the objection of Glasgow Anti-Co~ 
Law Association to his idea for a personal canvass of the city. 
Instead, they had appointed paid collectors, but Shearman was left 
on the horns of a dilemna. If he collected himself, he would fall 
out with the Glasgow committee - the most important association in 
Scotland - but if he left it to them, there might be no limit to 
the length of time he (and the League in Manchester) would be 
79~ J. Shearman to George Wilson, Glasgo\'T, 28/6/1839, in ibid., 
vol. 2, no. 238. 
80) J. Shearman to George Wilson, Glasgow, 5/7/1839, in ibid., 
vol. 2, no. 244. 
81) A.W. Paulton, to George Wilson, Perth, 3/7/1839, in ibid., 
vol. 2, no. 243. 
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obliged to wait. Before returning to Glasgow in the hope of 
obtaining at least a first instalment of £100 to transmit to 
Manchester, Shearman determined to test his fortune in Edinburgh. 
When Shearman followed by Paulton arrived in the me.tropolis, no 
anti-corn-law association existed.in the city, but partly due to 
Weir's prompting, a few local free-traders had assembled prior to 
their arrival, and appointed a sub-committee of six under the chair-
:ma.nship of John Wigham to "assist" the emissaries of the League to 
obtain accommodation in which to conduct their lectures. Having 
overcome an initial difficulty in refusing to stir until they had 
been given a definite assurance that Paulton would come too, the 
sub-committee fulfilled their allotted tasks, booking the Waterloo 
Rooms for two lectures by Paulton, and a Dissenting meeting-house 
for two lectures "in a political, moral, and religious point of 
view" by Shearman. A difference of opinion arose, however, on 
the latter 1s prime function in com:ing to the city. To Shearman, 
Edinburgh was a potential source of f:inance to assuage the wrath 
of the League council in Manchester, at his failure in Glasgow. 
The sub-committee had opened subscription books, although Shearman 
harboured no sanguine expectations of a substantial return. He 
hoped rather that he would be permitted to supplement their efforts 
(82) 
with a personal canvass on his own. To Wigha.m and the Edinburgh 
f'ree-traders, however, Shearman 1 s presence was for other purposes. 
Wigham regretted that the League had instructed Shearman to make 
exertions in collecting funds, thereby frustrating their arrangements, 
82) J. Shearman to John Ballantyne, Edinburgh, 14/7/1839, in ibid., 
~1. 2, no. 246. 
at least "until the experiment of addressing religious bodies
1 
including females~ shall have been tried - being strongly impressed 
with the sentiment that until this class of the community Shall 
become interested~ the real weight and influence of society will 
not be brought to bear on this important subject 1 nor will any 
pecuniary assistance worth naming be obtained". As a Quaker 
1 
Wigham contended that the support of the Dissenters by engaging in 
a moral-religious crusade against the Corn Laws was essential for 
(83) 
success 1 and pointed to female participation in the Society for 
improving the condition of India - which was no less political 
than the Corn Laws - as an example to the League • ~ requested 
in conclusion that the directors of the League would give 
Shearman permission to lecture in Edinburgh instead of collecting 
finance. He further suggested that to avoid duplication1 Shearman 
and Paulton should conduct different circuits 1 with the former 
organising socities "for continuously diffusing information and for 
(84) 
obtaining funds ". 
The opposing concepts of Shearma.n 1 s function in Scotland - the 
view of the League in Manchester and that of its adherents north 
of the border - placed Shearman in a nut cracker. Concious that 
there was an impression in Manchester that he was neglecting his 
mission of obtaining money for other objects he preferred to pursue 1 
83) " •• and if ever it shall go abroad in this countTY (i.e. 
Scotland) that this subject cannot be supported on pr:in-
:ciples of religion and morality - or that lecturers who do 
not base their arguments on them are preferred - the sup-
:porters of the Anti-corn-Law League will be ranked with 
Chartists and Infidels 1 and the more influential part of 
the conmn.mi ty will stand aloof from us". 
84) John Wigham to George Wilson, Edinburgh, 15/7/18391 :in ibid • 1 
vol. 2, no. 242. 
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he reiterated his difficulties with Glasgow Anti-corn-Law 
Association, and urged the League to approve his new proposals 
whereby he would endeavour to satisfy both viewpoints, by holding 
meetings at each new locality to argue the free-trade case, making 
an on-tre -spot collection, publishing an address on the League 1 s case 
in the local press, and accompanied "by some respectable inhabitants, 
call upon and solicit from., the middle classes and the higher., where 
not TOrY, subscriptions 11 • Shearman anticipated that by following 
this course, he would overcome one difficulty he had experienced in 
Glasgow - that he had no local person to introduce him if he made a 
personal canvass for subscriptions - and also the objections of 
Paulton, Hill Burton and others., who thought that he degraded the 
league by canvassing for ftmd.S personally. Shearman further 
expressed the hope that the League would 11take the opinions of such. 
as are acquainted with the mode of things in Scotland"., and intimated 
to the league chairman, George Wilson., that he interxled spending a 
few days in Glasgow trying to stir them up again., before returning 
(85) 
to Edinburgh 11to pick up which crumbs may fall 11 • Another of the 
League 1s agents in Scotland, Sidney Smith., the Edinburgh pl:lrenolqgist 
who passed into the League's employment as an itinerant lecturer, 
did not concur in Sherman 1s view that a collection should be 
attempted in the metropolis., noting that although Paulton 's tour had 
been 11triumpha.nt 11 ., his "Chartism" had alienated supporters "with 
purses and votes" in both Edinburgh and Glasgow., even if he had been 
favourably-received by many of the working-classes. In particular, 
many of the middle-classes attending his first Edinburgh lecture had 
85) J. Shearma.n to George \vilson., Edinburgh, 15/7/1839 .. :in ibid., 
vol. 2., no. 248. 
threatened not to return to the second one, tmless he removed some 
of the 11excresences 11 from it, such as his description of the 
working-classes as "the only source of wealth - the only producers". 
Smith urged the inadvisability of attempting to raise any sub-
:scription in Edinburgh till Paul ton 1s first lecture ( and its 
(86) 
heresies) were forgotten. 
Smith's pessemism may, however, have betrayed some slight 
animosity on the part of a fellow-lecturer, because on Shearman 1s 
return from Glasgow, he achieved some success in arousing interest 
in the metropolis. His initial step - addressing a large audience 
in the Rev. Dr. Peddie 's dissenting church - was marred after "all 
was go:ing well for a collection 11 , by a disruption on the part of 
Chartists, who failed to respond to appeals by John Wigham and 
Duncan f'lclaren to disperse in case they would not get the use of 
(87) 
the church again. However, despite this setback, Shearman was 
able to report that the existing Edinburgh conunittee was forming 
an anti-corn-law association, and securing subscriptions. Although 
noth:ing was yet to hand, Shearman hoped to remit £150-200 per annum, 
repos:ing confidence in the conunittee which contained "some good and 
86) Sidney Smith to George Wilson, Ed:inburgh, 20/7/1.839, in 
vol. 2, no. 249. 
87) "Scotsman", 27/7/1.839· 
Duncan Mclaren 's involvement in the anti-corn-law movement 
was of recent origin. Having been converted to the cause 
of free trade in corn by John Wigha.m, he took a prominent 
part in an anti-corn-law meeting in Edinburgh on 21/1/1.839, 
in support of Weir 1 s campaign to be heard by comsel at the 
bar of the House of Conmosn. (Report of the Proceedings 
of the Peace Conference at Edinburgh, October 12th, and 13th, 
1.853, p. 33; "Scotsman", 23/1/1839). 
(88) 
lffi. 
fine men like \•/igham". He illustrated his degree of trust in the 
committee by continuing to Dundee and Kirkcaldy - a trust that was 
justified, \'Then Edinb~gh Anti-corn-Law Association was formed in 
his absence at a meeting in the ~rchan.ts 1 Hall, Edinburgh, on 
29/7/1B39, at which the leading participants were John V/igham (in 
the chair), Duncan McLaren, Dr. Thomas Murray (the lecturer on 
political economy) and George M. Sinclair (who had acted as an 
interim secretary of the forner committee) • The new association, 
~ whidh established a wide base of support like Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law 
Association by adopting an annual membership fee of one shilling, 
but unlike the western body, it did not indulge in any political 
"excresences 11 • The new association declared its intention "to eo-
operate with the Anti-Corn-Law League of Manchester for the purpose 
of disseminating information on the subject of the Corn Laws 11 - but 
significantly like the Glasgow Association - the Edinburgh body also 
accepted as its aim "otherwise promoting the cause of unrestricted 
(89) 
commercial enterprise". 
The second major centre of population in Scotland without an 
organised anti-corn-law association, Dundee, was the magnet which 
drew Shearman from Edinburgh before the metropolitan association 
was officially la1.m.ched, and :in Tayside, the grotmd had been 
partially prepared for him. Weir had dispatched Paulton to Dundee 
at the beginning of the month, and the latter had delivered lectures 
in the city on 9-lOth, July, in which he had urged the working-
classes of Dundee to support the League in removing the Corn Laws, 
88) J. Shearman to George \'/ilson, Ed:inb~gh, 23/7/JB39, in L.L.B., 
vol. 2, no. 250. 
89) "Scotsman", 31/7/JB39. 
on the ground that such a unlon of the middle- and working-cla.sses 
Nould secure an extension of the suffrage. By this time, there 
v1as an anti-corn-lm·l association in embryo, vlith Alexander North 
as secretary, Nhi eh at the close of Paul ton's lecture presented an 
address in erati tude to the "Manchester f...nti-Com-Law League". (90) 
However, Paul ton's lectures having been badly-advertised, were 
poorly attended, and the task of completing the formation of the 
association devolved on Shearman vThcn he arrived in the city at the 
end of July. The Baxter brothers (linen manufacturers ) v1ho were 
"religious men" - active lay dissenters - responded to Shearman's 
approach by offering to organise tv1o lectures for him in the Hard 
Road Independent Chapel on 30-31st, July, \'Then the latter addressed 
"a numerous and respectible audience 11 • ( 9 l)On the advice of the Ba.A'ters, 
Shea.rman also agreed to participate in a debate with the Chartists, 
v1hen the latter contended that the anti-corn-law agitation Nas merely 
a whig ruse to divert support from the Charter, that repeal \'lould result 
in reduced vrages for the working-classes, and that it v1ould not be 
achieved anyvmy \'lithout an extension of the suffrage, to \'lhich points, 
Shearman replied that the League v-ras opposed by Vlhigs as \'fell as Tories 
and Chartists, that expension of trade would produce an expanding 
demand for labour and that "relatively" wages would be higher than 
food prices, and that there was more widespread support for Corn 
Law repeal than the Charter. The debate which delayed Shearman' s 
90) "Dundee Advertiser", 5/7/1839; 12/7/1939; "Glasgow Argus", 
8/7/1839. 
91) "Glasgow Argus ", 2/8/1839; also, J. Shearman to George \·Jilson, 
Dundee, 27/7/1839, in L.L.B., Vol. 2, No. 252. 
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departure after Paul ton, was attended by Boo members of the working-
(92) 
classes. 
In Forfarshire, Shearman's utility to the anti-corn-law movement 
was once more impaired by his instructions from the League in 
Manchester • Thus he worked the Montrose/~ech~Arbroath area for a 
week to secure subscriptions and to form associations, but without 
(93) 
success, and determined to leave the area to the Baxters. 
Paulton, on the other hand, had been well-received in Forfar where 
he had been requisitioned to speak, and had subsequently formed an 
anti-corn-law association in addition to obtaining a list of 40 
subscribers to the "Anti-Corn-Law Circular". Paulton was obliged to 
admit, however, that although zealous, there were few wealthy 
supporters of the League in Scotland without the four main centres of 
(94) 
population. Increasingly strained relations between the two 
emissaries of the League in Scotland exacerbated the situation. 
Shearman continued to blame his lack of success in obtaining sub-
:scriptions on the favourable impression which he contended Paulton 
was making on the working-classes at the expense of alienating middle-
(93) 
class sympathy, while the latter objected to Shearman 1s practice 
of dogging his footsteps as a lecturer, and conceived that Shearman 
as secretary of the League should have concentrated on fund-raising. 
92) J. Shearman to George Wilson, Dundee, 2/8/1839, in ibid., 
vol. 2, no. 257. 
93) J. Shearrna.n to George Wilson, Montrose, 8/8/1839, in ibid., 
vol. 2, no. 26o. 
94) A .w. Paul ton to Geor ge Wilson, Peterhead, 14/8/1839, :in 
ibid., vol. 2, no. 263. 
93) J. Shearman to George Wilson, Mbntrose, 10/8/1839, :in ibid., 
vol. 2, no. 262. 
Moreover~ while he conceded that no large subscriptions could 
have been obtained~ as the Scots were 11a thrifty people - their 
religion and their purse-strings being about equally sacred in 
their eyes 11 - he believed something could have been acquired in 
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many places~ if Shearman had been more energetic and had not tarried 
(96) 
for seven weeks in Glasgow - a criticism which was hardly valid~ 
as Paulton had personally indicated that the League's wealthy 
adherents in Scotland were resident in the major cities. 
In the North-East~ the League mission achieved a similar mixture 
of partial success and partial failure. Paulton 1s lectures~ in 
what was one of the most acutely protectionist areas of Scotland~ 
were relatively well-attended1 even if they did not equal the 
triumphal progress indicated in the lecturer's reports to the League~ 
which indicated that one of his meetings in Peterhead was packed to 
(gr) 
suffocation~ that he had lectures to ''very large audiences 11 in 
Fraserburgh~ and had achieved similar tales of success in Banff~ 
Elgin - "a very aristocratic little place 11 - and the Tory stronghold 
of Forres. In most of these. Paulton had been able to locate 
distributors for the "Circular 11 ~ with the assistance of James Adam~ 
editor of the Liberal "Aberdeen Herald 11 • Paulton concluded his 
northern circuit by repairing to Inverness. where he incorrectly 
claimed to have introduced the Corn Law question for the first time -
an anti-corn-law meeting in the burgh on 13/2/1839 produced a petition 
96) A.W. Paulton~ to George Wilson. Montrose~ 6/8/1839. in ibid. 1 
vol. 2. no. 259. 
W) A .W. Paul ton to George Wilson. Peter head. 14/8/1.8391 :in 
ibid •1 vol. 21 no. 263. 
(~) 
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with 1690 signatures - and where the provost of the town placed the 
court-house at his disposal for two meetings, the second of which 
(99) 
was overflowing. Shearman's reception was less enthusiastic. 
Despite Paulton's report to Wilson that the League would receive £50 
(100) 
from Aberdeen Anti-Corn-Law Association, there was no sign of 
it materialising when Shearman arrived in the city, although he had 
(101) 
taken measures to try to secure it. The news of his recall to 
Manchester released his feelings about the niggardliness of the 
Scots and of the Aberdeen free-traders in particular towards the 
League, in contrast to their . genero.si"ty· towards Dr. Chalrrers' 
Church Extension fund - whiCh was especially galling to Shearman as 
a dissenter - but his difficulties had further been increased by 
the "conversion" of Thomas Bannerman, one of the leading manufacturers 
and free-traders in the city, to the concept of a fixed duty rather 
(102) 
than total repeal. HOwever, a resolution by Aberdden Anti-Corn-







A.W. Paulton to George Wilson, Glasgow, 5/9/1839, in L.L.B., 
vol. 2, no. 269. 
A.W. Paulton to George Wilson, Nontrose, 6/8/1839, in ibid., 
J. 
J. 
vol. 2, no. 259. 
Shearma.n to John Ballantyne, Aberdeen, 16/8/1839, in 
ibid., vol. 2, no. 264. 
Shearma.n to John Ballantyne, Aberdeen, 18/8/1839, in 
ibid., vol. 2, no. 265. 
Shearman reported that he ''had a most uncomfortable time 
of it. Oh, the miseries of the man who corres to Scotland 
a-begging • • • Here, that outrageous imposter and law-
breaker, Dr. Chalmers, has got upwards of £4,000 out of 
these Aberdonians, and they have not done anything for us 
yet ••• Scotland is a most horribly priest-ridden, 
money-loving, whiskey-drinking place. You ought to have 
a special prayer meeting called for it at Manchester". 
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with an encounter \'lith the Edinburgh radical, James Aytoun, who 
encouraged him as to the volume of support for the anti-corn-law 
movement in Scotland, left Shearman in better heart when he 
departed from Aberdeen from Hull, omitting speaking engagements in 
Kirkcaldy, Ayr, and Kilmarnock in his desire to return to 
. (103) 
Manchester. 
Prior to his departure from Scotland, however, Paulton had to 
conduct a lecture tour in one further circuit - the South-West. 
Travelling 20-50 miles per day for sixteen days, he lectured to 
"large and respectable" meetings at several towns, which were 
characterised by their close association with dissenting con-
:gregations: in several cases (Sanquhar, Stranraer, Wigtown, 
Newton stewart, Annan, wckerbie, and I.angholm) the meetings con-
:vened in dissenting churches, and several dissenting ministers 
participated at Paulton1 s meetings. The urban middle-classes 
were also prominent in the proceedings, which resulted in the 
formation of anti-corn-law associations at several places, including 
Thornhill, Newton Stewart and Stranraer. (lo4) The formation of the 
last - the "stranraer and Rhinns of Galloway Anti-Corn-Law 
Association" - was the most successful outcome of Paulton1 s tour in 
the South-West. Formed after Paulton1 s lectures, it immediately 
recognised the leadership of Manchester by applying to the League 
for a copy of the rules of Manchester Anti-Corn-Law Association 
103) J. Sheannan to League H. Q., Aberdeen, 21/8/1839, in ibid., 
vol. 2, no. 266. 
lo4) "'!he Arrti-Corn-I.aw Circular", 1/10/1839, 15/10/1839; also, 
A. W. Paul ton to Sidney Smith, Dumfries, 25/9/1839, in 
L.L.B., vol. 2, no. 270. 
in order to adopt them, and invited instructions from the 
(105) 
174. 
League. The Stranraer Association \'las a model association for 
the League in Scotland. Having seen a request in the "Anti-corn-
Law Circular" for a list of the office-bearers of every local 
(106) 
association, this was promptly transmitted to Manchester, and 
having built up a membership of two htmdred by the beginning of 
(107) 
December, the association appointed its president, Anthony 
McMaster, as their "accredited" delegate to the Manchester Anti-
(ld3) 
Corn-Law Banquet to be held on 13/1/1840. In his regular 
reports to Manchester, the secretary of the association, James H. 
Ross, frequently eulogised Paulton for the deep impression he had 
made in the South-West. 
The impact made by Paulton and Shearman, except in exceptional 
localities such as Stranraer, appeared at first transi:;Jtory. In 
October, the "Glasgow Argus" noted the lull in activity which had 
followed the excitement of Paulton 1s tour, and a correspondent 
(109) 
enquired whether Glasgow was "still ~leep". The 'Argus" had 
explained the lack of activity by referring to the fact that the 
centre of the sta~ was occupied by the municipal elections, but 
observing the continuing apathy which followed them, it was obliged 
to concede that Glasgow had suffered an "irreparable loss" with 
105) James H. Ross to Sidney Smith, Stranraer, 2/10/1839, in L.L.B., 
vol. 2, no. 271. 
106) James H. Ross to Sidney Smith, Stranraer, 15/11/1839, in 
ibid •• vol. 2, no. 286. 
107) ''rhe Anti-corn-Law Circular "• 10/12/1839· 
ld3) James H. Ross to J.B. Smith, Stranraer, 3/1/1840, in L.L.B., 
vol. 3, no. 321. 
109) "Glasgow Argus", 10/10/1839· 
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(110) 
the departure to London of William Weir, who left the city in 
(111) 
September. The lull was, however, despite Weir's loss, more 
apparent than real. Before Shea.rman and Paulton had arrived in 
Scotland, there was scarcely any support for the Anti-corn-Law 
League without Glasgow, and that within, was subject to considerable 
qualification. The League mission established not only organised 
associations in all the large and many of the smaller centres c£ 
population in Scotland, thus guaranteeing that an agitation against 
the Corn Laws which had been in danger of petering out, would 
continue, but also the fact that such an agitation would look to 
Manchester for leadership. This was confirmed not at the League 1 s 
formation, but by Paul ton and Shearman when they combatted the 
apathy in Scotland which was the sequel to the rejection of 
Villiers 1 motion in 1839. Significantly, even the correspondent 
of the "Argus" who complained of lack of activity in Glasgow in 
October, 1839, looked to the south for a lead, and enquired whether 
'~he Manchester Anti-corn-Law League" intended petitioning? 
110) ibid., 9/12/1839· 
111) ibid., 12/9/1839· 
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6. Manchester Leadership, 1840-46. 
177. 
The ascendancy which the Manchester . free traders bad acquired in 
Scotland during 1839 remained substantially unimpaired throughout the 
remainder of the League's existence, 1840-46, and it was under their 
guidance and direction that the anti-corn-law movement in Scotland 
reached the apex of its success as a pressure group. With little 
exaggeration Scottish free traders and official Scottish anti-corn-
law publications referred to the League with such appellations as 
(1) 
"the Manchester League" or "the League of Manchester", and although 
the League did not integrate Scotland into the regional organisation 
with full-time agents which it established in England and Wales, the 
extent of its active involvement north of the Eorder militates against 
the proposition that the framework was not extended to embrace Scotland 
because "the League felt that the local free traders could be left to 
(2) 
, look af'ter the work there". However, as in 1839, Manchester's 
hegem~ was subject to the qualification that Scotland did not give 
blind obedience to the dictates of the League Council, and in no instance 
was that more apparent than over the central aims of the agitation. 
Apart from a modification of the objective of total repeal of the Corn 
(3) 
Laws - which found some support in Glasgow in December, 1839, but little 
countenance from most Scottish Leaguers thereafter - there were two 
potential lines of deviation from the orthodox position of the League. 
These were the twin heresies to which Glasgow Anti-Cam-Law Association 
1) "Scotsman", 25/3/1840; 17/3/1841; 14/4/1841; "Corn Laws a The 
Nature and Effect of these oppressive Statutes". p.8. Published 
by Edinburgh Anti-Corn-Law Association. Edinburgh, 1839-40. 
(Goldsmith Library) 
.2) See 11. McCord& The Anti-Corn-Law League, 1838-46. p.l80. 
3) ibid., p.72. 
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under Weir's influence had succumbed in 18~9 - the extension of the 
agitation to embrace free trade in general and its extension to incor-
apora.te parliamentary reform. 
Throughout the era of the League, the Scottish free traders were 
allured by the former and s,ystematically agitated for a comprehensive 
programme of tariff reform including repeal of the Corn Laws. This 
difference in emphasis between Scotland and Manchester was particularly 
evident after the publication of the report of the Select Committee 
on Import Duties of 1840, and in the "Great Scottish Free Trade Demon-
sstration of April, 1841, organised b,y Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law Association, 
it led to a serious rift with Manchester and the EngliSh free traders 
who declined to send a deputation to the meeting. Noting the absence 
of a delegation from the south, James Adam, secretar,y of Aberdeen 
Anti-Corn-Law Association, observed that Manchester had "bogled at the 
extent to which they had carried their views on this occasion, which 
were much more extensive than the mere repeal of the Corn Laws", but 
on behalf of Aberdeen, he intimated that "the larger views of the 
present meeting were much more in accordance with their sentiments 
than the confined and dogmatical notions of the Manchester people". 
In a similar vein, Walter :Buchanan, vice-president of Glasgow Anti-
Corn-Law Association, denied that the revision of the commercial 
tariff interposed obstacles to the repeal of the Corn Laws, and con-
a tended that comprehensive fiscal reform including repeal of the Corn 
Laws seemed more likely to excite interest among the mercantile classes. 
Accordingly, the demonstration urged a revision of import duties in 
general, and attacked the local Glasgow protectionist interests - the 
179. 
(4) 
west Indian Sugar and Canadian Timber monopolies - in particular. 
The Scottish attachment to free trade in everything remained, 
with corn Law repeal forming the principal but merely one plank in 
what were called not in£requently "anti-corn-law and free trade" 
(5) 
demonstrations. As the "Glasgow .Argus" observed in 1844, they 
(6) 
wanted "cheap wine for our cheap bread, as well as cheap sugar". On 
the eve of repeal, in 1846, George Duncan, M.P. for free trade Dundee ... 
anticipated that as the Corn Laws were "the key-stone or monopol~, 
their removal would pave the ~ for other commercial reforms, cam-
(7) 
amencing with the West Indian Sugar interest. Scottish persistence 
in pursuit or general free trade did not perpetuate the rift with 
Manchester. A difference or emphasis remained, but it was swept 
aside in an informal compromise. The Scottish tree traders although 
still attached to the notion or general free trade gave precedence to 
the Corn Laws, while in turn the leaders of the League especially in 
their Scottish tours widened their field of fire to embrace other 
commercial issues. On 6/11/1842 (in Manchester) Cobden underlined 
the distinction between the agitation of the League and that or 1815 
by observing that the current agitation was "of a more comprehensive 
character ••••• it aims at all monopoly, and seeking to establish 
4) "Glasgow Argue", 1/4/1841; 22/4/1841; 3/5/1841; "Scotsman", 
24/4/1841. 
In accord with the mode of action prescribed at the Great 
Scottish Free Trade Demonstration, the directors of Glasgow 
Anti-Corn-Law Association determined to petition for repeal 
of the Corn Laws and a revision of Import Duties in general. 
("Glasgow Argue", 10/5/1841). 
5) Enclosure in Walter Wilson to Earl of Minto, Bawick, 17/1/1844, 
in Minto Mss. 123/2. 
6) "Glasgow Arsus", 28/11/1844. 
7) "Dundee Advertiser", 13/1/1846. 
(e) 
lBo. 
rree-tra.de principles". Two years later, in Aberdeen, he came even 
closer to the Scottish position by stating that it should be "expressly 
understood that the Anti-Corn-Law League was a Free-trade League. Its 
object was the overthrow of all monopoly in whatever shape it might 
exist ••••• the Corn Law was the keystone of monopoly, and with its 
(9) 
fall the whole arch would fall". 
While the a ttacbment or the League in Scotland to oomprehensi ve 
tariff reform might be regarded with disquiet for tactical reasons 
by the Manchester free traders, it did not endanger the unity as an 
all-party movement for commercial reform. The possibilit,y of a 
schism loomed much larger with the prospect of sections of the move-
ament in Scotland embracing parliamentar,r reform. In 1839, Glasgow 
Anti-Corn-Law Association had flirted with this heresy, although other 
Scottish associations had generally adhered to the orthodox Manchester 
position, on the strict exclusion of all extraneous issues. In 1840, 
more societies north of the ~order adopted the rules of the Manchester 
Anti-Corn-Law Association together with their non-political clause, 
(10) 
such as the new anti-corn-law association formed in Stirling in February, 
(11) 
and the long-established one in Kirkcaldy" in March. By December, Dundee 
Anti-Corn-Law Association, in order to counter Chartist intrusions 
reaffirmed that their sole object was to procure the repeal of the 
Corn Laws and that "no motion whatever which is not in accordance with 
8) R. Cobden to H. Ward, Manchester, 6/11/1842, in Gleig Mss.3870. 
9) "Aberdeen Herald", 13Nl844. 
10) Robert Smith to League H.Q., Stirling, 30/1/1840, in L.L.:B. 
vol.3.no.348. 




this rule will be entertained". In Glasgow too, Weir's departure 
and the ascendancy of the more conservative Whig free traders ensured 
that the Glasgow Association's interest in parliamentary reform would 
wane. In October, the possibilit.y of co-operation with Lanarkshire 
Universal Suffrage Association was forfeited at a joint meeting when 
the Anti-Corn-Law Association delegation declined to unite with the 
Chartists on the "Durham" test of household suffrage, triennial 
parliaments, and the ballot, with the implementation of the entire 
Charter by instalments. The Leaguers argued that their sole object 
(13) 
was Corn Law repeal. The "Glasgow Argus" reiterated this position 
shortly after, observing that the agitation for repeal of the Corn 
Laws "ought to be kept entirely separate from that for every description 
of political change • • • • • the Corn Law question is above all others 
(14) 
that which can be most advantageously grappled with". 
The accession o£ a Tor,y Government in 1841, and more particularly 
Peel's fiscal measures of 1842, produced a new attitude among many 
free traders in Scotland on the expedienc.y of pursuing the Manchester 
line. In Glasgow several prominent free traders of both Radical and 
Whig colours, headed by Alexander J ohnstone of Shieldhall, Wal ter 
Buchanan, John Tennant, William :Bankier, and John Hamilton were 
appointed a committee to circulate among the electors of the city 
a treatise b,y Joseph Sturge on a "Reconciliation between the Middle 
and Working Classes". They also agreed that without a cordial union 
12) "Dundee Advertiser", 18/12/1840. 
Paradoxically this meeting was chaired by Councillor 
Alexander Easson, the future founder-chairman of Dundee 
Complete Suffrage Association. 
13) "Scottish Patriot", 3/10/1840. 
14) "Glasgow Argu.s", 28/12/1840. 
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between these interests in sooie~ "no system of just and impartial 
(15) 
legislation will ever be obtained". At a meeting of Glasgow Anti-
Corn-Law Association in the same month, they were given support from 
~ unexpected source. James Aclandg an itinerant League lecturer 
t.rom Manchester, proposed that the city should petition for the die-
, amissal of the Peel administration and for the appointment of ministers 
pledged to "secure to the people the constitutional right of a full, 
(16) 
f'i1r, and free representation in Parliament". With the prevalent 
economic distress of 1842, its social consequences, and the failure of 
both the Chartists and Free Trade movements to make any impact on the 
existing legislature, the demand for a union of reformers behind an 
ill-defined programme of organic constitutional changes and free 
(17) 
trade was adopted in several parts of Scotland. Dundee Anti-Corn-
Law Association responded b.1 rescinding their previous decision and 
(18) 
agreed to permit a discussion of Sturge1 s proposals at a future meeting. 
Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law Association forthrightly attributed the current 
industrial unrest and social disturbances to "partial legislation" and 
urged that "the substitution of a representative bo~, truly representing 
15) ibid., 7/7/1842. 
Johnstone, :Buchanan, and :Bank! er had earlier been three of 
the five Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law Association delegates who had 
declined to co-operate with Lanarkshire Universal Suffrage 
Association. 
16) "Scotsman", 19/2/1840 
However, Acland had been far.merly imprisoned for his 
activities as a Radical agitator. It was still a grave 
indiscretion for an emissary of the League Council to make, 
but there was a comparable crisis in the League in England, 
where the militants led by Prentioe were urging a refusal to 
~ taxes and the possibilit.y of a mass loCk-out to force the 
Government's band. (See B. McCorda op. oit., pp.58,123-25.) 
17) "Scotsman", 19/2/1842; 9/7/1842; 13/8/1842. 
18) ibid., 26/2/1842. 
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~he people in their vari~a classes and interests, is indispensible 
in their judgement to the national weal". Supporting this motion, 
Thomas David·son observed that although as an anti-corn-law association, 
they had hitherto refrained from participating in p~ politics, they 
conceived that on this occasion they should join the general demand 
tor a representation of all classes and interests in Parliament on 
(19) 
such a basis that would give adequate protection to property. 
Slateford and Colinton Anti-Corn-Law Association had already furnished 
an example of direct involvement in parliamentary reform demands by 
petitioning for the dismissal of the existing ministers and their 
(20) 
replacement by those who would "promote an extension of the suffrage". 
/ 
In the north too, a soiree organised by the Aberdeen Anti-Co~Law 
Association provided a platform for similar demands of a union of all 
classes behind an extension of the suffrage as the only means of effect-
(21) 
aing any change in the "agricultural House of Commons". The Aberdeen 
Association went further, following this up with a joint meeting with 
the local Chartists when resolutions were passed condemning the Corn 
Laws and demanding the implementation of the Charter. Among the 
participants were James Adam and Dean of Guild George Thompson (future 
Lord Provost of the city) • The latter declared that he was "one of 
those who refused to go on any longer with the League, unless it recognised 
19) ibid., 28/9/1842; "Glasgow Argus", 26/9/1842. 
20) "Scotsman", 5/3/1842. 
21) Mr. Park (Fraserburgb) stated that he was "an out-and-out repealer 
of all monopolies, not excepting the suffrage monopoly" and 
being "by no means sanguine of a.rry good resulting from all 
the Corn-law demonstrations and all the corn-law petitions that 
are poured in upon the agricultural House of Commons •••• nothing 
••••• will now do, but complete suffrage". ("Aberdeen Herald", 
26/2/1842.) 
(22) 
the full right of the people to equal representation". 
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Several active free traders subsequently formed branches of the 
complete Suffrage movement in pursuit of their aim of uniting the 
free trade and Chartist movements for a common goal. These included 
prominent Radicals such as James Turner of Thrushgrove aDd W.P. Paton 
in Glasgow, Patrick Brewster and Provost John Henderson in Paisley, 
James Aytoun,"William Tait, and John Dunlop of Brockloch in Edinburgh, 
James Adam and George Thompson in Aberdeen, and Alexander Easson in 
Dundee, as well as several Dissenting clergymen also active in the 
ranks of the League, such as the Rev. Dr. Ritchie (Edinburgh) and the 
(23) 
Rev. W. Marshall (Leith). Significantly, however, the vast major! ty 
of the free traders in Scotland were not prepared to join the Complete 
Suffrage Union, including such radical Whigs as Dun can McLaren who in 
March, 1842, had been prepared to accept universal suffrage as the 
price of a union of reformers, providing that the working-class radicals 
(24) 
dropped other points from the Charter. What McLaren and the majorit,y 
of middle-class reformers in the ranks of the League could not swallow 
was the total acceptance of the Charter whiCh seemed implicit in the 
c.s.u. Consequently by the Autumn of 1842, the Complete Suffrage 
movement was being roundly condemned by the most influential organs 
22) ibid., 12/3/1842. 
23) ibid., 12/3/1842J "Glasgow Argue", 6/10/1842; "Glasgow 
Constitutional", 8/10/1842; "Scotsman", 20/8/1842J 5/10/1842; 
30/12/1843; "Dundee Advertiser", 31/3/1843. See also, L.C. 
wrighta op. cit. pp.l39-41. 
24) D. McLaren to R. Cobdent Edinburgh, 7/3/1842. in W.S.R.O. 
Cobden Papers. 1.(53J· 
(25) 185. 
of the League in Scotland. Moreover, the possibilit,y of extracting 
an extension of the suffrage from the existing composition of Parlia-
sment seemed even more remote to even more radical free trade organs 
than free trade itself, in addition to its politically divisive threat 
(26) 
to the League. Some free traders nevertheless persisted, remaining 
to hiss Fox Maule at the Glasgow Free Trade banquet of Januar,y, 1843, 
when he tactlessly criticised those who were chasing the "fantasy" 
of universal suffrage rather than devoting their efforts exclusively 
(27) 
to the League. The majority of free traders in Scotland were only 
too well aware of the danger implied in Cobden1 s warning to Glasgow 
Anti-Corn-Law Association in Januar.y, 1844 that the extension of the 
League's programme to embrace ~ political question such as the ballot 
or an extension of the suffrage "would at once split us into shivers 
(28) 
and we should become a rope of sand••. After 1842, the deviation of 
the League in Scotland parliamentary reform ceased and the anti-corn-
law associations, irrespective of the s~pathies or activities of indi-
svidual members, adhered to the orthodox Manchester line. 
25) The "Scotsman" (1/10/1842) observed that "by' whatever name the 
Complete Suffrage Union mar be called, Chartism is blazoned 
on its bannera and to hold it up as a means of uniting 
'political reformers of all shades of opinions' is ••••• an 
absurd! ty and a delusion". To the "Argus" ( 28/11/1842) the 
sole point at dispute was "whether the original name of the 
Charter sbill be maintained or whether it is to give place 
to the designation of Complete Suffrage". 
26) The "Dundee Advertiser" (8/9/1843) noted that "an extension of the 
suffrage with the present Parliament is not only hopeless, but 
impossible ••••• ~esides, it is a subject on whiCh the most 
useful party in the country are greatly divided in opinion ••••• 
We see no way so short as that which Mr. Cobden and his party 
have Chosen - none so sure". 
27) "Glasgow Argue", 12/1/1843. 
28) ibid., 1~1/1844. 
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Acceptance of the aims of the League - albeit with some quali-
sfication- in Scotland, was facilitated and accompanied by accept-
sance of Manchester leadership, in particular that of Richard Cobden 
who was the indisputible high priest of free trade throughout 1840-46 
on both sides of the ~order. Recognition of Cobden's contribution 
was ux_iiversal, and evidenced in the volume and language of the 
addresses of sympathy whiCh he received on the occasion of the 
Drummond assassination. Most of these paraphrased Annan Town Council 
in condemning the attempt to misrepresent Cobden's words and destroy 
his character "and thus to injure the noble cause of which you are at 
(29) 
present the most conspicuous advocate". Two months earlier, Cobden's 
stature had been similarly recognised when several of the leading 
Scottish burghs at the instigation of the free traders - including 
Glasgow, E~inburgh, Dundee, Perth, and Stirling - had conferred the 
(30) 
status of·freeman on him as the apostle of free trade. In 1846, on 
the successful termination of the League 1 s campaign, Cobden once again 
received a spate of congratulatory addresses from middle-class bodies 
in Scotland, lauding the "foremost and chiefest among our national 
(31) 




Address of the Magistrates and Town Council of Annan, 17/3/1843, 
in W.S.R.O. Cobden Papers, 525. See also, ibid., 522-587 for 
other addresses from Scotland. 
Richard Cobden to George Wilson, Stirling, 18/1/1843, in Wilson 
Papers; Minutes of Glasgow Town Council, 8/12/1842; 22/12/1842; 
11/~1843; Roll of Eminent ~urgesses of Dundee, 1513-1886, 
PP• 277-78; "Scotsman", 4/1/1843; 11/1/18431 14/1/1843; 
21/1/1843. 
Address of the Inhabitants of ~usby' to Richard Cobden, 30/6/1846, 
in W.S.R.O. Cobden Papers, 592. See also ibid., 593-98, 602 
for other addresses from Scotland. 
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(32) 
landowner desired to erect a college of commerce in his honour, 
(33) 
while his patronage was sought by former Leaguers. No Scottish free 
trader approached the eminence of Cobden {or even Bright). The most 
prominent Scottish free trader after Weir's departure, or more 
(34) 
accurately after his return from political semi-retirement in 1841, 
was Duncan McLaren, but his contribution was largely limited to Edin-
sburgh where he became the driving force behind the local Anti-Corn-
Law Association although he never held office in it. Without the 
metropolis, his role - although an extremely important one - was 
restricted to that of an organiser, liason with the dissenters among 
whom he was nationally-known, and Cobden's confidant north of the 
Border, through whom the latter sounded out Scottish opinion on the 
(35) 
tactics of both the League and himself in Parliament. With the 
partial exception of McLaren, the League in Scotland possessed local 
lieutenants rather than generals, and looked south for the latter. 
The situation was not inaccurately reflected in 1847 when Edinburgh 
Anti-Corn-Law Association prior to dissolution, raised a testimonial 
to Cobden and Bright (divided equally between them) and accorded votes 
or thanks to those local free traders who had served it in office during 
its existence - John Wigham (chairman throughout the period), John Gray, 
32) G.S. Mackenzie toR. Cobden, Roslin, 30/6/1846, in ibid. 2(51). 
33) Earl of Buchan to Richard Cobden, Eroxburn, ? December, 1846, 
in ibid., 73; Alexander Russel to R. Cobden, Cupar, 13/4/1844, 
in ibid., 1(90). 
34) J .E. Ma.ckiea The Life and Work of Duncan McLaren. vol. 1. p.45. 
35) Thus when Cobden wanted the opinion of "leading minds" on the 
possibility of an "electoral union" to superintend registration 
on behalf of the League, he consulted McLaren among others on 
the proposal. (Copy. R. Cobden to D. McLa.ren, Manchester, 
3/12/1843, in W.S.R.O. Cobden Papers.71. See also, Cobde~ 
McLaren correspondence in ibid. 2.) 
(36) 
John Howison, and Archibald Thomson. 
The tendency of the Scottish free traders to look south for 
leadership was stimulated not only by a lack of nationally-known 
a,dherents in Scotland, particularly in 1839-40, but also by the 
188. 
organisation of the anti-corn-law movement north of the Border. 
Unlike the contemporaneous Chartist movement in Scotland, or its own 
immediate predecessor, the Central Anti-Corn-Law Association for the 
west of Scotland, the free trade movement north of the Tweed failed 
to evolve any permanent co-ordinating machinery between the constituent 
anti-corn~law associations. The closest approach to co-ordination in 
Scotland on a nation-wide basis was the presence of visiting delegates 
ab some of the major anti-corn-law demonstrations in Glasgow- parti-
1cularly the ''Great Scottish Free Trade Demonstrationtt of April, 1841, 
when delegates from as far afield as Aberdeen and Stranraer attended, 
or the Glasgow Artti-Corn-Law Demonstration of 14-15th., January, 1842, 
when delegates from at least twenty-one communities in Scotland outside 
Glasgow were present including Aberdeen, Dundee, Kirriemuir, Auchter-
(37) 
nnuchty, and Linli thgow. On a regional level, the anti-corn-law 
associations in the north-east and Tayside sent delegates to free 
trade meetings in Aberdeen and Dundee respectively. However, these 
rallies and McLaren's nation-wide conference of Scottish Dissenters in 
1842 - which was not nevertheless a delegate conference from Scottish 
anti-corn-law associations - were purely transient. No comparable 
36) "Scotsman", 12/8/1846; 13/1/1847· 
37) ibid., 19/1/1842; "Glasgow Argus", 22/4/1841. 
Stirling Anti-Corn-Law Association appointed fourteen 
delegates to the Great Scottish Free Trade Demonstration of 
1841. ("Scotsman", 10/4/1S41) 
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~achinery to the Council and committee structure of the League in 
Manchester (or even the weekly meetings at Covent Garden or Drur,y 
Lane) existed north of the Border. Consequently, the co-ordination 
of the individual anti-corn-law and free trade association depended 
on personal contact between individuals, and on the League Council 
which filled the vacuum. 
The continuing interventionist role by the League Council in 
Scotland in 1840 and after, was at least partially involuntarily 
assumed, and stemmed from the perpetuation of the circumstances 
behind Paulton's mission in 1839 - the failure of Scottish free traders 
to take the initiative, the desire to indicate that the free trade 
movement had support without Manchester, and the hope that Scotland 
would contribute to the expense of running the agitation. Thus at 
the outset of 1840, with Paulton and Shearman removed from the scene, 
apathy once again prevailed in most parts of Scotland, except Tayside 
where two members of Dundee Anti-Corn-Law Association, Alexander North 
and Thomas Wighton, had been engaged in a vigorous proselytising 
mission, culminating in the formation of embryonic anti-corn-law 
associations in Lochee, :Broughty Ferry, Coupar Angus, Blairgowrie, 
(38) 
Alyth, and Kirriemuir. However, their sustained campaign was the 
exception which proved the rule, and although anti-corn-law meetings 
and petitions were widespread in Scottish urban areas prior to the 
(39) 
discussion of Villier' s motion in Parliament, there was little indication 
that the agitation would be other than an ephemeral protest. The 
38) 
39) 
ibid., 4/1/1840; 11/1/1840; "The Anti-Corn-Law Circular", 23/1/1840; 
6/2/1840; 5/3/1840; 19/3/1840; 21/5/1840. 
"Scotsman", 11/1/1840; 15/1/1840; 18/1/1840; 22/1/1840; 25/1/1840; 
et seq • 
• 
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reluctance of the free traders in Glasgow in particular to take the 
initiative after Weir's departure worried Cobden, who proposed that 
Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law Association should organise a dinner in the 
Trades' Hall when deputations from other towns in Scotland as well 
as Manchester, Leeds, and English centres could be present. Cobden 
was optimistic that such a demonstration would "infuse a new spirit 
into the Scotch mind, and rouse Glasgow to what it ought to be - the 
centre of agitation upon the Corn question for West Scotland". At 
the same time, he advised John Hill :Burton to encourage the neigh-
sbouring towns and villages near Edinburgh to petition for repeal, 
and enquired whether Edinburgh too could organise an anti-corn-law 
(40) 
dinner. 
Cobden's suggestion to the Glasgow free traders conveyed by 
John Wigham met at first with an encouraging response. On 20/4/1840, 
Alexander Johnston of Shieldhall, president of Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law 
Association circularised Scottish Leaguers inviting deputations from 
the various anti-corn-law associations in Scotland to attend a delegate 
meeting in Glasgow in May to express their disapprobation of Parlia-
sment's rejection of Villier's motion and to arrange "a plan of future 
operations for obtaining a repeal of the :Bread Tax''. J ohnstone further 
invited Cobden, Sidney Smith, and a couple of lecturers from Manchester 
(41) 
to come north and assist "to stimulate" their efforts. The League 
Council responded by sending Archibald Prentice (a Scot who had left 
Glasgow in 1815) and George Wilson, its chairman. At the meeting, 
40) R. Cobden to J .H. :Burton, Manchester, 18/1/1840, in Watson 
Collection. Mss.578. 
41) Alexander Johnstone to Sidney Smith, Glasgow, 25/4/1840, in L.L.:B., 
vol. 4.no. 513. 
held on 8/5/1840, Prentice lectured the assembled directors of the 
Glasgow Association on the necessity to become "the central point 
of agitation for all Scotland, as Manchester was for all England", 
and urged them to establish committee rooms, print propaganda, and 
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emplo,y a clerk as well as volunteer lecturers in surrounding areas. 
The readiness of other Scottish free traders to accept Glasgow 
leadership was expressed by Wighton who (along with North) represented 
Dundee Anti-Corn-Law Association at the meeting. He observed that 
"the people of Scotland had been accustomed to look to Glasgow, and 
they now looked to it; but the trumpet gave them an uncertain sound". 
Nevertheless, despite the presence of the League delegation, the 
meeting broke up, deferring the consideration of a programme (on 
(42) 
Walter Euchanan's motion) to a future date. No progress was made, 
however, with Cobden's specific proposal, and in August, he visited 
Scotland personally, and having met "a score or two" of Leaguers in 
Glasgow where he "gingered" them into holding the next great anti-
corn-law banquet in Glasgow, which he trusted would thus relieve 
(43) 
Manchester of the expense and trouble of arranging one, he proceeded 
to Edinburgh where he urged the metropolitan free traders on 2/9/1840 
to co-operate with Glasgow in the proposed ~anquet in order to indicate 
that the anti-corn-law movement was not confined to Manchester, in 
addition to urging them on the need for petitioning, the distribution 
(44) 
of tracts, and lectures. 
Cobden's visit appeared at first sight to have the desired effect, 
42) "Glasgow Argue", 11/5/1840. 
43) R. Cobden to F. Cobden, Edinburgh, 31/8/1840, in \f.S.R.O. Add. 
Mss. 6011. 
44) "Scotsman", 9/9/1840. 
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although it did not diminish the tendency of the Glasgow Anti-Corn-
Law Association to look south for guidance on the most trivial 
matters. By October, the Glasgow free traders planned an important 
demonstration for January, 1841, when they hoped to seat 14-1800 at 
dinner, but they urged Cobden to attend together with English M.P.'s 
and to fix the period of the meeting !or their own convenience. The 
Association's secretary further requested the services of the League's 
itinerant lecturer, James Acland for a month prior to the meeting to 
(45) 
visit the main towns Qf Scotland. A month later, Murray threatened 
that the meeting might be cancelled unless the Glasgow Anti-Corn- Law 
Association had an assurance that Villiers or some other English 
(46) 
Members would be present. In December, a member of the Glasgow 
Association, George C. DiCk, met the League Council in Manchester and 
arranged that the demonstration should take place during the Easter 
recess, preparatory to the reintroduction of the question in Parlia-
:ment. Paradoxically, the sudden burst of energy by the directors 
of Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law Association following Dick's report to them 
on 30/12/1840, which the League Council might otherwise have welcomed, 
was marred by its direction. The Association not only appointed a 
committee to prepare an Address to the people of Scotland - which 
doubtless met with the League's approval - but impressed and alarmed 
by the report of the Select Committee on Import Duties which had just 
been published, they resolved to print and circulate officially an 
(47) 
abstract of the minutes or evidence. When the "Great Scottish Free 
45) David Murr~ to R. Cobden, Glasgow, 29/10/1840 in L.L.B., 
vo1.5.no.772. 
46) David Murray to G. Wilson, Glasgow, 11/11/1840 in ibid., vo1.5. 
no. 787. 
47) "Glasgow Argustt, 31/12/1840. 
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Trade Demonstration" materialised in April, 1841, organisationally as 
successful as Cobden would have wished, its complexion precluded his 
attendance and that of any League delegation. 
The rift with Manchester in 1841 was rendered less serious than 
it might have been insofar as Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law Association had 
shown more initiative than Prentice conceded. In March, 1840, they 
had appointed John Waugh of Edinburgh as an itinerant lecturer, and 
in that capacity he addressed meetings, distributed tracts, and 
prepared petitions in numerous villages in Ayrshire, Stirlingshire, 
and Dunbartonshire. In 1841, he lectured for sometime in the 
Lothians, before returning once again to .Ayrshire in May, when he was 
(48) 
instrumental in producing over fift,y petitions. Waugh was the only 
professional lecturer to be employed by the free trade mov-ement in 
Scotland independent;;J:y of the League, although the Glasgow Anti-Corn-
Law Association on 1/6/1840 following Prentice's advice to them, had 
optimistically advertised for working-class lecturers for the surround-
(49) 
aing areas, but his efforts were supplemented by those of volunteers, 
such as the Rev. Alexander Harvey, a Glasgow dissenting minister, whose 
(50) 
expenses were defr~ed by the Association, or George Thompson, the 
anti-slavery lecturer, who performed similar services for the movement 
(51) 
in Edinburgh and Leith in November, 1841. The rapprochement between 
Scotland and Manchester b,y the close of 1841, and the feeling of 
lethargy which was prevalent by the end of the year opened the door 
48) "Scotsman", 28/3/1840; 28/4/1841; 5/5/1841; 29/5/1841. 
49) "Glasgow Argus", 1/6/1840. 
50) ibid., 6/8/1840; "Scottish Patriot", 15/8/1840. 
51) John Wigham to R. Cobden, Edinburgh, 11/11/1841 in W.S.R.O. 
Cobden Papers. 1(46). 
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once more to the transmission of League lecturers to the north, and by 
(52) 
December, two of them - John Curtis (an American) and James Acland -
were both in Scotland. The latter had been dispatched by the League 
council to Glasgow that month to prepare the ground for the Anti-corn-
law demonstration to be held in Glasgow in early January, 1842, to 
offer his services to the delegates of any local associations represented 
(53) 
at it, and to promote the forthcoming League bazaar of 31/1/1842. 
Despite considerable Chartist opposition, Acland's lecturing had such 
a salutory effect, that Glasgow Anti-Cam-Law Association prevailed on 
the League Council to permit him to return the following year (which 
also gave him the opportunity to promote the League's £50,000 fund in 
Scotland) when he undertook a lecture tour of the west of Scotland 
from January to April, at the direction and expense of Glasgow Anti-
( 54) 
Corn-Law Association. Before returning to Manchester, Acland also 
made a foray into Perthshire in ~ where he lectured widely, distri-
:buted tracts, and formed anti-corn-law associations in Dunblane and 
(55) 
Doune - the first official League agitation in the Highlands. In 
addition to Acland, however, the League's case was presented annually 





"Scotsman", 18/12/1841; 25/12/1841. 
James Acland to George Wilson, Glasgow, 10/1/1842, in Wilson 
Papers; "Glasgow Argue", 23/12/1841; 27/12/1841: 13/1/1842; 
20/1/1842; 24/1/1842; 31/1/1842; 21/2/1842; "Aberdeen Herald" 
26/2/1842. In early 1840, Acland had been in Scotland at a 
social function organised by Stranraer Anti-Corn-Law Associa-
: tion. ("The Anti-Corn-Law Circular", 20/2/1840) 
"Glasgow Argus", 26/12/1842; 9/1/1843; 13/2/1843; 2/3/1843; 
Acland's personal expenses amounted to £102:12:9d., and 
his expenses in connection with raising subscriptions, printing 
and delivering circulars amounted to £324tl8:lid. (ibid., 
16/10/184 3) • 
ibid., 5/6/1843· 
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. should take the field, by high-powered deputations from the Council 
consisting of Richard Cobden or John Bright (or usually both) together 
with Colonel Perronet Thompson, R.R. Moore, and (separately) Archibald 
Prentice. Typical of these whistle-stop tours was that of January, 
1844, comprising Cobden, Bright, Thompson, and Moore. Having jointly 
attended the principal anti-corn-law banquets in Glasgow and Edinburgh, 
the mission split into two deputations, one heading north to Aberdeen, 
the other south to Dumfries, on itineraries arranged by Edinburgh Anti-
(56) 
Corn-Law Association. After 1841, the interventionist role of the 
League Council in Scotland was unquestioned. 
However, the concept of a "Manchester League'' must be qualified 
in several respects, not the least of which was the part played by 
Scottish free traders in England. The transmission of personnel over 
the Border was a two-way process. In addition to expatriate Scots 
such as Prentice, the representatives of Scottish anti-corn-law 
associations played a prominent part in the delegate conferences and 
political rallies of the League south of the Border, although they 
were precluded by geography from taking part in the business committees 
of the League in Manchester which dealt with day to day policy decisions. 
Scotland was well-represented numerically at most League conferences 
in Manchester or London. Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law Association appointed 
twenty-two delegates to the League's "national" meeting in Manchester 
56) Th.e northern deputation visited Perth, Aberdeen, Dundee, Cupar, 
Leith, and Jedburgh, while its southern counterpart went to 
Greenock, Paisley, Ayr, Kilmarnock, and Dumfries. (ibid., 
18/12/1843; 11/l/1844. See also correspondence of R. Cobden 
to his wife, C. Cobde~in W.S.R.O. Cobden Papers. 78.) 
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(57) 
on ~0/1/1843, including three members of Parliament. Scottish dele-
sgates took a leading part at some meetings. On 1/4/1840, on the 
absence or J.E. Smith of Manchester, the delegate meeting in London 
(58) 
was chaired by Alexander J ohnstone of Shieldhall, while Duncan McLaren 
performed the same function at the League's London conference of 1842, 
(59) 
in addition to addressing a League rally in Manchester. The member-
(60) 
sship of the League's general Council included Lord Kinnaird, and John 
{61) 
Wilson of Dundvan, a director of Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law Association. 
Individual Scots also lectured for the League in England, including 
· George Thompson, who, on the advice of John Wigha.m, was invited by the 
{62) 
League Council, to speak in Manchester. A more permanent acquisition 
was Sidney Smith, an Edinburgh solicitor, who on the recommendation of 
William Tait, entered the service of Manchester Anti-Corn-Law Association 
in January, 1839, (prior to the League's official formation), sub-
ssequently becoming secretar.y of the League in succession to the 







"The Anti-Corn-Law Circular", 16/1/1840; "Glasgow Argue", 30/3/1840; 
23/1/1843· 
Though resident in London, William Weir was appointed one of 
the Glasgow delegates to the London conference on 24/3/1840. 
ibid., 6/4/1840. 
ibid., 13/10/1842; J.B. Mackies op. cit., vol.l, p.49. 
"Dundee Courier", 28/4/1843· 
"Scotsman", 20/12/1845. 
John Wigbam to J .B. Smith, Edinburgh, 27/12/1839, in L.L.B., 
vo1.2. no. 309; Handbill, n.d., Papers of J.B. Smith. vo1.3. 
MS.923.2. S.333. 
Thompson subsequently acted as a paid lecturer for the 
League in England, as well as Scotland. ( George Thompson to 
George Wilson, London, 10/8/1842, in Wilson Papers.) 
Circular", and founder and secretary (for seven years) of the 
(63) 
Metropolitan Anti-Corn-Law Association in London. 
The infusion of Scottish free traders into the councils of the 
League was parallelled, especially after 1842, by an infusion of 
Scottish financial aid, although Cobden and other Leaguers on both 
sides of the ~order remained critical of the size of the Scottish 
contribution. To Cobden, finance was of prime importance. He 
did "not give a rush for the zeal that won't give money, or beg it 
for us. The sole test of our power and usefulness lies in the 
(64) 
Exchequer - we can't win our battle without the sinews of war". 
The same attitude was observed by Scottish delegates in Manchester. 
William Lang of Glasgow on his return observed that the Manchester 
free traders "set about Corn-law repeal as a piece of business -
they made it no holiday matter, and they went to the meetings of the 
Anti-Corn-Law League as the gentlemen now present would go to their 
(65) 
counting-houses". Scotland's lack of animation in this respect had 
been a principal motive for Paulton's mission in 1839, and it recurred 
as a prime factor in Cobden1 s tours of 1842-44. The latter complained 
as bitterly as his predecessor, and with the same national bias, that 
at his Scots meetings, "to name money was like reading the riot act 
(66) 
to disperse them". In particular, in Glasgow "it was all cry and 
63) "A :Brief Memorandum of circumstances connected with the first 
operations of the Anti-Corn-Law League, and the formation of 
the Metropolitan Anti-Corn-Law Association" by Sidney Smith, 
in Place Papers. Add. MSs 27,822. f£.152-63. (~.M.) 
64) Richard Cobden to George Wilson, London, 1/10/1841 in Wilson 
Papers. 
65) "Glasgow Argus", 23/2/1843· 
66) Copy. R. Cobden to C.A. Cobden, Sunderland, 23/1/1844. in W.S.R.O. 
Cobden Papers. 78. 
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little wool so far as money is concerned". In Cobden's view, the 
GlasgovT free traders did not understand how to hold a business meeting, 
caring too much "for speeches by mere politicians and vlhig aristocrats". 
Nevertheless, the situation had by 1844 improved out of all recog-
:nition since Paulton's visit, and in that year even Cobden antici-
:pated that Glasgow would contribute £4,000 to the League's fund. (67) 
Moreover, Cobden was forced to concede that he could "take no credit 
for Manchester doing what she had done; for it l'las better situated 
than any other town in the kingdom for working out an agitation 
against monopoly. B.lt Glasgow had its vlest Indian, its timber, and 
its other monopoly interests, spreading their ramifications throughout 
the whole social system."(6S)Despite Cobden's criticisms, the Glasgow 
Anti-Corn-Law Association had been less unbusinesslike than he implied. 
In promoting the previous 1843 subscription of £50,000 they had 
divided the city into districts, appointed collectors, distributed 
tracts to all 8,500 electors in Glasgow, and raised £2,500 within 
the city (of which £1,927 was remitted to Manchester after the 
deduction of expenses), in addition to transmitting Acland and depu-
:tations to promote the fund in neighbouring towns such as Greenock, 
Ayr and Paisley. (69)rn Edinburgh, where McLaren personally took charge 
of the local appeals, over £1,100 was raised in 1843- a proportionately 
more impressive sum in the light of Edinburgh's economic and social 
complexiOn. However, in relation to contributions from other comparable 
67) Cobden had a higher opinion of the business-like marmer of the 
Edinburgh free traders, McLaren and Wigham. (Copy. R. Cobden 
to C.A. Cobden, Glasgow, 11/1/1844, in ibid., 78.) 
68) "Glasgow Argus", 19/1/1843. 
69) ibid., 21/11/1842; 2/2/1843; 16/10/1843. 
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(70) 
English centres, such as Bristo1 (£1,000) or Liverpool (2,200) - the 
principal Scottish contributions were not low. The succeeding League 
appeals of 1844 and 1846 att·racted increased financial support from 
Scotland with the increased targets. On the latter occasion, Glasgow 
Anti-Corn-Law Association alone raised eight individual contributions 
(71) 
of £500 in addition to several in excess of £100. 
Scottish support was also given on a wide scale to the national 
fund-raising bazaars held by the League in Covent Garden and Manchester. 
In 1845 several Scottish communities had their own stalls at Covent 
Garden, including Glasgow, Edinburgh, Dundee, Paisley, Dunfermline, 
and Shetland. Facilitated by the knowledge that the bazaar furnished 
them with an opportunity to exhibit their products "to strangers from 
all parts of the world", Scottish manufacturers contributed representative 
local products (at the League's request) such as Paisley shawls illus-
strating "the poetry of' the loom", damask table-cloths from Dunfermline, 
(72) 
and linen products from Dundee. In Edinburgh, a ladies committee led 
by Mrs. Wigham, Mrs. Wemyss, and Mrs. Renton (the wives of prominent 
members of Edinburgh Anti-Corn-Law Association) made fancy goods for 
their stall due to the absence of manufactures peculiar to the capital, 






''Glasgow Argue", %2 5/1845; "Scotsman", 8/1/1845; 15/1/1845; 
25/1/1845; 24/5 1845; ~dee Advertiser", 7/2/1845; 8/4/1845; 
29/4/1845; 2/~ 1845· 
On a promotion visit to Edinburgh, R.R. Moore appealed for 
articles "peculiarly Scottish, such as these made of tartan" 
which would be especially saleable. ("Scotsman", 2/4/1845.) 
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(73) 
articles for the sale. Having held a special exhibition of the 
Edinburgh contribution - at an appropriate admission charge of 
sixpence to swell League funds - prior to its dispatch, the Edinburgh 
Association negotiated with two steam navigation companies to share 
its carriage free of charge to London, together with that of ladies 
t.rom Scotland travelling south to superintend the Scottish stalls. 
However, although Dundee Anti-Corn-Law Association entered into 
similar arrangements with the Leith, Dundee, and Aberdeen Steam 
Shipping Companies and the London Shipping Company, the League Council 
had some difficulty in procuring salesmen for the Scottish stalls as 
(74) 
relatively few travelled to London. The Scottish contributions to 
the League bazaars were important not only because of the financial 
contribution contained therein, but also as an indication of the 
total involvement of the free trade movement north of the Border in 
the national activities of the Anti-Corn-Law League, and the degree 
of organisation which it produced on their part under the auspices 
of the Manchester free traders. 
In another respect too the concept of a "Manchester League" must 
be qualified: in Scotland, despite the direct involvement of the 
League Council and its agents, the burden of missionary and propa-
sgandist activities fell on its local adherents. They organised 
the public meetings and demonstrations, dinners, banquets, and soirees, 
and organised the collection of subscriptions and goods for the League 
bazaars which provided Cobden's "Sinews of war". On the nuclei of 
73) 
74) 
ibid., 8/l/1845J 15/2/1845; 22/2/1845; 5/3/1845; 9/4/1845; 
"Dundee Advertiser", 21/3/1845; 4/4/1845. 
ibid., 8/4/1845; 2/5/1845; "Scotsman", 19/4/1845; 30/4/1845; 
24/5/1845. 
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free trade activists in the anti-corn-law associations fell too the 
task of promoting the League's petitioning activities which were one of 
the principal functions it fulfilled as a pressure group. In 1840, 
the petitions of the city of Glasgow excluding its suburbs contained 
50,000 signatures while the corresponding petition from Edinburgh 
(75) 
could boast a record 23,750. By 1842, the free traders were able 
to measure their progress by the increase in the figures to 54,600 
and 28,000 respectively. On the latter occasion, over two hundred 
petitions with a gross total of 73,344 signatures had been trans-
:mitted from the city and its suburbs. The free traders also 
succeeded in identifying divergent social and occupational groups 
wi~ repeal. In 1842, Glasgow's "female" petition attracted 11.,400 
signatures, an indication of its success in spreading its social 
base. Moreover, in some areas such as Pollok, the free traders 
commanded the support of several separate petitions from pro,essions 
and trades in the area, notably medical practioners, teachers, sho~-
:keepers, and bakers. Dissenting congregations too petitioned in 
their own right. However, in Glasgow, the strength of the Anti-Corn-
Law Association among the industrial magnates of the city facilitated 
the systematic production of widespread petitions from their enter-
aprises. By the beg:lnning of February, 1842, the "Argu.s" was enabled 
to report triumphantly that eighty-three separate petitions for repeal 
had been transmitted to one of the local Members of Parliament from 





"Glasgow Argue", 20/1/1840; 30/l/1840. 
ibid., 31/1/1842; 7/2/1842; 10/2/1842; 14/2/1842; 17/2/1842; 
21/2/1842; 28/2/1842. 
202. 
The free traders further endeavoured to identify the economic 
and social hardship in industrial areas and in particular industries 
in 1842 with the cause of repeal ~ holding delegate conferences 
and collecting statistical information for propagandist purposes. 
The encouragement for this activity came, as usual from the south. 
The cotton, woollen, and hosiery trades of the West Riding of 
Yorkshire had convened a joint meeting of deputies from the textile 
districts in Leeds in 1841, and at a League meeting in Manchester on 
17/11/1841, similar activit.y was urged on Scottish free traders. 
D~ndee Anti-Corn-Law Association responded ~ convening a conference 
of repealers connected with the linen industry in Tayside and Fife 
(and a substantial number of Dissenting ministers to furnish a 
moralistic tone to the proceedings) on 6/1/1842 in Dundee when dele-
agates from different areas reported on local distress in the industry 
or districts and exhorted the virtue of free trade as a panacea for 
(77) 
their difficulties. At a two-day demonstration in Glasgow on 14-15th 
January, 1842, although of a less specific character, sessions were 
devoted to reports from deputies from all over Scotland on the state 
of trade and social distress in their respective localities, which 
culminated in the reading of a paper prepared by a statistician, 
Alexander Watt, which attempted to trace the reduction of deposits 
in Savings ~anks in direct proportion to the rise in the price of 
(78) 
bread. 
77) "Scotsman", 4/2/1841; Report of the Great Anti-Corn-Law Meeting 
held at Dundee on Thursday, 6th January, 1842. 
78) "Scotsman", 19/1/1842. 
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Particular attention was paid by free traders in Scotland (and 
England) to the need to identify bodies assumed to be representative 
of manufacturing and commercial interests with the cause of repeal, 
notably chambers of commerce. On 6/1/1839, having experienced the 
successful take-over by the Manchester Leaguers of the local chamber 
of commerce, cabbden enquired of William Tai t what Glasgow Chamber of 
commerce was doing on the corn question, and asked him to '~ub" them 
in his review of the anti-corn-law movement in "Tait 1s Edinburgh Maga-
:zine ". He further observed that the chambers of commerce had done 
more harm than good hitherto, and "had suppressed all active minds 
beneath their own leaders 1 temperaments". He hoped that the Glasgow 
free traders would "effe et a change of administration in the Chamber 
(79) 
there" following the example in Manchester of Wood 1s deposition. 
His observation on the hostility of the directorate of the Glasgow 
Chamber to total repeal of the Corn Laws was accurate. Four days 
before he wrote Tait, the free traders led by Alexander Johnstone, 
Jolm Fleming of Clairmont, and Wal ter Buchanan, had moved a series of 
motions at the Chamber 1 s annual general meeting, deprecating the failure 
of the directors to join Manchester Chamber of Commerce in petitioning 
against the Corn Laws. These also proposed changing the constitution to 
make it obligatory for the chairman to call a general meeting on receipt 
of a requisition by twenty members (and mandatory for the directors to 
execute the instructions of such a meeting), and recommended the 
directors to print and circulate to members all the resolutions of the 
Chamber on the Corn Laws since 1783 in addition to giving all members 
79) Copy. R. Cobden to W. Tait, Manchester, 6/1/1839, in W.S.R.O. 
Cobden Papers. 30. 
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access to the Chamber 's re cords • Finally, they recommended the directors 
to petition for an "alteration or abolition" of the Corn Laws. Concur-
:rently, the chairman of the Chamber on behalf of the directorate had 
moved that no rules or regulations of the Chamber could be revoked with-
(80) 
:out notice at a previous general meeting. Deferred to a special 
meeting on 8/2/1839, by which time the directors had also rejected the 
idea of a petition on the Corn Laws or the printing of previous ones 
which 'referred to a state of the Corn Laws altogether different from 
the present", Alexander Graham and John Fleming (in Johnstone 's absence) 
proposed his motion which was overwhelmingly lost. This left the entire 
executive power of the Chamber for twelve months without review vested in the 
hands of a directorate of twelve out of 239 rrembers. 
The totality of the defeat of the free traders was recognised by the 
(81) 
11Argus 11 which urged them to break away to form another Chamber. When 
the directors Annual Report to the Chamber at the armual general meeting 
on 4/1/1840 noted their unanimous opinion on the impolicy of abolition of 
the Corn Laws, the free traders led by Buchanan renewed the attack, giving 
notice that at the Chamber's general meeting in July, they would propose 
an amendment to the constitution transferring more powe~ to the general 
neeting from the directorate. This proposal they did not implement prob-
:ably because to ~heir surprise, they were more successful in the election 
to the directorate than they had anticipated, returning Walter Buchanan to 
(82) 
the Board. His election brought no marked improvement in the success 
So) Minutes of Glasgow Chamber of Cornr-rerce, 10/2/18,38; 29/12/1838; 
2/1/1839; "Glasgow Argus ", 3/1/1839. 
81) Minutes of Glasgow Chamber of Comnerce, 16/1/1839; 8/2/1839; 
''Glasgow Argus ", 11/2/1839. 
82) Minutes of Glasgow Chamber of Conunerce, ~)/1/1840; "Glasgow 
Argus ", 13/1/1840. 
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of the free traders in the Chamber. Even when he modified his request 
to widen its appeal by asking the Chamber in 18401 1841 1 and 1842 to 
petition for an "alteration 
11 
or a fixed duty 1 he was defeated on each 
. the 11A 11 to occasion 1 forc~g rgus urge once more the establishment of a 
(83) 
new Chamber of Corrunerce on free trade principles. After the annual 
general meeting of 1842~ when Buchanan's motion was defeated by 54 to 39 
votes 1 the free traders gave up the attempt to capture Glasgow Chamber 
of Commerce as a lost cause. 
In areas where urban protectionist interests were weaker than 
Glasgow 1 the free traders more successfully utilised mercantile bodies as 
a platform for pushing free trade doctr:ines 1 and Edward Ba.xter 1 Alexander 
(84) 
Low 1 and Thomas Neish in Dtmdee Chamber of Commerce 1 Jolm. F. Macfarlane 1 
R.B. Blyth1 Dmcan McLaren1 and Adam Black in Edinburgh Merchant Company1 
(85) 
and Jolm Wigham~ R .B. Blyth1 Dun can McLaren 1 and Archiba.ld 'Ihomson in 
Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce took a leading role in promoting 
petitions for total and immediate repeal of the Corn Laws in addition 
to other free trade objectives. The last body after its contribution 
to the League's formation in 1839 continued to be particularly strongly 
identified with it in terms of persormel and sentirrent. Not only did 
the committee of Edinburgh Anti-Corn-Law Committee meet in its premises 1 
but the Corn Laws were the first item on the secretary's annual report 
(86) 
every year from 1840-43. One hundred copies of its petition on 
83) Minutes of Glasgow Chamber of Commerce 1 13/3/1840; 9/12/1841; 
3/1/1842; "Glasgow Argus 11 1 6/1/1.842. 
84) Minutes of Dundee Chamber of Comroorce 1 14/12/1844; 2/4/1846; 
2/7/1846. 
85) Minutes of Edinburgh ~rcha.nt Company1 26/3/1840; 24/3/1.841; 
12/5/1841; 29/9/1841; 29/5/1846. 
86) Minutes of Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce 1 15/1/1840; 20/1/1841; 
6/4/1841; 19/1/1.842; 7 /4/1842; 6/1/1846; 30/5/1.846. 
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comprehensive revision of Import Duties in 1841 were printed and 
circulated among the burghs, counties, and chambers of commerce of 
Scotland with a request for their co-operation behind the free trade 
cause, and the Chamber only ceased petitioning for total repeal of 
the Corn Laws on 10/1/1844 on receipt of an assurance from its secre-
: tary, John F. I'lacfarlan, that the exertions of the Lea&,'Ue "rendered 
(87) 
all such steps unnecessary 11 • 
The free traders also introduced the corn question, following 
precedent, into municipal politics to identify civic bodies with the 
League. In Glasgow with its protectionist interests, the issue was 
a particularly fruitful vTeapon for the \Vhigs and they employed it 
readily. Alexander Johnstone moved several petitions between 1838 
and 1841, but until the Whigs gained an outright majority on the 
Town Council in November, 1842, the free traders were obliged to 
support petitions for the modified aims of an "alteration" in the 
existing laws or a fixed duty, and take satisfaction that they had 
(88) 
at least secured a condemnation of the status quo. The Whig free 
trade-rs celebrated their electoral triumph by giving a notice of motion 
at the first meeting for a petition in favour of total and immediate 
repeal which their majority voted through the Council the following 
month together with freeman status for Cobden. In February, 1843, 
they proposed a further petition, charitably "on the understanding 
that those members of Council who formerly voted in the minority shall 
87) 
88) 
ibid., 6/4/1841; 10/1/1844. 
Yunutes of Glasgow Town Council, 12/4/1838; 3/5/1838; 26/7/1838; 
28/11/1839; 9/1/1840; 11/2/1841; 18/2/1841; 27/5/1841; 17/6/1841; 





not be held committed to the principle of the petitions". In other 
(90) (91) (92) 
towns too, such as Edinburgh, Dundee, and Perth, local free traders 
were active in municipal corporations proposing petitions or resolutions 
in favour of total repeal, but v1hat characterised Glasgow was the 
semi-official involvement of the local anti-corn-law association in 
municipal politics at the hustings. 10e pattern was set in November, 
1841, when the \·lhig candidates for the Tovrn Council asserted that "the 
municipal body of such a city as Glasgow should be composed of men 
holding clear and decided opinions on the great commercial questions 
vThich hc.'"tve been prominently brought before the country". Their 
election speeches dwelt on the Corn La\·T theme, ,.,hi le their past records 
of activity in the anti-corn-law movement and the unfavourable votes 
of their opponents on the issue in the Council '\o.rere publicised by the 
"Glast;row Argus". The joint committee for James Lumsden (proprietor 
of the "Argus") and Councillor \villiam Cross, the \Vhig candidates in 
the fourth municipal ward, was chaired by another prominent Glasgow 
free trader, John Whitehead, and during the campaign sat daily in the 
rooms of the Glasgo'v Anti-Corn-La'v Association. The celebration 





Hinutes of Edinburgh Town Council, 22/1/1839; 19/2/1839; 26/2/1839; 
24/3/1840; 7/4/1840; 2/2/1841; 9/2/1841; 16/2/1841; 11/5/1841; 
18/5/1841; 21/9/1841; 28/9/1841; 8/2/1842; 14/3/1843; 21/3/1843; 
28/3/1843; 25/4/1843; 28/10/1845; 3/2/1846; 17/2/1846. 
Adam Black, as assessor for Edinburgh, also carried a 
resolution at the Convention of Royal Burghs to petition 
for free trade, especially in corn. (Minutes of the Convention 
of Royal Burghs, 13/6/1842; 13/7/1842.) 
I~D.nutes of Dundee Town Council, 1/3/1839; 25/2/1841; 4/3/1841; 
15/3/1841; 3/2/1842; 17/2/1842; 16/1/1843· 
11inutes of Perth Town Council, 12/2/1839; 6/1/1840; 11/5/1841; 
3/1/1842; 7/2/1842; 17/1/1843; 1/5/1843. 
208. 
dinners Hhich followed the gains of the Liberals appropriately toasted 
(93) . 
Free Trade and repeal of the Corn Laws. In 1842, the electors of 
Glasgow were exhorted to vote for the "reform and Free Trade candidates", 
and in both 1842 and 1843, free trade remained the central theme of 
the vJhig municipal campaigns. At the celebration dinner following 
the latter, Councillor Brodie acknowledged the victors' debt to the 
Anti-Corn-Law League, attributing their triumph partly to the progress 
(94) 
which it had made. 
The most ambitious attempt to identify an interest group with 
the cause of free trade culminated in the national conference of 
Scottish Dissenters in 1842. Although McLaren has reaped the credit 
(95) 
for the enlistment of the Scottish Dissenters behind the League - and 
his contribution was considerable - the groundwork had been prepared 
for him. The basic sympathy of the Dissenters for repeal had been 
illustrated during Paulton's visit in 1839, and the concurrent success 
of Shearman 1 s initiatives towards them were already apparent in the 
number of Dissenting clergymen who addressed anti-corn-law meetings 
(96) 
in 1840-41, at a time when HcLaren was in semi-retirement from public 
life or taking only a limited and local role in the anti-corn-law 
agitation. One of the most prominent leaders of the Scottish Dissenting 
clergy, the Rev. Dr. Heugh, had been a speaker at the Great Scottish 
(97) 
Free Trade Demonstration of April, 1841, in 1840 all the Dissenting 
93) "Glasgow Argus", 28/10/1841; 1/11/1841; 4/11/1841; 22/11/1841; 
25/11/1841. 
94) ibid., 17/10/1842; 20/10/1842; 24/lo/1842; 27/10/1842; 3/11/1842; 
2/11/1843; 6/11/1843; 9/11/1843. 
95) eg. G.S. Pryde: Scotland since 1603. pp.200-l. 
96) "Scotsman", 11/1/1840; 16/5/1840; 15/5/1841; 26/5/1841. 
97) ibid., 24/4/1841. 
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clergy and some of the congr~gations in Dundee had petitioned for 
(98) 
repeal, and in !'1ay, 18Lj.l, 86 Dissenting clergymen in GlasgcrH had 
(99) 
folloHed suit. On 13/1/1840, the Rev. \•/illia.m HcKerrm·r of the 
scotch Secession Church had attended the I'1anchester Anti-Corn-La,., 
dinner, but vrhen the League held its conference for ministers in 
August, 1841, no fewer than 30 members of his Church were present 
in addition to 12 members of the Scots Relief Church and some other 
-- Scots clergy. Important del~f,ra tions left from Glasgo,., (led by the 
Rev. Alexander Harvey) and from Edinburgh, Hhere a meeting of the 
Dissenting clergy of the city on 26/7/1841 had determined that they 
could accept the invitation from Nanchester as the Corn-laws viere 
indefensible on moral and religious gTounds as well as economically, 
concluding by urging all ministers to go "even at the expense of 
personal inconvenience". Horeover, although the most prominent 
leaders of the Dissenting clergy, Dr. Heugh and Dr. Ralph Wardlaw, 
were both unable to attend, they indicated their approval of its 
(100) 
aims and objects. At the conference, several of the Scottish 
delegates took an active part including the Rev. Dr. Ritchie of 
Edinburgh (who proposed a resolution which condemned the "Bread Tax" 
as "anti-Christian"), the Rev. James Blair (Dunfermline) the Rev. Wo 




"Dundee Advertiser", 27/3/1840; 3/4/1840; 22/5/1840. 
''Scotsman", 15/5/1841. 
ibid., 18/1/1840; 28/7/1841; 11/8/1841; 14/8/1841; 18/8/1841; 





Thomas Struthers (Hamilton). 1Ufter the conference, Harvey and Dr. 
Heugh addressed an anti-corn-law demonstration in Glasgow on the 
(102) 
theme that the Corn La\oTS were a "national sin". 
The approach to the Dissenters in Scotland had not been left 
entirely to the Council of the League. In the course of 1841, 
Scottish free traders too had officially approached Dissenting bodies 
for assistance. Tfie United Associate Presbytery in Dundee recom-
:mended its congregations to meet with a view to furthering the object 
(103) 
of repeal, after a memorial to them by Dundee Anti-Corn-Law Association. 
By November, Edinburgh Anti-Corn-Law Association had appointed a sub-
committee to meet a committee of Dissenting ministers in order to promote 
systematically petitions from their congregations, with the former 
(104) 
offering to furnish ready prepared petitions whenever required. It was 
from this approach by Edinburgh Anti-Corn-Law Association, and stimulated 
by the further example of a conference of the Welsh Dissenting clergy 
(105) 
at Caernarvon in the first \veek of December, that the concept of a 
national conference of Scottish Dissenters emerged. A preliminary 
meeting of ministers and members of Dissenting Churches in the Broughton 
Place Session-house at the beginning of December, determined to hold a 
national conference of Dissenting clergy and laymen in Edinburgh on 
ll-12th., January, 1842, and appointed a committee of thirty-nine to 
101) "Scotsman", 28/8/1841. 
102) ibid., 25/9/1841. 
103) "Dundee Advertiser", 30/4/1841. 
104) John -~-ligham to R. Cobden, Edinburgh, 11/ll/1841, in Vl.S.R.O. 
Cobden Papers. 1,(46). 
105) "Scotsman", 11/12/1841. 
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make the arrangements, cornprising the r!1inisters from Edinburgh ,.1ho had 
attended. the previous Eanchester conference together Hith several 
others, and tvrenty-four lay Dissenters including John Wigham, Archibald 
Thomson, Adam Black, John Gray, and Duncan McLaren - all of whom had 
served the committee of the anti-corn-lavT c;.ssociation. As a former 
active member of the Scottish Central BoarcJ_ of Dissenters, through Hhich 
he ,.,ras acquainted 'vi th Heugh, '1:/ardlavr, and other Dissenters from different 
parts of Scotland, NcLaren 1,,ras not an unnatural choice for the convener-
(106) 
:ship of the organising corr~ittee. The success of the conference, sub-
:sequently extended because of the numbers to three days, which gave an 
. impressive display of Dissenter solidarity in Scotland for repeal - over 
two hundred ministers and about five hundred laymen agreed to take 
part - was attributable in no small measure to the energy of r~cLaren 
as convener. 976 circulars 1vere sent to Dissenting congregations 
(including Roman Catholics, l1ethodists, and Episcopalians who declined 
to attend), letters of invitation from HcLaren to several sympathetic 
Members of Parliament such as Joseph Hume, were transmitted, while the 
(107) 
tickets of admission were distributed from HcLaren's own warehouse. 
His personal contribution 1vas noted by both Cobden, 1-1ho _was precluded 
from attendance by illness, and by the conference which gave him a 
(108) 
special vote of thanks. His zeal and energyw_ere further recognised 
when he was appointed convener of the committee elected to carry out 
the instructions of the conference, especially the printing and circulation 
106) ibid., 6/1/1838; 11/12/1841. 
107) ibid., 18/12/1841; 22/12/1841; 1/1/1842; 8/1/1842. 
108) ibid., 12/1/1842; Also, John R. Fyfe and \villiam Sk.een (editors): 
Report of the Speeches delivered at the Conference of Yrinisters 
and members of Dissenting Cnurches, held at Edinburgh on the 11th., 
12th., and 13th., January, 1842. p.l29 (Edinburgh, 1842) herein-
:after referred to as Edin. Diss. Conf. Report. 
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of its "Address to the People of' Scotland", which had to be reprinted 
after the prevalent demand had absorbed the first edition of one 
(109) 
thousand copies. 
The expectations of the League from the conference had been con-
:siderable. On 10/1/1842, Acland urged George Hilson, the chai:rman 
of the Council, not to be "fidgetty" about Scotland, that once the 
. (110) 
priests came out in support, things would be done. The immediate 
success of the conference too raised free trade hopes. George 
Thompson informed Wilson that on no side of the Atlantic had he wit-
:nessed such a gathering, concluding that the doom of the monopolists 
(111) 
was sealed and "the handwriting is on the wall". On balance, free 
trade expectations of the galvanising effect of the conference were 
disappointed. As in the south, 1842 was a crisis year for the League 
in Scotland with the danger that the agitation for repeal would be 
swallowed up in a new demand for parliamentary reform, and when the 
League launched a new and more successful campaign in Scotland at the 
end of the year, McLaren and the free trade press in Scotland counselled 
them to commence their agitation in the large towns north of the Border 
in Glasgow, because of the alarm of the commercial interests at the 
economic situation in 1842, and their determination on the slight 
recovery by December to ensure that it vrould not recur by implementing 
(112) 
a further instalment of free trade. It was not until January, 1843, 
109) ibid., p.l28. 
110) J ames Acland to George \>/ilson, Glasgow, 10/1/1842 in \'iilson Papers. 
111) George Thompson to George Wilson, Edinburgh, 15/1/1842, in ibid. 
112) Copy John Bright to R. Cobden, Rechdale, 7/10/1842, in W.S.R.O. 
Cobden Papers. 66.; "Glasgow Argus", 8/12/1842. 
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that Cobden, a critical jud~e, could report triv.m:L-Jbantly to George 
\{ilson, that "Scotland is fairly up noH, and He shall hear rno:re in 
(113) 
future froJJ thj_s, north of the Tl·med, U:?on the Corn La.Hs". Never-
theless, l''~cLaren' s conference did have some long-term effect by 
encouraging Dissentint>· ministers to appear in even c:reater numbers 
than hitherto at free tr_ade de~ons tra tions, \-lhich hel Ded to contribute 
both an evangelical zeal and a moralistic cover to the self-interested 
motivation of the co~nercial and manufacturing interests in 1843-44· 
It was insufficient to maintain the momentum of the movement in 
the increased economic prosperity at the close of 1844, Hhen the 
economic interests began to lose some interest in free trade in their 
enjoyment of current g~od fortune. Ey December, 1844, the directors 
of Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law Association determined to hold no free trade 
demonstration in January through fear that a "repetition per annum 
(114) 
might tire the public". Wb,en the Association set up a committee on 
4/1/1845 to arrange for a Glasgo\v donation to the League bazaar in !<i.ay, 
they did so \·Ti th lack of enthusiasm, but relied on the judgement of 
the League leaders that one should be held. Several of those present, 
including Walter Buchanan and Alexander Graham felt obliged to labour 
the point that "still waters run deep" and that the League was stronger 
(115) 
than ever - a confession that this \vas not the case. \fuen the League 
113) Richard Cobden to George Wilson, Stirling, 18/1/1843, in Wilson 
Pr1pers. 
114) James Oswald to Andrew Rutherfurd, Glasgow, 22/12/1844, in 
Rutherfurd Papers. Adv. Mss. 85.1.3. 
115) "Glasgow Argus", 6/1/1845· 
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resumed its petitioning and proselytising activities at the end of 
1845 and the beginning of 1846, it did so ab~inst the backgTound of 
a further economic crisis. ~he latter created the new climate of 
opinion in Hhich Heney Cockburn could observe as early as 1/ll/1845 
that the Corn La-vT was "plainly ringing in. Cobden and the League 
(116) 
have done much against it, but Aquarius more". In Scotland this 
was true, as in the south, but the League had prepared public opinion 
for the change by persuasion or threat, and through local free traders 
conducting the most energetic and sustained agitation on the Corn 
Laws ever witnessed north of the Border, but despite the truth of the 
claim by the "Glasgow Argus" after Cobden's triumphant tour in Scotland 
in January, 1843, that "the notion entertained in some quarters that 
(117) 
this is a mere Nanchester movement" had been "very much v1orn away" 
it ·Has only achieved after direct and repeated intervention by the 
League C0 uncil, and under Yanchester example and leadership. 
116) Henry C0 ckburn: The Journal of Henry Cockburn. vo1.2, p.l28. 
117) "Glas6row Argus 11 , 13/2/1843• 
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7. Scottish Opinion and the Corn Laws: 
(1) Urban free trade interests and the Anti-Corn-Law League, 1839-46. 
216. 
The success of the Anti-Oorn- Law League as an extra parliamentary 
pressure group lay not only in its organisation and missionary acti-
:vities, but also in its skill at recruiting into its ranks, interest 
groups within society, which it endeavoured to associate openly with 
the cause of repeal. The prevalent opinion fostered by Scottish free 
traders at the time was that in Scotland the cause of free trade was 
triumphant and that the obstacle to its realisation was England. 
William Ewart, the Whig Member for Dumfries-shire, believed in 1842 
that nowhere was the cause of Free Trade "more strong, silent and 
speedy than in Scotland. From Scotland, it will spread to England. (l) 
The Reverend Dr. Heugh, a prominent figure in the ranks of the 
Scottish Dissenting clergy concurred, and trusted that "Scotland and 
Ireland will continue to point the finger, not of scorn, but of stern 
reproof, to their sister England, until the blush of honest shame shall 
cover her; until England shall repent and amend; and then the people 
of·the three portions of the empire shall, with united voice, demand 
this petition, or rather claim of right that these (Corn) laws be 
abolished. 11 ( 2)The notion that Scotland was particularly favourable to 
the doctrines of the League was also entertained by Sir Robert Peel, 
who adrni tted to Bright in 1846, that he had "no conception of the 
intense fee ling of hatred . with whi eh the Corn law had been regarded, 
more especially in Scotland". (3) 
1) Edin. Diss. Conf. Report 1842. p. 84 
2) ibid., p. 6o 
3) John Morley: The life of Richard Cobden. vol. 1. p. 357. 
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With some justification, modern scholars have made the same 
assumption. (
4
)However, it is easy to exaggerate the League's strength 
north of the Border; as 1:n England, the success of the League in 
Scotland varied in relation to the environment in which it worked~ and 
the occupational, social and political outlook of those whose ad-
:herence was sought. As in the south, the League's strongholds were 
principally in urban society, where it could appeal to several inter-
:est groups. Yet this must be qualified: there were significant 
pockets of protectionist support in the urban middle-classes. If the 
forums of urban opinion such as municipal corporations and chambers 
of commerce tended, albeit not universally, to support the League, 
this was at least partly attributable to the exclusion from them of 
the working-classes whose loyalty to the League was dubious, and more 
especially their ultra-radical mentors. The corollary of the 
League's strength in Scottish urban society was its weakness in the 
landward areas as a whole~ although it could claim individual 
successes. 
The growth of manufacturing activity in Europe and latterly in 
the United states of America, together with the consequent increasing 
competition faced by British manufacturers had been one of the princi-
:pal motivating factors (if not the main one) behind urban support 
for all agitations against the Corn Iaws since the end of the 
eighteenth century. Moreover, it was a threat which grew more potent 
with time. In 1833, several Glasgow cotton magnates, in their evi-
:dence to the Select Committee on manufactures~ commerce, and shipping, 
4) eg. L. c. Wright: Scottish Chartism. p. 117. 
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testified to the alarm of all exporting industrialists when they 
noted the growing competitive position of France, Austria, Switzerland, 
the United states, the Gennan states, and Russia. (5)Further reports 
by later select committees, especially that on import duties (1841) 
confirmed the continuing growth of foreign manufactures and 
competition, and a corresponding growth in the alarm of Scottish manu-
:facturers. The tendency of other states to promote their own manu-
:factures behind the protective umbrella of tariff walls gave parti-
:cular cause for concern. One of the background factors to the 
timing of the formation of the Anti-Corn-law league (in the Spring of 
1839) was the knowledge that in this respect, 1841 would be a vital 
year for British export interests. In that year, the articles of 
the Zollverein were to be submitted to a revision, a recommendation 
of the United states legislature that duties should be levied on im-
:ported merchandise purely for financial reasons would fall to be 
implemented, and the commercial treaty between Britain and Brazil 
would expire and fall due for renewal. The "Argus" counselled that 
if Britain wished more liberal terms from these vital export markets, 
a liberalisation of her own commercial policy was imperative. (6)The 
inevitable loss by Britain of her role as the hare of the Industrial 
Revolution demanded a readjustment of attitudes on the part of 
British manufacturers; but to a complex problem, the anti-corn-law 
5) Minutes of evidence of the Select Committee on Manufactures, 
Cormnerce, and Shipping, 1833. (evidence of Kirkman Finlay, 
Henry Houldsworth and William Graham). pp. 38-9, 71, 
309-31. 
6) "Glasgow Argus", 22/4/1839. 
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movements (culminating in the League) offered the comfortingly 
simple solution - free trade. 
When Glasgow Young Men's Free Trade Association in their address 
to eobd.en in 1843 lauded "those principles which can alone redeem our 
commerce from its present appalling state", (?)they echoed the senti-
:ments of most of the League 1 s urban adherents. It was, as Alexander 
Johnstone of Shieldhall claimed, not a political, but "almost alto-
:gether a canmercial question", and in this context" ••• there is 
no part of the country more interested in the repeal of the Corn I.aws 
than Glasgow • • • the very existence of Glasgow depends upon the 
abolition of the Corn I.aws". (
8
)Pictorial illustration of the theme was 
permitted in the Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law Association's Free Trade 
banquet of January, 1843, when the decoration of the hall included 
paintings of the Genius of Cormnerce descending on the City and harbour 
of Glasgow with the corresponding mottos, "Free Trade with the whole 
World" and "Let Glasgow Flourish". (9 )The comJX)sition of Glasgow's 
economy, and its heavy dependence on export markets, ensured that the 
city had an intrinsic commercial rather than a political attachment 
to the cause of Free Trade. 
In their evidence to various Select Committees, Glasgow manu-
: facturers especially in the cotton industry, and whether of free· 
trade opinions or not, had repeatedly expressed the view that repeal 
of the Corn Laws by cheapening food (and presumably labour) would 
7) Address of Glasgow Young Men's Free Trade Association to Richard 
Cobden, 5/5/1843, in W.S.R.O. Oobden Papers, 545. 
8) "Glasgow Argus ", 23/12/1839. 
9) ibid., 9/1/1843. 
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increase the competitive position of British manufactures in export 
markets, and by causing a reciprocal reduction of tariffs in overseas 
(10) . 
markets, provide easier access to them. The reports of Mr. S:ymons 
and Dr. Harding, Assistant Commissioners for the south and east of 
Scotland for the Royal Commission on Handloom Weavers in la34-35 also 
asserted that manufacturing opinion on the Corn Laws was unanimous 
(which was not true), but confirmed more accurately the fears of 
Scottish manufacturers that the Corn Laws produced re:taiiatory 
tariffs and encouraged other countries to manufacture on their own 
account "in order to supply themselves with those articles which the 
exclusion of their corn prevents them from purchasing from Great 
Britain11 • (ll) As "the manufacturing and connnercial metropolis of the 
North", (l2 )Glasgow epitomised these attitudes. 
The cotton industry in particular, Scotland's premier trade, 
seemed peculiarly vulnerable to retaliatory tariffs. The majority of 
Glasgow's cotton products - perhaps three-fourths of the total -
equivalent to £24 millions, were exported, of which the colonies took 
a mere £5 millions, according to Walter Buchanan, who anticipated 
that if Britain could 11 furnish our workmen with cheap bread under an 
altered Corn Law, Britain will continue to produce the cheapest goods 
in the world". (l3 ) The new American tariff of 1842 with higher rates 
10) See evidence of Henry Houldsworth in Minutes of Evidence of the 
Select Committee on Manufactures, Commercem and Shipping, 
1833. p. 313; evidence of William Craig and Thomas Davidson 
in minutes of evidence of the Handloom Weavers' Commission, 
1834-5. pp. 118, 128-31, 158-59. 
11) Reports of Symons and Harding in report of the Handloom Weavers' 
Commission, la34-5. pp. 51-52. 
12) "Glasgow Argus", 7/12/1843. 
13) ibid., 23/12/1839. 
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for British exports followed by the increased Prussian duties on 
imports of cotton (and iron) in 1844 seemed to confirm the League's 
case in the eyes of many of Glasgow's cotton manufacturers. In 
1841, the value of British cotton-twist exported to Gennany had been 
£2,4o6,936 and the Prussian proposals entailed doubling and trebling 
the duties on them. The iron trade of Glasgow was also hit by the 
new Prussian tariffs of 1844, which proposed a duty of fifty per 
cent of the value of pig iron imports, a serious blo\'r to the Scottish 
iron industry which was a major exporter to the German states. (l4 ) 
Moreover, if Glasgow's principal exporting industries were sub-
:ject to retaliatory tariffs~ the cotton industry in particular was 
peculiarly handicapped by Britain's own import duties. In 1836, 
Alexander Graham, a leading Glasgow cotton spinner had published a 
treatise on "'lhe Impolicy of the Tax on Cotton Wool", and this re-
:mained until its repeal by Peel in 1845, a continuous complaint 
allied by Graharn to his objection to the Corn Laws. (l5)A further duty 
which irritated the cotton interest was the duty on foreign soap~ 
especially olive-oil soap, which the cotton manufacturers considered 
milder and "more adapted for bringing out colours" in cottons. In 
Alexander Johnstone's opinion, this gave a distinct advantage to 
. (16) 
French dyers and printers. Furthermore, in Glasgow, as in other 
14) ibid., 26/9/1842; 5/2/1844. 
15) ibid., 22/2/1841; 18/3/1844; "Scotsman", 22/3/1845. 
16) Evidence of Alexander Johnstone. Minutes of evidence of the 
Select Committee on Import Duties. 184o. Vol. 5. pp. 136-9. 
As a manufacturer in cotton~ Johnstone exported to the u.s.A. 
Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Peru. His complaint against irn-
:port duties included those on foreign flour which cost him 
£1,200 per armum, as well as cotton wool (£1,o87:10:0d. ), 
and dyes (£150). ("Glasgow Argus"~ 28/1/1839). 
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areas of Scotland, the manufacturing interests were subject to the 
deleterious financial effects of the considerable protection en-
:joyed by Canadian timber over its rivals from the Baltic. This 
imposition affected a variety of industrial and manufacturing in-
:terests - cotton spinners and weavers, ironmasters, and brewers - to 
a varying degree, insofar as it was "short only of food as regards 
universality of consumption". (~7 )Not least among those affected was 
the Incorporation of Coopers in Glasgow who asserted in a memorial 
in 1844 that the heavy duties on their raw material excluded their 
products from foreign markets. (l8) 
Allied to the free trade manufacturers and industrialists of the 
city, and largely sharing identical opinions, were certain merchant 
and shipping interests in Glasgow dependent on foreign trade. Not 
only did they anticipate that increased trade would flow from the 
removal of protective tariffs on articles such as corn, timber and 
sugar, but they also had an intrinsic interest in the liberalisation 
of commerce. Profit margins and consumer demand for articles such 
as coffee were equally curtailed by the financial penalties and 
physical prohibitions exercised in the name of colonial preference. (l9) 
17) "Scotsman", 25/3/1846. 
18) Memorial of the Incorporation of Coopers of Glasgow, 10/10/1841, 
in Dalhousie Muniments. GD. 45/7/23. 
19) Bailie Mitchell, a prominent Glasgow free trader complained in 
1841 that under the prevailing colonial preference for coffee~ 
he was debarred from importing the i tern direct from st. 
Domingo and Haiti. His vessel was obliged to return via the 
Cape of Good Hope where it discharged and reloaded the article, 
paying port-dues, tax and insurance, and costing the consumer 
nearly ld. per pound more in the process. ("Glasgow Argus", 
22/2/1841). 
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Moreover, except for those who benefited directly from it, the 
shipping interests of Glasgow found cause for complaint in the 
Canadian timber monopoly, which allegedly enhanced the cost of ship-
:building by artificially inflating timber prices. Similarly, the 
Corn Laws increased the cost of victualling ships, but their influence 
was primarily symbolic. They were "the giant monopoly by which all 
fl (20) . other monopolies are upheld , ·. and prov~ded through the League a 
common platform from which assaults could be launched on a multi-
:plicity of commercialobstacles. This factor governed the decision of 
the Scottish free traders to agitate on a wider platform than in the 
south. In view of the intrinsic commercial interest of Glasgow in 
the Corn Laws, directly and symbolically, it was not surprising that 
the interest groups immediately concerned should be reflected in the 
League's principal adherents in the city. Commercial and industrial 
enterprises, as well as individuals, figured prominently in the 
Glasgow subscription lists to the funds of the League. Unsurprisingly, 
they were led by the cotton industry, its ancillaries, the iron in-
:dustry, and international mercantile concerns. (2l) 
20) ibid., 11/1/1844. 
21) ibid., 15/1/1846; "Scotsman", 20/12/1843. 
In 1846, the eight largest subscribers to the League Fund 
(with £500 each) included .. Charles Tennant & Co. (st. Rollox 
Chemical Works), J. & A. Denniston (international mercantile 
house), Samuel Higginbotham (power-loom cloth manufacturer), 
William Dixon of Govan (i:romaster), John Wilson of Dundyvan 
(ironmaster), Buchanan, Hamilton &· Co. (East India Merchant~), 
and Colin Dunlop & Co. {ironmasters). Heading further 
substantial contributors from the cotton industry were 
Duncan McP.hail & Co. and Alexander Graham of Lancefield 
(£200 each). The same interests - cotton and iron - were 
:repr&duced- in the league fund lists of smaller towns . in the 
Lanarkshire conurbation, such as Airdrie, the site of the 
fundyvan iron works. 
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If Glasgow manufacturers felt they had a commercial interest in 
repeal of the Corn Laws, this notion was equally held in the other 
principal commercial community in Scotland, Dundee. The linen in-
:dustry of Tayside had been protectionist in sympathy as late as the 
1820's, but Huskisson 1 s r..epeal of the export bounty had severed any 
interest the industry had retained with the cause of protection. 
When the linen manufacturers found increasing tariff barriers raised 
against them in France and the United states of America in 184o-42, 
they had little hesitation in attributing these hurdles to Britain's 
restrictive commercial policy, and in regarding Free Trade as the 
panacea for their troubles. D.lring the economic depression of 1842, 
when the five principal linen manufacturers in the Dundee area had 
only twelve out of a possible thirty warping mills in constant employ-
:ment, and when trade in osnaburgs and dowlas especially (though not 
in all articles) had declined, the Dundee free traders convened a 
meeting of the linen industry of the area - a direct appeal to an 
interest group by the league - to demonstrate in favour of free trade_ 
and to attribute all evils from bankruptcies to petty theft to the 
lack of free trade. (22 ) 
22) "Dundee Advertiser" and Supplement, 7/1/1842; "The Witness", 
15/6/1842; Report of the Great Anti-Corn-Law Meeting held 
at IA.tndee on Thursday, 6th_ January, 1842. 
At a free trade meeting in Dundee on 9/1/1839, David Baxter 
reported the growth of foreign manufactories, for spimling 
and weaving linen yarns by steam power. He had seen 
several in Belgium which "would not disgrace the town of 
Dundee and he could assure them that they would find it very 
difficult to compete with them. The Corn Laws were not the 
only thing that would require to be repealed, in order to 
restore our trade with these countries". ("Glasgow Argus ", 
14/l/1839) • 
225. 
As in Glasgow, the manufacturers of the east attacked the Corn 
Laws not in isolation, but as part of a comprehensive progrannne of 
tariff reform. Edward Baxter attributed the retaliatory measures of 
the Zollverein and the United States (and the anticipated measures by 
Brazil) to the fact that "we would not admit the corn, and the timber, 
and the sugar of these countries". (23 )The tentacles of the linen 
industry spread into all the towns of the region - Perth, Dunfermline, 
Kirkcaldy, Arbroath and Forfar - and in them too, the linen industry 
furnished a phalanx of support for the League. However, in Dundee 
and some of the other towr.son Tayside, the linen manufacturers were 
not the only interest group regarding the corn Iaws as a connnercial 
question. Flax spinners, although the most prominent participants in 
terms of labour and fiscal contributions to the League in Dundee, were 
accompanied by ancillary interests notably Shipping, marine insurance 
and banking. Many of the free traders had direct connections with 
foreign trade, including Edward Baxter (of Baxter Brothers, the linen 
manufacturers) who was the U.S.A. Vice-consul in Dundee, Thomas Neish, 
the Russian Vice-consul and William Thornton, their Prussian counter-
:part. (24 )In smaller linen centres, such as Arbroath, the same diversity 
(25) 
of interests was represented in the free trade party. 
Shipowners provided nuclei of support for free trade in other 
east coast ports. In I.ei th, the shipping and international mer-
:cantile interests objected to both the timber and corn monopolies. 
23) Report of the Great Anti-Corn-law Meeting held at Dundee on 
ntursday, 6th January, 1842. p. 48. 
24) "Durrlee Advertiser", 24/11/1843; 19/1/1844; 13/1/1846; 
16/1/1846. 
25) "Scotsman", 26/1/1839. 
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The duty on Baltic timber was prohibitive, equalling nearly two hun-
:dred per cent of the cost of the article. If the Canadian timber 
monopoly was overturned, they anticipated that there would be an 
increase in total trade through Leith, and that being cheaper and more 
durable than American red timber, it would be preferred for ship-
building. Moreover, repeal of the Corn laws \'tould produce not only 
a regular import trade in foreign cereals for Leith, but also "if they 
could import provisions cheaper from abroad, of course the wages of 
the ship-builders would be less". (26) 
In Aberdeen too, the League found support from several of the 
more prominent ship-owners in the town, notably Dean of Guild George 
Thompson, Henry Adamson, and Alexander Nicol of Nicol and Munro. 
Collectively, they were the owners or agents of twenty-four brigs and 
barques in the port. (27)Their complaint, articulated by J. H. Wilson of 
the "Aberdeen Herald n, was that the proportion of the import trade of 
Aberdeen in the hands of foreign shipping interests was steadily in-
:creasing at the expense of local ship-owners. This they attributed 
(like the Leith ship-owners) to the Corn laws which by enhancing food 
prices deprived them of the opportunity of victualling their vessels 
on equal tenns with their rivals, and more especially to the timber 
duties, which obliged them to build their ships from Baltic timber 
26) Evidence of William Muir (general merchant) in the Minutes of 
Evidence of the Select Committee on Timber Duties, 1835. 
pp. 333-36; Evidence of John Mitchell (merchant) in the 
Minutes of Evidence of the Select Canmittee on Import Duties. 
1840. pp. 223-33; and the evidence of John Snith (Ship-
owner) in Mirutes of Evidence of the Select Cormnittee on 
British Shipping. 1844. pp. 149-50. 
27) "Aberdeen Herald 11, 27/1/1844. 
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at double its original value, or use inferior native timber which 
"from the very nature of the material, will ·be shaken from their 
fastenings before they get half-way through the first voyage". 
British vessels were also effectually excluded from certain export 
trades, especially the herring trade to the Baltic from the North-east 
ports such as Aberdeen and Peterhead, because they were under-cut by 
foreign shipping interests. Moreover, the herring trade itself in 
ports like Banff attributed their failure to secure greater markets 
in Europe to the Corn Iaws which produced retaliatory tariffs rrhence 
a great number of coopers and others connected with the herring 
trade ••• feel the consequences of the present laws". (28) 
The League's appeal on the Corn Laws cast a wider net on urban 
middle-class society than was embraced in the large exporting indus-
:tries and those dependent on them for a livelihood in the mercantile 
and shipping interests. The multiplicity of shareholders in the new 
railway companies could be given the glittering prospect that their 
investments would be more profitable when the reduced value of land 
following Corn law repeal entailed that it could be purchased "to 
greater advantageu, in addition to the reduction in the value of 
labour. (2g )Moreover, the indirect commercial interest in free trade 
- which would benefit all consumers of grain and other commodities -
also influenced the mass of small manufacturers, merchants, tradesmen, 
and commercial classes in urban society who provided goods or 
28) Edin. Diss. Conf. Report, 1842. pp. 99-101.; ttAberdeen 
Herald", 26/2/1842. 
29) ''The Late Commercial Crisis, being a retrospect of the years, 
18.36 to 1838" by a Glasgow Manufacturer. Glasgow, 1839. p. 99. 
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services, and who identified their prosperity with the level of demand 
in the major industrial and commercial concerns. Acutely aware of 
the multiplier effect of prosperity or depression in the latter, they 
accepted the thesis that free trade would benefit them too. Conse-
:quently, when the smaller burghs of northern and north-eastern Scot-
:land participated at an anti-corn-law soiree in Aberdeen in February 
1842, their reports on the state of trade in their respective locali-
:ties placed the blame (predictably) on the lack of free trade, despite 
their non-industrial complexion. Thus although "the circumstances and 
situation" of Inverness did not pennit Ba.illie McAndrew "to point out 
special facts indicating any particular manifestation of the effect of 
the corn-laws on the trade or condition of society", he concluded that 
"trade, credit and industry were suffering in general with the country. 
As Banff too had "no manufactories of any description, nor any public 
works whatsoever, the direct bearing of the evil 11 was "not so obvious 
to the people's minds"~ but in the opinion of a local Dissenting 
minister, the community felt :'all the baneful effects common to the 
nation at large". (3o) 
In all urban centres, those members of the middle-classes took a 
prominent part in the Anti-Corn-Law League, but their importance varied 
with the economic and social complexion of the locality in which they 
resided. In Glasgow and Dundee, they were dwarfed (especially in 
terms of financial contributions to the League) by the direct interests 
- manufacturing and its ancillaries. In Edinburgh, however, the 
situation was the near antithesis of that in the industrial centres. 
In the metropolis~ manufacturing and mercantile interests on an 
30) "Aberdeen Herald", 26/2/1842. 
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international scale were comparatively few, and this was reflected in 
the composition of support for the Anti-Corn-I.aw league, which drew 
heavily on the distributive trades and professions for sympathy. The 
latter, especially advocates, writers to the signet, the medical pro-
:fession, and the Dissenting clergy comprised 22-23% of the total num-
:ber of identifiable subscribers to the league Appeals of 1843 and 1844, 
in contrast to lo% of the identifiable subscribers to the 1844 Fund in 
industrial Dundee. 'Ihe lack of an industrial base in Edinburgh was 
reflected too in the nature of the contributions. In 1843, of nearly 
1,200 donations, only four exceeded £10, and of these only one £50. (3l) 
Cobden was impressed with the total contribution from Edinburgh and 
the total number of contributors, correctly considering that it was a 
tribute to Duncan Mci.a.ren who had taken personal charge of the appeals, 
but he was less accurate when he observed that it came from a conmnmi ty 
"not interested directly, and decidedly the most intellectual judges 
of the question", (32 ) although there was a grain of truth in his generali-
:sation. 
Even Edinburgh was not devoid of all direct interest in free 
trade. As Adam Black observed, the city's publishing industry was 
restricted in the potentially numerous English-speaking market of the 
United states of America, because of an American duty of twenty per cent 
31) "Scotsman", 12/5/18411 25/1/1843; 28/1/1843; 
24/l/1844; "Dundee Advertiser", 22/12/1843; 
20/1/1844; 
26/1/1844. 
32) R. Cobden to F. Cobden, Edinburgh, 15/1/1843, in W.S.R.O. Add. 
Ms. 6011. 
Duncan Mciaren too argued that Macaulay was right in his 
assertion that Edinburgh had "less direct interest in the free 
trade issue than any town in the empire". (D. Mclaren to R. 
Cobden, Edinburgh, 14/3/1842, in W.S.R.O. Cobden Papers. 
1 (55). 
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ad valorem, whic~ he contended was in retaliation for BritiSh pro-
:tectionist policies. This more than outweighed the protective duty 
on foreign imports enjoyed by British IUblishers. (33)The paper manu-
:facturers of the city concurred, and four of them contributed £100 
(34) 
each to the League Fund of 1846. Moreover, as a largely non-
industrial community, Edinburgh was more readily attracted to the 
glamour of industry than those more intimately acquainted with it, 
comparing "the rude and antiquated operations of the English farmer, 
with the refined; complicated and beautiful processes of the cotton-
spinner, weaver, engineer and paper-maker", C3S ~and if the Edinburgh 
"Scotsman" felt some envy at Glasgow's industry, it could at least 
find consolation in the hope that "with the repeal of the Corn-Laws, 
mam1factures might speedily rise around us". (36) 
If Cobden considered that the "intellectual judges11 of the corn 
question resided in Edinburgh, the appeal of the Anti- Corn- Law league 
to the intellectual mainstream of the time, to religious enthusiasm, 
and to the social conscience was much wider, directed at all sections 
of urban society, in all parts of the country, and not least in Scot-
:land. The I.eague was able to present the cause of free trade as the 
logical application of the concept of an international division of 
labour beloved by prevailing economic doctrine, at a juncture when the 
scientific inevitability of the tenets of the economic faith advocated 
by the disciples of Ricardo were only ineffectually challenged. To 
33) Edinburgh. Diss. Conf. Report. 1842. pp. 124-25. 
34) 11Scotsman11 , 17/1/1846. 
35) ibid., 8/1/1842. 
36) ibid., 16/1/1839. 
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the free trade "Dundee Advertiser", it was a science "with which 
every class ought to be conversant, as it teaches not only the true 
position which all classes of society hold relatively to each other, 
but also the policy which in a national point of view is so essential 
to secure to industries and honourable exertions their true reward 11 • 
In the view of the organ - and others - Cobden 1 s stature rested not 
on his capacity as a propagandi-st, but because he had "fortified him-
:self with principles which no oratory, however captivating ••••••• 
can now for one instant unsettle". (37) 
To its appeal as the proselytising agent for doctrines in keeping 
intellectually with the spirit of the times, the league was able to 
claim Divine approval. Free trade could be equated with the Word of 
God, the cause of international brotherhood and peace, and the march 
ot civilisation. D1ssenting clergymen readily confirmed that Britain's 
role as the workshop of the world was attributable to a Divine scheme 
for the universe, which conveniently coincided with the precepts of 
the economists. (3S)On a similar theme, the "Dundee Advertisern pre-
:dieted that "not till this era of perfect freedom arrive will 
jealousies cease, and quarrels cease • • • those at the extremities 
37) "Dundee Advertiser", 22/3/1839; 5/5/1843. 
When Hamilton Town Cotmcil reversed their decision of the 
previoua year and petitioned for total repeal in 1843, it was 
attributed by a local free trader to the effects of Acland1 s 
proselytising work in the area at the time "and the pressure 
of the times". (Walter Black toR. Cobden, Hamilton, 
24/3/1843 in w.s.R.O. Cobden Papers. 548) 
38) At an anti-Corn-law soiree in Dundee, the Reverend William 
Berwick aclmowledged the contribution of the Bupreme Deity. 
Britain "was fitted for manufacturers - other more genial 
and fertile countries were fitted for agriculture~ He had 
given us the highway of the ocean - He had given us steam 
and wind11 • 
"IAlndee Advertiser" (Supplement), 7/1/1842. 
of the World become as brethern and as friends, and as mutually 
dependent upon and obliged to one another". (39) Comfortingly, the 
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economic and me·ssianic motivations could be construed as opposite 
sides of the same coin. The Reverend Dr. Ritchie., a prominent 
Edinburgh dissenter, reflected a widely-held notion when he hailed 
the iron steamer as "the predestined instrument of the world's re-
:generation • • • Success to the attempt to carry into Africa's in-
:terior the steamer, the harbinger of our manufacturers ! • • • • 
thanks to free trade, the shout will be heard - Africa is civilised! 
Slavery is abolished!" (40~ 
Paradoxically, the slavery question posed a dilemma for some 
Scottish free traders, many of whom participated actively in the 
anti-slavery movement. In conformity with the principles of :f'ree 
trade, they should have favoured the introduction of Brazilian sugar 
into the British market, but the fact that it was slave-grown pro-
:duced a crisis of conscience and a conflict of aims. The issue 
split the Anti-Slavery Convention of J\me., 1843., when the "Free Trade 
Abolitionists" seceded rather than accept the orthodox anti-slavery 
tactic of urging the boy-cott of slave-grown sugar. One of those 
who withdrew was the Edinburgh anti-slavery lecturer, George Thompson, 
who urged the admission of slave-grown sugar at the league meeting in 
Covent Garden on 17/5/1844., although he was opposed by Glasgow 
Emancipation Society which contained several free traders, notably 
the Reverend William Anierson, the Reverend Dr. Burns (Paisley), the 
Reverend Dr. Ritchie (Edinburgh) and William Turner. (
4
l)The di~ergence 
39) ibid., 24~/1843. 
40 Y Edin. Diss. Coni'. Report, 1842. pp. lo6-7. 
41) "Glasgow Argus"~ 18/4/1844; 20/5/1844; 5/8/1844. 
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of interests had, however, existed for some time. In May., 1841, at 
an anti-corn-law rally in Edinburgh, John Wigham regretted that the 
Anti-Slavery Society., with which he had been associated., opposed the 
proposal for free trade in sugar., and contended that there were other 
methods of dealing with the slave trade than by "burdening" the 
(42) 
people. _ 
A further collision of interests occurred for those Scottish free 
traders who were concurrently active in the temperance movement. 
Among those who held office or were otherwise active in the latter 
were Edward Baxter and Alexander Low in Dundee, the Reverend R. Forbes 
of Aberdeen, the Reverend Dr. Ri tchie in Edinburgh, and above all, 
Robert Kettle in Glasgow, who was both a director of the Glasgow Anti-
Corn-Law Association and president of the Glasgow Total Abstinence 
Society. (43 )Because of the identity of membership between the free 
trade and temperance movements, Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law Association pru-
:dently made a regular habit of reserving seats at their free trade 
banquets for temperance advocates, where they could partake of coffee 
or tea instead of sherry or port like the remainder of the company, 
and at a correspondingly reduced price of admission. (44 )Such a 
concession did not, however, prevent the temperance advocates from 
critically viewing the attitudes of other leaguers in the light of 
their own principles, and on 2/1/1843., at a meeting chaired by Robert 
42) "Scotsman11 , 12/5/1841. 
43) "Dundee Advertiser"., 2/1/1846; w. Norrie: Dundee Celebrities 
of the Nineteenth Century. pp. 368-74; Bon Accord 
Directory, 1842-43. p.9.; "Scotsman"., 8/3/1845; Andrew 
Aird: Glimpses of Old Glasgow. pp. 422-23. 
44) "Glasgow Argus "., 6/1/1842; 28/12/1843; 11/1/1844. 
234. 
Kettle, in the Reverend William Anderson's John Street Church, they 
met "to consider the inconsistent conduct of those individuals who 
are seeking the abolition of the Corn laws and yet supporting by 
their conduct and example, a system by which upwards of 60 million 
bushels of grain are annually destroyed". (4S)Tb some social reformers, 
the free trade movement was complementary to the cause of temperance, 
insofar as the reduction of tea duties - part of the free trade pro-
:gramme - offered "a cheap substitute for intoxicating liquors". (46) 
To others, however, the possibility of a clash of interests and of 
conscience seemed more real. Thus one Dissenting minister invited 
to McLaren's Edinburgh Conference of 1842 feared that a reduction in 
the price of grain from repeal of the Corn Laws might result in a 
diversion of more of it into the production of ardent spirits, and if 
he thought that free trade in corn would make whisky cheap, he con-
:fessed that he would change his mind "and become a friend to the Corn 
Laws. For great would be the sin committed, and the misery entailed 
by lowering the price of intoxicating liquors". (47) 
The identification between the personnel of the free trade move-
:ment and those of the anti-slavery and temperance movements indica-
:ted a preoccupation with social reform in Scotland which has also 
been identified in the contemporaneous Chartist movement north of the 
Border. other appeals to the social conscience in Scotland confirmed 
45) ibid., 2/1/1843. 
46) "Scotsman", 16/5/1846. 
47) Duncan Mcl.aren (editor): The Corn I.aws condenmed on account of 
their injustice and immoral tendency, by upwards of five 
hundred ministers of different denominations resident in 
Scotland. Edinburgh, 1842. p.51. 
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1 t. To the "Dundee Advertiser 
11
, the free trade movement followed 
the catholic Emancipation struggle and the Reform Bill as "the most 
(48) 
necessar'J and philanthropic struggle of them all". Insofar as 
protectionist commercia~ policies could be castigated as the cause of 
economic stagnation and distress, all social ills such as unemploy-
:ment, low wages, the growth of emigration societies on Clydeside, 
and rising crime rates in Forfar, could be attributed to the one scape-
(49) 
:goat, the Corn Laws. ·These complaints were general, but in Soot-
:land they \'lere supplemented by attitudes which were peculiarly 
Scottish in terms of social values, such as the claims of the school-
teachers and Sabbath school teachers of Eastwood that due to poverty, 
the education of the children in the district was being neglected, 
with 1,200 of them receiving instruction only in reading in the 
(50) 
Sabbath schools. Neglect of attendance at Church allegedly 
(51) 
due to ·a lack of suitable attire and resistance to the levy:ing of a 
compulsory assessment for poor relief "before repealing every law 
which tends to render food dear" as "unjust to those 'Nho pay it and 
double ®just to many of these \'lho would be at present compelled to 
• 
48) "Dundee Advertiser", 21/4/1843. 
49) Edin. Diss. Canf. Report. 1842. pp. 16, 30-1, 33, 39-41, 65, 
92-3. 
50) "Glasgow Argus ", 27/5/1841; 31/5/1841. 
51) Edin. Diss. Canf. Report. 1842. pp. 16, 45. 
The Rev. Mr. Lowe (Forf ar) enquired how they could go to 
Clmrch, as "the last blush of virtuous shame has not yet fled 
from the cheek of the poor man, al. though the last rag of once 
Church-going coat has nigh fled from his back ••• How can 
a father purchase a coat for himself, or a gown for his wife, 
when his hungry children cry in his face for more food than 
his wages will purchase to set before them?" 
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. " (52 ) fu th anif t t• receive ~t , were r er m es a ~ons of middle-class attitudes 
with a peculiarly Scottish sentiment. 
The projection of the League's case on a moralistic basis appealed 
to a wide cross-section of the socially-conscious members of the middle 
classes in Scotland, but foremost among these were the Dissenters. 
The Dissenting Churches in the eyes of the Established Church clergy 
had been "hatched midst the turbulence of public agitation", (53~ and 
their previous participation in political and social reformist move-
:ments (especially the anti-slavery movement) had given the claim 
some credence. The Reverend Dr. David King and the Reverend William 
Anderson, both of Glasgow, were fairly representative of the Dissen-
:ting clergy when they added the Anti-Corn-law league to a portfolio 
of political and social reformist activities already embracing the 
anti-slavery and temperance movements. (S4)Even lay Dissenters such as 
John Wigham referred to the League in private correspondence as the 
"cause of mercy and justice. 11 ( 55 )T.he Dissenting clergy added a semi-
religious appeal to the agitation, turning it into a crusade for 
doctrines "second only to those of Revelation". (56) 
• 
52) 11Glasgow Argus", 22/4/1841. (A speech by Dr. Buchanan, Professor 
of the Institutes of Medicine, Glasgow University) 
53) Rev. James Esdaile: The Voluntary Church Scheme without its 
foundation. pp. 5-6. · · - · ·-
54) Elizabeth King: Memoir of the Rev. David King, LL.D., pp. 95, 
100, 105; George Gilfillan: Life of the Rev. William 
Anderson, LL.D., pp. 92, 97, 128. 
55) John Wigham to League H. Q., Edinburgh, 30/9/184o in Letter Book 
of the Anti-Corn-law League. Vol. 5, No. 729; see too 
"Scotsman", 6/6/1846. 
56) Rev. Andrew Sonunerville: Free Trade in Corn and other commo-
:dities. p. 5. 
The "Inverness Courier" (19/1/1842) re~etted that the 
Dissenting clergy treated it as a religious question, pre-
: ferring to "see it handled as a branch of political economy, 
unconnected with those more solemn considerations which arise 
out of divine revelation". 
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However, the appeal to the Dissenters was also sectarian. In 
terms of ecclesiastical politics, it presented an opportunity to 
launch an attack on the Established Church which had a pecuniary in-
:terest (below) in high corn prices. Against the background of the 
Voluntary Controversy, it supplied the Dissenters an emotive addition 
to their argument. The Established Church could be assailed for 
having "patched up an alliance ·with the landlords to make the ~or 
man's loaf dearer, and the demand for his labour less, and his wages 
lower, in order that rents and stipends might be kept up", and "as 
collateral sharers in the spoils of an unjust monopoly - one even 
tempting them, in the secrecy of their hearts, to contradict and re-
: call the weekly public prayer of their lips for plenty in the land 11 • (57) 
Consequently, although several of the Dissenting ministers invited to 
the 1842 Edinburgh conference had grave reservations on the expediency 
of being involved in what they contended was a purely secular politi-
:cal issue, with possible damage to the League by association in the 
public mind with a sectarian religious body, many of those who 
accepted the invitation to attend, welcomed the opportunity for 
• 
Dissenting participation on a sectarian basis as an opportunity to 
strike a blow at the Established Church. Some of them urged that 
the ministers of the Church of Scotland Should be invited to attend, 
if only because their refusal to do so "would tend to show who were 
on the side of suffering humani tyu. (5S) 
57) 11 Glasgow Argus ", 26/2/1838; 11/l/1844. 
58) Duncan McLaren: (ed.): op. cit., pp. 3, 6, 10-13, 14, 23, 25, 
40, 44, et. seq. 
238. 
To political radicals too, the agitation presented itself as an 
opportunity to launch an attack, with less danger to urban property 
than Chartism seemed to entail, on the existing political balance in 
society. The Corn Iaws could be condemned - as they had been habi-
:tually - as a piece of class legislation, a tax on the industrious 
poor (or the urban middle-classes) for the benefit of a slothful, 
parasitic, and avaricious aristocracy. The veteran Aberdeen radical, 
James Adam, contrasted the amount of the poor rate for the parishes 
of st. Nicholas and Old Machar, estimated at £5,000, with the £35,000 
which he estimated the citizens of Aberdeen paid for the Corn Laws 
"to support the rank and station of the landowners • • • 2/6d per 
pound to the needy poor, and 17/6d. to the greedy rich." (59)To the 
"Dundee Advertiser", the political battles of the 1840's could be 
simplified as a struggle between the "aristocracy" and the "people", 
in which the Corn Laws were part of a general struggle following the 
disappointing results of the Reform Act. (60)In a similar vein, the 
Glasgow free trader, Alexander Graham, saw Cobden and free trade as 
the latest in a series of struggles for the amelioration of the human 
• 
race, with a pedigree which comprised Knox, Il.tther and Calvin and the 
Reformation, Wilberforce and Clarkson and the abolition of slavery, and 
O' Connell and Catholic Emancipation. (6l)In this context too of an 
59) "Aberdeen Herald", 26/~1842. 
William Nairne of I..ogical.mond, a flax-spinner, saw the land-
:owners as "Britain's homicidal oppressers •• they have 
turned thousands of helpless women and hunger-bitten children, 
in fluttering rags, to the pelting of the storm • • like the 
frogs of Egypt, they have come into our very ovens and kneading-
troughs, and rendered them empty". ("Dundee Advertiser", 
18/1/1844) • 
60) "Dundee Advertiser", 6/10/1843. 
61) "Glasgow Argus", 16/10/1843. 
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inevi.table evolution of human enlightenment, the League as a vehicle 
of agitation, as opposed to the corn issue, appealed to middle-class 
reformers. The "Argus" considered that it marked a new stage in 
agitation insofar as unlike previous political combinations, it de-
:pe~ed on a real, if circumscribed, public involvement, and like 
sane other free traders, looked forward to its use for "other pur-
:poses of politiaal agitation". (
62
)The more conservative Alexander 
Dunlop, the Free Church lawyer, represented another school of 
thought, when he intimated his jealousy "of\ any great association 
being likely to be permanent, which by its great and gigantic power 
would at all seem to crush and overbear individual private opinion", 
but he reconciled himself to the League's existence by arguing that 
it was a necessary evil to counter-balance the "League of the 
Aristocracy" ranged against it, and because it was temporary. (63) 
The political appeal of the League was not restricted to 
radicals and those who desired changes in the existing political and 
social order. It also attracted conservatives, and those who wished 
to stabilise political and social relationships below if not above 
• 
them. The fear of social convulsion~ an apparently iminent threat 
in view of the activities of the more militant Chartists in the New-
:port rising (November, 1839) and the Plug Plot disturbances (August 
1842), was a potent argument in the League's armoury. Thus one 
anonymous pamphleteer drew attention to the social and political 
implications of defending the Corn Laws - an issue in which "the belly 
62) 
63) 
ibid., 13/1/1845; "Scotsman"~ 28/l/1846; Rev. E. D:rumnond to 
R. Cobden~ Edinburgh~ 4/2/1845, in W. S.R. 0. add. Mss. 6ol3. 
"Scotsman", 17/1/1846. 
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is • • • the subject of the agitation", and lauded the league as 
"the onlY true conservatives - men who are not given to change, to 
whom political convulsion is certain loss, revolution irreparable 
ruin", concluding that unless the Corn Iaws were sacrificed, it "will 
not be the repeal of the Bread-tax alone that will suffice". (64) 
Following the Plug Plots of August, 1842, Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law 
Association drew attention to ''recent disorders and insubordination 
exhibited in various parts of the country" which constituted "the 
most serious alarm for the peace of society and the ultimate safety 
of our national institutions", and sought protection against the im-
:plici t threat to property through a repeal of the Corn Laws -
"partial legislation". (6S) 
The demand for repeal of the Corn La'\'TS as a concession to 
working-class opinion was based on two distinct and partly contra-
:dictory attitudes. Some, such as the Reverend William Berwick, a 
Dissenting minister in Dundee, believed that free trade was a "safety-
valve", the economic benefits of which would alleviate material hard-
:ship among the working-classes, and thus the impulse for social 
unrest. (66 )To the Tory, Dr. Thomas Cha.lmers, however, repeal of the 
Corn Laws was only to be hoped for because it would not in his view 
upset the existing social and political balance in society by pro-
:ducing any marked encouragement to the growth of comnerce or manu-
:factures. The positive benefit which he anticipated would flow 
64) "letter to his Grace, the Duke of Wellington, on the Corn laws, 
by a Forfarshire Merchant" pp. 14-15. 
65) "Glasgow Argus", 26/9/1842. 
66) "Dundee Advertiser" (SUpplement), 7/1/1842. 
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from repeal was the removal of "a topic of agitation and conflict, 
and so tend to the restoration of a better understanding among the 
various classes of society" and thus too the removal of another ex-
:pedient to make way for the true cure for the ills of society - a 
Christian education. (
6
?)The "Aberdeen Banner " - which followed 
Chalrners into the Free Church fold - also followed him on this question. 
It accused the Corn laws of embittering "the mutual feeling of the 
aristocracy and the democracy for generations", urging repeal "for 
the sake of all that is humane, conservative and philanthropic". <68 ) 
Despite their difference in emphasis, however, both Berwick and 
Chalmers would have agreed with Lord Dunfermline that Cobden had re-
:moved a great danger when his success "proved that universal suff-
:rage is unnecessary". (
6
g)The League's appeal to those of a more con-
:servative hue was clinched in the crisis of 1846 when potato riots 
took place in northern Scotland. (70)The Edinburgh Merchant Company 
petitioned in May in favour of Peel's proposals for repeal as 
"calculated to allay the feelings of animosity which have existed 
between different classes of the connnuni ty". (7l) 
67) "Scotsman", 3/12/1845; "Kelso Mail", 13/8/1841; Thomas 
Chalmers: "On Political Economy, in connection with the Moral 
State and Moral Prospects of Society" 1832. pp. 520-21, 536-
37. 
68) "Aberdeen Banner", 12/1/1844. 
69) Copy. George Corn be to R. Cobden, Edinburgh, 27/12/1845, in 
George Combe Papers. Mss. 7390. 
70) In February, 1846, several fanners in Nairn were assaulted, a 
detachment of troops was sent from Fort George, and thirty-
nine rioters were imprisoned. ("Scotsman", 21/2/1846). In 
Inverness, a mob attempted to prevent the shipnent of 
potatoes to London, and the military were twice called out to 
restore order, but there was "no sacrifice of life". (R. 
Grant to Lord Dalhousie, Inverness, 7/2/1846 in Dalhousie 
Muniments. GD. 45/7/23). . 
71) Minutes of Edinburgh Merchant Company, 29/5/1846. 
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However, it \'tould be an over-simplification to compart free 
traders (or protectionists) into a clear-cut division between those 
whose interest was direct or indirect, commercial, political or 
moralistic. In most free traders, several influences helped to 
mould outlook on the corn question, and these were reflected in their 
pronouncements on the issue. Duncan McLaren reflected the outlook 
of a D1ssenter, political Radical and substantial merchant. Ech'IB.rd 
Baxter felt an intrinsic interest commercially in the question as a 
large-scale manufacturer, but he was also an active Dissenter and 
social reformer. Untypical of the majority of free traders, was 
Walter Buchanan of Glasgow who had a direct mercantile interest in 
the Corn Laws, but was otherwise a member of the Established Church 
and by no means on the radical wing of the Whigs. <72 ) As such, he was 
an object of suspicion to the dedicated Radical, William Weir, (73)who 
in company with other journalists like William Tai t or James Adam 
were equally interested in the exploitation of the issue for politi-
:cal purposes. <74) 
Similarly, it would be an over-simplification to classify all 
opinions as either free trade or protectionist. These were 
72) Memoirs and Portraits of One Hundred Glasgow Men. Vol. 1. 
pp. 57-8. 
73) William Weir canplained, with radical prejudice, that Buchanan 
was deficient in character, deferring "too much to the con-
:ventional tone of the society in which he moves - more 
Tory as Whig men - am is afraid to act upon his own con-
:victions11. (W. Weir to R. Cobden, London, 23/12/1839, in 
W.S.R.O. Cobden Papers. 1. (25). 
74) Adam saw a general collapse of existing parties taking place in 
1842 and argued that there was no place for a middle-of-the-
road party, Conservative or Whig - but that the choice lay 
between ul tra-Toryism and "a practical recognition of the 
theoretical Whig doctrine that the people are the only 
legitimate source of power". (James Adam: Complete 
Suffrage. preface .1842. ) 
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alternate poles of a debate rather than clearly-defined divisions. 
The Glasgow free traders in 1$39 were not the only adherents of the 
r.eague who were prepared to accept less than "Total and immediate" 
repeal. In 1843, a Leaguer in Leith, George McCallum advocated a 
small fixed duty for revenue purposes as it would be less irksome 
than direct taxation. (75 )The principal task of the League in Scotland 
in the urban areas was to convert to total and immediate repeal, 
those whom Prentice described as "warmly attached to whiggism as 
associated with its former services to liberty, and therefore, looked 
favourably on the scheme of a moderate fixed duty, for which the late 
whig ministers would contend". (76) Opinions on the Corn Laws between 
those of ultra-free trade and ultra-protectionist were multifareous 
and shaded imperceptibly into each other. 
A further complication in urban society was the qualified 
support of the working-classes in Scotland. It is impossible to 
sustain the thesis that the hostility of the Chartists in Scotland 
to the League was confined to a small minority of "physicals" who 
were out of step with working-class opinion which was generally 
favourable to repeal of the Corn laws. There was a less defective 
communication between the Universal SUffrage Central Committee for 
Scotlarrl and world.ng-class opinion than has been suggested, and few 
free traders - despite their public statements - would have 
75) George Mccallum to Mrs. G. Wilson, Leith, 16/1/1843, in Wilson 
Papers. 
76) Archibald Prentice: op. cit. Vol. 1. pp. 294-95. 
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concurred in the view that they met "little real opposition". (77) 
Although it is possible to identify support ~om Chartists for the 
League in some localities, such as Kelso, Kirriemuir, Dysart or 
(78) 
Newburgh, these were exceptions rather than the rule. In the 
large towns especially, the widespread nature of Chartist distur-
:bances at League meetings in 1839-43 (with some later), and more 
particularly, the numbers involved at individual meetings belied the 
suggestion that it was a small knot of extremists, quite apart from 
the dubious value of the division between "physicals" and others. 
When James Moir "captured" the Glasgow League meeting on 28/1/1842, 
in the City Hall, carrying an amendment for the Charter (on the 
admission of the "Glasgow Argus") by a majority of three to one, 
(79) 
there were over 4,000 present. The obloquy of a similar Chartist 
success at a meeting of Edinburgh Anti-Corn-Law Association in the 
Assembly Rooms on 10/5/1841, when Adam Black was obliged to vacate 
77} I.eslie vlright suggested that the decision of the Universal 
SUffrage Central Connni ttee for Scotland to break up League 
meetings was "contrary to the general wishes of those people 
it was supposed to represent" and "up to the end of 1841 few 
League meetings were disturbed - except by the Physicals". 
In Scotland, he contended, "only ••• a small minority -
but a fanatical minority" supported O'Conner' s line, and in 
Scotland the League met "very little real opposition". 
(L.c. Wright: op. cit., pp. 90-91, 116-18). Cobden's bio-
:gra~er, Morley, expounded the same theme. See John 
Morley: op. cit., vol. 1, p. 156. A more satisfactory 
analysis based on Chartist sources, of Chartist attitudes to 
the Corn Laws has been made by Dr. Wilson. See Alexander 
Wilson: op. cit., Chapter 10. 
78) "The Anti-Corn-law Circular", 20/2/1840; 5/3/1840: "Scotsman" 
8/2/1840. 
79) "Glasgow Argus", 31/1/1842; "Scotsman", 19/2/1842. 
(80) . 
the chair, had a lasting effect, and J.n March, 1842, IAmcan 
McLaren confessed to Cobden that the Association had been forced to 
give up the idea of a public meeting through fear of the Chartists 
and the damage which their intervention could do to the cause of the 
league. (
8
l)Appea1s by members of the League to Soottish Chartists to 
support the :f'ree trade movement were a tacit recognition of their 
(82) 
failure to do so. and significantly, even the Chartist members of 
the Dissenting congregations, almost invariably strongholds of the 
(83) 
Anti-Corn-League, opposed the movement to the chagrin of their pastors. 
Moreover, when Bai1lie William Christie of Dundee broke with the 
Chartists because of 0' Corm~' s rejection of the League, his action 
was sufficiently exceptional to be noted. (B4)As a body, the Chartists 
in Scotland adhered to the policy of disrupting League meetings 
(along with those for other public objects), despite the private dis-
:approval of some individual adherents on the principle or expediency 
of such tactics. 
What characterised Chartists in Scotland was not their failure 
to oppose the Anti-Corn-Law League, but their motivation. Although 
some of them were suspicious that low wages could be equated with 
cheap food, (BS)an attitude which had been expressed previously by some 
80) ibid., 12/5/1841. 
81) D. McLaren to R. Cobden, Edinburgh, 14/3/1842 in W. S. R. 0. Cobden 
Papers. 1. (55) • 
82) "Scottish Patriotrr, 1/8/1840; Archibald Prentice: 
vol. 1. p. 291; Edin. Diss. Conf. Report, 1842. 
83) Duncan Mciaren (ed): op. cit., pp. 7, 32. 
84) Memoranda of the chartist Agitation in Dundee, 1892. 





working-class witnesses to the Handloom vleavers 1 Colllllission in 1834-
35 despite the opinion of Symons, one of the Assistant Commissioners 
for scotlan~ who had claimed that the weavers condemned the Corn Laws 
i 11 (86) t t-.-- . "as with one vo ce , mos C.r.u:u·tJ.sts in Scotland opposed the League, 
not repeal of the Corn Laws, accepting the viewpoint of Moir that the 
Whigs had "cheated" the working-classes during their period in office, 
and that the only mode of ensuring repeal was through universal 
suffrage. (87)The principal organ of the Chartists in Scotland, the 
"Scottish Patriot'; engaged in scathing attacks on the Corn Laws and 
rebuked the landowners for attempting to "insult the understanding of 
the working-classes by telling them that cheap bread will make low 
wages". The "Patriot" echoed Chartist hopes by predicting that the 
League's rebuff in Parliament would force free traders to consider 
suffrage reform, and lauded the League 1 s intervention in the Walsall 
by-election (1841) as an indication that the Leaguers were "in 
earnest in their war against the monopoly of food", but the hostility 
86) Report of the Handloom Weavers' Connnission, 1834-35, pp. 51-?; 
Minutes of Evidence of ibid., pp. 72, 87, 90, 99, 251. 
One of those e.xpre·ssing such fears was James Buik, a leading 
member of Dundee Anti-Corn-Law Society in 1834. Another, 
Hugh Mackenzie, on behalf of the Central Committee of Handloom 
Weavers~ transmitted a letter to the Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law 
Demonstration of 14/1/1842, enquiring whether repeal would 
benefit them, or whether wages would be cut. (rrGlasgow Argusrr, 
17/1/1842) 
87) "Glasgow Argus", 27/1/1842; 14/10/1841. 
Moving a Chartist amendment at a league meeting in Glasgow, 
on 11/8/1840, Moir noted that they "were all fully convinced 
long ago, of the evils of the Corn Laws, and they were as 
fully convinced of the uselessness of their attempting their 
repeal in the manner pursued by the Anti-Corn-Law Association". 
("Scottish Patriot", 15/8/1840) 
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of the "GlasgmT Argus" after Weir's departure, and its in increasing-
:ly Whig and middle-class political tone was a further factor miti-
:gating against any possibility of support for the anti-corn-law 
association. (8S)To the League, however, it made little practical 
difference what motivated Chartist hostility: it was a serious oppo-
:sition in almost all urban areas. 
Moreover~ there was little real divergence if any between the 
attitudes of the Chartists and those of the working-classes collec-
:tively. As a body, the latter were noticeably absent from the 
anti-corn-law agitation of 1839-46 throughout most of its life. In 
part this was due to the League 1 s enforced reaction to Chartist in-
:cursions; meetings were frequently held in the afternoon to dis-
:courage large-scale working-class attendance, and admission charges 
to lectures and demonstrations had the same effect. (89 )rn January, 
1844, Leith Anti-Corn-Law Association decided to permit access to the 
gallery during a free trade meeting without an admission charge to 
allow "respectable" workmen to attend, but the cormni ttee still 
retained control over the entrants by prudently making admission by 
ticket. (90)The membership of the anti-corn-law associations was 
placed on a similarly socially-exclusive basis by pecuniary imposi-
:tions. Those associations adopting the Manchester constitution 
88) "Scottish Patriot", 11/7/1840; 25/7/1840; 15/8/1840; 3/10/1840; 
26/12/1840; 2/1/1841; 10/1/1841. 
89) The admission charge to the Great ScottiSh Free Trade Demonstra-
:tion, including dinner, was eight shillings. Rates of 
admission to lectures were much lower. Cobden 1s meetings 
in Aberdeen on 15/1/1844 had entry fees ranging from 3d. to 
2/-. ("Glasgow Argus", ~/4/1841; "Aberdeen Herald", 
13/1/1844) • 
90) "Scotsman", i3/l/1844. 
in its entirety demanded an entry fee of 5/-, and even Edinburgh 
which had established itself in 1839 on a relatively "popular" 
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basis with a fee of one shilling revised its constitution on 9/3/1843 
to debar those contributing less than 2/6d. to the funds of the 
(91) 
League from voting rights. 
The increasingly middle-class nature of many of the League's 
demonstrations in Scotland from 1839 - dinners, banquets, and 
soirees - was both a result and a cause of working-class abstention. 
Nevertheless, participation b.y individual members of the work~ 
classes underlined the absence of the remainder. Working-class 
attendance at League demonstrations, including those of a social 
nature, where the admission charge was not too prohibitive to the 
labouring "aristocracy", together with working-class donations to 
the League funds of 1843 and 1844, especially in Edinburgh, testified 
(92) 
to individual participation, and support. In some anti-corn-law 
associations, the working-classes were represented more directly. 
An address by Kelso Anti-Corn-Law Association to Cobden in 1843, 
although overwhelmingly middle-class in composition, also contained 
the signatures of four labourers and three weavers, and even the 
hostile Tor, "Kelso Mail" had previously recognised working-class 
(93) 
support for the League in the locality. In Arbroath, the secretary 
of the association formed on 22/1/1840, R.N. Andersan, (a solicitor), 





"Scottish Patriot", 15/8/1840J "Dundee Advertiser", 19/~1844; 
26/1/1844; "Scotsman", 25/1/1843; 28/1/1843; 20/1/1844; 24/1/1844. 
Address of Kelso and District Anti-Corn-Law Association to R. 
Cobden, n.d., 1843. in W.S.R.O. Cobden Papers. 555.; ttKelso 
Mail", 12/5/1841. 
249. 
sympathetic, having disdained the efforts of the Chartist .. demagogues" 
_ an assertion partly justified by the presence of four flax-dressers, 
three weavers, and a ship-carpenter on the association's general 
(94) 
committee. 
These were, however, exceptions which proved the rule, and the 
notice taken of them by middle-class Leaguers in Scotland indicated 
their extraordinary nature. Despite earlier reports that operatives 
had taken a leading part in the formation of the Stranraer Anti-Corn-
Law Association in 1839, its secretar.y, James Ross confessed (opti-
:mistically) in January, 1840, that the working-classes of the district 
(95) 
were "only just beginning to find out the bearings of the matter". 
Moreover, the efforts of Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law Association at enlisting 
working-class participation met with little success. The Glasgow 
Operatives' Anti-Corn-Law Association, the counterpart of similar 
bodies in Liverpool and Manchester, left virtually no activity on 
record, while the Anti-Corn-Law Association's soiree on total abstinence 
principles especially for the working-classes on 15/1/1842, was res-
stricted to the minority of relatively affluent tradesmen who could 
(96) 
afford the admission charge of l/3d. Nevertheless, the absence of 
working-class active involvement in the anti-corn-law agitation may 
not be attributed merely to the unsuitable vehicle provided b,y the 
League for suCh participation. As on previous occasions, the 
94) R. N. And er son to Lea.gu.e H. Q. , Arbroath, 1/2/1840 in Letter :Book 
of the Anti-Corn-Law League. vo1.3, no. 349; "The Anti-Corn-
Law Circular" , 6/2/1840. 
95) James H. Rosa to J.:B. Smith, Stranraer, 3/1/1840 in ::L~L_:a..,vol.3, 
no. 321. 
96) "Glasgow Argue", 6/1/1842; 8/5/1843· 
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working-classes could have conducted an agitation in their own right. 
The address by the weavers of the western district of Perth in support 
of Cobden was an exceptional example of working-class initiative in 
(97) 
support of repeal and the League. 
The propensity for participation and the basic sympatby of the 
working-classes for the aim of the League was underlined by the 
working-class agitation of 1845-46, when operatives in Glasgow, 
Edinburgh, and other centres faced with the prospect of high food 
prices for their staple, the potato, organised public meetings, 
formed committees, and transmitted petitions in favour of total and 
immediate repeal of the Corn Laws. Delegate meetings of operatives 
from Glasgow and neighbouring communities led by Robert Sinclair, 
a weaver from Springburn, were held at the beginning of 1846 when 
deputations were appointed to call on various parties, while a 
(98) 
petition was transmitted to Lord Erougham. In Edinburgh, Charles 
Rosa, an operative, chaired a meeting on 29/1/1846, of delegates from 
forty workshops in the city, when an attempt by some recalcitrant 
Chartists to disrupt it was defeated, and resolutions were passed to 
(99) 
petition for repeal through Macaulay. However, the vigour and 
spontaneity of the working-class agitation of 1845-46, when Chartism 
was on the wane, heightened the contrast with the lack of involvement 




Address of the Handloom Weavers and other inhabitants of the 
Western District of the City of Perth~n.d., (probably 1843) 
in W.S.R.O. Cobden Papers. 574: 
"Glasgow Argue", 24/11/1845; 22/1/1846; 29/1/1846; 2/2/1846; 
5/2/1846; 9/2/1846; 12/3/1846; "Scotsman", 22/11/1845; 
26/11/1845. 
"Glasgow Argue", 5/2/1846. 
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working-classes as an entit,y was signatures on mass petitions and 
(100) 
workers' petitions oxganised by the League itself. Collectively, 
, the working-classes in Scotland supported repeal: they may be 
, counted accordingly as a free trade interest in urban society. 
As a group, however, their support for the Anti-Corn-Law League 
was minimal. In Scotland as in the south, the latter had its roots 
in the free trade interests of the urban middle-classes. 
However, although the volume and complexion of free trade support 
in Scotland have been respectively exaggerated and misinterpreted, the 
movement north of the Tweed was not merely a microcosm of the League 
nationally. Similar free trade interest groups did emerge in Soot-
sland, but these were influenced (as in previous agitations) by an 
economic, political, social, and religious environment which was 
distinctive both within Scotland as a whole and within her localities. 
The participants in the northern movement, and their attitude~reflected 
the interaction of several influences - nationa.l, regional, and local. 
The National Anti-Corn-Law League was the aggregate of a multiplioit.y 
of local movements, rather than one homogeneous entity. 
100) P.M. Stewart, M.P. received a number of working-class subscribed 
petitions in February, 1842, including those of the workers 
in Auldhousefield Bleaohfield and Weaving Factory, Auldfield 
Cotton-spinning and Weaving Factory, Millholm Paper Manufactory; 
Greenbank Dye Works, Thor.nliebank Calico-printing Works, 
and the coal-hewers in Cowglen Coal Works and at Ti twood. 
("Glasgow Argue", 10/2/1842.) 
8. Scottish Opinion and too Corn Laws; (2) The Agricultural 
Interest and its urban apologists, 18:d9-46. 
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one of the cardinal themes of the propaganda of the Anti-Corn-
Law League in 1839-46 was that in Scotland, agriculturists having 
um.ertaken considerable improvements were less dependent than south 
of the Border on the Corn Laws for protection, and \>7ere accordingly 
more sympathetic to free trade. The theme was set by the "Anti-
Corn-Law Circular" in August, 1839, \'then it quoted out of context 
selected evidence from Scottish witnesses to the Select Committee 
on Agr:'iculture (1836) in support of the contention that "the 
embarrassed condition of the English landlord and farmer \'ras there 
traced to the benumbing influence of their dependence on the 
fallacious idea of protection by corn laws, while the superior 
condition of proprietor and tenant in Scotland was attributed to 
the fact that in that country confidence in the corn la\'Ts had been 
(1) 
gradually abandoned". In reality, none of th.e witnesses, including 
Robert Hope of Fenton Barns, had renounced totally the concept of 
(2) 
protection. Paulton too on his return from Scotland reported at a 
public diml.er in his honour in his native Bolton that no\'lhere md 
he been more favourably received north of the Border, than in tr..e 
(3) 
agricultural districts. During his sojourn there he had been less 
enthusiastic, and more accurate, observing privately to George 
Wilson that the Scottish farmers were no less "bigotedly prejudiced" 
1) "The Anti-corn-Law Circular", 6/8/1839· 
2) Select Conmittee on Agriculture (1836). See Minutes of 
Evidence. 
3) "The Anti-Corn-raw Circular", 12/11/1839· 
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than tmse of the south. Moreover, despite the public reports of 
the impression which Paul ton was alleged to have made among the 
farmers of the south-west, the despa:lr of the free traders to make 
arry significant headway among the farmers in Galloway was voiced by 
James Ross, secretary of the new Anti-Corn-Law Association in 
stranraer, who confessed that they ncould not make much" of the 
farmers in his area: their rents (1839) were at a high pitch but 
(5) , 
they still supported the Corn Laws. Nevertooless, the Leaguers 
persisted in their theme. On 17/1/1843, Cobden claimed in 
Stirling at a free trade demonstration, tmt "in Scotland, there 
is to be found in the ranks of the supporters of free trade a much 
larger proportion of the enlightened and enterprising agriculturists 
(6) 
and la.rrlowners than we can boast of in the south". The important 
qualification employed by Cobden, however, was the adjective "en-
:lightened", because although the League in Scotland. did recruit 
individual farmers into its ranks, such as Williarn Murray of Polmaise 
who chaired the Stirling demonstration attended by Cobden, it un-
:doubtedly failed to recruit the Agricultural Interest, especially 
tenant farmers, as an entity. 
The attachnent of Scottish agricul.turists to the Corn laws was 
scarcely stn:'prising. The fact that large areas of Scotland depended 
less on cereal product ion a.n:l more on a mixed farming economy did not 
4) A.W. Paul ton to George WUson, Perth, 3/7/1809, L.L.B., 
vo1.2, no. 243. 
5) James H. Ross to Sidney Smith, Stranraer, 15/ll/1809, in ibid., 
vo1.2., no. 286. 
6) u Glasgow Argus ", 19/l/1843 • 
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(7) 
detract from their interest in protection. They fully realised the 
implications of repeal of the Corn Laws on the protection \'lhich other 
agrarian commodities also enjoyed - a danger which was brought home 
to than by the comprehensive nature of the movanent in Scotland ani 
its declared adherence to free trade "principles". Moreover~ l.mder 
the protective umbrella of the Corn Laws, marginal lands througoout 
Scotlan:l had been extensively. taken into cultivation. Paul ton 
lamented what he conceived to be the misapplication of capital in 
"actually growing corn mlf-way up the Pentland Hills behind 
Edinburgh, on the very summit of the Grampian range~ near Aberdeen~ 
(8) 
and along the rocky steps of the mist-clouded hills of Argyllshire"~ 
and even once allowance has been made for his exaggeration, Scottish 
witnesses to various Select connnittees on Agriculture furnished 
evidence of a similar natl..tr'e. Tre island of Lewis produced a 
(9) 
surplus of corn in most seasons~ like several other parts of the 
Highlands~ while throughout 1827-36~ Inverness exported substantial 
(10) 
quantities of wheat~ as well as oats ani barley, to England. Large 
areas of upland and marginal land in north and south were peculiarly 
7) "Glasgow Chronicle"~ 2:1/l/18.39 
Leslie Wright ms argued tmt "Almost every class in Scotland 
wanted Corn Law repeal and the League met very little real 
opposition"~ which he attributed partly to the fact that 
"Agriculture was not tied so exclusively to corn - more 
concern was felt over legislation regarding sheep~ cattle~ 
arx:1. oats". (Leslie c. Wright: op. cit • ., p.ll7) 
8) "The Anti-Corn-Law Circular"~ 12/ll/1839· 
9) Select Canmittee on Emigt'ation 1841. Evidence of Thomas Knox~ 
cmrnberlain of the Isle of Lewis~ in Minutes of Evidence. 
p.l75. 
10) Select Committee on Agricultural Distress~ 1$36. vo1.2.~ 
Appen:iix 21. 
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vu].nerable to aey regression in prices which might be too sequel to 
repeal• David Htmter of Blaclmess made the point \'lhen he conten::ied 
that nine-tenths of Scotlarrl was poor land, despite the quantity of 
(11) 
grain gro\'m for export to Englan:i. ·The "Perthshire Courier", a 
Tory and agricultural paper, concurred ani reverted to the League's 
conventional argument by noting tmt in a country which had already 
executed (on the League's own .admission) \'lidespread improvements, 
there '>~as no scope for these as a safety-net in the event of a 
(12) 
recession in prices. ·The loss of cultivation and the consequent 
loss of capital on marginal lands, extensively invested in improve-
:ments, thus formed one of the stock arguments of Scottish agricul-
(13) 
:turists, including those from the cereal-producing Lothians, where 
the same fear existed, albeit on a diminished scale. This was the 
basic fear underlying the agricultural reaction to the agitation for 
repeal. To all agriculturists the same prospect of reduced prices 
implied at least curtailed profits, reduced rents for lando\mers an::i 
the possibility of having to face the same rent despite a reduced 
income for tenants, an acute danger in view of the usual leases of 
nineteen or twenty-one years in Scotland. 
In most areas, however, the diversification of Scottish 
agriculture changed the complexion of the economic threat rather 
tmn diminishing it. The reduced protection accorded by Peel in 
11) David Hunter of Blackness: The Corn Iaw Question shortly 
p.l8. investigated. (1839)• 
12) "Perthshire Courier", 8/2/1844. 
13) "Scotsman", 24/l/1846; 
Courier", 28/2/1844; 
"Kelso Mail", 15/5/1841; "Inverness 
"Aberdeen Journal", 20/3/1844. 
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his successive fiscal measures of 1842 and 1844 to a variety of 
agrarian produce~ cereals~ root crops~ and livestock~ evoked a sharp 
response from agriculturists throughout Scotland against free trade 
in toto. The principal Scottish objections to Peel's proposals were 
listed by the Perthshire Association for the Protection of Agr'iculture 
in a memorial in 1842. Firstly~ they objected (as an important area 
for root crops) to the reduction of the import duty on potatoes from 
40/- to a nominal 3/4d. per ton. For several years1 over 23,000 
tons had been exported annually from Perth1 and the agr'iculturists 
feared that ··they could not compete in the London market \'lith t~ 
produce of France, Belgium~ and Germany. Their second complaint \'1as 
to the reduced protection for live cattle, ani to the mode of im-
:posing a duty on a flat rate principle1 irrespective of weight or 
size~ vlhic h they contended would favour foreigners vrho would import 
heavy cattle. Thirdly~ they feared that t~ removal of the previous 
prohibitive duties on starch and the substitution of nominal ones 
would m·ramp the market with foreign imports. Fourthly (arxl signi-
:fica.ntly last in order) the Association objected to the reduced 
duties on oats and barley as peculiarly injurious to the lighter 
(14) 
soils of Scotland. The complaint from Perthshire was echoed in the 
(15) 
north-east 1 Forfarshire1 Midlothian, and Dumfries-shire. 
All of the problems faced by tre I.owlan:l districts i-'Tere re-
:produced in a more acute form in the Highlanis ani Islanis. 
14) fl'lemorial of the Perthshire Association for the Protection of 
Agriculture. 1842. in Add. MS. 4o613. ff.50-I. (B.M.) 
15) See Buccleuch Monuments. GD. 224/511. 
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The arable farmers of the eastern seaboard of Ross complained 
bitterly that the protective duties on barley and oats (in relation 
to \llheat) \·rere disproportionately lo\'1_, and. that the cost of 
(16) 
freightage to London was greater than from Hamburg. Hovlever, the 
principal concern in the north \·las the threat to the export trade to 
London of livestock. A principal part of too agricultural revenue 
of the north was derived from. the shipment of live cattle to the 
south, vrhich the end of prohibition t~eatened \·Iith ruinous cornpeti-
(17) 
:tion, especially in lean cattle. A similar fear governed the 
shipnent of sheep, both thr-ee-year old e\lles ani cross-lambs which 
were sent south for fattening. The opinion of too north \'Ias that 
"the purchasing and feeding portion of the country may benefit, but 
the breeding parts of the country, especially Scotland and the north 
of Scotland may suffer severely", depending on the extent of foreign 
(18) 
importation. 
In the islands, the same attitude prevailed. The farmers in 
Seye noted that in the \'lest, the gr'azing interest frequently drove 
their stock several hundred miles to the appt"opriate markets and 
that the expense per pound weight of sending small cattle exceeded 
17) 
18) 
"Inverness Courier", 6/1/1842; 23/3/1842; 20/4/1842; 
24/1/1844; 11~/2/1844; "Perthshire Courier", 8/2/1844. 
The steam-ship opened up the markets of the south, especially 
London, to the stock-br.eeders of the north of Scotlarxi, 
altl'bugh it was one of the factors in the declining usage of 
the drove roads. See A.R.B. Haldane: The Drove Roads of 
Scotland. chap. 12. 
"Inverness Courier", 6/1/1842; 23/3/1842; 30/3/1842; Jolm 
Mackenzie (Agent, Bank of Scotland in Inverness) to 
Treasurer, Bank of Scotla.rrl in Edinbtn"gh, Inverness, 21/3/ 
1842. in Clerk of Penicuick Muniments. GD.l8/3509. 
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the amount of freight and duty \·lhich European breeders \'lould pay, as 
a result of the flat rate mode of assessment. T ooy f'urt her c cm-
:plained that since the decline of the kelp trade and the cessation 
of public 1-Jorks, smaller tenants '17ere solely dependent on limited 
sales of cattle and partial fishing, both of v1hich 1·1ould be adversely 
(19) 
affected by arry decrease in the price of meat. The Hebrides further 
feared that not only v1ould the small cattle reared in the islands be 
unable to compete, but also that Peel's proposals for nom5.na.l duties 
on fish imports would er ipple the cod and .ling fisheries of the 
north-v1est, if it produced imports from Europe 1-{here fish v1ere caught 
(20) 
in greater abundance and thus more economically. 
Moreover, the north as a \·Thole felt the threat of Peel's 
proposed reduction of duties on Canadian timber in 1842 \~hich to-
:gether vli th the danger to agrarian exports had far-reaching rever-
:berations. The ships involved in this trade could be rendered_ 
re-dundant, and therefore incapable of returning with lime., coal, and 
bone manure direct to the port of embarkation, v1hich had made the 
price of these imports more moderate ani permitted the Vlidespread 
use of the first and the third of them on the improvement of arable 
(21) 
lands in the north. With such a plethora of protectionist in-
:terests, all of which felt collectively threatened by the free trade 
19) 11 Inverness Courier", 20/4/1842. 
20) ibid., 13/4/1842. 
21) Copy letter. Jolm f\ia.ckenzie (Bank agent, Inverness) to the 
Treasurer of the Bank of Scotlan:l in Edinburgh., Inverness, 
19/3/1842 in Clerk of Penicuick Muniments. GD.l8/3509; 
"Inverness Courier", 23/3/1842. 
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movement, Inverness-shire v·Jas hardly the "neutral" county on the corn 
question v1hich the protectioni;:;ts of the county claimed, and it was 
no surprise \'7hen Dean of Guild C. Rose of Inverness, a member of the 
League, failed to find a secon:ler vlhen he moved an amendment for 
(22) 
total repeal at the county meeting on ~3/1844. 
In addition to the economic threat felt by most agriculturists, 
the agitation for repeal appeared to rna.rzy- as a political threat to 
property in general and the lamed interest in particular. Barclay 
of Balgone (AbernetJ::w, Pertbshire) accused the League of attempting 
(23) 
11 to raise an aristocracy of cotton upon an aristocracy of land", 
and agr-iculturists reacted to free trade glamorisation of industry 
and connnerce, v-li th an equally distorted picture of the countryside. 
An idyllic rural society was contrasted l'lith "the puny race vlhich 
rush up like mushrooms in the contaminated atmosphere of large towns 
ani dense factories", with all the attendant hazards to morals which 
(24) 
life in such an environment could create. If the aims of the agita-
:tion implied a political threat, most agriculturists were no more 
enamoured l'Iith the adherents of it, whom they identified as political 
22) ibid., 13/3/1844. 
23) "Perthshire Courier", 18/J/1844. 
24) James Carmichael of Raploch: Review of the Evidence taken 
before the Select Col'IIllittee of the Ibuse of Comnons on 
Agricultural Distress. 1836. 1838. p.132. 
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(25) 
radicals, unable to control the passions v1hich they had released.~ 
John Haldie of Herrlersgate Park, a Border farmer, confessed that 
although he feared the effects of both a fixed duty a.n1 total repeal 
almost equally., he v1ould support the former as oo did not like "the 
majority of the people who are so violent about the Corn La\'l 
(26) 
l •t. 11 abo 1 1on •• 
Hm·1ever, the dislike of the agriculturists was directed too at 
the vehicle of the agitation, which seemed to have revolutiona.ry 
implications. The 11 Perthshire Courier" lamented that "the \'lorst 
feature in the case of the League, and generally of the present 
times, is the organised form in Hhich discontent is embodied an1 
prosecutes its object", and recalled the halcyon days when societies 
25) The protectionist. attitude to the political implications of the 
activities of Leaguers was illustrated in a political song 
entitled 11 An Advice to the Meni:>ers of the League, by an East 
Lothian Ploughman", attributed to Howden of Lav1head, a tenant 
of Lord Haddington, which observed:-
"But to me it seems BRIG Hr 1 that it carmot be right., 
Foul seeds of dissension to sow - to sow; 
So COBIE take heed, for protection ye' 11 need, 
Should Democracy's storms rude blow - rude blow. 
11 From lawless assembling refrain - refrain -
From lawless assembling refrain - refrain -
You may calmly Petition, but by threat and sedition., 
I scare e think your likely to gain - to gain. 
Sae Radicals bide ye at hame - at hame -
Sae Radicals bide ye at hame - at hame -
Arrl by sophist oration., mislead not the Nation, 
Or the bullets may riddle your wame - your wame" • 
Enclosure in Joln Richardson to Loro Dalhousie, Haddington., 
9/l/184-4. in Dalhousie Huniments. CID. 45/7/23· 
26) John Vlaldie to Earl of Minto., Herxiersgate Park, 16/3/1844 in 
Minto MSs. 123/2. 
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for the propagation of 
11
revolutionary or unconstitutional opinionsu 
b f the
. . (27) 
were "onlY known Y means o J.r annual convivial meetings". Even 
those members of the landed interest with some sympattw for the 
League had reservations about its mode of agitation (or its very 
existence) • Lord Melgund (of the House of Minto) disliked 11 grteat 
agitating organised combinations" 1 and alth::>ugh prepared to place 
the League in "A higher ani more intellectual class"6 he still con-
: sidered it in the same category as Orange and Ribbon societies, 
(28) 
Chartism and Political Unions. Fox Maule too did not approve in 
general of such association for the purpose of urging legislation
1 
but perceiving the unrevolutionary character of the Lea.gue6 he gave 
it his blessing as he had never kno\'m one 11 which had such beneficial 
objects in vieW6 or urged them \·tith such legitimate arxi laudable 
(29) 
weapons11 • - Maule' s involvement in the League was1 however6 con-
: siderable6 and in the eyes of most ~iculturists6 economic and 
political fears were inextricably ent\'tined. 
In such a hostile climate of opinion1 the League's success in 
~icultural districts was accordingly limited. Paradoxically, the 
League \'tas able to cla:fm by 1846 that many of the wealthiest land-
:owners in Scotland were free traders - including the Duke of 
Sutherland~ Sir George Mackenzie of Coul6 Bart. 6 Lord Kinnaird6 
Lord Panmure6 Lord Dunfermline6 the Duke of Hamilton6 the Duke of 
Buccleuch1 and the Earl of Minto - and that support for protection 
27) "Perthshire Courier11 , 4/J/1844. 
28) Loro Melgund to Walter \vilson1 Minto 1 10/2/1844, in Minto Mss. 
12.3/2. 
29) 11 Glasgow Argus" 6 lJ/1/1844. 
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came from smaller landed proprietors. That a considerable ntnnber of 
landed proprietors supported the League, especially in latter yeai's, 
\'las indisputable· On J/q'l844, c. Toomson, of \'lest Lothian Agri-
:cult'UZ"al Association, requested Lord Dalhousie to express his 
sentiments on the Corn La\'ls by letter to an anti-League meeting in 
the county, thereby strengthening their han:is, because he regretted 
to say that "many of the la..Yl.d.J,.ords in this county entertain favour-
(31) 
:able views of the proceedings of the League". 
However, both free trade claims and. protectionist fears gave a 
misleading impression of the impact which the League made among the 
wealthiest landed proprietors. They were motivated by political 
and national considerations rather than a conviction that repeal of 
the Corn Laws would mld a:ny economic advantage for agriculture. 
Noting the adherence of Lord Kinnaird, one of the most active 
' supporters of the League, to free trade, the 11 Perthshire Courier" 
observed that he was a strong party-conscious Whig, who was 
"interested in a:rry tactics by \~hich that party may be restored to 
(32) 
office". Despite the "Courier 1 s" cynical exaggeration, Kinnaird 
was not oblivious of the sectarian advantage for the Whigs to be 
identified with the popular movement for free trade, ani its 
electoral potential. The "conversion" of Fox Maule by George 
Hope 1 s essay on free trade, arrl f.1aule 1 s anticipation that the effect 
of repeal on Engla.rrl would be to make "the gardens of the sluggard 




C. Thomson to Lord Dalhousie, Linlithgow, J/q'l844. in 
Dalhousie Muniments. GD.45/7/23· 
32) "Dundee Courier", l/12/1843; "Perthshire Courier", lJ/1/1844. 
were probably factors of less importance in determining him to 
identify himself vlith the League, than the potential economic 
benefit to the nation as a \'/hole v7hich he hoped vtould rub off on 
agriculture. Moreover he could not fail to see the political 
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advantage to the ltlhigs of championing the cause an:1 the dangers of 
failing to do so, especially l'-7ith Peel in office. Maule believed, 
before most landed proprietors, that the Corn La..,..IS l'-tere lost, and 
that free trade was inevitable 11 either f'rom the principles of a 
(33) 
Liberal Government, or the fears of a Tory Government~. His 
father-in-law, Lord George Abercromby, also accepted the in-
:evitability of repeal, and subscribed to too view that it should be 
(34) 
conceded in order to terminate the agitation. 
Kinnaird, Maule arrl Abercromby were fairly early to identify 
themselves with the cause of Repeal, but the adherence of some of 
the other landed proprietors claimed by too 11 Glasgo'\'1 Argus" to 
subscribe to free trade was more belated and qualified. The Earl 
of Minto (and Lord Melgund) declined the invitation of vlalter Wilson 
and Ha't'lick Anti-Corn-Law Association to identify himself l'-7ith the 
Anti-Corn-Law League by chairing a League meeting for Cobden and 
(35) 
Bright in Jedburgh on 20/J/1844. Minto indicated that his agree-
:ment with t~ principles of free trade were "quite consistent with 
a -rr1ide difference of opinion as to the extent to which under given 
33) 11 Glasgow Argus 11 , 17/J/1842; 12/l/1843; 19/J/1843; lJ/l/1844. 
34) Lord Abercromby to Fox ~1aule, Airtlrey, 20/2/1842. in Dalhousie 
ffunirnents. GD.45/14/627· 
35) \·lalter Wilson to Earl of ~Unto, Hawick, 25/12/1843, in Minto 
Mss. l<J/2; Also, cow• Earl of Min:to to ltlalter \vilson, 
I>1into, 27/12/1843. in ibid., 123/2,. 
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circumstances arry single principle should prevail •• and as to the 
means by v-1hich an object desirable in itself may be most aclvanta-
:geously attained"· He further did not concur in "those ulterior 
objects, altogether unconnected v1ith the establishnent of free trade, 
(36) 
to vlhich the corn law agitation o'·1es a good deal of its support". 
The alarm created by Cobden' s meetings in :rural areas in Scotland 
during his 1844 tour (and hi$ incursion into East Lothian in 1843) 
was also felt by Minto. By Harch 1844, he was endeavouring to call 
an anti-corn-law meeting without a direct assocation '·lith too League, 
on the promise that it was better "for those chiefly depen:ient upon 
the profit of agr-iculture, that they should take a timely part in a 
cautious and prudent cmnge in \'lhich their voice would be heard than 
that they should vainly stand out for a season till forced to a nruch 
larger surrender which they might have averted - He have all heard 
(37) 
of the merits of a stitch in time". Minto recognised tmt the 
interests of the manufacturing and agrarian interests were incom-
(38) 
:patible, and his reaction v-1as conservative - he hoped that a small 
sacrifice of protection would save a larger one. 
If Minto' s adherence to free trade in corn was luke-warm, that 
of his opponent in county politics ani at v/estminster, the Duke of 
Buccleuch, v-:as non-existent, despite the claim of the "Argus". 
36) Copy. Earl of runto to vJalter v/ilson, Minto, 17/J/1844, in 
ibid., 123/2. 
37) Copy. Earl of Minto to James Elliot, ~tlnto, 18/3/1844, in 
ibid... 123/2. 
38) Notes on the Corn Laws by too Earl of Minto1 in Minto Mss. 123/2. 
He bad been president of the Border Association for the Protection 
and Encouragement of Agriculture., but his loyalty to Peel overcame 
his reservations on the Prime fllinirrter 1 s proposals for repeal, and 
in 18~-5.. he determined to continue to support him in office., as a 
(39) 
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member of his cabinet. Hhcn Cobden subsequently observed that the 
politically-conscious protectionist landowners would sacrifice the 
three years of additional decreasing protection which Peel proposed 
(40) 
in order to salvage their political influence, his observation \'las 
as relevant to the past as the future. Moreover., the distinction 
dra1tm between the wealtey and inferior lanio1tmers \'las a valid one: 
the former had wider interests, orientated nationally rather than 
locally in politics and society, and equal.ly important, unlike the 
latter, they had the pecuniary resources to cushion them against the 
economic consequences· of repeal. 
Among smaller landed proprietors and tenant farmers., ho\1ever, 
the League made substantially less impact in proportion to their 
numbers. The attendance of farmer's at Cobden' s meetings, in-
(41) 
:variably recorded by League annalists like Prentice., or the free 
trade press in Scotland, cannot be translated as a universal coonnit-
:ment on the part of those p:t"esent to free trade doctrines; less 
still to their alleged benefits to a.gr-icu1tur:e. r4oreover, the 
League endeavoured to maximise the :rm>licity which it could derive 
39) Duke of Buccleuch to Sir Robert Peel, Montagu House., 22/12/1845., 
in Peel Papers. Add. Ms. 40.,581 ff. 156-201 (Brit. I~s.) 
40) R. Cobden to Lord Jolm Russe11., Lemon., 6/2/1846, in Russell 
Papers. P.R.o. 30/22/5A· 
41) Archibald Prentice: op. cit • ., vol. 2, pp.150-51. 
from those farmers who were sympathetic to it, by encouraging them 
to tal:~ an active part in free trade demonstrations. TlnJ.s Cobden 
advised McLaren that "practical agriculturists" sh:>uld be seen at 
the &linburgh Dissenters' Conference of 1842, denouncing tre Corn 
(42) 
La\'lS, ani r~cLaren obliged by nrustering twenty-one. Sympathetic 
landed proprietors Y.Iere also invitoo to fill titular office as 
presidents of local anti-corn-law associations. On its formation 
in Decanber 1841, Falkirk and District Anti-corn-La\'1 Association 
invited Sir Gilbert Stirling, Bart., a prominent lan:iowner in the 
~ft3) 
county to accept such an office.l 
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However, despite the League's attempt to exaggerate its support 
among the smaller landed proprietors and tenant farmers, it 
undoubtedly did draw some support from these gr-oups. Almost 
invariably they were politically-conscious Whigs, a.n:i frequently 
substantial tenants who had been noted for their zeal in improve-
:ments, a.r.rl were therefore to some extent cushioned (like the most 
prominent landowners) from the potentially deleterious economic 
effects of their political opinions. Their attitude \·las summed up 
by 'ltlilliam Murray of Polmaise, an active Whig, free trader, ani 
:lmprover, whose opinion was that agr:'iculturists in general \'Iere "all 
too forrl of living a life of indolence" and whose answer to falling 
prices - apparently oblivious to the logical consequence of his 
42) "Scotsman", 12/l/1842. 
43) ibid., 1/1/1842; New Statistical Account. 
Stirling. Parish of Larbert· P·356· 
Vol.8. County of 
Lord Kinnaird, president of Dun:iee Anti-Corn-Law Association, 
and Sir John Maxwell of Pollokshaws, president of Pollokshaws 
Anti-Corn-Law Association, were further examples •. 
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advice on prices - \'las tmt farmers "ought to try to produce double 
(44) 
the quantity produced" • 
The dissenting congregations too pr'obably produced more than 
their just proportion of farmer repealers1 thereby accounting for 
tre number at McLa.ren' s conference1 but the Dissenting clergy were 
obliged to admit that even in these citadels of free trade
1 
the 
farmers - especially in the north-east ani the Highlan:ls - v1ere 
antagonistic to repeal. The almost complete division of sentiment 
on an occupational basis was lamented by one pastor in the Borders
1 
who observed that tl':ll?ee-fourths of his congregation depen:ling on 
trade and manufactures were zealous free traders1 but that "the 
remaining one-fourth being of the agricultural class1 are strongly 
(45) 
prejudiced on the other side". George Hope of Ferrton Barns re-
: flected all of these influences - a substantial tenant farmer who 
occupied a farm which had l:ad considerable :improvements carried out 
on it1 a politically conscious radical Whig who saw the issue as a 
party one in which the Tories were the opposition1 and a strong 
(46) 
Unitarian. 
Farmer-repealers of Conservative persuasion, such as KennErly 
of ~emill in Ayrshire1 who participated at one of Bright's meetings 
44) 11 Glasgo\'1 Argus" 1 19/l/1843 • 
45) Duncan McLaren (ed.) op. cit. 1 1842; P·35· See too ibid.~ 
PP• 11 31 4-81 11-131 17-18, 20-21~ 23~ '26~ 28~ 35~ 42-45~ 
47. 
46) c. Hope: A sketch of too life of George Hope of Fenton Barns~ 
canpiled by his daughter. PP• 75..61 86-7~ 131; "Scotsman", 
16/8/1843. 
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in Ayr on 16/1/1844~ \'lere a sufficiently rare species to evoke 
(47) 
comment from the free trade press1 but their number increased with 
the crisis of 1845-46, when former staunch protectionists like James 
Adam Gordon of Knockespock (Aberdeenshire) lnd come to the con-
:elusion - like many proprietors - that protection was finis bOO, and 
that any state \•las "better th::m that of the uncertainty and agita-
:tion of \'lhich all parties are no\'1 the victims". Like many other 
Tories1 he preferred change to be uniertaken, if it was unavoidable 
(48) .. 
by Peel, rather tllan by a \·Hug administration. His motivation, 
like that of Hope, was political - although of a diametrically 
opposite nature. 
Nevertheless, in two areas the Anti-Corn-Law League did make 
some in roads into agricultural areas, and the cereal-producing 
county of East Lothian, untypical of Scotland 1 s mixed agrarian 
economy, \'Ias one of them. Cobden and Bright addressed a meeting 
G in Ha.ddington on 27/10/1843 at Hope's request which subsequently 
passed resolutions for free trade, and evinced sufficient enthusiasm 
to encotn'age Cobden in the vie\'1 that the farmers of East Lothian 
would commence an agitation against the Corn laws l'lhich would be 
(49) 
"a nucleus for independent action amongst their class elsel'lhere". 
In addition to Hope, several other tenant farmers had actively 
}nrlicipated at the meeting, and although eighteen of the eighty-
one farmers reported to have attended the meeting subsequently 
47) "Glasgow Argus ", 18/l/1844. 
48) ibid., 19/l/1846. 
(50) 270. 
published a disavowal of the proceedings, the meeting shocked the 
protectionist press which considered that it was "a striking feature 
of the times that a meeting with such an object should receive any 
public support in the richest and most advanced agricultural district 
(51) 
in the country". To the free trade press, it was an unqualified 
(52) 
triumph for the League - but it was more limited than they allowed. 
Hope had had considerable difficulty securing twenty-five names for 
the requisition which Cobden demanded as a prerequisite to coming, 
and the nucleus of free trade farmers was dwarfed by a public affir-
:mation of faith in protection by 16o farmers and proprietors in the 
(53) 
county published almost immediately after the meeting. MOreover, 
Cobden had caught the protectionists off their guard by proposing 
resolutions at the meeting: instead they had expected only speeches 
and were unprepared. Nevertheless, even a Haddington Tory, Jolm 
Richardson, was obliged to concede that some responsible tenants in 
(54) 
the county did favour free trade in corn. 
What had also facilitated Cobden's success was, as Richardson 
admitted, a schism among the protectionists, many of whom had lost 
faith in the sliding scale as a means of maintaining grain prices 
50) "Scotsman 11 , 28/10/1843; 1/11/1843; 8/11/1843. 
In addition to HOpe, several other tenant farmers actively 
participated at the meeting, including John Rennie of 
Oxwell-ma.ins, Miller of Newhouse, and Waterson of Balgonie. 
51) "Perthshire Courier 11 , 9/11/1843. 
52) "Scotsman", 1/11/1843. 
53) C. Hope: op. cit., pp. 107-8, 112. 
54) Jolm Richardson to Lord Da.lhousie, Haddington, 9/1/1844, in 
Dalhous ie Muniments • GD. 45/r /23 • 
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a.rrl \'I ere prepared to experiment \'11th a fixed duty~ \·lhich also held 
. (55) 
forth the pr'ospect of keepmg the manufacturers quiet. _A more 
important underlying cause of the League 1 s limited success in the 
cotmty was the impersonal relationship between landlords ani tenants 
throughout most of Haddingtonshire# 11 \'lhere the tenant is only looked 
(56) 
upon as a medium of the due payment of rent ani treated accordingly". 
Friction on a nurrber of issues, notably the Game Laws, as well as high 
. rents, served to destroy any identity of outlook between owner and 
occupier of land. The League exploited these differences to the 
full. George Hope 1 s own contribution to the debate~ in a prize 
essay published and circulated by the League, was grounded on the 
_premise that there was a division of interest between landlord ani 
tenant. He argued that tenants on corn rents~ like most farmers in 
East Lothian# had no intrinsic interest in high gr-ain prices~ as they 
paid their rent in kind and their labour costs largely in kind; and 
that on the contrary, tenants on grain rents unable to pay their 
full rent in grain during deficient years when rrices were high 
faced the problem that the monetary value of the deficient quarters 
was higher. Free trade., he anticipated would cut out such fluctua-
:tions# in addition to enriching the largest number of a~icultural 
consumers in too urban areas# \'7hich he envisaged would have a 
55) John Richardson to Lord Dalhousie., Haddington., 24/l/1844 in 
ibid.# GD.45/7/23• 
56) "Perthshire Courier"# 2/ll/1843; 9/ll/1843. 
(57) 
multiplier effect on the rural economy. Where Hope's thesis was 
weak \·tas that not all farms in East Lothian (far less \ltithout the 
county) v1ere on corn rents, that sane of these had maximum rent 
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levels fiXed and \'1ere tlms able to exact the full benefit of high 
prices on 'i1ha.t \'las a fixed rent level, ani that not all labour costs 
(58) 
far less other expenses of cultivation ~11ere paid in kind. One 
dissentient at the Haddington meeting, a farmer on a corn rent, 
conceded that it did not matter to him v-rha.t the monetary value of the 
corn was which he paid to his lanilord as rent, but made the telling 
point that "the price of all the surplus corn which belonged to him-
:self being increased by the operation of the Corn-Ia\·ls was so much 
(59) 
gain to him". The importance of Hope's essay was less, however, 
its limited influence among the tenant farmers of East Lothian, ani 
more the apology which it furnished other free traders sue h as Fox 
(60) 
Maule, V'lho was allegedly converted by it, for propounding the notion 
that tenant farmers had no interest in too Corn Laws, a.n1 'Nould not 
suffer through repeal. It salved the urban conscience. 
The limited nature of the League's impact on rural society was 
illustrated by both the apatey of the a~icultural protectionists 
57) "Scotsman", 4/2/1843. 
Hope merely elaborated ideas which his father, Robert Hope 
of Fenton Barns, had already propou.rxled in his evidence to 
the Select Committee on Agriculture, 1$36. ~linutes of 
Evidence. Third Report. vol. 2., PP• 19-25. 
58) See ibid., Third Report. vol. 2., PP• 33-43, 49-56; 
59) "Scotsman" • 28/10/1843. 
60) ibid., 14/1/1843. 
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until 1844 ancl the strength of the reaction l'lhich follol'led Cobden r s 
incursion irrto East Lothian. Apart from a series of protest 
meetings at the beginning of 1839 \'lhile Villier' s motion was before 
(61) 
Parliament, and a similar response to Peel's bu:lgeta.ry proposals 
(62) 
over the first four months of 1842, t~ protectionists had been 
relativelY quiescent. 
Horeover with exceptions such as the revival of the Perthshire 
Association for the Protection of Agriculture, first formed in 1834 
during the agitation of the early anti-corn-law societies, which 
presented a memorial to Peel (above) in 1842, they had been relatively 
tmorganised. The activities of the League in rural areas in the 
winter of 1843-44, inclu:iing its essay into southern Scotlarrl pro-
:duced a sharp reaction in the beginning of 1844. Tm Border 
Association for the Protection and Encouragement of Agriculture, the 
prototype of other Scottish protectionist societies, \'lhich had been 
formed during the agricultural alarm of 1834, (and \'lhich had been 
defunct since then) \"las hurriedly reconstituted in January, 1844, 
after a fe''~ agriculturists played an active part at a League meeting 
in the Borders and in view "of the infernal lies the League told in 
East Lothian • • • that the tenants had no interest in the perfor-
:mance of the Corn Laws". A camnittee was established to raise a 
(63) 
subscription to publish tracts. In Midlothian, a protectionist 
61) ibid., 20/2/1839; 23/2/1839; 2/3/1839; 20/3/1839; 23/3/1839; 
"Glasgow Argus", 21/2/18.39; 4/4/1839· 
62) "Scotsman"# 20/3/1842; 30/3/1842; 2/4/1842; 
Courier", 6/l/1842; 30/3/1842; 20/4/1842; 




association formed on 14/~1844 set to work raising a subscription~ 
an1 came to an arranganent with the "Edinburgh Weekly Journal n (a 
Tory paper) which placed the paper under the control of the associa-
·tion in return for its employment for circulating protectionist 
. (64) 
propaganda. Mass petitions and. affirmations of faith in protection 
from agr'iculturists \'Jere also raised - with over 2~000 signatures 
(65) (66) 
rrom Perthshire and about 6~000 in Aberdeenshire. 
The contrast between the volune of support accorded to the 
protectionist "Anti-League" of 1844 an:l the league 1 s most ambitious 
sally into an agrarian stronghold in East wthian was not mitigated 
by the latter 1 s complete success in another rtn'al area, where con-
:ditions were unique. In 1839, an anti-corn-law association had 
been founded in Shetlan:l by a native of the county, Artl'rur And er son, 
who bad subsequently engaged. in shipping in London, bec001ing managing 
director of the Oriental and Peninsular Steam Navigation Company. 
The association's success was illustrated in the transmission from 
the islarxls of petitions containing 7 ~000 names for repeal of the 
(67) 
Corn Laws. In Shetland, the motivation of a basically rural society 
for free trade was largely economic: other free trade interests~ 
(68) 




\'!.B. Callamer of Prestonhall to the Duke of Buccleuch, 
ffiinburgh, 24/2/1844, in ibid., GD.224/511. 
"Perthshire Courier", 2~~1844; 7/3/1844. 
"The Aberdeen Journal", 2J/2/1844. 
• 
67) Jolm Nicolson: Artlnlr Anderson; a founder of too P. & o. 
Company. PP• 88, 101. 
68) Ne\'J statistical Account, County of Shetland. vol. 15. P• 175· 
Ti'lO factors served to prcxluce an econanic interest in free trade. 
In the first place., agriculture was overall at subsistence level. 
Irrleed the islands produced corn - principally oats and barley of 
an inferior quality - for less than half the population in even a 
(69) 
relatively good harvest. Consequently, the islands l'lere nett 
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importers of cereals., ani the:i.r geogr>aphical isolation together with 
the existence of the second ·factor favouring free trade., a connnercial 
fishing interest., made Europe a more likely source for these than the 
mainland of Britain. The Shetlar:rl Fishery Company \'Thich employed 
about eight thousand men \'las cramped by protection in several spheres. 
It could not canmand an advantageous foreign market - and the 
domestic one was too restricted - because of the effect of import 
duties., the Corn Laws., on the grain \'7hich Spain offered in return for 
cod. I1oreover., the -islanders felt that their competitive alility 
vis-a-vis their principal rivals, Norway and Newfoundland, was 
curtailed by the relatively high cost of victualling their boats 
(due to too Corn Laws) ani by the heavy fiscal burdens on most 
(70) 
articles (especially timber) required to prosecute the industry. 
The peculiar situation in Shetland was laboured emotively by League 
(71) 




ibid., vol. 15. pp. 11, 15, 20, 27-8, 42., 65., 78-9, 89, 120, 
158; "Scotsman", 28/3/1846. 
John Nicolson: op. cit., pp. 95-100; Also, printed circular 
relative to the Shetland Fishery Compaey, sgd. Art bur 
Anierson, London, 25/5/1842 in Irvine of I'vlidbrake Papers. 
R.H.4/35/387 (III). 
eg. Colonel Thompson at an anti-corn-law demonstration in 
Dundee, on 28/3/1845. ("Dundee Advertiser"., 4/4/1845). 
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a verY' minor qualification of the thesis that the small proprietors 
and tenants were as a body strongly in sympattv·-with protection, 
despite some dubiety on which l'las the most expedient form. 
If the League made little headway with small proprietors arrl 
tenants, its success among agr'icultural labourers was equally disa-
: ppointing• Their names occurred frequently in protectionist re-
:quisitions and petitions - -forty-two of than were included in the 
(72) 
Forfarshire requisition of 1844 - and it would be no more valid to 
attribute their appearance purely to influence than in tm case of 
workers 1 signatures in free trade petitions fran urban areas. The 
protectionists emphasised the dangers to their class of a diminution 
of wages following repeal and the probability of rt.trtal tmemploy-
(73) 
:ment. -That farm-servants even in Dissenting congregations shared 
(74) 
such fears was conceded by several of t:OOir ministers. An exception 
which proved the rule was a petition in February 1842, fran lo4 
agr'icultural labourers in Pollock v1hich stated that 11 as the Corn and 
Provision Laws had not been enacted for their benefit, so they did 
not fear their repeal". It doubtless owed much to the fact that 
t~ most extensive lar.rled proprietor in the county, Sir Join Maxwell 
of Pollockshaws, Bart. , was president of the local anti-corn-law 
(75) 
association. -Closely allied in sentiment to agricultural labourers 
72) "Dundee Co~ier", 16/4/1844. See too "Aberdeen Journal", 
2]/2/1844. 
73) "Dundee Courier", 1,3/2/1844. 
74) Duncan McLaren (ed.): op. cit., PP• 42, 50-51. 
75) "Glasgow Argus 11 , 10/2/1842. 
\'tere other occupations directly dependent on agrarian prosperity _ 
millers1 vlrights, and smiths - v1hose names also adorned numerous 
(76) 
protectionist petitions. -Petitions fran allegedly "~icultural" 
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parishes., such as Inverarity ~ Glamis, Aberlemno~ Char lest on., and 
Kinnettles., all in Angus, for free trade carmot be read as support 
from agriculturists; the linen in:iustry was represented in several 
(77) 
of these as well as the distributive ani other trades. _ 
The adherents of the "Agricultural Interest" were not all en-
:gaged in even indirectly agr-arian occupations. The claims of the 
export-intensive manufacturing interests were not tmiversally 
accepted by the urban middle-class. The assumption which some 
made vlas that out\'lith Mancooster and similar large iniustrial 
centres., the prosperity of the merchants ani distributive trades was 
primarily dependent on the prosperity of the ~iculturists. This 
(78) 
"ras a potent argument not ol'l.4r in small market towns such as Kelso, 
but also in larger urpan centres which were not self-consciously 
iniustrial in complexion. On 30/6/1846., Councillor Iqon Iv!ackenzie 
unsuccessfully moved an amendment in Inverness Town Council., that 
they should not express their approbation of repeal of tm Corn Laws 
TI) 
This category comprised 8% of the identifiable subscribers to 
the Perthshire protectionist petition of 1844. ("Perthshire 
Courier", 22/2/1844; 4/3/1844 ). 
"Scotsman", 26/5/1841; New Statistical Account. County of 
For far, Parishes of Aberlemno, Glamis, Inverarity., ani 
Y~nnettles., PP• 219-24., 236-7, 347, 633· 
78) "Kelso Mail", 12/5/1841; 15/5/1841. 
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(79) 
in view of "the peculiar circumstances of the burgh of Inverness". 
Probably its isolation froot too south1 its own relative lack of an 
industrial self-consciousness (inlicated. partly 1n the absence of the 
conventional manufacturers' pressure group1 a chamber of connnerce) 
and its important function as a market centre for the protectionist 
:Interests of the north-east with l'lhich it was closely associated, 
111ere the underlying factors behind the apatey for free trade in 
Aberdeen. This was almost the only place in Scot.lani, according to 
Cobden1 "where the capitalists seem to have taken no part in the Free 
(80) 
Trade movement" • Acland made similar observations during his so-
:journ in·the.city, and even James Adam was forced to admit that by 
January 1 18441 the local anti-corn-law assooiation was "almost 
(81) 
defunct". -Some of the middle-classes in Aberdeen undoubtedly 
subscribed to the views of a local manufacturer and active protec-
:tionist, James Hadden, junr •• who ar,gued that there was no likeli-
:hood of reciprocity from Germa.ny1 in return for tre tmilateral 
initiative for free trade advocated by the League1 and with the 
removaJ.· of agricultural Fotection "the consequent ruin of too best 
. '(82) . 
home market \'lould ensue~'. · In in:lustrial centres such as Dundee1 
protectionist organs like the "Dundee Courier" propounded the same 
(83) 
theme, -but made no headway. 
79) Hinutes of Inverness Town Council, 30/6/1846. 




Cobden Papers. 78. 
"Aberdeen Herald", 26/2/1842; 20/1/1844; "Aberdeen Journal" .. 
20/3/1844; "Aberdeen Banner", 12/l/1844 .. 
"Aberdeen Journal" 1 20/3/1844. 
"Dundee Courier" 1 16/l/1844. 
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In Edinburgh, however, a minority Tory group argued with some 
justice that the metropolis had an intrinsic interest in the fate of 
the agriculturists. Through Sir 'vlilliam Drysdale and other Censerva-
:tives on Frlinburgh Town Council, they noted their concern at the 
competitive ability of Scotlarrl v1ith its unduly high proportion of 
marginal lam, and above all the effects on Edinb~gh 11 for (excepting 
the nobility) she still forms the residence of the wealthiest of the 
larrlowners of Scotland. The principal business before the Supreme 
court ani of the gentlemen of the law resident in Edinburgh is derived 
from the landowners, and by them chiefly are our sch:>ols an:l teachers 
supplied lt7ith pupils, and our shops with customers. But were any 
material diminution to take place in their incomes, they would be 
compelled to forego the luxuries of a large city, to remain on their 
estates, and to educate their children at home or in provincial towns 
as was the case in former times. The rents of houses would sink to 
a degree that is difficult to calculate, and like Genoa, Frlinburgh 
would become a city of empty palaces". They further argued that 
even if it \'las shown, which they did not admit, that repeal of the 
Corn LaNs would benefit manufacturing centres like Glasgow or 
Manchester, the responsibility of Edinburgh Town Cotmcil was to safe-
(84) 
:guard the interests of its own citizens. 
The economic motivation of the urban apologists for agricultural 
protection was as diverse as that of the f'ree traders. Their 
strength in Glasgow was attributable less to a disproportionate 
number of believers in the primacy of agriculture in the national 
84) Minutes of Edinburgh Town Council, 26/2/1839· 
economy, and more to the existence of separate urban protectionist 
interests who felt obliged to defenl protection for agriculture as 
its removal, and the substitution of t~ principles of free trade, 
would lead thrtough consistency to the abrogation of t~ir own 
peculiar privileges. The West Indian sugar interest who feared 
that competition from foreign sugar interests - slave-grown, and 
therefore cheap, in Brazil -. \'lould destroy both their monopoly of 
the sugar trade and their tropical estates, through a reduction df 
(85) 
home prices to the constmter, were the principal bastion of protec-
:tionism in the city. They were especially strongly organised in 
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Glasgo\'1 Chamber of Commerce, supported by the Glasgow East Irrlia 
Association (after the equalisation of West an:i East Indian sugar in 
(86) 
1841) and the Canadian timber merchants wh:> benefited from the 
exclusion of Baltic timber through a rigid application of colonial 
(87) 
preference. When Glasgow Chamber of Connnerce considered the report 
of the Select Conmittee on Import Duties on 8/2/1841, they intimated 
their dissent from the proposition that existing import duties should 
be simplified according to a "well-defined intelligible principle". 
On the contrary, they argued that it was "right and expedient to 
maintain moderate preferential duties in ·favour of otn" manufactures, 
domestic and colonial agriculture, and fisheries". Any dubiety 
about t~ir order of importance was dispelled when they reiterated 
85) Minutes of Glasgow Chamber of Cormnerce, 8/2/1841; "Glasgow 
Argus" 1 18/2/1841. 
86) ibid., 29/3/1841; 13/5/1841. 
87) flinutes of Evidence. Select Committee on Manufacturers, 
Commerce and Shipping. 18.33· Evidence of Allan Gilmour, 
ship-own~. pp. 523-30. See too Gilmour' s evidence to 
the Select Committee on Timber Duties, 18.35· PP• 235-46. 
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1 b 11 i d. rrt" t ak that it wou d e nexpe 1.e o m e a:rry alteration in the duties 
(88) . 
protecting Britain's tropical colonies - the sugar estates. Free 
(89) 
trade in sympathy when this could be pursued in safety, they defended 
protection for agriculture not for its intrinsic merit, but because 
it would be "impolitic and inexpedient" to abolish the Corn Laws, as 
such a measure would require n a corresponding abolition of all 
(90) 
protecting duties upon manufacturesn, ani of greater importance, 
altmugh less openly admitted, certain branches of commerce. 
The appeal of protection attracted more than local interests 
who felt an intrinsic self-interest in the issue of repeal. other 
members of the urban middle-classes of conservative persuasion 
sensed an indirect interest and acted as apologies for agrarian 
protection. Typical of those was Donald Bain, an Edinburgh accoun-
:tant, woo attributed Britain 1 s growing wealth to agricultural inno-
:vations - an attitude which probably owed much to the contemporary 
scene in Scotlani - rather than to commercial or industrial ex-
:pansion. To Bain, agiculturists were the best market for home 
marrufactures., and he repudiated the view that reciprocity would 
follow the unilateral adoption of free trade by Britain, arguing 
88) rvlinutes of Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, 8/2/1841. 
89) The Chamber campaigned for the reduction of the duties on 
cotton wool and urged representations against the new 
duties imposed on cotton an::i iron by the Zollverein - all 
of \'lhich affected their members. Similarly., too Chamber 
objected to Peel's proposals for an increased colonial 
preference for coffee in 1842., as it was calculated to 
raise prices of coffee and tlrus injure the sugar suppliers 
in the Cha.ni:>er. ("Glasgow Argus", 9/l/1845; 12/l/1846; 
The Memorial of the Directors of the Chamber of Commerce 
ani Marru.factures in the city of Glasgow respecting the 
proposed change in the coffee duties, 20/4/1842 in Clerk of 
Penicuick Munim~nts. GD.l8/3509) 
90) tt Glasgow Argus", 13/l/1840. 
that Britain could not expect to continue as the purveyor of the 
whole v10rld, but should accept that national self-interest would 
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force other states to turn increasingly to protection. He feared 
too a loss of specie through the purchase of foreign cereals, but 
his real objection was emotional rather than economic. Ae;t'iculture 
furnished employment "healthily • • • and in circumstances calculated 
to leave their morals pure",. v;hereas factory chimneys frequently in-
:dicated "sites of dependence and misery; of ava:rice on the one 
hani, and ignorance and poverty on the other; of enforced over-work, 
or reckless idleness a.n:l beggary; of feeble minds and b :dies - of 
(91) 
disease ar:rl early death" • Sir Archibald Alison, the high Tory 
sheriff of Lanarkshire, produced a similar diagnosis, and enquired 
whether it \Alas desirable that "the zone of tall chinmeys, sickly 
faces, brick houses, and crowded jails, which at present spans 
across the wmle of Englani and part of Scotland should be doubled 
and trebled in breadth?" In particular, from his experience as an 
agent of la\'~ and order, in an area suffering from the social disloca-
:tion caused by the Industrial Revolution, he feared the effects of 
rural depopulation on the cities - the danger that starving crofters 
from Mull., lacking subsistence would come to the Lowlands., spreading 
(92) 
typhus fever, a.rrl becoming a permanent burden on the poor rates. 
91) Donald Bain: Tbe Egregious and Dangerous Fallacies of t~ Anti-
Corn-Law League. 1843• PP• 5-6, 19-23, 56-58. 
92) Sir Archibald Alison: Free Trade and Protection. 1844. p.43; 
Free Trade and a Fettered Currency. 1847 • P• 20. 
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Both Bain and Alison were primarily motivated by a combination 
of the economic fear that free trade would not fulfil the expenta-
:tions of its advocates - but ruin a~iculture in too process _ and 
the political fear that it would~ with a train of further political 
ani social consequences to exacerbate those \'lhich had already appeared 
from the changing economic balance in society. At its most extreme, 
the latter fear produced the 1'\vsterical reaction of the "Glasgow 
constitutional" which condemned Cobden as "the foe of our matchless 
constitution~ the libeller of our patriotic aristocracy, the sower 
of civil strife, the apostle of false principles" \'Ihile it recognised 
only a choice "bet\'leen two extremes; Peel ani safety - Liberalism 
(93) 
and revolution" • 
In both urban and rural society, especially the latter~ the 
Agricultural Interest had a fairly reliable ally in the Established 
Church. The signatures of parish ministers in rural charges 
decorated many protectionist petitions, whereas the appearance of a 
Church of Scotlani minister~ among free trade petitioners, rendered 
(94) 
him the object of special notice. -Only two members of the 
Established Church responded to the invitation to atterrl the League's 
1841 conference of clergy of all denominations in ~'Ianchester,. and 
only t\'ro others - although important as individuals - sent sympa-
(95) 
:thetic apologies,. Dr. Thomas Cha.lmers ani Dr. Robert Candlish. 
93) "Glasgow Constitutionaln, 5/2/1842; 14/J/1843. 
94) 
95) 
John Selkirk to R. Cobden., Jedburgh., 2J/3/1843, in \~.S.R.o. 
Cobden. Papers. 554. 
If Scotsman", 7/8/1841; 2J/8/1841; 18/9/1841; Archibald 
Prentice: op. cit.~ vol. 1., P• 246. 
Those clergy woo did support free trade fell into two categories. 
In the first instance were those such as the Revererrl fiJessrs. Reid 
(96) (97) 
ani Thomson of Dundee or the Rev. Dr. Burns of Paisley who reP-
:resented industrial centres where the economic and social effects 
of a trade recession were felt most acutely, an:1 \'lhere entrrusiasm 
for free trade doctrines 'ilas almost universal among the middle 
classes. The second category consisted of those wh:>se motivation 
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was individualistic~ such as Dr. Cha.lmers on the one hand or the two 
(98) (99) 
crertists~ Patrick Brewster __ and \rlilliarn Wyper~ on the other. 
In part the response of the Established Cl'D.lrch clergy stemmed 
from their general identification with the forces of conservatism 
against social and political change~ their distrust of enthusiasm~ 
and their tendency to vote (in rural areas especially) almost solidly 
(100) 
for Conservative carrlidates. The Rev. Thomas Smith~ a Church of 
Scotland missionary in Calcutta~ voiced the fears of rna.rzy- of the 






11Dun:iee Advert is ern~ 3/4/1840. 
ibid.~ 26/3/1841. 
nThe Anti-Corn-Law· Cirrolar 11 1 9/4/1840. 
Aformer Dissenting clergyman, \\Yper was received into the Church 
of Scotla.ni by the presbystery of Annan on 7/10/1840~ despite 
Chartist opinions and activities. On 16/3/1840, he had also 
delivered a lecture against the Corn Laws in the Relief Church. 
( 
11 Glasgow Argus 11 ~ 23/3/1840; 15/10/1840) 
In 18371 17 ~ clergy of the Established Church in Midlothian voted 
Tory~ none Whig. (nscotsmann, 23/8/18.37)• Similar complaints 
were voiced by the \~hig, Hetn7 Cockburn~ a.rrl noted in: Leslie 
c. Wright: op. cit., P• f5r· 
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"verY hurtful to the country and to Scotland in particular _ by turn-
: ing the greater part of the land into pasture., ani the greater part 
of the agr-icultural popul(l~~.) into manufacturers ••• the best days 
of Old Scotla.rrl are over" • Tm general identity of social attitudes 
prevailing between patrons and the Established clergy (especially the 
"Moderates11 ) ttlas attributed to some extent to tm pressure ttlhich the 
former could exert on heretios. \•lhen the Marquis of Abercorn., the 
Earl of Glasgow., and other heritors of the Abbey Parish served a 
libel on Patrick Brewster on 15/2/1843., they charged h:Im with intro-
(102) 
:ducing wordly affairs into his sermons., such as the Corn Laws. 
The mode of financing the Established CJ:n.trch in Scotland added an 
economic pressure. By the Act of 48.Geo.III.c.l38., the parochial 
clergy had- since 1808, drawn their stipems as the monetary value of 
a fixed quantity of grain., the value of which varied according to tm 
market price. Proposed at a t:ime '\llhen grain prices (in war-time) had 
been rising, it had been eagerly accepted by the parochial. clergy, but 
many viewed repeal as a direct threat to the:lr material standard of 
(103) 
living. Insofar as town cotmcils \'let'e obliged to keep urban stip-
:ends in line with those in the lan:lward areas in·.order to maintain 
the quality of recruitment_ the direct vested interest of the 
Established Church clergy in the price of corn was not confined to 
101) Tlnnas Smith to Catherine &lith, Calcutta_ 14/2/1843- in Smith 
Family Papers. ~1ss. 7185(I).f.lO. 
102) Robert ~own: op. cit._ vol. 1. P• 105. 
' 103) "Scotsman", 12/l/1839· 
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the 1an1ward parisoos. By the time of the League. t:OO Established 
c!'nlrch was more pruient than it had been in 1827 • when it petitioned 
officially against any alteration in the existing Corn La\'ts on the 
groun1 that "a:rry measuremving the effect of pr:-oducing a diminution 
in the value of corn must reduce those stipends below the amount 
(105) 
contE!llPlated by the legislature". It refrained from taking any 
official part in the Anti-League. contenting itself with resisting 
the attempts of free traders such as Brewster or the anti-corn-law 
associations of Forfar and Y-..irriemuir to enlist the aid of sections 
of the Church of Scotland hierarcey for the cause of repeal. on the 
ground that the issue was entirely a civil one (ani sometimes. in-
(lCX>) 
:dividual~ that it would ruin agriculture). Nevertheless. in-
:dividual members of the Established Clrurch were acutely aware of 
the economic implications of repeal on their stipenis. T~ Rev. 
John Tulloch. then minister of the rural charge of Kettins in Perth-
:shire, condemned "those confourrled blustering Cobdenites" woo 
104) Tms the mini5ter of the High Church of Paisley- drew a stipenl 
of £300 per annun. So few, urban clergymen in the Established 
Church engaged in too anti-corn-law movement. that tm "Argus" 
could observe tmt n • • • there are exceptions. but tmse are 
so rare. that. when mentioned. they are regarded as wondersn. 
("Glasgow Argus" • 24/5/1841). 
105) The petition further observed ttat no class were "more deeply 
interested in the decision of this questionn than the paro-
:chial clergy. ani complained in particular tmt the proposed 
import duties on barley and oats were "manifestly too low" 
ani "most detrimental to the petitioners. too amount of whose 
stipends almost mtirely depends upon the prices of these 
descriptions of grain". ("Glasgow Argus". 26/2/18.38; James 
Barr: The Unitai Free Cl'nlrch of Scotlani. P• 282) • 
lo6) "Scotsman", 10/2/1845; "Dundee Advertiser" • 16/4/1841; 30/4/ 
1841. 
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threatened the clergy with "genteel beggary" ani confessed that they 
" (107) 
bad squeezed every drop of his old v/higgery" out of him. The same 
fear motivated the parochial clergy- in Ross-shire to petition Peel 
on 17/2/1846 for compensation for the anticipated reductions in their 
stipends to enable them to maintain their "undefined high rank in 
society" and the "corresponding mode of life arx:l of bringing up our 
(lo8) 
families". Tm "Scotsman" •. with its free trade sympathies, doubt-
:less over-simplified the motivation of the Established clergy, when 
it contended that those who \'lere favourable to free trade generally 
derived their stipends from particular local arrangements, such as 
(109) 
that of Dr. Candlish from the Annuity Tax in Etlinburgh. However, 
the clergy \'lere not oblivious to the potential economic reper-
:cussions of repeal ort their o"r'm situation, and economic as well as 
political and social factors combined to identify the Established 
Cl:rurch in general with tM Agriculttn'al Interest. 
The Agr-icultural Interest 'r'-7as unable to command any sympatcy 
(110) 
from the body of Dissenters or Roman Catholics, who in general 
entertainEd free trade sympathies, but they did gain the neutrality 
107) r-1rs. Oliphant: Memoir of too life of John Tulloch, D. D., 
LL.D • ., P• 73· 
Tulloch subsequently became Principal and Primarius 
Professor of St. Mary 1 s College, St. Andrews. 
lo8) I€wis Ross to Sir R. Peel, Invergordon, 10/2/1846, in Peel 
Papers. Add. MSs. 40,585, ff. 126-9· '-
.109) "Scotsman", ll/12/1841. 
110) The Roman Catoolic clergy were invited to McLaren 1 s conference 
of Dissenting clergy. f.1ost did not reply, but of those 'r'lho 
did, nearly all favoured total repeal of too Corn La\-ts, al-
:though unprepared, mainly from theological reasons, to 
participate in a joint religious demonstration. . (D'lmCan 
MbLaren (ed.): op. cit., P·53·) 
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or passive sympatl'zy' of tv1o further denominations in addition to the 
Established Church. After 181~3, some ministers am distinguished 
laY members of tm Free Church, such as t~ Rev. Robert Aitkin of 
(111) 
Willison 1 s Free Church., Dundee, or t~ Rev. MJ:t. Ivlackenzie of 
(112) (113) 
North Leith, and D.M. I~kgill Crichton of Rankeilour, followed 
those prominent manbers of the Free Church whose sympathies with 
free trade had preceded too Pisruption. Nevertheless, although 
Alexanier Graham at a Glasgm1 Free Trade banquet in January, 1844, 
at which Fox Maule ani Cobdcn spoke, \'las able to observe that the 
function v1as "not entirely without some representation of • • • the 
Free C!rurch of Scotland", re t<las clearly unimpressed 'Nith their 
nunerical strength, and proceeded to argue that as t~ Free Churcoos 
rested on voluntary contributions, "tooy owe at least some sympatey 
(114) 
to the cause of free trade"~ Graham's attempt to enlist the Free 
Cl:rurch as a further interest gttoup behind the League t'las a confession 
that this had not already happened. This was scarcely surprising in v•Ew 
of the fact that the Evangelicals in 1843 had not defected from 
sympatey with the voluntary principle, but had accepted it of necessity 
111) "Dundee Advert is er", 19/J/1844. 
112) ~·1ackenzie preached on 4/lJ/1845 to tM Synod of Lothian and 
Tl,'leeddale of the Free Church in Dr. Candlish' s CJ:rurc~ 
Edinburgh, on the impolicy of Laws which made the food of 
too poor scarce ani dear. ("Scotsman", 5/lJ/1845) · 
113) ibid. 1 13/6/1846. 
114) "Glasgow Argus", lJ/1/1844. 
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in the anticipation that they Vlould eventually replace the original 
church of Scotlanl as a purified Establishnent. Consequently~ the 
Free church clergy did not - despite the action of some individuals _ 
adhere to the League~ and they abstained as a body from taking a 
part in the issue. If the Agtticultural Interest secured the 
neutrality of the Free Church - a major success in vie"w't of its 
urban orientation - it was even more successful with t~ Scottish 
Episcopal Church which was almost unanimous in its condannation of 
free trade in corn. In part, this may be attributed to a disin-
:clination on the part of the Episcopalians to be considered as 
(115) 
"Dissenters". Although it \'7as not the Establishnent in Scotland~ 
the Episcopal Church was tre Scottish counterpart of the Established 
Church in England, ani accepted the establishnent principle. Draw-
: ing substantial support :from the landed interest by the 1840's, it 
reflected their conservative social and political attitudes. Thus, 
in Forfar, the Episcopal minister refused to sign the local anti-
corn-law petition~ as he was not convinced by the arguments of either 
(116) 
J .R. r1cCulloch or even Adam Smith. 
That the Anti-Corn-Law League conrnanded some support from the 
Agricultural interest in Scotland was indisputable~ an1 too League 
endeavoured to exaggerate both tm numbers and their degree of 
conmitment to the cause of free trade. The League's success in 
115) Duncan McLaren (ed): op. cit.~ PP• 54-56. 
ll6) Hilliam Sturrock to the Editor of the "Anti-Corn-Law 
Circular"~ Forfar, 2/3/1840, in L.L.B., vol. 3, no. 3CJ7 • 
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attracting the support of the largest landed proprietors facilitated 
its propagand.istic assertions~ but also indicated the limitation of 
its impact • Th:>se :Scottish agriculturists \'lho did give their 
adherence to the League \"4'ere usually acting from a political moti-
:vation - \'thether radical or conservative - and had come to the 
conclusion that protectionist fears of agricultural distress \>lere 
eXaggerated. Hovtever ~ \'lith. the exception of Shetland~ the League 
failed~ totally to engage the loyalty collectively of an agr-i-. 
:cultural camm.mity~ ani the existence of a mixed farming economy 
hardened opinion behind protection~ rather tmn free trade. The 
stoclc-raising areas viewed the Anti-Corn-Law League~ like the 
Scottish urban free traders~ a$ a free trade League~ with all the 
economic dangers to other agrarian interests implicit in the success 
of such a body. Nevertheless~ the existence in both rural and 
urban society of other interest groups who felt~ from a variety of 
motives - political~ economic~ and social - a bond of sympat~ with 
the ~iculturists~ detracted in some degree frcm the appearance of 
a straight clash bet\-Jeen urban ani rural society. similarly~ they 
serve to modify historical interpretations which - have exaggerated 
the League 1 s success in ·vanquishing opposition north of the T\'leed. 
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g. The Corn Law ~uestion and Scotland's Parliamentgry ReEresentation 
Central to the motivation of any extraparliamentary agitation, 
whether for or against the Corn Laws, was the belief that it would 
influence to some extent at least the course of the deliberation on 
the issue in Parliament. In this context, the attitudes of indi-
:vidual ~mbers of Parliament were of crucial importance and were 
closely scrutinised. Moreover, the corn question was not debated 
in a political vacuum: it was an integral part of the political 
and constitutional struggles of the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, contributing to mould attitudes towards 
political change in other directions. Above all, it seemed at 
several stages an opportunity to test the effectiveness of the 
existing political system as a medium of representing "popular 11 
opinion, and constituted a stoCk radical argument for reform. 
Before the anti-corn-law agitations reached their most successful 
era (and in part a cause of this), the existing political system 
was Changed by the first Reform Act, 1832, which in Scotland to a 
greater degree than in the south, produced radical changes in the 
composition of the burgh electorates. But radical as these were, 
the '~eformed" structure was still sufficiently conservative to 
ensure that burgh Members would not be open to electoral sanctions 
from the urban middle-classes, on the scale which the radicals had 
hoped and the conservatives had feared. Moreover, the perpetuation 
of many of the least redeeming features of the eighteenth century 
electoral system and practices contributed to produce a substantial 
(1) 
degree of continuity before and after 1832. Furthermore, it would 
1) See Norman Gash: Politics in the Age of Peel. Also, G.S.R. 
Ki tson Clark: "The Electorate and the Repeal of the Corn 
Laws" in 'Iransactions of the Royal Historical Society, 19.51, 
5th., series. I., pp. 109-26. 
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be dangerous to assume that electoral and other pressures on Members 
of Parliament on the corn question comnenced with the Reform Act and 
were non-existent prior to that event. Even under the unreformed 
regime in Scotland, issues as well as influence t-lere important 
factors in determining the relationship between r~1.P. 's ani t~ir 
numerically limited constituents. 
The late eighteenth century \·tas a period of innovation in some 
constituencies in the relationship between Members of Parliament and 
their constituents. The radicals in London and some other commer-
:cial centres in England attempted, especially in the General 
Election of 1774, to extract "pledges" on future coniuct from 
(2) 
parliamentary candidates as a prerequisite for electoral support. 
Such advanced thinking and attempts to transform representatives in 
to delegates in the radical interest \'las not feasible under t~ 
circunscrilied electorates of t~ Scottish burgh constituencies where 
voting power was vested exclusively in self-perpetuating town 
councils. However, Scottish I·1embers of Parliament discovered as 
early as 1777 that the anachronisms of the unreformed electoral 
system north of the Border did not shield them from the demands of 
the:ir constituents on issues such as the current corn-bill agita-
:tion. The ArnnuaJ. Committee of the Conven:bion of Royal Burghs 
instructed their agent to transmit to all the royal burghs a copy 
of the resolutions passed by the previous annual Convention, and 
ratified by the cOIIIJlittee, together with a request to thEm to write 
2) Lucy s. Sutherland: "Ednrund Burke ani the relations between 
Members of Parliament and their constituents" in Studies 
in Burke ani his time. pp. 1005-21. (Published by Alfred 
University, New York, 14802). 
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their individual M. P • 's to oppose the bill as contrary to the 
D) . 
resolutions. If 1777 marked the first systematic lobbying of 
Scottish Ivlembers on the corn-bill issue, the latter had at least 
been made aware of the Convention's view on previous occasions. In 
the agitation of 1740~ Patrick Linisay, M. P. for Edinburgh, was 
energetic in presenting the Convention 1 s case~ and had his expenses 
(4) . 
reimbursed as a consequeno e. . He further acted as a lias1on with 
(5) 
other Scottish M.P. 's on the Convention's behalf. 
A:rter 1777 too pressure on Scottish M.P. 's to reflect the 
opinions of the growing urban communities - particularly Glasgow -
steadily increased. In the corn-bill agitation of 1786, the Lord 
Advocate found that his office gave h:i.m no imnunity from the 
expectations of his constituents. On 20/10/1786, the Tovm Council 
of Glasgow authorised· the provost 11 in the name of the magistrates 
and cotm.cil to write to the Lord Advocate, their member in Parlia-
:ment, to oppose any alteration that may be proposed in Parliament 
of the present Corn Law, tending to raise or increase the price of 
(6) 
grain". - In the controversy of 1790-91, the Member for Glasgow, 
h 
William McDowall of Gartlani, was !'requested to go to London as 
" soon as he can conveniently, to take charge of this business on 
3) Extracts fran the Records of the Convention of Royal Burghs, 
1759-79· pp. 570-1. 
4) ibid., 1738-59· P• 68. 
5) ibid., 1738-59· P• 65. 
6) ibid., vol. 8, PP• 205-6. 
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behalf of his constituents". Glasgow Town Council further entreated 
all the other burghs and counties of Scotland, and the Convention of 
Royal Burghs, to assist the city in an application to be heard by 
counsel at the bar of the House of Commons, against tre corn-bill, 




s diligence on the counc il 1 s behalf earned 
(8) 
him their approbation. As ~.P. for Renfrewshire in 1805, McDowall, 
in company with Boyd Alexander, the new M.P. for Glasgow, and Lord 
Archibald Hamilton, M.P. for Lanarkshire, were lauded by Glasgow 
Town Council for "their disinterested, zealous, am enlightened 
exertions in promoting the progress through Parliament of the late 
corn statute " which had obtained several of theCouncil 1 s leading 
(9) 
objects. 
The concept tra t. a Member of Parliament should act on his 
constituents' behalf and with regard to their opinions on issues 
which seemed to intrinsically affect their interests, such as the 
Corn Laws, was reinforced in the crisis of 1813-15. Scottish 
burgh Members were again expected to adjust their parliamentary 
conduct to their constituents 1 views, by being "instructed" to 
oppose the corn-bill and present petitions against it. Sir David 
(10) 
Wedderburn, M.P. for Perth district of burghs received such requests, 
7) Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Glasgow, vol. 8, 
pp. 400-2. 
8) ibid., vol. 8., p. 420. 
9) ibid., vol. 9, pp. 461-62. 
10) Minutes of Perth Town Council, 7/3/1814; Minutes of Dundee 
Town Council, 7/5/1814. 
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but his counterpart in Inverness received more precise directions. 
The latter was instructed "to oppose any bill to be brought in 
for a1 tering the present Corn La.\'Is, and in case he is of opinion 
that a petition to both Houses of Parliament is expedient ••• he 
will inform the Provost thereof, that such a petition may be made 
(11) 
out, and transmitted without delay". Not least among those Scottish 
Members who founi the expectations of their constituents embarrassing 
was Kirkman Finlay, M.P. for Glasgow. Lord Provost of the city, ani 
chairman of Glasgow Chamber of Comnerce, he entered Parliament as a 
popular representative of the city's conmercial interests - a popu-
:larity v1hich increased when m opposed the original corn-bill of 
Glasgow Town Council placed on record their "satisfaction 
an1 pr"ide" at "t~ unremitting assiduity, with which he has atten:led 
to every measure, cormected with the general welfare of the country, 
an:l more particularly to those, in which his constituents are 
(12) 
interested". By March, 1815, however, Finlay was prepared to accept 
the Ninistry' s modified proposals, and felt obliged to assure the 
Council that although his views differed f'ran theirs, he was prompted 
purely from sincere motives and conviction. Glasgo\1 Town Council 
accepted his assurance, expressing their conviction that his conduct 
had "proceeded from the most sincere and disinterested zeal for the 
(13) 
vlelfare of his constituents and of the nation at large" • Finlay' s 
11) I11inutes of Inverness Town Council, 7/3/1814. 
12) I-1inutes of Glasgow Town Council, 2/7/1813. 
13) ibid., 25/3/1815. 
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past record of service to the commercial interests of Glasgow and 
opposition to the Corn Laws, togetoor with a reserve of respect for 
the independent judgement of a rllember of Parliament allayed the 
feelingS of the "electors" of Glasgow. The radical non-electors of 
the city were less impressed 'Nith their virtual representative· they 
(14) . 
mobbed his house. 
The apex of pressure on Scottish Members f'ran their constituents 
on the corn quest ion urrler the pre-1832 constitution was realised in 
1826 v1hen the decision of too Liverpool administration to defer con-
:sideration of the issue until after the election made it for the 
first time a central theme of an election campaign. In a.gr'icultural 
areas, with their marginally \'tider electorates, parliamentary canii-
:dates gave appropriate assurances of fidelity to the Corn Lal'ts, as 
in the case of Captain Wemvss in Fife, woo indicated that the 
(15) 
Liverpool r•linistry had members too "wildly speculative". others 
qualified their adoption of protection in place of prohibition by 
assurances, such as that of Home Drunmond in Stirlingshire, that in 
determining the level of duties, he would err on "the safe side" 
(16) 
from the vie'\A7point of the agricultural interest. With the tentacles 
of influence of the landed interest reaching into the burgh 
14) James Gourlay (Ed.) : The Provosts of Glasgow from 1609 to 
1~2. PP• 118-19. 
M 
Finlay's decision to contest ~~Yesbury instead of Glasgow 
in 1818 was unconnected \'lith the corn question. In 1818, 
the casting vote in the finely-poised Glasgow district of 
burghs fell by rotation to Renfrew, a Whig interest. · 
("Glasgow Constitutional", 9/3/1842). 
15) "Scotsman", J/7/1826. 
16) "Glasgow Chronicle", l/7/1826. 
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constituencies too, parliamentary candidates in these were unable 
to indulge in the luxury of following entirely their m·rn predelic-
:tions• The radical, Joseph lme, contesting Montrose Burghs, had 
one eye on Lord Pannure, their patron, when he gave the vague 
assurance that he \'lould put the Corn Laws 11 on such a footing as, 
without destroying the interests of the growers, 11ould place the 
consumers in a situation that would enable them successfully to 
compete \'tith others 11 - a sufficiently equivocal statement to draw 
too vituperation of a meeting of Glasgow operatives on 16/11/1826, 
(17) 
who accused him of trying to "blinkn the question. 
The vacillation of both Hurne ani other parliamentary aspirants 
was understandable, as in other areas, attempts were made to extract 
11 plegges" on future parliamentary conduct on the corn question. In 
Inverness-shire, the Rt. Hon. Charles Grant, a member of the 
lllinistry directly concerned \'lith the Goverment' s proposals for an 
(18) 
alteration to the Corn Laws was a vulnerable and valuable prey to 
electoral pressure. In November, 1825, (and again in January, 1~26), 
the ultra-tories and ultra-prohibitionists in the cotmty 1 led by 
Mackintosh of Raigmore and r-1acDonald of Glengarry endeavoured to 
estrange Grant from his constituents. They proposed meetings of the 
county to both censure the Ministry's conduct on the corn question 
ani to secure a pledge from Grant on his own future parliamentary 
comuct - a gambit \'lhich attempted to capitilse on the genuine fears 
17) ibid., 4/7/1826; 18/lJ/1826. 
18) Grant was vice-president, an::i subsequently pr-esident of the 
Board of Trade. (11The Complete Peerage", vol. 5·, P• 677) • 
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of the county freeholders. These manoeuvres Grant ani his adherents 
(19) . 
onlY overcame \'tith some difficulty. I<ioreover, the ultras persisted 
in their attempts to brand Grant as a free trader dttr'ing the l8~ 
(20) 
General Election, albeit \'lithout success. But the concept of 
pledges \'las not confined to the counties or to the prohibitionists. 
In the Perth district of burghs, the cormnissioners representing 
Perth and Durxiee were inst~cted by their respective town councils 
to extract a pledge from their Nember of Parliament, Hugh Limsay, 
that he would support the substitution of a moderate protecting duty 
(21) 
for prohibition. Even within a political system gt'ounded on the 
politics of influence, ideological issues still played a contributory 
role, if only insofar as they influenced the wielder of influence. 
I~reover, on socially-divisive questions, such as the Corn Laws, 
influence frequently reinforced opinions and attitudes already 
entertained. 
The first election fought un:ler the Reform Act furnished a 
clear indication of radical anticipation that on issues such as 
free trade, the legislation of 1832 should be the starting-point 
ani not the terminus of reform. To ensure the speedy advent of the 
new dawn, the already familiar concept of pledges was readily re-
:·strrected by the Radicals for '\'lidespread use. Proffering advice 
19) See Bught ~hm:lments. GD.23/6/746; GD.23/6/6c6. 
20) Charles Grant to James Grant of Bught, Lon1on,,2/3/1824 in 
ibid., GD.~/6/746/59; ani, Mackintosh of Raigmore to 
Forbes of Culloden, n.a., 5/6/1826. in ibid., GD.~/6/611. 
21) Hinutes of Dundee Town Council, 14/6/1826; Minutes of Perth 
Town Council, 12/6/1825; "Dun:iee Advertiser11 , 15/6/1826.; 
"Glasgow Chronicle", 17/6/1826. 
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to the newly-enfranchised electors of Glasgow, one anonymous scribe 
postulated the need to extract pledges from parliamentary candidates 
on a mu1 tiplici ty of prevailing issues. The abolition of the Corn 
Laws and the general removal of all restrictions upon trade and 
commerce rated fourth and sixth respectively in his revealing order 
of priori ties. Nevertheless, he recognised that the enforcement 
of pledges was more difficult than their extraction. They were not 
all so "accurately defineable both as to their extent and immediate 
operation" as (for example) triennial parliaments. In particular, 
the Corn Laws might admit of a pledge "to the full extent in point 
of principle 11 , but dubiety could still exist ''whether they shall be 
abolished at once or prospectively, and if in the latter mode subject 
(22) 
to what contingencies?" However, the ooncapt of pledges was taken 
up as the most efficacious mode of forestalling candidates giving 
"general promises and a thousand qualifications", and one radical 
organ drew up a list of thirty-five (:including free trade) to which 
(23) 
the ideal re former should subscribe • 
The radical nature of their contents, and their encroachment on 
the freedom of conscience and action of an individual Member of 
Parliament, ensured that sympathy for the notion of pledges would 
be limited in the restricted electorates created by the 1832 Reform 
Act. Sir Michael Shaw Stewart, the more conservative of the two 
Whig candidates contesting Renf'rewshire spurned the whole idea of 
22) 
23) 
Anonymous : Letter to the Electors of Glasgow un:ler the Reform 
Bill. pp. 12-14. 
"The Political Examiner", 8/9/1842. p. 10. See also, R.M. 
Cowan: The Newspaper Press in Scotland. pp. 80-82. 
pledges on principle. This did not prevent the defeat of his 
opponent, Robert Cunninghame Bontine, who had been prepared to 
(24) 
accept them. Pledges were an early admission of radical fears 
and weakness, rather than strength. Where there was a demand from 
the electorate for the adoption of a radical programme on issues 
such as free trade in corn, pledges were unnecessary. In Dundee, 
four candidates vied with each other in protesting their bona fides 
on the corn question, with victory finally accorded to the most 
(25) 
radical of them, George Kinloch, senior. In Edinburgh, however, 
where enthusiasm for free trade was less securely anchored in 
commercial interests, the situation in 1832 was quite different. 
301. 
With impunity, the Rt. Hon. James Abercramby could scatter ambiguous 
(26) 
claims to having always "voted on the side of the consumer". 
The same radical disillusionment with the Whigs from 1833 which 
manufactured anti-corn-law societies from that year, also produced 
a number of unilateral radical parliamentary candidatures. One of 
the most persistent, James Aytoun of Edinburgh, contested several 
constituencies on a wide-ranging programme which gave priority to 
24) 
25) 
See Cunninghame Graham Muniments. GD. 22/2/158-9. 
Address to the Prospective Electors of Dundee, 10/6/1841 in 
Airlie Muniments. GD. 16/40/55; Election addresses and reports 
of Dundee candidates in 1832 in "Old Dundee Collection", 
D.7172(1) (in Dn.P.L.); and "Dundee Advertiser", 9/6/1831; 
23/6/1831; 30/6/1831; 28/6/1832; 5/7/1832; 26/7/1832; 2/8/1832. 
26) Report of the proceedings at the public meeting of the electors 
of Edinburgh on Thursday, 2nd August, 1832, PP• 6,9-11. 
At this meeting, the chairman, Sir James Gibson-Craig, a 
leading Edinburgh Whig, denounced the entire concept of 
pledges. Aberoromby promised to endeavour "to cheapen the food 
o:f the people," but without inflicting an injustice on any other 
class of the community. 
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rurther parliamentary reform, but which also embraced abolition of 
the Corn Laws, the continued existence of which was "disgraceful to 
. (27) 
a reformed Parl~ament to have allowed to exist a single session". 
Yet even Aytoun placed the Corn Laws seventh and last in his electoral 
(28) 
platform, and the defeat of the radicals was general. Even when, 
like Alexander Johnstone of Oakbank (later Shieldhall) or William 
Dixon of Govanhill, they emphasised the commercial radicalism of 
(29) 
free trade, their parliamentary aspirations remained unfulfilled. 
Two principal factors served to play a restricting role on radical 
initiatives on the free trade question. Firstly, the anti-corn-law 
movement was in the doldrums during the middle years of the decade, 
reflecting its failure to arouse much active sympathy outwith radical 
and a few commercial circles. Secondly, the parliamentary performance 
of the Scottish burgh Members matched up to the limited expectations 
of their conservative constituents. Nine Scots burgh Members 
(30) 
supported Whitmore 1 s Corn Law motion of May, 1833, and sixteen 
adhered to Villiers' motion in 1838. ~y the latter occasion, interest 





"Mr. Aytoun's speech to the constituency of Edinburgh", in "A 
Collection of Newspaper Cuttings, Pamphlets, etc., 1792-1847"• 
(N.L.S.) 
"Report of the speeches delivered on the hustings on the nomination 
of candidates", 28/5/1834, in ibid. 
"Glasgow Argue", 29/12/1834; 15/1/1835; 14/2/1837; 17/5/1838; 
14/2/1839; "Scotsmant', 12/7/1837, 22/7/1837. 
"Glasgow Argue", 23/5/1833· 
The Scots burgh Members voting for Whitmore's motion were 
J. Duplop (Kilmarnock), James Ewing and James Oswald (Glasgow), 
R. Ferguson (Kirkcaldy), W.D. Gillon (Falkirk), Sir John 
Maxwell (Paisley), Laurence Oliphant (Perth), Sir H. Parnell 
(Dundee), H. Rosa (Montrose), and R. Steuart (Haddington). 
in its favour, only three "skulked" from the division, although 
the triumvirate included such influential Whig mandarins as Fox 
(31) 
Maule and Sir John Campbell. With Scotland's burgh Members 
generally in step with electoral opinion on the corn question, they 
did not experience the embarrassment of Lord Dalmeny, M.P. for 
Stirling Burghs, who was censured in 1837 by the electors of Dun-
sfermline (one of the constituent burghs) for his insufficiently 
radical attitudes to a number of issues, headed by the Corn Laws. 
Yet even in Dalmeny's constituency, the revolt was largely confined 
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to the radical stronghold of D~ermline, and their proposal to put 
a candidate in the field at the succeeding General Election (of 1837) 
(32) 
did not come to fruition. In general, the Scottish burgh Members 
accurately reflected the attitudes (and apathy) of their electors on 
the corn question throughout the 1830's, if not those of the free 
trade activists. Through the "Glasgow Argus", William Weir exhorted 
the need for more anti-corn-law societies on the model of Glasgow to 
exert pressure on Scottish Members to vote for Hume's fixed dut,y 
(33) 
motion of 1834· His appeal was a reflection of the prevailing climate 
of opinion, rather than the failure of the reformed political system 
to adequately represent it. 
In areas, such as Glasgow, where the free trade movement did 





"Scotsman", 7/1/1837; 15/7/1837; 19/7/1837; 26/7/1837; 29/7/1837· 
Anti-Corn-Law Societies founded on the model of Glasgow, would in 
Weir's opinion have as one objective, the exertion of pressure 
on Scots M.P.'~ to vote for Hume's motion of 1834 for a fixed 
duty on corn and to "prevent shufflers from avoiding to commit 
themselves b; keeping away". (nGlasgow Argus", 13/2/1834) • 
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effectively represented in Parliament with little overt pressure from 
bel~ required to make Members toe the line. Both of the city's 
first two M.P.'s after the Reform Act, Oswald and Ewing, supported 
Whitmore's motion, and from the be~inning the former took a leading 
(34) 
part in the anti-corn-law movement. In 1835, he was joined by 
Colin Dunlop of Tollcross, president of Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law 
Society, who displaced Ewing when the latter declined to oppose 
(35) 
Wellington's administration. Only after Oswald's temporary with-
:drawal from politics and the death of Dunlop, was a novel situation 
produced by the arrival of two new actors, one of whom was at first 
non-commital. Lord William Bentinck was merely prepared to advocate 
a gradual abolition of the Corn Laws, accompanied by an "equitable 
(36) 
compromise between the agricultural and manufacturing interests". 
Weir castigated Bentinck's compromising terms as evasive, declaring 
that "the representative of a manufacturing district ••••• must be 
decided on this point as his constituents are". Weir was more 
(37) 
satisfied with the other aspirant, John Dennistoun, a total repealer. 
Nevertheless, a crisis was averted by Bentinck's statement that he 
would "go" for total repeal or any obtainable amendment and the "Argue" 
supported him in 1837 in order to remove the possibility of a split 
(38) 
reform vote in the face of a strong Tory challenge. 
34) ibid., 19/12/1833. 
35) ibid., 3/4/1834; 15/1/1835; "Scotsman", 21/1/1835· 
36) "Glasgow Argus", 15/2/1836. 
37) ibid., 1/12/1836; 22/5/1837; 25/5/1837· 
Dennistoun was a brother of Alexander Dennistoun, a director 
of Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law Society in 1833-34· (ibid., 3/4/1834) 
38) ibid., 24/7/1837· 
However, the dubiety which had prevailed over the candidates' 
views in Glasgow produced a development with implications for other 
constituencies and future occasions. Anderston Anti-Corn-Law 
Association organised a public meeting of 5-6,000 in HYde Park to 
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be addressed by the two Whig candidates, when they pledged themselves 
(39) 
to total repeal. This interventionist role by the anti-corn-law 
movement officially in a parliamentary election foreshadowed the 
events of the following decade. A logical progression of thought 
and action followed when the Central Anti-Corn-Law Association for 
the West of Scotland requested Joseph Hume in the succeeding session 
of Parliament for a list of Scottish M.P. 1 s voting on Villiers' 
motion in 1838, for subsequent publication and distribution, "that 
(40) 
the people may lmow in future whom to trust". These limited 
forays, officially undertaken, into parliamentary elections and the 
relations~ip between Members and their constituents were in part a 
manifestation of universal radical frustration with alleged Whig 
lethargy in promoting reform. They reflected too, however, the 
increasing acceptance b,y more radical opinion in the free trade move-
ament, of the justification for schismatic tactics in parliamentary 
politics. This was a further respect in which the ground in Scotland 
had already been prepared, before the advent of the League. 
With the revival of interest in the corn question from 1838, 
and particularly from the formation of the Anti-Corn-Law League in 
early 1839, a new situation emerged. Whig inertia and Melbourne's 
implacable hostilit.y to change evoked an even more aggressive attitude 
39) ibid., 27/7/1837. 
40) ibid., 22/2/1838. 
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on the part of more radical free traders towards Whig Members and 
candidates unwilling to give unqualified approval to total and 
immediate repeal. At the Trades' Hall meeting of Glasgow Anti-Corn-
Law Association on 3/4/1839, when the free traders of the city decided 
to adhere to the nascent League, Weir proposed that candidates unprepared 
(41) 
to endorse the League's aim should be denied electoral support. On 
(42) 
issues such as the ballot, radicals had frequently suggested that 
Whig candidates should be "tested" for satisfactory answers, and that 
their production should be regarded as a sine qua non of electoral 
support. However, free trade appealed to a wider range of interest 
groups, and was therefore b,y implication a more serious threat to the 
parliamentary Whigs. Although this proposal was the logical sequel 
of those previously made by Weir and by the Central Anti-Corn-Law 
Association, the possibility of its imminent implementation on a wide 
scale sparked off a debate within the League in Scotland, whether it 
should be executed, and under what circumstances. 
Weir 1 s Whig employers on the board of management of the "Glasgow 
Argus", never outright ministeritalists on economic and commercial 
policy, were prepared to overlook such a proposal at a public meeting. 
Like Weir's advocacy of political reform as one of the aims of Glasgow 
Anti-Corn-Law Association, it was an individual opinion. However, 
when Weir made his personal viewpoint the editorial policy of the ttArgus" 
- the official organ of the Whigs - such a provocation could not be 
41) ibid., 4/4/1839. 
42) As late as 3/1/1839, Sir John :Bowring had suggested to John Hill 
:Burton, that Radicals should make the ballot the sine qm non 
for supporting Whig c~~didates at the following election. (John 
:Bowring to John Hill :Burton, Portsmouth, 3/1/1839, in Hill 
:Burton Papers. F.20/12.) 
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disregarded. Through its columns, on 22/4/1839, he urged Glasgow 
reformers with votes in Ayrshire to abstain in the pending by-election, 
rather than support the Whig candidate, James Campbell of Craigie House, 
as the latter endorsed a fixed duty rather than total repeal. To 
underline the far-reaching implications of his proposal, Weir further 
predicted that the reform electors of Glasgow,with votes in Lanarkshire, 
Stirlingshire, Dunbartonshire, and Renfrewshire, had sufficient strength 
to remove any recalcitrant Whigs, but should commence by making an 
(43) 
example of Ayrshire. 
Implicit too in Weir's advice on count,y constituencies such as 
Ayrshire was the possibility that if it was effective, the outcome 
would be the return of a Tory on a split reform vote. Many radicals 
(44) 
in the course of the 1830's had been reconciled to this prospect. 
They anticipated that this would either coerce the Whigs into more 
radical postures, or produce a polarisation of support between ultra-
toryism or radicalism, to the advantage of the latter. Like many 
radicals, Weir increasingly saw little meaningful difference between 
Whigs and Tories, both of whom appeared in the guise of aristocratic 
43) 
44) 
"Glasgow Argus", 22/4/1839. Campbell advocated a duty of eight 
or ten shillings per quarter on wheat, although the average 
duty paid in 1828-39 under the.sliding scale had been a mere 
six shillings. 
In the Perthshire election of 1834, William Tait, the Edinburgh 
Radical, saw no difference between the Tory and Whig candidates 
on any issue which mattered, and urged an independent reformer 
to stand in the Radical interest and face "an honourable defeat 
at the hands of the two Conservative factions". ("Tait's Edin-
sburgh Magazine", (JWle, 1834), pp.277-78. See too, "Duncan 
Mncklewham's Opinion of the two candidates addressed to his 
brother Sandy in Crieff", Perth, 24/3/1834, in Abercairney 
Muniments. GD.24/l/1068.) 
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factions with equally vested interests in maintaining the Corn Laws. 
Less radical Whigs did not concur in this diagnosis of the situation, 
and he quickly came under fire from "certain professing reformers'' 
for his counsel on the Ayrshire by-election. By 1839, however, 
Weir was determined to force a showdown on the issue. Totally 
unrepentent, he rejected "such trimming between our own convictions 
and the wheadling of others" .on the principle that "he who is not 
with us is against us". When he followed this up by urging that 
the vacant constituency or Leith should not be wasted "on a half-
:informed, half-hearted professor of friendship to the cause of Corn 
Law repeal", namely the new Whig Lord Advocate, Andrew Rutherfurd, 
(45) 
who was an adherent of gradualism, he contended that his attitude 
merely "acted up to the resolutions of the anti-corn-law delegates" 
in urging voters not to support candidates unwilling to adopt the aim 
of the League. The Whig proprietors of the "Argus", who were at 
that point ta,ying with the concept of a moderate fixed du~ anyway, 
could not overlook the numerous complaints about the editorial policy 
of the journal, and on Weir's repeated refusal to be more discreet, 
(46) 
they dispensed with his services. 
In his determination to force a collision with those Whigs who 
had reservations on total and immediate repeal, Weir was out of step 
with free trade opinion, not only in Glasgow, but in most parts or 
45) 
46) 
"Glasgow Argus", 29/4/1839; "Scotsman", 27/4/1839. 
Weir's vituperation included the irrelevant point that 
Rutherfurd as a lawyer could not adequately represent a 
mercantile constituency. ("Glasgow Argus", 3/6/1839) 
William Weir to Richard Cobden, Glasgow, 7/5/1839, in W.S.R.O. 
Cobden Papers. 1.(16)1 Minutes of the proprietors of the 
"Glasgow Argue", 6/5/1839; 8/5/1839; 9/5/1839· 
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Scotland. A fellow-radical and eo-founder of the Anti-Corn-Law 
League, the Hon. James Erskine Murray of Aberdona, withdrew his proposed 
candidature against Rutherfurd in Leith from the fear of a Tory gain 
(47) 
on a split reform vote. In the succeeding by-election in Edinburgh, 
Weir again clashed with the attitude of the local free traders, when 
he castigated the "sins of omission and commission" perpetrated by 
T.B. Macaulay, including his abstention on Fryer's motion on the Corn 
(48) 
Laws in the first reformed Parliament. Despite Macaulay' s gradual 
approach to total repeal, the free traders including Erskine Murray, 
William Tait, John F. Macafarlan, Duncan McLaren, and John Wigham, 
Junr. supported his campaign. Seconding his nomination, Wigham 
indicated that he did so, because Macaulay had declared emphatically 
that he "will do all in his power to enable us to get rid of these 
laws". Only Ja.mes Aytoun wavered and determined to withhold his 
(49) 
support from the Whigs. 
Support for Weir's stand came from the radicals of the linen 
centres, Dunfermline and Dundee. In the former, a second vot:e of 
· censure was passed on Lord Dalmeny by his constituents on 11/10/1839. 
Although their grounds of complaint were not concentrated on the 
corn question, but were wide-ranging with emphasis particularly on 
the Church issue, their adoption of James Aytoun, the Edinburgh radical, 
(50) 
to stand against Dalmen,y at the next election, became an opportunity 
for polarising support on the free trade issue. Dunfermline 
47) "Scotsman", 27/4/1839· 
48) "Glasgow Argus", 3/6/1839· 
49) "Scotsman", 25/5/1839; 1/6/1839; 5/6/1839· 
50) ibid., 16/10/1839; 2/11/1839; 25/12/1839. 
310. 
Anti-Corn-Law Association at a meeting chaired by Provost James 
Morris on 12/3/1840, celebrated its formation by agreeing to withhold 
electoral support from any candidate unprepared to adopt the aim of 
the League. To obviate any dubiety which could pertain to questions 
on the hustings, they urged C.P. Villiers to bring forward not only 
his annual motion for an enquiry into the Corn Laws, but also a 
resolution for total repeal ~o "enable the constituencies to judge 
of the fitness of their present representatives to be returned to 
(51) 
future Parliaments". In Dundee too, the local anti-corn-law 
association determined to adopt an interventionist role in parlia-
1mentary elections at a meeting chaired by the radical George Klnloch 
of Kinloch, Junr. Prudently, they agreed to appoint committees in 
each parliamentary district to ascertain the numbers favourable to 
total and immediate repeal "in order to obtain a knowledge of the 
(52) 
strength which can be .brought to bear on this question in Dundee." 
The eventual purpose of this exercise was fairly clear. Nevertheless, 
these movements were the exception, not the rule, and in most areas if 
the free traders were dissatisfied with the machinery of the existing 
electoral system as a medium for representing their views in Parliament, 
this feeling was insufficiently strong to outweigh part,y considerations. 
The failure of the Whig administration to respond to the renewed 
pressure of the League in the winter of 1839-40 served to increase the 
sympathy of a bnoader section of free trade opinion for a more effective 
means of translating urban sympathy into voting figures in the division 
lists than the apparently futile activity of petitioning. Moreover, 
51) ibid., 21/3/1840. 
52) "Dundee Advertiser", 29/11/1839· 
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this sentiment was reinforced by the difficulty of maintaining public 
interest. By the close of 1840, the threat of falling corn and bread 
prices was beginning to wo~y moderate Whig free traders like Wigham. 
on 30/9/1840, with the support of McLaren, he urged the League to 
increase the pressure on sitting Whig Members, by encouraging as many 
electors as possible to sign a request to their individual M.P.'s to 
support repeal. He anticipated that in most cases, the request would 
be so numerously signed "as to deter any member from treating the 
request with neglect", in addition to its value as a means of "keeping 
with the intercourse it is intended previously to have with the 
(53) 
electors". Those sections of free trade opinion more closely 
identified with the parliamentary Whigs continued, however, to resist 
any attempt to engage in any tactics which could divide the Whig 
interest and endanger the stability of the Melbourne Ministry. One 
of their organs, the "Scotsman" reported that the Government was 
"obliged to govern for all parties" and that it could not be expected 
to act immediately upon the views of an extraparliamentary movement 
agitating an issue which was "as yet in a state of progression" in 
(54) 
public opinion. However, opinion within the League in Scotland 
continued to swing towards the ass~ption that Scotland's parliamentary 
representation, at least in the burghs, could be rendered a more 
effective and unanimous voice for the free trade movement in the 
legislature. 
53) John Wigham, Junr., to League H.Q., Edinburgh, 30/9/1840, in 
L.L.B., vol. 5., no. 729. 
54) "Scotsman", 2/9/1840. 
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There was a further aspect to the problem in Scotland, which made 
it peculiarly urgent. No Scottish Member of any standing was pre-
:prepared to openly identify himself with the free trade movement, 
despite the near-phalanx of votes from the burghs which attended 
Villiers' motions for an enquiry into the corn question. This fact 
was brought home to the Scottish free traders at the close of 1840 
when Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law Association was engaged in organising the 
Great Scottish Free Trade Demonstration of the following Spring. The 
Association's secretary, David Murray, was obliged to request the 
presence of several eminent English free trade Members, from the fear 
that otherwise there would be insufficient inducement to attract 
Scottish free traders from a distance to the function, as "with the 
exception of Mr. Macaulay ••••• there is no representative of any of 
our burghs who is likely to attract many to our meeting'', and from 
the latter's connection with the Ministry- he was Secretary for War -
(55) 
he was unlikely to be present. The handful of Scottish Members in 
1840, such as William Ewart or Edward Ellice, who were prepared to 
attend League functions carried little prestige with them. 
The growing schism within the free trade movement on the problem 
of bringing the parliamentary representatives into line with what the 
League conceived to be the opinions of their constituents was under-
slined by two by-elections in January, 1841, and the reactions which 
they evoked. On 27/1/1841, the radicals in Kirkcaldy :Burghs fielded 
'- Dr. John :Bowring, the former radical free trade M.P. for Kilma.rnock, 
against the Whig nominee, Colonel Ferguson, The latter, a nephew of 
55) David Murray to George Wilson, Glasgow, 11/11/1840, in L.L.B., 
vo1.5., no.787. 
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the late Member, and a total repealer on the corn ques-tion (which he 
made the principal plank on his electoral platform) was opposed by 
Bowring on the basis that Fergu.son's rejection would be "the triumph 
of that principle (commercial reform) over local feelings and 
(56) (57) 
associations". Ferguson's substantial majority- 218 to 131 votes_ 
was a discouraging start for the radical free traders, but their defeat 
was overshadowed b,y the League's official participation in the Walsall 
by-election three days later when they permitted the Tories to top the 
poll by forcing the withdrawal of the Whig candidate. 
Voicing Whig and conservative free trade opinion, the "Scotsman" 
deprecated the schismatic tactics of the League in Kirkcaldy and 
Walsall in being prepared to sacrifice the "general interests of 
reform" for their own exclusive aim. That the Whig nominee in Walsal1 
had been prepared to vote for repeal of the Corn Laws if an enquiry 
showed this to be desirable made the League's action from the Whig 
viewpoint, a test of the extremes to which the radical free traders 
were prepared to go in pursuit of their aims. The "Scotsman" con-
:demned the League's readiness to contest any constituency "whatever 
the consequences" as an attempt to blackmail sitting Liberal M.P.'s 
to vote for repeal against the dictates of conscience in order to 
retain their seats, a proposition which offended the conception of a 
Member's freedom of action. In conclusion, the organ urged "a less 
(58) 
costly means'' of turning public opinion on the issue. The "Glasgow 
56) "Scotsman", 9/1/1841; 20/1/1841. 
57) ibid., 27/1/1841; Also, T.Wilkie: The Representation of 
Scotland. p.87. 
58) "Scotsman", 6/1/1841; 9/1/1841; 16/1/1841; 20/1/1841; 27/1/1841; 
3/2/1841. . 
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.Argus" now safely out of the hands of the Radical, Weir, also voiced 
Whig protests against the League's "impolitic" mode of action in Wal-
:sall, and though conceding that such action might be justifiable in 
Manchester or Glasgow where it could be enforced, warned that this 
(59) 
was not the case in smaller boroughs such as Walsall. 
In the anti-corn-law associations, however, the free trade 
activists enthusiastically endorsed the League's action. On behalf 
of Edinburgh Anti-Corn-Law Association, John Wigha.m transmitted a 
message to the electors of Walsall, pointing out that every burgh 
representative in Scotland favoured repeal - a debateable claim 
depending on the definition of "repeal" - and trusting that the 
(60) 
English boroughs would follow suit. Dundee Anti-Corn-Law Association 
exhorted the Walsall electors not to return a "bread taxer" to Parlia-
(61) 
sment. 
The division of opinion on the tactics to be adopted towards the 
Whigs, however, parallelled a further schism in the ranks of the free 
trade movement in Scotland by January, 1841. Both the "Scotsman" 
and the "Glasgow Argus" and the section of conservative free trade 
opinion which they represented had by then transferred their allegiance 
from total repeal to the concept of a fixed duty, bringing them into 
harmony with the change of attitude by the Whig administration, on the 
grounds that public opinion was not ready for total repeal and that 
(62) 





"Glasgow Argus", 5/1/1841; 28/1/1841; 6/5/1841. 
"Scotsman", 9/1/1841. 
"Dundee Advertiser", 15/1/1841. 
"Glasgow Argus", 4/2/1841; "Scotsman", 6/1/1841. 
The tone of the "Arg..1s" changed considerably with Weir's de-
parture. On 28/1/1841, it argued that there had been "a most 
unnecessary, as well as unwise, amount of abuse expended upon 
the individuals composing what is asually denominated the 
landed interest". ("Glasgow Argus", 28/1/1841) • 
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The League's action at Walsall reflected the increasing impatience 
of active free traders with the parliamentary Whigs, but in turn it 
stimulated free traders in other par.ts of the country, including 
Scotland, to take similar action. Within ten days of the Walsall 
poll, the committee of Forfar Anti-Corn-Law Association convened an 
electors' meeting which considered correspondence between the Associa-
:tion and the local M.P., Patrick Chalmers of Auldbar, indicating 
that he refused to pledge himself to vote for total and immediate 
repeal. The correspondence on the issue had almost certainly 
commenced prior to the Walsall poll, but the intransigent line taken 
by the local association owed much to the stimulus of uncompromisin~ 
t63) 
example. Despite Chalmers' past services to the free trade movement, 
the Forfar Leaguers could not overlook his loyalty to the Whig concept 
of a fixed duty, and with only three dissentients, resolved to sup~ort 
(64) 
no candidate unwilling to accede to total and immediate repeal. A 
month later, a meeting of 403 electors in Dundee agreed to a resolution 
by Edward Baxter, president of the local anti-corn-law association, to 
support only an outright free trader. All other qualifications for 
for public office should be ignored as the Corn Laws were "the chief 
grievance in the country - a question of all others the most important". 
63) 
64) 
An active member of Dundee Anti-Corn-Law Society in 1834 and 
London Anti-Corn-Law Association in 1836 (above), Chalmers 
had also served the League after its inception, as a member 
of Dundee Anti-Corn-Law Association, and as a delegate for 
Arbroath Anti-Corn-Law Association at the League Conference 
in London in 1840. (George Canning to J.B.Smith, Arbroath, 
28/12/1839, in L.L.B. vol. 2 no. 310; also, George Canning 
to League H.Q., Arbroath, 10/3/1840, in ibid., vo1.3, no. 
423.) 
"The Anti-Corn-Law Circular", 25/2/1841. 
As in Forfar, there was no resistance to the hardline approa_ch, and 
(65) 
only one dissented. In the Lord Advocate's constituenoy too, 
there were rumblings by the Leith free traders in April, 1841, that 
the Corn Laws should be made"a hustings question" and that every 
(66) 
constituency should "act like Walsall". Even in Glasgow, where 
the adherence of the local Members, Oswald and Dennistoun, to total 
repeal, removed any casus belli, there was still a discernable 
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division between Whig and Radical free traders on the efficacy of 
supporting the Whigs if they were unprepared to adopt the aim of the 
League, leading to a clash at the Great Scottish Free Trade Demon-
(67) 
:stration in April, 1841. 
However, despite the portents of possible League intervention 
in a number of Whig constituencies in the 1841 General Election, few 
materialised in Scotland. In most areas, free traders supported 
~ the local Whig candidates, even when (like Fox Maule), they adv9cated 
a fixed dut.y of eight shillings to provide a measure of protection for 
(68) 
agriculture. In Edinburgh too, the ~ig candidates, Macaulay and 
Gibson-Craig, received free trade support despite their ambiguous 
65) ibid., 25/,/1841; "Dundee Advertiser", 12/3/1841; 28/2/1840. 
66) "Scotsman", 14/4/1841. 
67) At the demonstration, Alexander Johnstone clashed with John 
Dennistoun. The former asserted that if the Whig Ministers 
were unprepared to adopt an enlightened commercial policy, they 
should quit "the cabinet of this commercial state", while the 
latter regretted that there was a large and influential party 
(the League) willing to accept only total repeal, and although 
accepting their aims, he contended that their immediate 
realisation was impossible. He had faith in the Whigs, "a 
ministry favourably-inclined'', and contended that public 
opinion must first be mobilised on the issue, as on the Slavery 
question. ("Scotsman", 24/4/1841) 
68) "Perthshire Courier", 24/6/1841; 1/7/1841. 
(69) 
reservations on repeal as "a work of time." Only in the radical 
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linen towns, where there was no danger of Tory gains on split reform 
votes did the free traders precipitate a collision with the Whigs. 
In D~dee, led by Edward Baxter, they sponsored J.B. Smith, president 
of the Anti-corn-Law League (and the defeated League candidate at 
Walsall), in opposition to a local Whig, George Duncan. Local 
associations and the support pf the more conservative free traders 
and Whigs led by Provost Kay gave Duncan a winning margin of 577 to 
(70) 
445. A more satisfactory result from the League's viewpoint came 
from Stirling Burghs, where Lord Dalmeny scraped home over Aytoun by 
439 to 420 votes, although the latter had swept Dunfermline with the 
(71) 
support of the Anti-Corn-Law Association. The League's only real 
success was the return of Alexander Johnstone in Kilmarnock Burghs, 
~ but his victory was facilitated by the support of the local Whigs and 
(72) 
the defection of the former Member, James Colquhoun, to the Tories. 
Despite the dissatisfaction of the radical free traders with the 
attitude of many of Scotland's parliamentary representatives to the 
aim of total repeal, and their alleged failure to represent public 
( opinion on the issue, the League failed totally to displace any of them. 
It is impossible to attribute this to the failure of the electoral 
system to represent the attitudes of the electorate. If Lord Dalmeny 
and other urban Whigs could command considerable influence in the 
smaller burghs, the same pressures could be exercised by the free 
69) "Scotsman", 11/8/1841. 
70) ibid., 3/7/1841. 
71) ibid., 26/6/1841; 3/7/1841; 7/7/1841. 
72) ibid., 19/6/1841; 7/7/1841; "Glasgow Argus", 14/6/1841; 17/6/1841; 
28/6/1841. . 
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trade manufacturers, like Edward Baxter. If the opinion of the 
burgh Members did not always coincide with the aim of the League, 
this was attributable rather to the fact that the urban electors 
were on the whole either unwilling to accept total and immediate 
repeal or if they did, were unprepared to give it precedence over 
their general party affiliation. If the electoral system failed to 
, represent the free trade movement of urban Scotland as adequately in 
Parliament as the Leaguers wished, this was less a reflection of its 
failure to express the sentiments of the preponderating sections of 
the electorate in 1839-41, and more the League's failure to convert 
the latter, including most of their own activists like Wigham or 
McLaren to the expediency of unilaterally pursuing the uncompromising 
aim of total and immediate repeal. Although the burgh electors of 
Scotland as a body favoured free trade insofar as the concept was 
represented by the modified programme of the parliamentary Whigs, 
their commitment to the radical objectives of the League was more 
qualified. 
The lack of progress by the League among the Whigs both in and 
out of Parliament together with the example of registration practised 
with same effect by the Conservatives prior to the 1841 election and 
their ensuing victory disillusioned a wider segment of free trade 
opinion with the efficacy of relying on the existing complexion of the 
electorate (and in some cases, the existing constitution) to return a 
favourable legislature, attracting their sympathy for enlarging the 
radical electorate by emulating Tory electoral manipulation. This 
was facilitated south of the Border by the existence of the forty-
shilling freehold qualification, which the legal agents of the League 
(73) 319. 
were able to exploit with considerable effect. In Scotland, however, 
the League operated within a different legal and political framework. 
Strictly entailed estates constituted an impediment to this activity 
in the counties, and this was supplemented by the further obstacle of 
the requirement of property of £10 annual value which effectuall¥ made 
t . (74) votes five imes more expens1ve to create north of the Border. 
Probably this factor (as well. as the strength of the Tory party in 
the routh) inspired a group of Dundee free traders in 1845 to intimate 
to the League Council their willingness to purchase fort.y-shilling 
freehold qualifications in the English counties, to be selected by 
(75) 
the League. Nevertheless, a limited attempt was made in Dundee and 
Edinburgh to register urban voters in the free trade interest. In 
the latter, the Anti-Corn-Law Association published a request to all 
free traders in the city to register their claims to enrolment through 
(76) 
the General Liberal Committee, but in Dundee, the local Association 
adopted a more active role, setting up a sub-commttee to assist electors 
in filling up their claims of enrolment, and to encourage others to 
(77) 
apply too. In other areas, the free traders apparently relied, 
(78) 
as in Glasgow, on the local Liberal registration committees, and took 







Minutes of evidence before the Select Committee on Votes of 
Electors. pp. 192-93· (Evidence of George Wilson) 
''Glasgow Argus", 28/11/1844. 
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The lack of zeal by the Scottish free traders, particularly in 
Glasgow, in attempting to secure the return of total repealers gave 
considerable concern to Cobden and the League Council, who privately 
did not concur in their public approbation of Scottish endeavours. 
In December, 1843, Cobden advised McLaren - by then his principal 
liason in Scotland - to make certain that the Glasgow free traders 
did not nominate "any half and half man" (a fixed duty Whig) to 
contest the Kilmarnock by-election following Johnstone's death. 
(79) 
The League Council had considered the possibility of direct inter-
:vention in Kilmarnock, and were prepared to do so if the Glasgow 
free traders failed to act. The principaldbstacle to ~~cheater 
intervention was Cobden's belief that a Scotsman was a preferable 
candidate for a Scots burgh: an Englishman crossing the Border was 
(80) 
"in danger of stumbling over some Church or banking prejudice". 
The following year, Cobden attempted to arouse interest in 
Scotland in the possibilities of registration. He invited Alexander 
Russel, editor of the "Scotsman" - once more in the League fold - to 
take up the question after studying the law and practice of county 
registration in Scotland. Cobden did not share the attitude of many 
Scottish whiggish free traders that Scotland had already played her 
part by returning parliamentary majorities for the ambiguously-woraed 
motions put forward annually by C.P. Villiers. He argued that it was 
in the power of the Scots middle-classes in the burghs to qualify them-
:selves for the counties under the Scots Reform Act of 1832, and that 
79) Copy. Richard Cobden to Duncan McLaren, Manchester, 3/12/1843, in 
W.S.R.O. Cobden Papers. 71. 
80) R. Cobden to John Bow.ring, Salisbury, 17/11/1843, in W.S.R.O. 
Cobden Papers. 15. 
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they should be urged to do that. In particular, he contended (like 
Weir) thah an impression could be made in Lanarkshire, Ayrshire, 
Stirlingshire, and Dunbartonshire, where manufacturing interests were 
strongly-represented. Moreover, in the last of these, in addition to 
the calico printers and glass manufacturers, a large number of villa 
residences belonging to Glasgow merchants were placed - "in fact, 
Glasgow, if it did its dut.y like Manchester, ought to carry Lanark-
. (81) 
1 shire, Ayrshire, and Dunbaxtonshire". SuPport for Cobden' 6 
criticism came from the "Glasgow Argus" (also returned to the repeal 
camp .by 1844) . The organ admitted the peculiar difficulties in the 
way of registration in Scotland, but counselled Scottish reformers 
(82) 
to be more vigilant. 
In general the League's exhortations fell on stony ground, and 
its electoral effort north of the Border after 1841 remained concen-
:trated on attempting to win the support of existing electors through 
(83) 
the distribution of tracts and the holding of lectures. Few 
practical steps were initiated to implement the League's declaration 
h of 11/2/1842 that electoral support ~ould be denied to all except 
total repealers at the next election, and that free traders would 
abstain in a division where no outright Corn Law repealer took the 
field. 
81) R. Cobden to Alexander Russel, Manchester, 6/11/1844, in Letters 
to Alexander Russel. MSs.l845· 
82) "Glasgow Argus", 28/11/1844. 
83) In 1843 the League distributed packets of tracts to the electors 
of ~rehire, Clackmannanshire, Dunbartonshi:e, Perthshi:e, 
Renfrewshire, Rosa and Cromarty, StirlingshJ.re, Ayr, Ed.J.nburgh, 
Falkirk, Glasgow, Haddington, Kiitma.rnock, Leith, Montrose, 
Paisley, and Stirling. (Report of the Council of the National 
Anti-Corn-Law League (1843) in Wilson Papers.) 
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The exception to the general inertia in Scotland was Edinburgh. 
This was scarcely surprising in view of the presence of Duncan McLaren, 
one of the moving spirits behind the League's hardline approach 
(84) 
nationally, which he termed a "resolution of action". Moreover, 
previous schisms in the ranks of the Edinburgh Whigs, in which 
McLaren had been a leading actor on behalf of the Dissenters, made 
the metropolis fertile ground .for such a policy in view of the 
identification of religious dissent and free trade. Accordingly, 
when the League's resolution was circulated to the multifar~ous free 
..4 
trade bodies, it was endorsed by the committee of Edinburgh Anti-Corn-
(85) 
Law Association with little opposition, and subsequently transmitted 
to the two Edinburgh Members with a request to support Villiers' 
(86) 
motion. This initiated an attempt to transform the M.P.'s into 
parliamentary delegates on the free trade issue. It lasted two 
years, and included the use of blackmail, with the Anti-Corn-Law 
Association threatening to field rival candidates unilaterally on the 
(87) 
League's behalf. Moreover, throughout the dialogue, the local 
association received active encouragement and guidance from the 
League Council, through John Bright and Archibald Prentice. The 
Council hoped not only to give a demonstration of the strength of 
free trade sentiment in a "free" constituency (removed from landed 
84) ''Scotsman", 16/2/1842. 
85) By 18 votes to 3, at a meeting chaired by the Radical, William 
Tait. 
86) ibid., 23/2/1842. 
87) "Scotsman", 13/4/1844. 
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influence), and to intimidate Macaulay and Gibson-Craig, but also to 
overawe other Whig Members into following the League line on the 
assumption that Edinburgh was a weathervane of Whig opinion. 
(88) 
However, the cardinal point which emerged from the confrontation 
was the League's failure to achieve its short-term objectives. Al-
sthough both parties in the dispute compromised to some degree, the 
two Members retained openly-stated reservations on the expediency of 
voting for total and immediate repeal, and the wrangle with Gibson-
Craig was not finally resolved until Russell's "Edinburgh Letter" of 
(89) 
1845 committed the Whigs as a whole to repeal. Despite the 
League' s warning to the M. P. 1 s that with eight hundred electors in 
Edinburgh adhering to the Complete Suffrage Association, no-one 
unprepared to accept total repeal "would now have the certainty of 
(90) 
being returned, were an election to take place", the ranks of the 
free traders were not unanimous. The more Whiggish and influential 
members of the Anti-Corn-Law Association, led by Lord Provost Adam 
:Black, James Moncrieff, Montgomery :Bell, and James Crawfurd resisted 
McLaren's intransigent policy, rendering some dubiety whether unilateral 
(91) 
candidatures by the League in Edinburgh would have been successful. 
The principal obstacle to League incursions into parliamentary 





J.B. Mackiea The Life and Work of Duncan McLaren. vol.l., PP• 
261, 268-75; "Scotsman", 11/5/1844. 
ibid., 11/5/1844; 1/6/1844; 3/8/1844. 
The electors in the Complete Suffrage Union remained convinced 
that the two 1'1. P. Is were "by no means fit representatives of the 
great body of the inhabitants". (ibid., 20/7/1844•) 
J.:B.Mackies op. cit., vol.l., pp.249-50, 255, 257-9; "Scotsman", 
14/1/1843; 11/3/1843· 
ibid., 8/]/1843; 13/4/1844; 17/4/1844; 11/5/1844. 
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the free trade movement -~ the sympathy of the prosperous urban 
middle-classes, it is easy to exaggerate their readiness to sacrifice 
traditional loyalty to the vlhigs and reform in general, or their 
sense of commitment to the uncompromising aim of total and imnediate 
repeal. Further bolstered up by the traditional role of influence 
operating within the relatively conservative framework of the 18
32 
Reform Act, the Whigs were enabled to withstand the threat of a 
serious League challenge in most constituencies. 
The resilience of the Whigs extended in Scotland to county 
constituencies, and provided the basis for the League's claim that 
Scotland as a whole demanded free trade. The proliferation of small 
(SE) 
· ma.nufactur:Ing towns and villages in counties such as Forfar undermined 
the electoral prospects of the protectionists by swamping them with 
electors favourable to free trade. Yet, even in constituencies devoid 
of industrial :Interests, the Whig Members were rarely counted in the 
protecionist lobby, although they were frequently sufficiently prudent 
(93) 
to avoid jo:In:Ing the free trade one. Despite their apparent vulnera-
1'1 
:bility to Tory charges of failing to defend intrisic agrarian interests, 
" 
the county Whigs had a considerable propensity for survival. In 1831, 
the Ross-shire Tories attempted unsuccessfully to stigmatise the Whig, 
(94) 




'llie Tory ''Dundee Courier" lamented the fact that the agricultural 
interest in the county was tmrepresented, because of the 
proliferation of manufacturing burghs and villages where the 
ten pound feuars were able to outvote the landed proprietors 
and their tenants • ( "Dundee Courier 11, 16/4/1844) • 
In March 1838 when Villiers' motion came before the House of 
comrno~, oniy one Whig county Member voted for it, wh~le nine 
Scots county Members abstained from the division. ( 'Glasgow 
Argus ", 19/3/1838) • 
I. Macleod to J .~. Stewa.rt Mackenzie of Seaforth, Invergordon, 
19/7/1831, 1n Seaforth Muniments. GD. 46/4/133/3· 
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1835, when his parliamentary conduct in failing to support two motions 
by the Marquis of Chandos to alleviate agricultural distress had 
provided them with additional leverage, their success was restricted 
(95) 
to reducing his majority. 
What frustr~ted the protectionists in Scotland was paradoxically 
the conservative complexion of the first Reform Act. The economic 
fears of the tenantry were su?merged by the influence of the Whig 
landed proprietors in Scotland, few of whom were prepared to desert 
to the Tories on the corn question. The one major exception was 
the Duke of Roxburgh, one of the two principal Whig interests in 
Roxburghshire, who defected to Peel in 1841 over the proposals of 
the Melbourne ministry for a fixed duty. The loss of the votes of 
his forty tenants and "the batch of mushroom votes which his Grace 
(96) 
made" together with Tory diligence at registration in the Jedburgh 
(97) 
area, was sufficient to turn the tide in a marginal constituency. 
Yet despite the almost universal fear of free trade among the Rox-
(98) 
:burghshire farmers, the Hon. J.E. Elliot dropped only fift,y-five 
(99) 






See Seaforth Muniments. GD.46/4/80/2; GD.46/4/158-9. 
D. of Roxburgh to Earl of Minto, ? , 15/5/1841, in Minto Mss. 
1~0/1; Also, E. Selby to the Earl of Minto, Mlnto, 24/5/1841, 
in ibid., 119/6. 
See election correspondence of 1841 Roxburgh election in ibid., 
120/1. 
Minto's factor, E. Selby, observed that he had "not met one 
farmer who did not fear the alteration of the Corn Laws 
on agriculture". (E.Selby to the Earl of Minto, Mindo, 
24/5/1841, in ibid., 119/6.) 
Elliot was defeated by 830 to 748 votes. (T. Wilkie: op. cit., 
p.260) 
in Scotland did change hands to the Tories' advantage · 
l.n the 1841 
election, but their transfer may be related to extr f t 
aneous ac ors, 
Tory zeal in the registration courts or a change in th 
1 1 (lOO) e comp ex on 
of the county interests. In most county constituencies, the 
politics of ideology played an extremely circumscribed role, saving 
the Scottish Whigs much embarrassment in the process. 
Nevertheless, the dialogue over the Cqr.n Laws did furnish a 
fillip to the growth of ideological politics in Scotland as in the 
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south. This became apparent during the crisis of 1846, when "public 
opinion" served to dent the previous supremacy of the politics of 
interest. The Anti-Corn-Law League representative who contested 
, the Falkirk Burghs by-election of April, 1846, failed to defeat 
Peel's cabinet minister, Lord Lincoln. However, the former secured 
a moral victory by coming within six votes of victory, despite the 
defection of the influential Hamilton interest to the Tories and 
Lincoln's peculiar appeal as a valuable asset to Peel in piloting 
(101) 
repeal through Parliament. Moreover, not only did the weight of 
electoral opinion within an individual constituency make itself 
apparent, but "national public opinion" contributed to the passage 
of repeal by inducing previously committed protectionist Tory M.P.'s 
to follow Peel into the free trade lobby. Despite the attitudes of 
100) 
101) 
e.g. The loss of Argyll was predicted when the death of the Whig 
incumbent led to the succession of a Tory to the peerage. 
(Andrew Rutherfurd to Fox Maule, Edinburgh, 24/10/1839, in 
Dalhousie Papers. GD. 45/14/642(1).) 
"Scotsman", 7/2/1846; 4/3/1846. See too the Newcastle Papers, 
Ne.C. 4,659; 4,662(b); 12,390-1; 12,415. 
their own agricultural constituents, these included Sir Thomas 




Despite the shortcomings of the post-reform political structure 
in radical eyes, it proved sufficiently flexible during the final 
crisis on the corn question to respond to pressure from below. In 
Scotland, as in the south, a ~jor contributory factor was the 
existence of the Anti-Corn-Law League, and its success as an extra-
parliamentary pressure group in mobilising opinion in 1839-44. This 
underlined its potential influence during a period of acute crisis, 
frightening conservatives into sacrificing repeal in order to salvage 
the existing political and social order. In their ranks, the Scottish 
Whigs were prominent. The League's apparent lack of initiative north 
of the Border in generally adopting militant schismatic activities 
did not detract from its long-term contribution to the attainment of 
repeal. 
102) "Scotsman .. , 7/2/1846; 4/3/1846; 27/5/1846. 
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10. CONCLUSION 
The history of the anti-corn-law movement 1n Scotland has been 
the victim of inattention by scholars rather than misinterpretation. 
Unlike the contemporaneous movements for parliamentary reform, 
including the Chartist agitation of the post-Reform Act period, the 
campaigns for a modification or repeal of the legislation governing 
the importation of grain, have been, in the Scottish context, the 
central theme of no account. Some of the agitations have been noted 
in a peripheral context, as part of the background to separate themes 
such as Chartism in Scotland, or the free trade movement throughout 
Britain, but no attempt has been made to evaluate the movement in 
the Scottish setting. Consequently, although some aspects of the 
(1) 
Corn Law question, notably Chartist attitudes to the Corn Laws and 
(2) 
the treatment of the issue by the periodical press in Scotland, have 
been the subject of valuable analyses, the evolution of the aims, 
attitudes, and activities of the free traders north of the Border, 
and their relationship to the movement south of the Tweed has been 
largely ignored. It would be untrue to suggest that scholarship 
has disregarded the possibilit.y that the movement in Scotland, and 
Scottish opinion towards it, would not necessarily mirror the same 
reflection as its counterpart in England, and primarily based on 
League propaganda of the period and Mackie 1 s flattering biography 
of Dunoan McLaren, the vacuum in the history of the agitations before 
1839 has been followed by the incongruous interpretation that Scottish 
opinion was peculiarly favourable to free trade and the Anti-Corn-Law 
League in the 1840's, and that the responsibilit.y for rallying opinion 
1) See Alexander Wilsons op.cit., esp. Chapter 10. 
2) R.M. Cowan: The Newspaper Press in Scotland, 1815-60. 
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in Scotland behind the campaign was by implication attributable to the 
personal contribution of Duncan McLaren. These partial truths may 
not be accepted without considerable qualification. 
The fact that the Anti-Corn-Law League was merely the last and 
most successful anti-corn-law agitation of a lengthy line of pro-
:genitors was recognised in December, 1845, by Henry Cockburn when 
he observed that none of the great internal questions which had 
arisen in his time had "been inventions of the day. They have all 
had their rise in an older soil, and the fruit that each has yielded 
in its season has been the result of long elaboration. Yet though 
(3) 
thus prepared, that fruit has always been 'harshly plucked' " • 
Dissatisfaction with the legislation governing the grain trade was 
in Scotland as in the south, a phenomenon already familiar by the 
mid-eighteenth century, before the take-off period of the Industrial 
Revolution and before Smith fUrnished an economic philosophy of free 
trade. The motivating fear of the earliest agitation of 1741, and 
one which was present as late as the concluding one of 1846 (as 
evidenced b.y the meal riots in the north of Scotland) was the fear of 
famine and starvation. The vehicle of protest utilised Qr some of 
(4) 
the agitators of 1741 and repeated as late as 1847 was the least 
sophisticated form of demonstration, a riot. From such rudimentar,y 
begi nnj nga, limited in aim and form, the Anti-Corn-Law League in 
Scotland could trace its origins. 
3) 
4) 
Henry Cockburna Journal of Henry Cockbur.n. vol.2., pp.l34-5. 
"Scotsman", 23/1/1847; 27/1/1847; 30/1/1847; 3/2/1847; 10/2/1847; 
27/2/1847; 3/3/1847; 6/.3/1847; Alexander Falconer to Cosmo 
Innes, Nairn, 27/1/1847, in Rutherfurd Papers. Adv. Ms. 
85.1.3. 
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The Corn Laws were not entirely English in origin. 
The legis-
:lation regulating the grain trade of Scotland tmtil 1 T74 was based 
on Acts of the Scots Parliament (albeit based on En li h ) g s example , 
insofar as they could consistently be perpetuated by the articles of 
Union of 1707. '!be removal of the mitigating machinery, inherent 
in the abolition of the Scots Privy Cotmcil, and the amendnents to 
the Scottish legislation proposed by the ~itish Parliament, parti-
:cularly the singularly harsh treatment of the Scots staple, Oatmeal, 
were readily identified in Scottish eyes with a denial of their rights 
as &itish citizens under the Treaty of Union. Also the orientation 
of the debate around the mechanism of the legislation governing 
Scotland as opposed to the rest of ~itain, together with the existence 
of the peculiarly Scottish institution, the Convention of Royal Burghs, 
as the focal point of agitation, daubed the anti-corn-law agitations of 
the first three-quarters of the eighteenth century with a Scottish 
character which was to a considerable extent superficial. Their aim 
was far from being peculiarly national in the Scottish context: they 
wished an assimilation of the Scottish Corn Laws to those of England 
on the assumption that the latter would be more favourable to the 
interests of the Scottish burghs. The apparent Scottish character 
of the earlier agitations rapidly diminished in the last quarter of 
the eighteenth century when all-embracing British legislation superseded 
the previous legislation peculiar to Scotland, re-orientating the 
debate around the details of the legislation insofar as they applied 
to regions of Scotland rather than the latter as a whole • Furthermore, 
the debate was increasingly revolved around the concept of prohibition 
of grain imports in toto, a proposition which was assailed by the 
growing commercial communi ties of :Britain, including Glasgow, who 
conceived that it was inimical to their interests, particularly in 
the light of the new economic faith of inevitable progress through 
a liberalisation of trade promulgated by Adam Smith, and published 
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in 1776. The polemics of the debate in the closing decades of the 
eighteenth century, with their increasing recognition of the political 
nature of the contest involve4 in the clash of class interests, anti-
:cipated most of the dialogue familiar to the Leaguers in the 1840's, 
a fact which has received insufficient recognition. 
Although the agitatione against the Corn Laws north of the :Border 
by the close of the eighteenth century were clearly a :British movement 
in Scotland rather than a Scottish movement in Britain, they were 
nevertheless a native product. They had arisen from pressures within 
individual communities within Scotland, not as a result of stimulation 
from without. If events followed a similar pattern on both sides of 
the Tweed, they reflected a similar response by similar growing 
commercial communities to similar apparent restraints on their interests. 
I 
This theme was perpetuated in the evolution of the movement in the first 
three decades of the nineteenth century. When Tooke's petition of 
1820 formulated a demand for new principles of economic polic,y based 
on a more consistent application of the concept of free trade, it was 
not presented in isolation. A simultaneous response was recorded in 
Scotland, reflecting the transition throughout :Britain from the 
eighteenth centur.y negative approach to the Cprn Laws to the more 
positive free trade philosophy of the mid-nineteenth century. When 
the transition in aim was parallelled b.1 the evolution of a more 
sophisticated vehicle of agitation than the former sporadic petitioning 
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which prevailed as late as the 1820's, this too was reflected in 
events north of the Border. The anti-corn-law societies formed in 
England in 1833 were rapidly emulated by similar associations in 
Scotland, and the latter owed as much to Radical experience of 
extraparliamentary organisations in the Reform Bill era as to English 
example. Scottish persistence in the campaign for free trade in 
corn, without the stimulus of interest from the south, was reflected 
in the successive attempts by William Weir and other Scots repealers 
to furnish the agitation with an effective vehicle for political 
education, demonstration of public sympathy, and pressure on Members 
of Parliament in the 1830's. The Central Anti-Corn-Law Association 
was a mini-League in the Glasgow area Which provided a melting-pot 
for ideas on a missionary system and whose failure illustrated the 
necessity of ade_quate financial resources to fulfil them. Many of 
the free traders who campaigned for the League in Scotland in the 
1840's, including Duncan McLaren, John Wigham, Edward Baxter, and 
Walter Buchanan had already gained experience of the futility of 
unco-ordinated local activit.y in the early 1830's, and some of the 
organisations which campaigned for free trade in Scotland in 1837-38 
remained to adhere to the Anti-Corn-Law League after its formation in 
1839. The latter did not fall heir to a total vacuum north of the 
Border. 
On the contrary, the stimulus for united action by the industrial 
and commercial interests throughout Britain came from Scotland, in 
particular from William Weir who had consistently urged the need for 
co-ordination since 1833-34, and who had endeavoured through the 
abortive Central Association to put into practice the concept of a 
3~. 
widespread and sustained agitation envisaged by the Radicals who 
formed the London Anti-Corn-Law Association of 1836. He persuaded 
the free traders throughout Britain to pursue his common plan of 
attack - an agitation to be heard by counsel at the bar of the House 
of Commons, and when it failed (as he probably expected) to achieve 
its immediate ostensible purpose, he and other Scots free traders 
proposed the need for a permanent union which materialised in the 
Anti-Corn-Law League. The concept of the League as "bor.n in 
Manchester" has little substance. It was when the Scottish free 
traders, with notable exceptions like Weir himself, having tasted 
defeat frequently during the course of the decade, relinquished hope 
of attaining any meaningful progress on the issue without further 
parliamentary reform, and consequently failed to respond with 
enthusiasm to the League's appeals for further agitation and money 
that the latter felt obliged to respond to Weir's invitation to adopt 
an interventionist role in Scotland. The mission by Paulton and 
Shearman in 1839 was the first of repeated initiatives by the League 
Council to prod the Scottish free traders from their lethargy and to 
encourage them to undertake a sustained agitation. The complaints 
by Cobden and other English (and some Scottish) Leaguers about Scottish 
apathy until 1843 were legion and may not be summarily dismissed as 
mere national prejudice. From 1839-42, considerable pressure was 
required from the south to encourage the Scots to engage in wide-
sspread political education and fund-raising, and if the League Council 
did not intervene more directly to an even greater extent, this was due 
less to their faith in the unilateral activity and enthusiasm or the 
Scots and more to their experience during Paulton's mission of 1839 
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of the futility of attempting to rouse support by by-passing the 
local free trade "activists". From 1839, Scottish free traders 
looked increasingly to Manchester for leadership, but it was a 
crown which the latter accepted with some reluctance. The League 
Council was sensitive to criticism that the "National" Anti-Corn-
Law League was merely a Manchester (or at best Lancashire) movement, 
and made repeated requests to. Glasgow to take a more prominent, if 
not an equal, role in order to rebuke protectionist allegations. 
The increasing identification of the League with Manchester was a 
product of the events after its formation rather than before then. 
The concept of a "Manchester League" must be qualified further, 
in several respects. In the first place, Scottish financial resources 
for the free trade agitation were directed into the central coffers 
of the League, and although Cobden and other English Leaguers 
lamented with jaundiced eyes the failure of the movement in Scotland 
to provide a larger proportion of the total, the amounts remitted 
from most Scottish urban communities after 1842 compared not unfavourably 
with the a ums raised by English communi ties of a similar size and 
economic composition, with the exception of Manchester which was in 
some respects in an economic and social league of its own. Moreover, 
individual Scottish free traders, such as Sidney Smith or Archibald 
Prentice (a Mancunian by adoption) played conspicuous roles in the 
movement in England. Free Traders in Scotland too played, as far 
as distance would permit, a prominent role in the councils or the 
League, particularly McLaren who emerged as the principal confidant 
of Cobden and Bright in Scotland, but also others including George 
Hope of Fenton Barns and John Wigham. There was a two-way transmission 
of ideas and resources, and Scotland was not the only recipient. 
Above all, the concept must be qualified insofar as the League's 
success - like that of previous agitations - dependad ultimately 
on local initiative and leadership. The roots of the agitation 
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sprang from individual localities and the interest groups represented 
therein, and the strength of the demonstration in favour of repeal 
rested on their enthusiasm and.activity. Where these were sub-
:stantially absent, as in Aberdeen, the arguments of Cobden and the 
oratorical powers of Bright, made little impact. In this context, 
the role of McLaren can be readily exaggerated. He was primarily 
a local lieutenant rather than a Scottish national leader of the 
movement. With the exception of his role in the Edinburgh Dis-
:senting Conference, the importance of which in rallying the Dis-
ISenters was circumscribed as most of them already adhered to the 
cause, his principal function in the movement in Scotland was as an 
effective fund-raiser and propagandist in the metropolis. Moreover, 
it was a role Which he only fulfilled to any considerable extent from 
1841. The spadework required to launch the League in Scotland was 
primarily undertaken by William Weir, and in Edinburgh by John Wigham. 
In another respect too, the concept of a Manchester League must 
be modified. The aims of the free traders in Scotland were less 
well-defined than those of the movement south of the Border. In the 
first instance, the Scottish free traders were unprepared to place the 
agitation on the exclusive basis of Corn Law repeal, but emphasised 
other free trade objectives too, particularly the need for the abolition 
of the sugar, coffee, and timber monopolies. Although this led to a 
rupture only in 1841 between the movement in Scotland and in the south, 
\ 
it was a difference in emphasis which remained throughout its 
existence. Secondly, some of the more Whiggish Leaguers in parts 
of Scotland were prepared at certain junctures to contemplate the 
possibilit.y of a modification of the aim of the agitation in the 
name of expediency, notably in 1839 and 1841. Thirdly, the free 
trade movement in Scotland had since before the inception of the 
League been an integral part o~ the movement for general reforms 
it had not been isolated from it. The failure of Parliament to 
legislate to secure minimum wages for Scottish operatives in 1812 
in contrast to their enthusiasm for legislation to maintain food 
prices had converted free traders in 1815 into Radicals in 1819-20, 
and this pattern was repeated whenever the movement for practical 
reform such as free trade seemed to reach an impasse within the 
pale of the existing constitutional system. The same frustration 
furnished part of the motivation for the Reform Bill agitation of 
1831-32, and the emergence of the Chartist movement in Scotland in 
the latter half of the 1830's. Even after the League's formation, 
it remained an inherent characteristic of the movement in Scotland. 
In 1839, Glasgow Anti-Corn-Law Association adhered to the League 
subject to the reservation that .the former retained the right to 
urge organic constitutional change too, and when the League was in 
the doldrums in 1842, the same reaction was widespread in Scotland, 
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in contrast to the English reaction in favour of industrial and fiscal 
sanctions. The adherence of some Scottish free traders to the Complete 
Suffrage Union in 1844 was a repetition of the same reaction, which 
would have been more widespread if the League had not appeared to be 
making substantial progress in Scotland by that time. However, the 
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willingness of the movement in Scotland was not attributable to a 
peculiarly strong contingent of Radicals in its ranks. They were 
of course present, but the demand for political reform from the 
movement became serious only when the manufacturing interests deter-
:mined that it was necessary to advance the cause of free trade. 
When the latter was making headway, it was quickly dropped, and no 
less quickly than after the final success of the League in 1846. 
The thesis that Scotland was peculiarly fertile ground for the 
Anti-Corn-Law League and for free trade was advanced frequently by 
free traders at the time, and has been echoed by modern scholars, 
but it is easy to exaggerate the truth of this assumption. If 
this proposition had been as valid as sometimes claimed, it would 
not have been necessary for the League to engage in such an inter-
:ventionist role north of the Eorder, and to display such anxiety 
that it could not stimulate more effort in Scotland. Nevertheless, 
the environment in which the League operated in Scotland was not an 
exact replica of the situation in the south, and this factor deter-
:mined not only the composition of the interest groups for and 
against repeal, but also to some degree the nature of the argument. 
The foundation for the League's claim that Scotland was favourable 
to free trade rested on the foundation - an apparently effective 
litmus test of Scottish sentiment - of Scotland's parliamentary 
representation. A disproportionately high number of the parlia-
:mentary lobby for Villiers' successive motions represented Scottish 
constituencies, and relatively few Tory Members were returned from 
north of the Border to vote the other way. However, Villiers 1 
motions were sufficiently broadly-based in their phraseology, as some 
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Scots radicals observed (above), to constitute little guidance if 
any on their supporters' sympathy for the aim of the League - total 
and immediate repeal. Many of the Scots, inside and outside Parlia-
sment who supported Villiers' annual motions for an enquiry into the 
Corn Laws were committed in sentiment to a more modified aim, parti-
scularly a moderate fixed duty. Only a handful of Radical Members 
from Scotland supported the League's aim, and as individuals, they 
carried little weight. Whiggish Scotland was clearly sympathetic 
to an alteration of the existing legislation, to "free trade" in a 
qualified form, with perhaps total repeal as a distant objective, 
but the volume of support for the League's unqualified and exclusive 
aim was severely circumscribed. Even some of the League's own 
declared adherents in Scotland expressed at different junctures, 
reservations on the principle or expediency of going the whole way. 
The League's strength in Scotland was drawn, as in the south, 
primarily from the urban middle-classes. The manufacturers, parti-
scularly in export trades or those penalised by import duties on raw 
materials, such as the cotton industry in Glasgow, the linen industry 
in Dundee, or the publishing trade in Edinburgh, saw potential economic 
advantages in free trade if applied as a universal principle. Unlike 
England, the shipowners in Scotland frequently played an important 
role in the movement, especially in the east of Scotland, where the 
prospect of a boom in the grain, fish export, and Baltic timber trades 
seemed likely to outweigh a:ny disadvantage which might follow the 
application of free trade principles to the navigation laws. The 
"direct" urban interests were S'.lpported by the substantial number of 
adherents from the·professional and merchant classes who felt an 
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indirect interest in the prosperity of industry and commerce, and who 
looked to the economic philos9phy of free trade as the most likely 
means to secure it. However, substantial economic interests even 
in urban society were weighted against the League, especially in 
Glasgow which unlike Manchester had to contend with the West Indian 
Sugar, East Indian, and Canadian Timber monopolies and their rami-
afications throughout society ~ithin its own precinct. Moreover, 
in most other Scottish towns, protectionist minorities of varying 
strength, but of some consequence in Edinburgh and Aberdeen in parti-
:cular, identified the national weal with the prosperity of agri-
:culture and the landed interest and their purchasing power in their 
own communi ties, and shared the alarm of the rural areas at the 
dangers allegedly inherent in repeal. 
In rural Scotland, with the exception of Shetland where a sub-
asistence agricultural community dependent on imported food and 
commercial fishing made the League's economic arguments peculiarly 
potent, the free trade movement had no economic case. The pastoral 
bias of agrarian industry in large areas of Scotland served to rally 
the grazing interest behind some of the eighteenth century anti-corn-
bill demonstrations, but when the movement for free trade principles 
emerged, threatening the protection for livestock, timber, fish, and 
marginal arable production of cereals, which the north enjoyed, they 
(like the urban protectionist interests in Glasgow) rapidly jumped to 
the defence of the protection of corn from fear of the domino principle. 
Indeed, because of the widespread prevalence of marginal lands, the 
substantial investment of capital in improving them (and others), and 
the frequency of long leases with rents assessed in the anticipation 
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of high cereal prices, Scottish agriculturists felt a peculiarly 
strong economic threat from the principles of free trade. Only, 
among some of the larger tenant farmers in the cereal-producing 
Lothians, where corn rents were widespread, and which with the size 
of their establishments cushioned them to some extent against the 
potential hazards of repeal, were a few voices raised in favour of 
the League, but as with the larger proprietors who felt similarly 
secure, their motivation was not economic, but political. 
Political considerations, contradictory in aim, whipped up 
considerable support for the League in a country with a widespread 
commitment to at least some progress towards reform. The middle-
class Radicals, as in England, played a prominent role accepting Corn 
Law repeal not merely as a desirable end in itself, but also as a 
stick with which to beat the landed interest, and insofar as the 
movement met with frustration, as an opportunity to demonstrate the 
need for further organic constitutional changes. However, in this 
context, the attitude of the Chartists and working-classes in 
Scotland towards the League has been misinterpreted by some scholars. 
Despite the sympathy of the Chartists and working-classes for repeal 
/ 
of the Corn Laws - few in Scotland followed 0 1 Co~r into protectionist 
notions - their attitude to the League from tactical motives was 
negative. The Chartists were only marginally less disruptive than 
in the south, and the thesis that there was a lack of communication 
between the Chartist leaders in Scotland and the Scottish working-
classes is untenable1 the latter gave practically no active support 
to the League other than signatures to petitions organised by the 
middle-classes or attendance at meetings in some localities similarly 
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organised. They took no initiative on their own account until 1845, 
when the prospect of repeal and high food prices both loomed large on 
the horizon, but their participation at that stage (and in previous 
anti-corn-law agitations) underlined the unacceptability of merely 
attributing their abstention to the inappropriate complexion of the 
League as a vehicle for working-class demonstration. On the other 
hand, the absence of active ul~ra-radical participation in the free 
trade movement in Scotland was increasingly compensated for by the 
attraction of "conservative" reformers to the ranks of the League. 
The Scottish evidence underlines the importance of "conservatives" 
as well as radicals in the League's success. Without the adherence 
of those, such as Buccleuch or Chalmers, who were prepared to support 
repeal not from a belief in its intrinsic merits, but as a sacrifice 
necessary to prevent a more revolutionary one, the League would not 
have gained its point in 1846. Almost all the leading landed pro-
aprietors in Scotland fell into this category, and their influence 
rather than their numbers was important to the success of Peel's 
proposals. 
Appeals to religious sectarianism, religious and moralistic 
idealism, and the social conscienc~ invariably found fertile soil in 
Scotland, and in this respect, the League was no exception. To the 
Dissenters, the issue presented an opportunity to attack the financial 
basis of the Established Church - one of the central points of debate 
in the Voluntary Controversy anyway - on the eve of the Disruption. 
The Dissenters clearly seized this weapon before 1842, and McLaren's 
Edinburgh Conference was a reflection rather than a cause of their 
sentiment. Only the adherence of the Free Church at the outset to 
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the Establishment principle frustrated the attempts of the League to 
enlist the latter as a further active interest group in the cause. 
As in England, there were few exceptions to the rule that the Established 
Church clergy declined to participate in the free trade movement, 
although their support for the protectionist standpoint was on an 
individual, not a corporate basis. The crisis in ecclesiastical 
politics in Scotland, furnished the League with a different environ-
:ment north of the Border, but the League's appeal was not based ex-
:clusively on religious politics. The free traders' selected biblical 
quotations in support of the thesis that protection for corn offended 
the Supreme Deit,y struck a responsive chord in Scottish minds. More-
:over, on the moral front, the League appealed to many as the cause of 
the poor, sentenced to perpetual poverty for the sake of an affluent 
aristocracy - a natural sequel to the moral crusades which had already 
attracted many free traders into the anti-slavery and temperance 
movements, even where these involved conflicting ideals and crises for 
the middle-class conscience. The Corn Laws could be portrayed as the 
root of many, if not all, evils, and attachment to peculiarly Scottish 
social values - notably the value of working-class education, Church 
attendance, and independence of poor relief - with an appeal beyond 
the restricted confines of the middle-classes, was reflected in the 
polemics of the debate north of the Tweed. On the other hand, the 
protectionist cause did not lack a moral-political appeal too. The 
social problems of an emergent industrial society in Lanarkshire 
merely convinced Alison of the desirability of conserving the existing 
economic complexion of the state, especially the economic importance of 
agriculture, and the political importance of the landed interest, in 
order to preclude a further erosion of moral and social values. 
A monopoly of the social conscience did not rest with the League. 
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If the origins of the free trade movement as an extraparliamentary 
association, its adherents and their attitudes, reflected to some 
extent the fact that it functioned within a different environment 
in Scotland, this was equally true of the League's intrusion into 
parliamentary politics. As in its propagandist activities, the 
League was not the first agitation to put pressure on Scottish parlia-
:mentary representatives. Issues as well as interests played a role 
in the relationship between Members and their constituents in the late 
eighteenth century, and by 1826, the former could be acutely embar-
:rassed if their views on the Corn Laws did not coincide with those 
of the electors, especially during an election. The conservative 
complexion of the Reform Act of 1832, even in Scotland, ensured that 
Radical expectations of acceptable "popular" views on the Corn Laws 
from Scotland's parliamentary representation would not be realised, 
and the free trade cause was one of the issues which drove increasingly 
a wedge between the different wings of the Reform interest. Increasingly 
too, the Radicals endeavoured to apply electoral sanctions to either 
return advanced liberals to Parliament or blackmail those of a con-
sservative hue into adopting a more radical line. The League's inter-
:ventionist role was a continuation of this trend by a more broadly-
based and more effectively organised pressure group. Its relative 
lack of success, notably in the Falkirk Burghs constituency, even on 
the eve of repeal, was evidence of the severely circumscribed progress 
whiCh the politics of ideology, as distinct from those or interest, had 
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made even in a radical urban seat, sixteen years after the Reform Act, 
although the small tory majority indicated some advance in that direc-
:tion. 
One of the principal differences between the League's activities 
in Scotland and England was in the field of registration of electors. 
The apathy of the Scots free traders, partly attributable to the 
greater financial hurdles imposed by the Scottish Reform Act, was a 
continuous source of concern to Cobd.en and the League. In this 
context, as in the other aspects of the movement's activities and 
strength in Scotland, too much credence has been atta.ched to its propa-
:gandist image with its assumption that Scotland was almost a solid 
phalanx for free trade. Moreover, in the field of political and elec-
:toral pressure on parliamentary aspirants, the activities of the free 
traders were parallelled by those of the protectionists. Despite this 
pressure from both sides, however, it would be easy to exaggerate the 
difficulties of the Whigs. Only in exceptional circumstances, notably 
when a leading interest in county politics was persuaded to desert 
their ranks, such as Roxburgh in 1841, did they lose a seat, a loss of 
support which was probably at least counterbalanced by the appeal of 
free trade (even in a modified form) in urban areas. The power base 
of a Member of Parliament was below. Consequently, this ensured 
that their views were in general in line with sufficient of their 
constituents to preclude the possibility of rejection. 
The point that political movements in Britain operated to some 
extent within different economic, social, and political environments 
wa.s reiterated in the history of the Corn Laws and of the leaguers 
after 1846. A rearguard action in defence of protection for corn 
was fought in the Highlands from 1847-57 to the embarrassment of the 
(5) 
Liberal Member for Roes-shire, James Matheson of Achany. If the 
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Corn Laws took an uncommonly long time to die in Scotland, the 
demise of the communion of spirit in the League was more rapid and 
complete. When Cobden attempted to rally the Scots free traders 
of 1846 behind his peace movement of the 1850's, he foUQd little 
response, and felt compelled to concede that in no part of Britain 
(6) 
had the movement fewer partisans than in Scotland. Nevertheless, 
although the contribution of Scotland to the growth of the free 
trade movement has. been unrecognised, an accurate assessment of the 
League may not permit the continued exaggeration of differences 
between the movement on both sides of the Border which were minimal. 
Like most political movements of the nineteenth century, the free 
trade agitations constituted a British movement within a distinct 
environment north of the Border, and the analysis of its activities 
and support in Scotland emphasises the importance of locality as well 
as region in shaping its composition and character. 
5) See Munro of Allan Muniments. GD. 73/333. and Seaforth Muniments. 
GD. 46/4/178-180. 
6) Copy R. Cobden to D. McLaren, Bognor, 19/9/1853 in W.S.R.O. 
Cobden Papers. 29. 
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